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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to the research 
Anti-competitive or anti-trust activities affect the economy as a whole. By diminish-
ing market competition they cause losses to competitors, who suffer lost business 
opportunities and market share, and damage to consumers who are harmed by higher 
prices. As such, anti-competitive practises can also have the effect of reducing prod-
uct diversity and quality. The EU Commission and national competition authorities 
may start investigations in to alleged anti-competitive practises, and impose public 
law sanctions if breaches of anti-trust provisions are proven. Although fines may 
involve large amounts of money, they do not compensate for private losses incurred 
by victims. The redress of such losses falls within the domain of tort law, and the 
only possibility for individuals and companies to obtain compensation is to bring an 
action for damages before national civil courts.  
An effective system of antitrust damage actions is to the benefit of those who 
have suffered damages (be it the consumers or other economic actors) since it pro-
vides a realistic possibility of receiving compensation. According to the EU Commis-
sion, a more effective system would not only be beneficial for potential claimants, but 
also for the functioning of the internal market and the competitiveness of the Euro-
pean economy. It can be reasonably expected that better private enforcement would 
lead to a higher level of compliance with the competition rules.1 The threat of having 
to pay damages for the harm caused by an infringement of competition rules operates 
as a powerful deterrent for companies, who might otherwise engage in violations of 
competition law, and consequently increases the effectiveness of EU law. As the old 
saying goes, “prevention is better than cure”, and if the law is not violated, no one is 
harmed and no compensation is required. With the possibility of increased deterrence 
and fair market competition in mind, great emphasis has been laid on the goal of an 
effective system of antitrust damage actions in Europe. 
In spite of the EU Commission’s efforts to enforce competition law by means of 
damage actions in the Member States, to date actions for damages have been limited 
in Europe. This is in stark contrast to the United States, where the actions for anti-
trust damages have been at the core of the antitrust law since its inception. The exist-
ing system of private enforcement in Europe not only limits the victim’s ability to 
obtain redress but it also jeopardises the effectiveness of EU competition law. Per-
sons and companies victimised by anti-competitive behaviour face an uphill battle in 
overcoming a large number of barriers created by national law that applies to damage 
actions. 
The aim of this research is to identify barriers to antitrust damages claims in Eng-
land and Slovenia, and determine if private law can be used for effective enforcement 
                                                        
1  Speech by J. Almunia, European Commissioner for Competition matters, of 12 May 2010. Available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-233_en.htm (last consulted on 15 May 2013). 
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of EU competition law. In this context it can be argued that private law can be used 
for effective antitrust enforcement, provided that any new measures introduced – in 
order to increase effectiveness of the EU competition law – respect the existing legal 
structure and are consistent (as far as possible) with the core features of national pri-
vate law systems. The research in this thesis will contribute to a better insight into the 
barriers that exist for victims seeking redress. 
The first part of the thesis (comprising Chapters 2, 3 and 4) will address the pri-
vate enforcement of EU competition rules at the European level. The second part of 
the thesis (which includes Chapters 5, 6 and 7) is used to explore the private enforce-
ment of EU competition rules within the private law systems of two Member States. 
In particular, the EU Commission’s initiatives are analysed from the perspective of 
English and Slovenian national civil law systems. 
1.2 Research problem 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in finding ways to facilitate damage 
actions before national civil courts. The process began with one of the most exten-
sive projects on damages actions ever undertaken by the EU Commission in the field 
of competition law. By virtue of the findings in the Ashurst Report,2 the EU Com-
mission in 2005 published the Green Paper3 aimed at identifying legal and procedural 
obstacles that antitrust victims often face when attempting to obtain compensation in 
the Member States, and it also aimed to foster and further focus ongoing discussions 
for the creation of an effective private enforcement system in Europe. Following the 
consultation on the Green Paper, in its 2008 White Paper4 the EU Commission put 
forward several policy suggestions and specific measures for further consideration 
and discussion before an actual proposal for EU action could be made. It was, and to 
this day remains, the view of the EU Commission that private enforcement should 
play a significant role in the enforcement system of EU competition rules. Notwith-
standing the consensus with regard to the use of private law (in EU Member States) 
to enforce EU competition law and the policy choices that have been put forward to 
achieve this goal, national private law systems might not always be best suited for this 
task.  
Not every issue described in the White Paper as an obstacle to antitrust damage 
actions created by private law is a ‘real’ obstacle, since existing mechanisms in private 
law can be used just as effectively to deal with the relevant issues. EU-level interven-
tion is not required for these specific sets of obstacles, even though it is important 
from an enforcement perspective. Consequently, these sets of obstacles identified by 
the EU Commission are redundant from a private law perspective.  
                                                        
2  Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, 
comparative report, Ashurst, August 2004. 
3  Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2005) 672, 
19.12.2005. 
4  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, 2.4.2008. 
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With regard to the remaining set of obstacles outlined in the White Paper, the 
question that needs to be addressed is whether these issues can be adequately over-
come by amendments to private law without adversely affecting the existing legal sys-
tems of the Member States. If not, the reasons for EU intervention in private law 
should be justified. Only measures that provide good counterbalance between the in-
terests of European law and the interests of private law should be upheld. Conse-
quently, private law should not be used as a tool in addressing those obstacles that 
require changes to national laws; changes that are not well balanced and go against 
the core principles of private law. 
Against this backdrop a number of related questions can be raised. For instance, 
which legal issues have to be overcome to achieve effective enforcement of the EU 
competition rules? What are the legal obstacles that prevent victims of anti-com-
petitive behaviour from going to the court, and what are the obstacles faced by na-
tional civil judges in granting damages for breach of EU antitrust rules? All such 
questions in addition to relevant issues and considerations will be investigated. How-
ever, the question of fundamental importance is which national rules of civil law dis-
courage companies and persons from starting civil law suits based on infringements 
on EU competition law. 
1.3 Methods of research 
The focus of this research is on private enforcement of EU competition law, in par-
ticular on identifying obstacles that reduce its efficacy and efficiency. All relevant 
issues will be explored from several different perspectives. 
Legal analysis of legislation, case law and documents will be carried out. It goes 
without saying that this analysis concerns the relevant European Union law sources.  
Additionally, a comparative analysis of two national civil law systems will be used to 
compare the legal rules of two different legal systems. In this thesis, the comparative 
analysis will also serve as a tool for identifying obstacles to EU competition law en-
forcement by private law and finding solutions to the problem. The study will focus 
mainly on the relationship between national private law and EU competition rules, 
and will only briefly touch upon the interplay between private law and national com-
petition law, as European competition law (and not national competition legislation) 
is at the core of the White Paper. 
Furthermore, it is beyond the scope of this thesis research to provide a complete 
overview of the situation in EU. Given the aim of this research and owing to the 
constraints of time, no attempt has been made to describe, analyse and compare 
twenty-eight different legal systems (the domestic legal systems of each of 28 the 
Member States). Instead, the focus will be on the legal systems of two Member 
States, one of which has been a Member of the EU for a long time and a state that 
became member in one of the recent waves of EU expansion. By exploring these two 
national systems of civil law, this research will be used to highlight issues relevant to 
these two member states, and provide an accurate picture of private enforcement at 
national level.  
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The first system that will be examined is the civil law regime of the United King-
dom. Within Europe, the UK5 has probably one of the most developed jurisdictions 
of competition law. Furthermore, following the policy of the EU Commission, a 
number of changes to the competition regime in the UK have already been designed 
to facilitate private party actions for damages in the field of EU competition law. One 
of the most significant developments was the creation of a specialised court, the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal,6 which, inter alia, can hear actions for damages where 
an infringement of competition law has been established by a prior decision of the 
English competition authority or the EU Commission.7 This and other changes un-
doubtedly bolster the position of claimants and constitute the structural and legal 
elements for effective private actions in competition law.  
There is an additional reason for choosing to examine the legal system of the 
UK. As a part of the common law system, it has developed some concepts which are 
pursued as basic in most Anglo-Saxon Common Law regimes, but less accepted, or 
even unknown, in the continental law tradition. In particular, the disclosure rules in 
the UK are more extensive than those available in other European countries where 
disclosure is often severely restricted or non-existent. This research will assess wheth-
er existing English legal provisions in fact are sufficient to ensure effective private en-
forcement of EU antitrust law, and highlight the areas where the English law still re-
quires fine tuning for effective private enforcement of EU antitrust law. 
The second country which is the subject of this thesis is Slovenia, one of the 
newer Member States from Eastern Europe. The Slovenian legal system differs from 
the English legal system not only in terms of civil litigation, but also in terms of how 
its competition law has developed. Slovenia shares a common past with other Eastern 
European countries, which are characterised by the rise of Communism after the 
Second World War and the shift towards democracy and free enterprise since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In general, competition law has developed in Slovenia only 
during the last decade. The Slovenian economy has undergone tremendous changes, 
characterised by the transition from a socialist structure to the European common 
market economy. Since the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
trend away from controlled economies has been accompanied by widespread adop-
tion of competition laws, particularly along the style of those in the European Union. 
Although changes in the economic system have led to a number of reforms, including 
those in the market and regulatory environments and the development of competi-
tion law regimes in the new Member States, several challenges still remain. Due to a 
variety of structural weaknesses and varying perceptions of competition law among 
businesses, enforcement of competition law still needs to be developed. It is, there-
                                                        
5  While similar legal principles apply throughout the UK, different procedural rules might apply de-
pending on whether proceedings are brought before the courts in England & Wales, Scotland or 
Northern Ireland. For the purpose of this research, the focus is primarily on the position in the Eng-
lish courts.  
6  Alternatively, it is possible to start an action in the English High Court.  
7  Section 47A of the 1998 Act (inserted by section 18 of the Enterprise Act) provides for the possibil-
ity of claims for damages or other sum of money to be made in the Tribunal by persons who have 
suffered loss or damage as a result of the infringement of the Chapter I or II of Competition Act 
1998 or Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
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fore, important to understand the circumstances limiting the effectiveness of private 
enforcement of the EU competition rules in one of the newer Member States such as 
Slovenia. This research will be used to assess whether private enforcement of EU 
antitrust law is possible on the basis of currently applicable legal rules. The research 
will also be used to pinpoint areas where Slovenian law needs to be changed in order 
to ensure private enforcement of antitrust law in Slovenia. 
To distinguish the legal issues to be dealt with in this thesis, the White Paper will 
serve as the point of departure. It is true that the policy suggestions set out in the 
White Paper are not final. As a long-term policy document it is used to set out a cer-
tain number of policy choices so that they can be examined and discussed further 
before an actual proposal for EU action is put forward. Nevertheless, one must not 
disregard the fact that in the White Paper on damages actions the EU Commission 
identified eight specific legal issues or obstacles that are relevant in the context of 
competition litigation based on EU law. Apparently, these issues were considered as 
important starting points for addressing the current ineffectiveness of antitrust dam-
ages actions in the EU, and for this reason the White Paper will serve as a point of 
reference in identifying issues of private enforcement. The White Paper will be con-
sidered as the starting point for this research, even though some of the EU Commis-
sion proposals are highly controversial and EU action with regard to them is unlikely 
at this stage. 
The scope of the research of this thesis is limited in two different aspects. First, 
as the research aims to identify obstacles for private enforcement of EU competition 
law and to analyse whether private law is an appropriate tool to overcome the obsta-
cles, the issue of discoverability of leniency documents is outside the scope of the re-
search. The issue of leniency8 will be addressed in the first part as a part of EU Com-
mission’s proposals, but it will not be discussed again, either when examining national 
law or in the overall discussion. Leniency is regarded as a matter belonging to the 
sphere of public law. In the context of private antitrust damage actions, leniency pro-
grammes raise a broader question of the relationship between private and public en-
forcement, which falls outside the scope of the thesis research. As such examination 
of the issue of leniency does not add anything to answering the question whether pri-
vate law is an appropriate tool for enforcement of competition law.  
Second, due to time limitations, the research will take into account developments 
up to January 2013. It will also pay attention to important developments after January 
but will not discuss them in great detail. Therefore, while an important document, the 
proposed Directive regarding competition damages claims9 will only be touched 
upon and not discussed in great detail in this study. The draft Directive is the result 
of a long process that was initiated by the EU Commission almost a decade ago to 
encourage claimants to bring civil claims before national courts in antitrust cases. Al-
                                                        
8  The term ‘leniency’ refers to immunity as well as a reduction of any fine which would otherwise have 
been imposed on a participant in a cartel, in exchange for the voluntary disclosure of information 
regarding the cartel which satisfies specific criteria. 
9  Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 (11. june 2013). 
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though the draft directive follows the Green and White Papers and is the first move 
in the EU’s usual legislative procedure, in reality the proposal is only one step in the 
long and difficult path towards legislative measures aimed at facilitating private en-
forcement of EU competition law. The proposed Directive will now be sent to the 
European Parliament and EU Council where it will be decided whether the legislation 
is adopted or shelved. Since a number of the proposals in the draft Directive are con-
troversial a vigorous debate is likely to ensue and amendments are almost unavoida-
ble. In other words, not only is there no guarantee that the proposed Directive will 
ever be adopted in its current form, but it is very uncertain whether it will be adopted 
at all, even in an amended form. It is fair to say the status of the proposal of the draft 
Directive is highly uncertain and as such, no proposals in it can be considered as a 
foregone conclusion.  
1.4 Outline of the Research 
The thesis consists of two parts. The first part (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) provides the 
background for the rest of the thesis and builds the case for an effective system of 
private enforcement of EU competition law. The second part of the thesis (Chapters 
5 and 6) is then dedicated to the examination of the national legal rules that are appli-
cable to antitrust damage actions.  
The chapter 2, which follows this introduction, discusses the theoretical basis for 
the private enforcement of EU competition law and the developments that have 
taken place with regard to this matter. Chapter 2 looks at the position of competition 
policy in the TFEU and the objectives of this policy. Moreover, analysis of the EU 
antitrust enforcement system, which includes public and private enforcement mecha-
nisms, is also discussed. 
In order to get a complete overview of the private enforcement system of EU 
competition law, it is essential to explore the basic rules and doctrines governing the 
relationship between EU and national law. Hence, Chapter 3 will give a general intro-
duction into the relationship between EU and national law in the sphere of claims 
brought to protect EU rights. Moreover, it will look at the developments of the most 
important case law of the European Court of Justice in the area of private antitrust 
enforcement, in particular the well-known cases of Courage and Manfredi.10 
Chapter 4 will set out and analyse the policy choices and specific measures pre-
sented by the EU Commission in the White Paper. The EU Commission believed 
that these measures would contribute to the improvement of the existing antitrust 
enforcement system. The aim of these measures was to stimulate effective redress 
and compliance with EU competition law.  
After chapters 2, 3 and 4, in which the discussion centres on the European point 
of view, the focus in chapters 5 and 6 moves towards a national perspective. Chapter 
5 looks at the state of private enforcement in England and the possibility for its fur-
                                                        
10  Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297, and Joined Cases C-î0Dn-
fredi, [2006] ECR I-6619. 
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ther development by changing the national tort and civil procedural rules. To further 
analyse the ramifications of doing so, the EU Commission’s initiatives are presented 
from the perspective of UK private law. Chapter 6 will examine the same questions in 
the framework of the Slovenian legal system. 
Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary and the final conclusions of the research. 
It gives a list of recommendations that should be addressed by the EU in future. The 
list of recommendations is arrived at by classifying the measures proposed by the EU 
Commission in the White Paper into three groups, and analysing each of the issues in 
that group. The first group of the proposed measures involves actions that are con-
sistent with private law, but their introduction into national law appears to be unnec-
essary. The second group will include measures that are neither desirable nor appro-
priate (‘no go area‘). The third group consists of measures that might be inconsistent 
with the rules of national private law, but there are well-founded reasons to interfere 
with these rules. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Basis and Recent Developments in the Area of 
Private Enforcement 
 
 
 
To better understand the importance antitrust enforcement through damage actions 
have within the European Union (hereafter ‘EU’) framework, it is necessary to ex-
plore some basic issues related to the process of EU antitrust enforcement. The first 
section will consider the role competition policy plays in the EU. To this effect, the 
EU competition provisions, changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty and the competi-
tion goals pursued by EU competition policy will be analysed. The second section 
will be devoted to the system of antitrust law enforcement, in particular the relation 
between private and public enforcement mechanisms: private and public enforcement 
systems, which differ in their nature and function, will be discussed. 
The third and fourth sections will be dedicated to introducing the extent of pri-
vate enforcement in EU competition law. In theory, private enforcement of antitrust 
laws has been possible since the 1957 Treaty of Rome. However, until the adoption 
of Regulation 1/2003, violations of Article 101 TFEU (prohibition of cartels) and 
Article 102 TFEU (prohibition of abuse of dominant position) have been dealt with 
almost exclusively by public enforcement. The third section explains the main rea-
sons for the lack of private enforcement in practice. The fourth section will analyse 
the changes in the competition enforcement system brought by the adoption of 
Regulation 1/2003. More specifically, it addresses the question as to how the provi-
sions of the new Regulation facilitate parties bringing direct civil action for damages 
for infringement of EU competition rules. 
2.1 Substantive background 
Competition issues have been at the forefront of the EU since its inception. When on 
9th May, 1950, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, presented 
the well-known Schuman declaration a new concept of European integration was 
launched. The declaration introduced the idea of the establishment of a single internal 
market with free movement of goods and services throughout the EU.1 To achieve 
this, it was necessary to ensure competition within the EU is not restricted or dis-
torted. 
                                                        
1  L. Warlouzet, The Rise of European Competition policy, 1950 – 1991: a cross-disciplinary survey of a contested 
policy sphere, EUI working papers (2010), European University Institute, Florence. Available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/14694/RSCAS_2010_80.pdf (last consulted on 12 
April 2012). 
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2.1.1 Substantive EU competition provisions – Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
‘Competition law,’ or ‘antitrust’ as it is known in the United States (hereafter ‘US’),2 is 
one of the most important areas of EU law and one of the key pillars on which the 
European Union has been built. It regulates the exercise of market power by compa-
nies, governments and other economic entities in order to maintain a ‘balanced and 
fair competition’ throughout the Union.3 It remedies “some of the situations in 
which the free market system breaks down.”4 As such, competition law was regarded 
as an essential instrument in creating and maintaining a single European market. 
Unlike in other jurisdictions, competition law provisions are to be found in one 
of the most fundamental constitutional text of the Union, the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (hereafter ‘TFEU’),5 as amended by the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2007. The basic competition rules6 are provided by Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. Article 101(1) of the TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings, deci-
sions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices that might affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, re-
striction or distortion of competition within the European Union. Agreements that 
violate the cartel prohibition of Article 101 TFEU are void and unenforceable.7 As an 
exception to this rule, Article 101(3) TFEU provides that if the agreement, decision 
or concerted practices satisfies the cumulative requirements of Article 101(3) with 
regard to countervailing economic benefits, then it is not prohibited under Article 
101(1). More specifically, Article 101(1) TFEU does not apply if (i) restrictive agree-
ments contribute to improvement in the production or distribution of goods or to 
promotion of technical or economic progress; (ii) consumers receive a fair share of 
the resulting benefits; (iii) the restrictions are indispensable to the attainment of these 
objectives; (iv) the agreement affords the parties the possibility of eliminating compe-
tition in respect of a substantial part of the product(s) in question.8 The other Article 
î$UWLFOH7)(8î prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the common 
market in so far as it may restrain trade among the Member States. Before behaviour 
can be judged as amounting to an abuse, the company in question must be domi-
nant.9 Since Article 102 TFEU does not explicitly prohibit agreements, but focuses 
                                                        
2  The terms ‘competition law’ and ‘antitrust law’ in this thesis will be used interchangeably. 
3  The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C 115/47 preamble.  
4  S. Marco Colino, Competition Law of the EU and UK (2011) 7th edition, Oxford University Press, p. 1. 
5  Formerly known as the EC Treaty, the Treaty of Rome or the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. 
6  The framework of EU competition law policy is formed by Articles 101–109 TFEU. Further rules 
are provided by Council of the EU and EU Commission regulations (for more on the subject see A. 
Dashwood, M. Dougan, B. Rodger, E. Spaventa and D. Wyatt, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union 
Law (2011) 6th edition, Hart Publishing, Oxford, Part V. 
7  Article 101(2) TFEU. 
8  The four conditions are discussed at length in The Commission Notice – Guidelines on the applica-
tion of Article 101(3) TFEU [2004] OJ C101/97. 
9  ‘Dominant position’ referred to in Article 102 TFEU “relates to a position of economic strength en-
joyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the 
relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its com-
ĺ 
Theoretical Basis and Recent Developments 
11
 
on a wider range of conduct (in contrast to Article 101), it does not explicitly pre-
scribe the legal effects of agreements whereby the abuse of a dominant position is 
carried out. Nevertheless, it is commonly assumed that when Article 102 TFEU ap-
plies to agreements the effect of the provision is similar to that of Article 101(2) 
TFEU by analogy.10 
Both Articles – 101 and 102 TFEU – only apply to practices which have an ap-
preciable effect on cross-border trade within the European Union.11 When the in-
fringements do not affect trade between Member States, but are limited to a single 
Member State, then Articles 101 or 102 TFEU do not apply. In these cases, infringe-
ments will be considered under the relevant national rules.12 However, the CJEU 
recognised that application of EU competition rules does not preclude the applicabil-
ity national provisions of competition law. Member States may (in principle) apply 
their domestic competition rules also to offences that fall within the scope of both 
EU and national competition law.13 One of the concerns raised regarding mixed ap-
plication of national and EU competition rules relates to the risk of prosecution and 
sanction of the same anti-competitive practice by different competition authorities. In 
particular, under a system of parallel reviews, the risk of violation of the ne bis in idem 
principle (protection against double jeopardy, as provided for by Article 50 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 4 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR) arises. The 
CJEU ruled that when EU Commission and a national competition authority act on 
the same infringement, there were no problems of incompatibility with the principle 
of ne bis in idem (or the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence) as 
long as each authority applied a different law (EU competition rules and national 
competition rules), and the application of the national law does not imperil the full 
and uniform application of EU rules.14 In order to avoid or reduce conflicts when ap-
plying EU and national competition rules in parallel, many Member States have har-
monised their competition laws with EU law.15 
 
                                                        
petitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers” (Case No. 27/76, United Brands v. Commis-
sion, [1978] ECR 207). 
10  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law, Text Cases and Materials (2011) 4th edition, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 1200. 
11  On the territorial scope of the EU competition rules see: A. Dashwood, M. Dougan, B. Rodger, E. 
Spaventa and D. Wyatt, European Union Law (2011) 6th edition, Hart Publishing, Oxford, pp. 718– 
722. 
12  The effect on the inter-state trade criterion has been interpreted broadly by the EU authorities. See 
Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten & Grundig [1966] ECR 299, where the CJEU stated that the 
concept of ‘effect’ extended not only to direct effects but also to indirect and potential effects. Like-
wise, the concept of ‘trade’ is not confined to exchanges of goods and services across borders, but 
covers all cross-border economic activity (Case 172/80 Zuchner v Bayerische Vereinsbank AG 
[1981] ECR 2021, par. 18). 
13  Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartellamt, [1969] ECR 1. See also I. Van Bael and 
J.-F. Bellis, Competition law of the European Community (2010) 5th edition, Kluwer Law International, 
p. 968; A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law, Text Cases and Materials (2011) 4th edition, Ox-
ford University Press, p. 1163. 
14  Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartellamt, [1969] ECR 1, pars. 4 and 6. 
15  L. Ritter, W.D. Braun, European Competition Law: A Practitioner’s Guide (2004) 3rd edition, Kluwer Law 
International, p. 15. 
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2.1.2 Relevance of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU for private enforcement of EU 
competition rules 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are not only basic EU competition rules designed to pro-
tect undistorted competition within the internal market, but they are also central to 
the discussion on private enforcement of EU antitrust law for the following reasons. 
First, the provisions of the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have a horizontal direct effect 
– as it will be explained later16 – and consequently can be applied directly by a na-
tional judge.17 Second, in contrast to some other competition provisions (such as the 
rules on mergers), infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are most likely to re-
sult in damages for competitors and consumers. For example, a cartel agreement be-
tween undertakings to allocate market shares undermines the competition process 
and is prohibited by Article 101 TFEU. By undermining the competitive process, 
cartels may impose extra costs on (potential) competitors and consumers. In particu-
lar, competitors will bear extra costs because they will be prevented from competing 
effectively in the market or will be even forced to leave the market. Potential com-
petitors will suffer damage because they will be obstructed from entering the market. 
Consumers will face cost increases as a consequence of higher prices. 
An additional characteristic of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which offers a unique 
platform for discussion of antitrust private enforcement, is the fact that the Articles 
were meant to be constitutional and were conceived briefly and broadly in order to 
be given content in practice.18 General and open norms allow more flexibility in the 
orientation of their application. As it will be explained later,19 provisions of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU were intended to be implemented gradually, allowing them to 
evolve and be shaped by policy considerations. In other words, the wording of the 
prohibitions laid down in the Articles leaves ample room for the development of the 
rules according to the needs of the interests of the Union and of the Member States, 
reflecting the shifting balance of the power among European institutions and the 
Member States.20  
2.1.3 Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU competition law 
The Lisbon Treaty came into force on the 1st December 2009. It amended the Treaty 
on European Union (‘TEU’) and created a new Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (‘TFEU’). For the first time in the history of European integra-
tion,21 competition’s role in the structure of the Treaties was called into the question. 
It all started with the French delegation who attempted to abolish any reference to 
                                                        
16  See section 3.3.1. 
17  Article 6 of Regulation 1/2003. 
18  D. Gerber, Law and competition in twentieth century Europe, Protecting Promotheus (1998), Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, p. 347. 
19  See sections 2.3. and 2.4. 
20  D. Gerber, Law and competition in twentieth century Europe, Protecting Promotheus (1998), Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, p. 346. 
21  D. Ashiagbor, N. Countouris, I. Lianos (eds), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon (2012), 
Cambridge University Press, p. 255. 
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‘undistorted competition’ as an objective of the EU. Consequently, the old Article 
3(1)(g) – which aims at an establishment of a system ensuring competition in the 
internal market is not distorted and was often referred to in case law – has been re-
moved from the Treaty. The substantive content of the Article has been transferred 
to a protocol22 that states that “the internal market as set out in Article 3 TEU in-
cludes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted”. For the first time since 
1957 the competition phrase has been stripped from the EU’s core objectives.  
There has been a lively debate over whether or not the omission of the reference 
to ‘undistorted competition’ from the Treaty will have an impact on European com-
petition policy in future.23 While the French President at that time, Nicholas Sarkozy, 
declared “we have obtained a major reorientation of the Union’s objectives”,24 ac-
cording to some, including the high-level EU Commission officials, the removal of 
Article 3(1)(g) from the Treaty did not change much. At the time, Competition Com-
missioner Kroes noted that she was not worried by the decision to move the com-
mitment to ‘undistorted competition’ from the European Union’s reform Treaty into 
a Protocol.25 According to her, changes to the Treaty will not have significant impli-
cations for the EU’s free-market policy. The Protocol to the Treaty is a “legally bind-
ing confirmation that the system of undistorted competition is part of the internal 
market.” 26 She went further in her speech emphasising that putting it in Protocol 
No. 27 makes it clear that one cannot exist without the other. The Protocol is of 
equivalent status to the Treaty. In her words, “they have moved the furniture round, 
but the house is still there.”  
Although the legally binding nature of Protocol No. 27 was undisputed, several 
commentators feared that the replacement of Article 3(1)(g) EC, in substance by 
being down-graded to a protocol would affect the constitutional status of the compe-
tition rules within the EU legal order.27 In particular, there was a risk that the removal 
                                                        
22  Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition [2008] OJ C 115/309. The protocol is a 
compromise that the member States accepted for making competition not an objective of the 
Treaty. It was designed for two purposes, (i) to keep the focus on competition policy as a key part of 
the Union, and (ii) to ensure that the Union has legislative competence to use Article 352 TFEU (be-
fore Article 308 EC) to enact legislation in the field of competition (see: D. Chalmers, G. Davies and 
G. Monti, European Union Law; Cases and materials (2010) second edition, Cambridge University Press, 
p. 922). 
23  See, for example, L. Parret, Do we (still) know what we are protecting? The discussion on the objectives of the 
system of competition law from different perspectives (April 2009), Tilburg Law and Economics Center 
(‘TILEC’), Tilburg Law School. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com (last consulted on 2 May 2012). 
24  France’s hyperactive president, The Sarko show, The Economist, June 28, 2007. Available at http:// 
www.economist.com (last consulted on 2 May 2012). 
25  The Protocol on the Internal Market and Competition (Protocol No 27) provides that “the internal 
market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes a system ensuring that 
competition is not distorted” and that the Union shall, if necessary, take action under the provisions 
of the Treaties, including under Article 352 TFEU to ensure that the Internal Market includes a sys-
tems of undistorted competition. 
26  See speech by N. Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition matters, of 26 June 2007. Avail-
able at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-425_en.htm?locale=en (last consulted on 
2 May 2012). 
27  A. Riley, The EU Reform Treaty and the Competition Protocol: Undermining EC Competition Law (September 
2007), Centre for European Policy Studies. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/7535/1/142.pdf (last 
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might have an impact on the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’), the 
EU Commission and the national competition authorities (‘NCAs’) in their fight 
against anti-competitive practices. When deciding on a case for example, the CJEU 
frequently refers to EU objectives. It does not just look at the substantive articles of 
the Treaty, such as for example Article 101 TFEU, which sets out the prohibition 
against price-fixing, but it also considers the interpretative provisions (old Articles 2 
and 3 EC). Having a powerful interpretative effect, the interpretative provisions help 
the judge to determine the true scope of the more substantive and practical articles.28 
Thus, there was a fear that the Protocol, although binding, might not have the same 
interpretative value as the text of the first few articles of the Treaty.29 Without a ref-
erence to ‘undistorted competition’ in the interpretative provisions, non-competition 
objectives, which are now listed in the key interpretative articles such as ‘full em-
ployment’ and ‘social progress’, could more easily prevail. While ‘full employment’ 
and ‘social progress’ would remain ‘objectives’ in the EU’s new legal foundation, 
‘undistorted competition’ would be downgraded to an ‘activity’. This means that 
whenever there was a trade-off with industrial policy, competition might have lower 
priority.  
The recent case law of the CJEU allays the fear that the removal of the principle 
of ‘undistorted competition’ from the Treaties would affect the interpretative status 
of the Treaty rules on competition. In Konkurrensverket v Telia Sonera Sverige 
AB,30 for the first time the CJEU referred to the new Protocol on the Internal Mar-
ket and Competition. It observed that according to Article 3(3) TEU “the European 
Union is to establish an internal market, which, in accordance with Protocol No 27 
on the internal market and competition, annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, is to include a 
system ensuring that competition is not distorted.”31 By reading the Protocol No 27, 
together with the objective of establishing an internal market, the Court made clear 
that the Protocol No 27 forms a constitutive part of Article 3(3) TEU and has the 
same interpretative value as the old Article 3(1)(g) EC. 
Despite the fact that the suppression of the reference to ‘undistorted competi-
tion’ in the Treaty could impact (at least to an extent) on the CJEU’s decisions, and 
possibly on the individual decisions of some EU Commissioners (for example, when 
authorising mergers), it is important to note that such a suppression has had no ad-
verse effect on the private enforcement of EU competition rules. The relevance of 
the reference to undistorted competition rule in the old Article 3(1)(g) EC in the 
context of private enforcement has been preserved by its inclusion into a protocol. 
                                                        
consulted on 2 May 2012). On the subject see also: L. Parret, Do we (still) know what we are protecting? 
The discussion on the objectives of the system of competition law from different perspectives (April 2009), Tilburg 
Law and Economics Center (‘TILEC’), Tilburg Law School. 
28  See, for example (Case 32/65 Italy v. Council and Commission [1966] ECR 389). 
29  A. Riley, The EU Reform Treaty and the Competition Protocol: Undermining EC Competition Law (September 
2007), Centre for European Policy Studies, pp.2. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/7535/1/142.pdf 
(last consulted on 2 May 2012). 
30  Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB (17 February 2011). 
31  Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB (17 February 2011), par. 20. See also 
Case C-496/09, Commission v Italian Republic, judgement of 17 November 2011. 
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2.1.4 Dynamics of EU competition law goals 
Although the competition policy has been central to the European Union, EU legisla-
tion does not provide any comprehensive list of goals that could serve to bring about 
the intended effects of the policy. This can be explained by the fact that the competi-
tion policy has never been an end in itself, but rather an instrument for advancing the 
Union’s larger policy objectives.32 The CJEU had already recognised an instrumental 
view of competition provisions in 1966 in the Grundig-Consten case33 when it em-
phasised the importance of market-integration values and condemned strategies for 
market separation. From the language of the decision, it is clear that the EU Com-
mission and the CJEU itself viewed Article 101 TFEU not merely as a programmatic 
guide to policy, but as a law to be interpreted according to the needs of the Union.34 
From this point of view, competition policy “cannot be understood or applied with-
out reference to the legal, economic, political and social context.”35 
Due to the absence of a detailed description of the operational objectives of EU 
competition policy it is difficult to find a common view on the categories of goals of 
EU competition policy in literature. The answer depends on the approach taken by 
the authors, namely whether the question is dealt with by lawyers or economists. A 
former EU Commissioner Monti distinguishes three core values of EU competition 
policy, competition (understood as the maintenance of economic freedom), market 
integration and economic efficiency (as a means of enhancing consumer welfare). 
Similarly, Ahlborn and Padilla classified the various competition policy goals into 
three categories, fairness goals (which include fairness, the protection of economic 
freedom, the protection of rivalry, and the competitive process and the protection of 
small and medium-size firms), welfare and efficiency goals (which cover both of the 
welfare objectives principally discussed, i.e., the goal of consumer welfare and that of 
total welfare) and market integration goals (which deal with the goal of a single Euro-
pean market and the reduction of obstacles to cross-border trade).36 Bishop and 
Walker distinguish two main goals, the integration goal (the promotion of integration 
between the Member States) and the economic goal (the promotion of effective and 
undistorted competition), which are potentially in conflict with each other.37 Al-
though the above mentioned authors disagree with regard to classification of the 
competition policy’s goals, they all agree that the EU competition law does not have 
                                                        
32  See one of first speeches of K. Van Miert as Commissioner in charge of competition policy, 11 May 
1993. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-93-53_en.htm (last consulted on 
2 May 2013). 
33  (Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299). 
34  D. Gerber, Law and competition in twentieth century Europe, Protecting Promotheus (1998) Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, p. 355. 
35  Speech by K. Van Miert, former Commissioners for Competition Policy, of 11 May 1993. Available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-93-53_en.htm (last consulted on 2 May 2013). 
36  C. Ahlborn and A.J. Padilla, From Fairness to Welfare: Implications for the Assessment of Unilateral 
Conduct under EC Competition Law, in C-D. Ehlermann and M. Marquis (eds), European Competition 
Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (2008) Hart Publishing, Oxford/Port-
land/Oregon, p. 7. 
37  S. Bishop and M. Walker, Economics of EC Competition Law: concepts, application and measurement (2002) 
2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, pp. 3–6. 
Chapter 2 
16 
 
any single exhaustive objective, but multiple objectives the importance of which has 
changed over time.38  
Until the late 1990s, ‘market integration’ was the most frequently mentioned goal 
of EU competition policy. Primary concern of the EU institutions was ‘economic in-
tegration.’39 Accordingly, the competition law system was primarily shaped to achieve 
a single unified market,40 and prevent the possibility that private undertakings could 
maintain barriers to free trade between Member States by carving up markets be-
tween them. As Deringer has noted, “the basic sin in Europe is not so much restrict-
ing competition, but creating an obstacle to integration of the various member 
states.”41 The objective of the protection of competition was interpreted as meaning 
protecting economic freedom of the market players, inspired by the Ordoliberal 
School.42 Ordoliberals viewed competition law as a central element to economic pro-
gress and as a base of the legal order of a free market economy.43 
In the late 90s the EU Commission undertook efforts to re-define the goals of 
EU competition policy. The emphasis has been shifted from economic integration to 
economic efficiency and ‘consumer welfare.’44 The change took place with the ap-
pointment of Monti to the position of EU Competition Commissioner. One of the 
main objectives of the former Commissioner was to strength the economic basis of 
the EU Commission’s work, and thus to deliver a more ‘consumer welfare’45 based 
model of antitrust enforcement. In the words of former EU Competition Commis-
sioner Monti, the ultimate goal of the competition rules is “to ensure that consumers 
benefit from new and improved products and lower prices.”46 This orientation soon 
                                                        
38  See L. Parret, Do we (still) know what we are protecting? The discussion on the objectives of the system of competi-
tion law from different perspectives (April 2009), Tilburg Law and Economics Center (‘TILEC’), Tilburg 
Law School. 
39  D. Gerber, Law and competition in twentieth century Europe, Protecting Promotheus (1998), Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, p. 347. 
40  L. Parret, Do we (still) know what we are protecting? The discussion on the objectives of the system of competition law 
from different perspectives (April 2009), Tilburg Law and Economics Center (‘TILEC’), Tilburg Law 
School, p. 10. 
41  A. Deringer, in conference discussions, Enterprise law of the 80’s: European and American perspectives on 
competition and industrial organization (published by American Bar Association, 1980), p. 65 (cited by 
C.A. Jones, Competition Dimensions of NAFTA and the European Union (2006) 6(7) Jean Monnet/Robert 
Schuman Paper Series, p. 5. 
42  L.L. Gormsel, Article 82 EC: Where are we coming from and where are we going to? (2006) 2(2) 
C.L.Rev, p. 8. 
43  See A. Pera, Changing Views of Competition and EC Antitrust Law, Working Paper, No. 13/2008 (March 
2008), p. 23. 
44  G. Monti, EC Competition Law (2008) Cambridge University Press, p. 99. 
45  In EU antitrust policy the term ‘consumer’ refers to any buyer. “The concept of ‘consumer’ encom-
passes all direct and indirect users of a product affected by certain conduct, including intermediate 
producers which use the products as an input, not only end consumers” (Commission Guidelines on 
the application of Art 81(3) [now Article 101(3)] of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C101/97). See also G. 
Geraint, I. Ramsay and T. Wilhelmsson (eds), Handbook of research on international consumer law (2010) 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, p. 71. 
46  Speech by M. Monti, European Commissioner for Competition matters, of September 18, 2000. 
Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-00-315_en.htm?locale=nl (last con-
sulted on 2 May 2013). 
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became the official position of the EU Commission47 and has continued to be an 
important goal of EU antitrust policy of the successor of Monti, Kroes,48 and later 
Almunia. In one of his speeches, Almunia held that “competition policy is a tool at 
the service of consumers. Consumer welfare is at the heart of our policy and its 
achievement drives our priorities and guides our decisions.”49 Given their immediate 
effect on the market, nearly all antitrust infringements automatically result in eco-
nomic harm to other market participants that may or not be contractually related with 
the antitrust violator. The problem of anti-competitive conduct is that it results in the 
diminution of goods being produced; it raises prices and reduces quality and choices 
that would be offered in a competition situation. Hence, in addition to the enhance-
ment of consumer benefit, by pursuing the objective of protecting consumers, the 
“firms that can offer competitive and innovative products and services to them, at all 
levels of the value chain” are encouraged and promoted.50 
The re-orientation of the goals of EU competition law towards consumers has 
had tremendous impact on the competition policy and the way the enforcement of 
EU competition provisions should proceed. In this context, the question arises 
whether consumers (and not only competitors) should be protected by competition 
rules, and if so to what extent? If the policy priority is inspired by a consumer-
focused approach, then it is more likely that considerable resources and efforts will be 
set up with the focus on private parties (be it citizens or companies) harmed by anti-
competitive behaviour.51 According to Parret, the EU Commission’s decision to 
make private enforcement of antitrust law one if it’s key policy priorities and the 
steps it has taken to bring it to fruition were clearly inspired by a consumer-focused 
approach.52 This is a reasonable explanation since the harm (done to consumers), and 
redress of that harm are of utmost importance in private enforcement. In contrast to 
                                                        
47  See Commission notice on the application of Article 81/3 (2004), OJ 2004, C101/08. In pars. 13 
and 33 the Commission states that “the objective of Article 101 TFEU is to protect competition on 
the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of re-
sources…’’. The same applies also to Article 102 TFEU, since both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU seek 
to achieve the same aim (Case C-6/72 Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215, [1973] 
CMLR 199, par. 25). 
48  In one of her speeches, N. Kroes (former EU Commissioner) held that “competition is not an 
objective itself, but it is an instrument for achieving consumer welfare and efficiency” (speech of 15 
September 2005). At another occasion, she said that “… the objective of Article 102 TFEU is the 
protection of competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an 
efficient allocation of resources” (speech of 23 September 2005). Both available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_speeches_by_the_commissioner.html (last consulted on 
2 May 2013). 
49  Speech by J. Almunia, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for competition 
policy, of 12 May 2010. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-
233_en.htm. Last consulted on 10 May 2013. 
50  Speech by J. Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition 
Policy, of 24 November 2011 (speech 11/803). Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-11-803_en.htm?locale=en. 
51  See section 4.4.1. 
52  L. Parret, Side effects of the modernisation of EU competition law (2011) Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 
pp. 139–142. The author argues that the changes in priorities in enforcement policy are result of the 
modernisation process (the entry into Reg. 1/2003 and decentralisation). 
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the economic-freedom approach, which focuses on harm to the structure of the mar-
ket, the consumer-welfare approach focuses on harm to consumers. Accordingly, it is 
in line with the objective of consumer welfare – which is a primary goal of modern 
competition policy – the individual (consumer) is given the right to defend himself 
against negative effects of competitive constraints by means of private law actions 
through normal court processes. 
2.2 Antitrust enforcement system 
The process of creating the rule of law does not end with the promulgation of sub-
stantive law provisions. It is merely one of the first steps in the law-making process, 
and enforcement of these provisions adopted pursuant to law is no less important. In 
order to achieve its goals, formulation of the rule of law needs to be followed by the 
enforcement phase, which, to a certain extent, is the indicator of the effectiveness of 
the law-making process as a whole. The enforcement phase provides incentives to 
comply with the laws by detecting violations and imposing sanctions on the violators. 
At the same time, by attempting to affect the behaviour of people, enforcement es-
tablishes and encourages a model of desirable behaviour. Legal systems are of little 
use if they are not effectively enforced. To avoid such a situation, it is necessary to 
establish an appropriate system of law enforcement, which can be based on private 
law, public law or combination of both. The choice will depend on various factors, 
including the goals that the enforcement system is pursuing. 
2.2.1 Enforcement mechanisms and their position in the EU legal context 
When discussing enforcement of competition law three enforcement mechanisms 
should be distinguished, administrative law, criminal law and private law.53 Enforce-
ment based on administrative law (administrative enforcement) is undertaken by 
public authorities, which investigate potential infringements of competition rules and 
impose administrative sanctions such as fines on infringing undertakings. Criminal 
enforcement is another type of law enforcement that is carried out by public authori-
ties. In contrast to administrative enforcement, it involves sanctions that are usually 
imposed on individuals (natural persons) and less often on corporate entities (legal 
persons).54 Another obvious difference between criminal and administrative en-
forcement is, that while fines can be either criminal or administrative, imprisonment 
is essentially a criminal sanction. Administrative procedures cannot result in a prison 
sentence. 
                                                        
53  A.P. Komninos, Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap? 
(2006) 3(1) C.L.Rev, p. 12; F. Marcos, A. Sánchez, Damages for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: 
Harmonising Tort Law through the Back Door? (2008) 16(3) European Review of Private Law, p. 7. 
54  M. Hazelhorst (Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: Why Punitive Damages Are a Step 
Too Far (2010) 18 European Review of Private Law), who refers to E-J Zippro, Privaatrechtelijke handhav-
ing van mededingingsrecht (2009) Deventer: Kluwer. For more detailed difference see W.P.J. Wils, Is 
Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer? (2005) 28(2) World Competition, pp. 118–120. 
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At the EU-level, the system of public enforcement of EU competition law, which 
refers to the procedure taken by the EU Commission, is ‘administrative enforce-
ment’. According to Article 23 (5) of Regulation 1/2003 – which is the main regula-
tion governing the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU – antitrust violations 
are considered as administrative violations, and the fines and remedies imposed are of 
an administrative nature. However, this does not exclude the fact that the EU Com-
mission’s procedures are criminal in nature in the sense of Article 6 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’)55 and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights (‘CFR’).56 It should also be noted that although the CJEU has never 
explicitly recognised competition fines as being criminal in nature, it has ensured that 
the procedural guarantees of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) 
and the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights (‘CFR’) with respect to criminal proceed-
ings are respected in practice.57 
Although enforcement of EU competition law by the EU Commission is ‘admin-
istrative enforcement’ in the meaning of the TFEU, the EU enforcement system 
allows for criminal enforcement of EU competition rules (Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU) by the Member States.58 The Member States are free to choose whether to 
criminalise infringements of EU competition law at the national level, regardless of 
the fact that there is no parallel action taken at the level of EU institutions.  
Recently, enforcement of competition rules through criminal law has provoked 
much discussion.59 It has been often argued that the current EU system based on 
non-criminal sanctions leads to “ineffective law enforcement of an activity that causes 
serious harm to consumers and the economy.”60 Introduction of criminal sanctions 
                                                        
55  The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has made clear in many cases since Engel (Engel 
and others v. Netherlands [1976] 1 EHRR 647) that the national designation of ‘criminal’, for the 
purposes of the Convention, is not decisive. The core standards that bear upon the Court’s analysis 
are the nature of the offence and the nature and severity of the penalty. 
56  With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the CFR has been given “the same legal value as 
the Treaties”. In particular, Article 47 CFR, which provides for the right to “an effective remedy be-
fore […] an independent and impartial tribunal previously independent and impartial tribunal previ-
ously established by law”, mirrors the text of Article 6 ECHR. 
57  With respect to the right to hear witnesses and the non-retroactivity of criminal law, see e.g. C-
213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425; with respect to the pre-
sumption of innocence, see Case C-199/92 P Hüls v Commission [1999] ECR I-4287. 
58  Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 states that “the competition authorities of the Member States shall 
have the power to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty in individual cases”. For this purpose 
they may take decisions “imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty provided 
for in their national law.” 
59  A number of scholars have argued in favour of European antitrust criminalisation. On the topic see, 
for example, W.P.J. Wils, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer? (2005) 28(2) 
World Competition; M. Zuleeg, Criminal Sanctions To Be Imposed on Individuals as Enforcement In-
struments, in C-D. Ehlermann, I. Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2001 (2003) Hart 
Publishing, Oxford/Portland, Oregon; P. Whelan, A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal 
Sanctions as Punishment Under EC Cartel Law (2007) 4(1) C.L.Rev. Some other legal scholars think 
criminalisation of antitrust infringements is not appropriate (see for example, M. Hazelhorst, Private 
Enforcement of EU Competition Law: Why Punitive Damages Are a Step Too Far (2010) 18(4) 
European Review of Private Law. 
60  P. Whelan, A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as Punishment under EC Cartel 
Law (2007) 4(1) C.L.Rev, pp. 7–40. 
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would increase deterrence,61 and therefore render enforcement of the EU competi-
tion rules more efficient. Despite the debate, as a matter of EU competition law, 
criminal liability would be very difficult to introduce on the EU level. Member States 
generally consider criminal law as their exclusive prerogative, and any effort at EU 
criminalisation would involve significant legal and political challenges. Undoubtedly, 
the debate on the introduction of criminal sanctions is important, but it involves a 
wide range of questions that are not part of the subject of this thesis.62 For this re-
search it is sufficient to know that as the law stands, the EU Commission does not 
impose criminal sanctions and it is very unlikely that it will be in a position to do so 
in the foreseeable future.  
The third form of competition law enforcement is enforcement through private 
law. This type of law enforcement – which is also the subject of this research – is 
characterised as ‘private enforcement.’ In contrast to public enforcement, private 
enforcement involves legal actions taken by private actors. For the purposes of this 
research, ‘legal actions’ in the terms of private enforcement comprises only damages 
actions and not actions for injunctions or the defensive use of law (for example an 
application of Article 101(2) TFEU). Based on this adopted meaning of private en-
forcement, private enforcement involving damage claims is distinguished from the 
aforementioned administrative and criminal enforcement mechanisms by the goal of 
compensation for those who have suffered from the wrongdoings of others. Some 
authors also distinguish between public and private enforcement on the basis of what 
interests are protected.63 In their opinion, while public enforcement pursues the pub-
lic interest of protecting the competition norms through administrative or criminal 
sanctions, private parties utilise competition law provisions to their benefit. Similarly, 
the EU Commission’s statements with regard to the nature of civil claims (as oppo-
site to the actions of competition authorities) sometimes have been founded on a 
similar approach.64  
It follows from the above that the enforcement of EU competition law can be 
taken through the application of administrative (‘public’ will be used as synonym) 
and/or private law. So far, enforcement of EU competition law has been predomi-
nantly practiced through public law by public competition authorities (the EU Com-
                                                        
61  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2011) 4th edition, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 1167. 
62  The debate on the Union’s criminal law competence after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
is certainly not settled yet. Although the adoption of criminal law measures is technically ‘easier’ after 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, broad consensus will still be required. (see: G. Ha-
kopian, Criminalisation of EU Competition Law Enforcement – A possibility after Lisbon? (2010) 
7(1) C.L.Rev, pp. 157–173). 
63  For example, C. Harding and J. Joshua clearly distinguish the two by saying that “injury to competi-
tors and consumers is dealt with via civil claims for damages, while the injury to the competition 
norms is dealt with via penal sanctions, whether of an administrative or criminal category.” (C. 
Harding and J. Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, A Study of Legal Control of Economic Delinquency 
(2003) Oxford, p. 239). 
64  See E-J. Mestmäcker, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy: Constitutional Challenge or Ad-
ministrative Convenience?, in: D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 
2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (2001) Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, Oregon, 
pp. 233–234. 
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mission at the European level, and the national competition authorities at the national 
level). As will be seen later, the reasons for the EU enforcement model with a domi-
nance of public enforcement is to be found in the history of the European Union as 
well as in the private litigation culture and tradition in Europe. 65 
2.2.2 Objectives and functions of antitrust enforcement 
Law enforcement may pursue different, although substantively inter-connected objec-
tives. From a pure competition law perspective, according to Harding and Joshua,66 
antitrust enforcement policy aims at achieving three main objectives, injunctive, re-
storative (compensatory) and punitive. The first objective – the injunctive objective – 
in some ways is the most straightforward. It has been interpreted as providing an 
avenue to bring the infringement of the law to an end. The objective entails not only 
negative measures, in the sense of an order to abstain from the delinquent conduct, 
but also positive ones, such as ensuring that that conduct ceases in the future.67 The 
second objective – the restorative or compensatory objective – seeks to remedy the 
injury caused by anti-competitive conduct. The third objective – punitive objective68 
– tends to punish the perpetrator of the illegal acts in question, and also to deter him 
and others from future transgressions. Similarly, based on a slightly different classifi-
cation, Wils69 speaks of three functions of antitrust enforcement, (a) clarifying and 
developing the content of the antitrust prohibitions, (b) preventing the violation of 
these prohibitions through deterrence and punishment and (c) pursuing corrective 
justice through compensation. Especially with regard to deterrence and compensa-
tion, some further considerations need to be elaborated.70  
The main goal of antitrust enforcement is to prevent violations of prohibitions 
set up by antitrust law through deterrence. Although deterrence is not the only con-
ceivable way to prevent anticompetitive practices taking place,71 it is an objective that, 
in principle, can be enhanced by authority. By creating a threat of imposition of sanc-
tions such as administrative fines (or civil damages by private parties), the potential 
                                                        
65  See sections 2.3, 2.4 and 4.1. 
66  See C. Harding and J. Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, A Study of Legal Control of Economic Delin-
quency (2003) Oxford University Press, pp. 229 et seq.  
67  C. Harding and J. Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, A Study of Legal Control of Economic Delinquency 
(2003) Oxford University Press, pp. 229. 
68  The expression ‘penal’ is used in its generic sense and it does not necessarily correspond to criminal 
law. 
69  W.P. Wils, The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Dam-
ages (2009) 32(1) World Competition, p. 5. 
70  On deterrence and compensation see: P. Nebbia, Damages actions for the infringement of EC 
competition law: compensation or deterrence? (2008) 33(1) E.L.Rev, pp. 23–43. 
71  Business entities also pursue other goals than maximisation of their profits. They might also feel a 
moral responsibility and duty to obey and to live within the law (philosophical reflection on moral 
responsibility has a long history and a great amount of literature has been written on this topic, 
started by Ancient Greeks texts and continuing with philosophers such as Aristotles, Nietzsche (The 
Genealogy of Morals) and Foucault (Madness and Civilization), as well as Kant). On the subject see T.R. 
Tyler, Why people obey the law? (1990) Yale University Press. 
Chapter 2 
22 
 
violator can be restrained from infringing practices.72 Discouraging anti-competitive 
behaviour therefore, significantly contributes to the effectiveness of the antitrust rules 
and the maintenance of effective competition in the Union.  
According to Wils, the second task of enforcement is to compensate those who 
have suffered loss as a consequence of anti-competitive behaviour. The principal73 
idea behind the compensatory objective is not to prevent law infringements from 
happening, but to correct the consequences of the infringement, in particular the 
harm that the plaintiff has suffered. The compensatory objective rests principally on a 
notion of corrective justice in the view of giving each person what he or she deserves 
or, in more traditional terms, giving each person his or her due.74 A party who has 
been engaged in a “form of wrongdoing that violates the equal autonomy of another 
party has a legal obligation to correct the consequences of that wrongdoing.”75 This 
theory of corrective justice best explains why in various areas of private law (such as 
tort law) the right to compensation is recognised not primary for instrumental rea-
sons, such as deterrence, but to compensate. 
2.2.3 Advantages of public enforcement seen in the context of 
corresponding weaknesses of private enforcement 
Although, at least in principle, both deterrence and compensatory objectives can be 
pursued by either the public or the private enforcement system, it is commonly ac-
cepted that deterrence is better pursued by competition authorities, while compensa-
tion is better achieved by private damage actions.76 In supporting the superiority of 
public enforcement as a deterrent mechanism, Wils enlisted three sets of reasons.77 
Firstly, public enforcement benefits from more effective investigative and sanctioning 
powers. Secondly, private enforcement is driven by private motives, which funda-
mentally diverge from the general interest in antitrust area. Thirdly, private antitrust 
enforcement is more costly than public enforcement and presents a risk that damage 
actions can be used or abused by the plaintiffs as a strategic instrument against com-
petitors. 
With regard to the first reason in terms of investigative powers, competition au-
thorities (the EU Commission and national competition authorities) are better at 
discovering and proving antitrust infringement than private parties, because they are 
                                                        
72  W.P. Wils, The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Dam-
ages (2009) 32(1) World Competition, p. 9. 
73  Through compensation also deterrence can be achieved. 
74  K. Roach and M.J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition Laws, (1996) 34(3) Osgoode Law 
Journal, p. 496. See also W.P.J. Wils, The Relationship between public Enforcement and Private Ac-
tions for Damages (2009) 32(1) World Competition, p. 13. 
75  H.W. Micklitz (ed.) The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law (2011) Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd, p. 437. 
76  See, for example, W.P.J. Wils, The Relationship between public Enforcement and Private Actions 
for Damages (2009) 32(1) World Competition; M.J. Frese, Fines and Damages under EU Competition Law – 
Implications of the Accumulation of Liability, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper 
No. 2011-05, p. 18. 
77  See W.P.J. Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe? (2003) 26(3) 
World Competition. 
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endowed with wide investigatory powers.78 The EU Commission’s investigatory 
powers cover the whole of the European Union and are coupled with the assistance 
of national competition authorities under a network and cooperation of Regulation 
No. 1/2003. Similarly, national competition authorities when dealing with cases of 
infringement of competition law with transnational effect will be able to obtain help 
of competition authorities from other Member States in accordance with the Regula-
tion 1/2003.79 Besides, enforcement authorities are specialised public authorities and 
therefore are better acquainted with the economic specificities of antitrust. Detection 
of infringement and gathering evidence and collecting information about antitrust 
infringement requires a broad investigation. In contrast, antitrust victims face difficul-
ties of collecting evidence, but also they are often not even aware of the infringement 
and the harm inflicted on them as a result of that infringement. This is even more ob-
vious when victims of antitrust law infringements are private consumers. In contrast 
to legal persons (who are better at detecting market-wide price increases) and com-
petitor companies (who are most likely to be aware of antitrust strategies aimed at 
them), consumers are more likely to suffer from shortage of information.80 In addi-
tion, competition authorities, including the EU Commission, are seen as superior in 
the terms of deterrence because they impose sanctions that are punitive in nature. As 
such, they deter the potential infringer from anticompetitive act. While private dam-
ages are usually calculated by reference to the loss that the plaintiffs who happen to 
bring claims manage to prove, fines are to be calculated either by reference to the 
gain obtained by the antitrust offender or by reference to the loss caused to society.81 
With regard to the EU Commission, Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation 1/2003 endow 
it with the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments when it finds an in-
fringement of EU competition rules.82 The imposition of a sanction and the amount 
depends in particular on the gravity and duration of the infringement,83 as well as the 
profit that the undertaking was able to derive from its infringement.84 Moreover, 
comparing the later decisions of the EU Commission to the earlier ones shows that 
practices punished by the EU Commission in recent years carry heavier fines than the 
earlier ones.85 The increased level of fines shows the EU Commission’s determina-
tion to attack antitrust activity and increase the efficiency of EU antitrust enforce-
                                                        
78  See, for example, W.P.J. Wils, The Relationship between public Enforcement and Private Actions 
for Damages (2009) 32(1) World Competition, p. 10. 
79  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
80  B.J. Rodger, Why not court? A study of follow-on actions in the UK (2013) 1(1) Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement, p. 4. 
81  W.P.J. Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement be encouraged in Europe (2003) 26 World Compe-
tition, pp. 482 and 481. 
82  As regards the sanctioning powers of the NCAs on the other hand, the Regulation provides only 
that NCAs may take decisions […] imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty 
provided for in their national law’ (Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003). 
83  Article 23(3) of Regulation 1/2003. 
84  Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80, Musique diffusion francaise [1983] ECR 1825; Joined Cases C-
189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri [2005] ECR. 
85  Speech by N. Kroes, former Commissioner, of 13 October 2006 (available at http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/press-release_SPEECH-06-595_en.htm?locale=en last consulted on 16 May 2013). 
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ment.86 Also the EU Commission often justifies a high fine being imposed by its de-
terrent effect. It has recognised the two-fold character of the deterrence. Fines should 
have a sufficiently deterrent effect in order to punish past acts (specific deterrence), 
but also in order to deter other undertakings that might be tempted to engage in the 
same type of conduct that is contrary to Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU (general 
deterrence).87  
The second advantage of public enforcement mechanism in terms of deterrence 
(compared to private enforcement) comes as a result of differing motives driving 
public enforcers and litigants pursuing private action. This has important conse-
quences for the working of the enforcement system. Public enforcers – competition 
authorities – that deal with violations will frequently invest their resources in cases 
they consider to have broad social significance or impact. Public enforcement offi-
cials set policies and priorities with a view to enhancing respect for the antitrust pro-
hibitions through deterrence and education.88 This public goal89 has little to do with a 
private litigant’s decision whether to bring suit or not. Their interest is normally 
driven by private profit motive.90 A private litigant will not care about enforcing the 
antitrust law because competition is distorted in the market. Typically it will bring a 
lawsuit in order to obtain reparations through monetary awards. The general rule for 
such awards is that they compensate for damages, whether they have a deterrent 
effect or not. 
The third argument in favour of public enforcement rests on the fact that as-
sessment of effective enforcement and deterrent mechanisms in order to facilitate 
access to civil courts in antitrust cases is costly, in addition to the risk that private 
damages actions can be abused by competitors. It is feared that in a system that en-
courages private litigation, damage actions would not be employed for the right rea-
son – “that is, because a practice is harmful to competition, not simply because it 
harms the competitor,91” but rather for strategic and private reasons. Private enforc-
ers would have greater incentive to use the antitrust laws to win in the courts when 
they are unable to win in an honest competition with their rivals, and this is clearly 
not in line with public goal sought to be enforced. 
The reasons listed above support the argument that public enforcement is signifi-
cantly better in terms of deterrence, which in general terms is also the primary goal 
                                                        
86  The methods used by the Commission for setting fines are described in Fining Guidelines published 
in 2006. Introducing a number of innovations in the calculation of fines, it amended the previous 
guidelines from 1998: Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 
23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003 [2006] O.J. C210/2. 
87  See Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 
No 1/2003, OJ [2006] C 210/2, par. 4.  
88  W.P.J Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement be encouraged in Europe (2003) 26 World Compe-
tition, p. 482; I.R. Segal and M.D. Whinston, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A 
Survey (2007) 28(5) ECLR, pp. 309–312. 
89  C. Hodges talks about ‘public good’ (see C. Hodges, Competition Enforcement, Regulation and 
Civil Justice: What is the Case? (2006) 43(5) C.M.L.Rev, p. 1395). 
90  M.J. Frese, Fines and Damages under EU Competition Law – Implications of the Accumulation of Liability, 
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2011-05 (April 2011), p. 15. 
91  D.H. Ginsburg, Comparing Antitrust Enforcement in the U.S. and Europe (2005) 1(3) Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics, p. 430. 
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pursued by antitrust enforcement. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the 
importance of public law enforcement undermines the importance of private dam-
ages actions (private law enforcement).92 The majority of antitrust scholars agree that 
although law enforcement models, at least in theory, could be purely private or purely 
public, neither public nor private enforcement should monopolise competition law.93 
“Each of the systems aims at different aspects of the same phenomenon; they are 
complementary and both are necessary for the effectiveness of the whole of competi-
tion law enforcement.”94 Disadvantages of the one mechanism can be offset by the 
advantages of the other one. Therefore, it has been widely accepted that EU competi-
tion law should be based on a system whereby public and private enforcement work 
together to deter, detect, punish and compensate victims of unlawful anticompetitive 
conduct.95 Overall, when it comes to enforcement of the EU competition rules the 
question of replacing competition authorities by private parties has never been raised. 
Also EU policy debate is not on selection of either, but on the correct balance be-
tween public and private enforcement mechanisms.96  
2.2.4 Advantages of private enforcement of EU competition rules 
Private antitrust enforcement can effectively complement the competition authority’s 
activities. There are at least two strong arguments supporting that belief.  
First, private law enforcement permits those who have suffered damage as a re-
sult of infringement of competition rules to seek redress, which would not be forth-
coming in a system solely comprising of public enforcement. It is obvious that while 
public enforcement fulfils the deterrent function by creating a credible threat of sanc-
tions in the case of violations, typically it does not provide for the compensation of 
victims of the anticompetitive behaviour. Compensation can only be attained by way 
of private antitrust enforcement, in particular through damage actions. Thus, for an 
antitrust enforcement system to be effective it should combine deterrent and com-
                                                        
92  Although public enforcement of competition rules is well developed in Europe, this does not ex-
clude the need for encouraging private damage actions (see e.g.: Editorial Comments, A little more 
DFWLRQSOHDVHî The White Paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules (2008) 45(3) 
C.M.L.Rev). 
93  See, for example, C.A. Jones, Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and 
Reality Check (2004) 27(1) World Competition. 
Wils argues differently: he argues that public enforcement of competition law is superior to private en-
forcement and that there is even no need for a supplementary role for private enforcement in terms 
of compensation. He explains that there is no clear social need for private antitrust enforcement by 
the pursuit of corrective justice. In the antitrust context, attempts to achieve corrective justice 
through damages actions are to be very costly. Identifying the real victims of anticompetitive behav-
iour and the extent of their loss is a difficult task. 
94  See A.P. Komninos, Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap 
(2006) 3(1) C.L.Rev, p. 10. 
Speech by S. Norberg, director of Directorate-General Competition European Commission, of 20 June 
2003, pp. 28. Available at http://ec.europa.eu (last consulted on 2 May 2013). 
95  S.W. Waller, Towards a Constructive Public-Private Partnership to Enforce Competition Law (2006) 
29(3) World Competition Law and Economics Review, p. 368. 
96  See chapter 4. 
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pensatory functions. In this context it should be noted that as some suggest, 97 the 
majority of antitrust damages actions are likely to be ‘follow-on’ lawsuits. ‘Follow-on’ 
refers to the case in which individuals who suffer damages as a consequence of anti-
trust conduct prefer to wait for a competition authority to make an infringement 
finding and then use this as the basis for a damage claim in court.98 The important 
role that an infringement decision of competition authorities, including the EU Com-
mission, plays in the context of private damage actions suggests that private law en-
forcement (in terms of compensation) is complementary to public enforcement.  
Second, when seen from a broader perspective (apart from its compensatory 
function), private antitrust actions fulfil an important deterrent function and thereby 
engage public policy interests. This is obvious in legal systems such as that of the U.S 
in which a private litigant is seen as a ‘private attorney-general’,99 whose role is to 
close the ‘enforcement gap’ generated by the perceived inability of public enforce-
ment authorities to deal with all attention-worthy cases.100 To that end, here actions 
of private litigants are encouraged by means of the award of treble damages.101 Even 
when a system of private enforcement is based on a purely compensatory function, 
damage actions generate a deterrent effect. Companies are more likely to avoid in-
fringements of the competition rules when they risk having to pay damages to their 
competitors or consumers. Therefore, private actions have a positive effect on the 
enhancement of competition culture amongst market participants and in raising 
awareness of the competition rules. They encourage actors in the market to act with 
the appropriate level of care in order to prevent antitrust occurrences. In the words 
of a former EU Competition Commissioner Monti, “threat of possible litigation has a 
strong deterrent effect and could lead to a higher level of compliance with the com-
petition rules.”102 Additionally, damage actions also fulfil (to certain extend) the ‘en-
forcement gap’ in legal systems where statutes do not rely on private attorneys gen-
eral for their enforcement. In the EU in particular, enforcement of EU competition 
law is primarily through a system of public enforcement. However, private litigants 
may take action against the infringements that the EU Commission or national au-
thorities would not pursue despite their view that a breach might have occurred. 
After all, the competition authorities have to concentrate their limited resources on 
cases that inflict the greatest harm on the general interest. As result, the cases that 
cause less harm to the general interest will not receive the competition authority’s 
                                                        
97  K. Holmes, Public Enforcement or Private Enforcement? Enforcement of Competition Law in the 
EC and UK (2004) 25(1) E.C.L.Rev, p. 30. 
98  The Commission is also actively encouraging follow-on damage claims (see section 4.4.9). 
99  K. Roach and M.J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition Laws, (1996) 34(3) Osgoode Hall 
Law Review. 
100  It should be noted that this applies only to stand-alone actions, which concern violations of compe-
tition law that were not detected by the public authority. 
101  In U.S. treble damages principle is a ‘consciously though-out aspect of deterrence theory’ (See: C. 
Harding and J. Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, A Study of Legal Control of Economic Delinquency 
(2003) Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 237). 
102  Speech by M. Monti, former Commissioner for Competition matters of 17 September 2004 
(speech/04/403). Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-403_en.htm?lo-
cale=en (last consulted on 2 May 2013). See also F. Jacobs, Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust 
Law (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review, p. 1367. 
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attention. These cases are of secondary importance for the competition authority but 
they might be so significant for an individual company that it would be willing to take 
the case to court. Hence, while administrative authorities have discretion to investi-
gate a particular case, courts always have to hear cases that private parties bring be-
fore them. In this way, in the context of private dispute, courts may address a specific 
competition issue in the context of a broader commercial dispute.  
In addition to a valuable contribution to the general enforcement of antitrust law, 
private law enforcement also fulfils so-called ‘indicator function’.103 Victims of anti-
trust law infringements are commercial parties who in some cases might be better 
informed than the competition authorities.104 This is the case when victims are par-
ties to a contract with the infringer: they naturally possess broader information to 
which public agencies usually do not have access. Thus, they could be the ones who 
are in the best position to obtain the most appropriate information necessary to start 
an investigation. The problem is that victims of antitrust conduct who at the same 
time are parties to that contract are unlikely to have the motivation to maintain a 
private party action and will often face weak incentives to bring an action because 
they are interested in continuing the business relationship in the future. 
Komninos has listed two additional – EU oriented – arguments in favour of a 
system of private enforcement of EU antitrust rules.105 The first argument arises 
from the fact that private actions constitute the only complete means for individuals 
to exercise the rights guaranteed to them by Union law. After all, as it will be ex-
plained later,106 it is the CJEU’s long-standing case law that Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU have direct effect and grant individuals right to bring actions that national 
courts must safeguard.107 The second argument in favour of private enforcement of 
EU law lies in the perception of the relation between European citizens and the EU. 
When citizens pursue their rights conferred on them by EU law in national courts, 
they benefit directly from EU law. The exercise of EU rights might contribute to 
bringing the “application of EU competition rules closer to citizens and undertak-
ings”.108 Thus antitrust law enforcement in the form of private enforcement is of 
particular importance in the EU context. Due to its special nature, the European 
Union generally benefits from system of private enforcement more than Member 
States can on the national level. 
                                                        
103  Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement in Cartel Cases, Report of Cartels Working Group to International 
Competition Network annual conference (May 2007), p. 33. Available at http://en.fas.gov.ru/netcat_files/ 
Analitical%20materials/MKS/Report%20on%20Interaction%20of%20Public%20and%20Private% 
20Enforcement%20in%20Cartel%20Cases.pdf (last consulted on 18 may 2013). 
104  K. Roach and M. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition Laws (1996) 34(3) Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal, p. 472. 
105  A.P. Komninos, Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap? 
(2006) 3(1) C.L.Rev, p. 11. 
106  See section 3.3.1. 
107  Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 51, par. 16. 
108  Speech by N. Kroes, former Commissioner for Competition matters, of 14 September 2005, p. 6. 
Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-507_en.htm (last consulted on 2 
May 2013). As she said, “I think we can do more to bring the benefits of our fight against competi-
tion offences closer to the citizen.” 
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2.3 Private enforcement under Regulation 17/62 
As pointed out earlier, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are general and open norms that 
were intended to be implemented gradually.109 Accordingly, the TFEU neither elabo-
rates on how the provisions should be applied nor creates a procedural framework 
for their enforcement. It is left to the EU institutions and Member States to construct 
a proper competition law system. 
Until 2003 the role of private parties and national courts in the EU competition 
enforcement system was not particularly strong and even now it still is far less devel-
oped than the US system of competition law enforcement.110 One of the key reasons 
for a weaker private enforcement tradition lies in considerations of the feasibility and 
desirability of such enforcement in the early stages of the history of EU competition 
law. This is evident from the content and structure of Regulation 17/62, which was 
the primary instrument governing the enforcement of the EU competition rules till 
2003. Although from the early stage of EU development it has been considered that 
enforcement of EU law in national courts is possible, Regulation 17/62 did not con-
tain any provision with regard to private damages actions. Bringing private actions 
under EU competition law has been further complicated by a model of division of 
responsibility. As the system was constructed and it functioned, competition law 
enforcement under Regulation 17/62 was clearly based on enforcement functions of 
public authorities. 
Although Regulation 17/62 significantly influenced the evolution of the EU 
competition policy and enforcement mechanism, over time the need arose for reform 
or modernisation of Regulation 17/62. In the following subsections the impact of 
Regulation 17/62 in the evolution of private enforcement in EU competition law is 
discussed together with its role in expanding the role of EU commission and how 
this subsequently led to a weaker role for national courts.  
2.3.1 Orig ins of private enforcement of EU competition law 
A number of uncertainties have characterised the development of private enforce-
ment in Europe since the Treaty of Rome came into force. A foundational issue was 
whether there is a private right of action for antitrust violations at all. In contrast to 
the US where the Clayton Act111 and the Sherman Act112 specifically provide for 
private enforcement, in Europe the EU Treaty does not contain any express provi-
                                                        
109  See section 2.1.2. 
110  See: C.A. Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA (1999) Oxford University 
Press; F. Jacobs, Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust law (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review; R. Whish, 
The Enforcement of EC Competition Law in the Domestic Courts of Member States (1994) 81 
E.C.L.Rev. 
111  Section 4 of the Clayton Act states: “Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the 
United States ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained…” 
112  Section 7 of the Sherman Act applies a similar provision to the one of the Clayton Act. 
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sions for private damages remedies in case of infringement the antitrust rules.113 In 
particular, the EU Treaty is silent on the question whether competition law enforce-
ment should be administrative in nature or taken through the courts.114 When in 1962 
Regulation 17 was adopted it empowered the EU Commission with strong enforce-
ment powers but it did not refer to the questions in regard to private right of action. 
Wils115 argued that Regulation 17 was meant to discourage private actions since there 
was no reference to pro-active use of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (use of competition 
law as a ‘sword’)116 in Regulation 17. However, this was not completely true.117 De-
spite a strong centralisation embodied in Regulation 17/62, it was assumed from the 
very beginning that actions for damages were available to the third parties being the 
victims of antitrust infringements, as the EU Commission’s proposal to the Council 
(that ultimately became Regulation 17/62) reveals.118  
The uncertainty regarding the existence of private right of action has been gradu-
ally overcome by the development of the case law of the CJEU through principles of 
direct effect and supremacy.119 However, the fundamental difficulty faced by private 
litigants in the EU system remained. There were almost no EU level legislative rules 
governing private enforcement to set the scope in which private actions could oper-
ate.120 Lack of rules governing antitrust damage actions caused uncertainty among 
lawyers and clients whether a private right to damages existed at all and how it should 
be pleaded under national law.121 As a consequence of this uncertainty private actions 
in competition law context were very rarely brought. More often than being invoked 
                                                        
113  The only express provision that deals with private legal relationships is Article 102(2) TFEU, which 
at that time (1957) was seen as exceptional in the sense that a provision of this kind was included in 
an international treaty of such scope. (See: A.P. Komninos, New Prospects for private enforcement 
of EC Competition law: Courage v. Crehan and the Community right to damages (2002) 39(3) 
C.M.L.Rev, p. 450). 
114  K. Holmes, Public Enforcement or Private Enforcement? Enforcement of Competition Law in the 
EC and UK (2004) 25 (1) E.C.L.Rev, p. 25. 
115  W. Wils, Should Private Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe? (2003) 26(3) World Competition.  
116  The use of competition law as a ‘sword’ commonly involves ‘actions for injunctive relief’ and ‘dam-
age claims’ for loss suffered as a consequence of a violation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
117  Different view to Wils’s opinion was given by C.A. Jones (C.A. Jones, Private Antitrust Enforce-
ment in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality Check (2004) 27(1) World Competition, p. 15). 
118  EU Commission, Premier Reglement D’Application Des Articles 85 et 86 du Traité (1960) : “A ces 
sanctions s’ajoutent la publicité éventuelle de la décision et les risques inhérents à la nullité de len-
tente et aux demandes de dommages et intérêt qui pourraient être formées par des tiers.” (“To these 
sanctions may be added the eventual publicity of the decision and the inherent risks of the nullity of 
the understanding, and of damages which could be raised by third parties”). 
119  See section 3.4. For a detailed explanation from the development of EU principles of direct effect 
and supremacy to the recognition of private damages actions for breach of EU competition rules see 
C.A. Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA (1999) Oxford, OUP, 
pp. î 
120  C.A. Jones, A New Dawn for Private Competition Law Remedies in Europe? Reflections from the 
U.S., in C.D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private 
Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (2003) Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, Oregon. 
121  C.A. Jones, A New Dawn for Private Competition Law Remedies in Europe? Reflections from the 
U.S., in: C.D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private 
Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (2003) Oxford/Portland, Hart. 
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as a ‘sword’, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU were used as a ‘shield’,122 as they had a clear 
basis directly in TFEU’s text for asserting the nullity of infringing contracts.123 When 
competition rules are used as a ‘shield’, they are invoked as a defence against actual or 
potential claims that are based on an agreement or some other rules of which the 
validity is disputed.124 Some authors are of the opinion that this kind of civil litigation 
(‘shield-litigation’) cannot be qualified as private enforcement in the strict meaning of 
the term.125 
2.3.2 The EU Commission’s leading role in the competition law 
enforcement system 
Historically the enforcement of EU competition law has not been seen as the respon-
sibility of the EU Commission. It was Regulation 17/62 that explicitly entrusted the 
key role in the enforcement of EU competition law to the EU Commission. While 
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements with the object or effect of restricting 
competition and Article 101(2) renders such agreements void, the Articles do not 
mention who may declare the provisions of Article 101(1) TFEU to be inapplicable 
under Article 101(3) TFEU. Article 103 TFEU only states that it is the task of the 
Council to adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the princi-
ples set out in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The implementation of Article 101(3) 
TFEU therefore involves a necessary and inevitable process – the adoption of a sec-
ondary document. In the absence of a procedural framework for the application of 
the competition rules, pursuant to Article 104 TFEU, the competence to enforce EU 
competition rules was delegated to the authorities of the Member States. Accordingly, 
based on the provision of Article 104 TFEU, the competition rules that were set in 
the Treaty of Rome and came into force in 1958 were not enforced by the EU insti-
tutions until the first regulation implementing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Regula-
tion 17/62) was adopted four years later. 
In 1962 Regulation 17/62 was enacted and remained in force until May 2004 
without significant modification.126 Regulation 17/62 conferred a key role in the 
application and enforcement of EU competition law to competition authorities, 
which investigate (on their own initiative or responding to private complaints) suspi-
cious business practices, in order to impose sanctions on infringements of EU com-
petition rules and deter future anti-competitive behaviour. Given the lack of experi-
ence with competition law in the Member States at the time of the creation of Regu-
                                                        
122  Competition law is used as a “shield”, if it is invoked as a defence. 
123  Article 102 TFEU does not contain a declaration of nullity equivalent to Article 101 TFEU. This is 
not surprising since Article 102 TFEU prohibits a wider range of conduct, and not only agreements. 
See W.P.J. Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe? (2003) 26(3) 
World Competition. 
124  A.P. Komninos, Introduction, in E. Ehlerman, C. Atanasiu (eds), European Law Annual 2001: Effective 
Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (2003) Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon, p. xxvii. 
125  F.G. Jacobs, T. Deisenhofer, Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Com-
petition Rules, A Community Perspective, in C.D. Ehlerman, and I. Atanasiu (eds), European Law 
Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (2003) Oxford/Portland, p. 190. 
126  Regulation No. 17/62 was last time amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1216/1999, OJ 1999 L 148/5. 
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lation 17/62 and the widely held opinion that for that reason competition law might 
only play marginal role in EU, Regulation 17/62 was used to create a competition law 
system which was characterised by a great degree of centralisation. In particular, in 
contrast to the general rule of EU law (according to which the application and the 
enforcement of EU policies and EU law is a matter for the national authorities), 
Regulation 17/62 made competition policy primarily an EU matter,127 and put its 
enforcement mainly in the hands of the EU Commission.128  
The policy-making responsibility of the EU Commission in defining the orienta-
tion of EU’s competition policy was reflected in the specification of competition 
rules in Regulation 17/62. The specification of competition rules was founded on 
one hand, on a system of direct effect of the prohibition rule of Article 101(1) and 
Article 102 TFEU ([…shall be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being re-
quired])129 and on the other hand, on a prior notification to the EU Commission of 
restrictive agreements and practices for exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. More 
specifically, Regulation 17/62 set up a system whereby an agreement potentially fal-
ling within Article 101(1) could be upheld via Article 102(3) if it was exempted. There 
are two ways of obtaining exemption. First, the agreement could fall under the bene-
fit of a ‘block exemption Regulation’ of the EU Commission, which is a regulatory 
instrument that exempts categories of agreements that fully comply with certain con-
ditions therein. Secondly, restrictive agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
that seemed to fall under Article 101(1) TFEU had to be notified to the EU Commis-
sion, which had exclusive competence to give them immunity by granting an ‘individ-
ual exemption decision’ under Article 101(3) TFEU.130 The EU Commission had the 
monopoly to apply Article 101(3) as Article 9(1) of Regulation 17 conferred sole 
power on the EU Commission to declare Article 101(1) TFEU inapplicable pursuant 
to Article101(3) TFEU. This system was known as the ‘administrative prior authori-
sation’ or ‘notification system.’131 
Unless and until notification was given no decision could be taken under Article 
101(3) TFEU in respect of such an agreement, decision or practice. While parties 
were not obliged to give notice of agreements, in practice many did so. Especially, 
notification of high value commercial contracts was an irresistible option and became 
almost commonplace, unless there was a block exemption or an agreement was oth-
erwise excluded from Article 101(1) TFEU. Prior notification was perceived as a way 
to ensure greater legal certainty.132 First, nobody could challenge the validity of an 
                                                        
127  See C.D. Ehlermann, The modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution 
(2000) 37(3) C.M.L.Rev, pp. 575–577. 
128  On the subject see W. Van Gerven, Substantive Remedies For the Private Enforcement of EC 
Antitrust Rules Before National Courts, in European Competition Law Annual 2001, Effective Private En-
forcement of EC Antitrust Law (2003) Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon, pp. 66–68. 
129  See section 3.3.1. 
130  Art 4 (1) of Regulation 17/62. 
131  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2007) Oxford University Press, 
p. 1139. 
132  I.S. Forrester and A.P. Komninos, EU Administrative Law – Competition Law Adjudication, Sec-
toral Report on Adjudication in the Competition Field, American Bar Association, European Union 
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agreement that was before the EU Commission. It had important positive conse-
quences for the civil enforceability of the agreement, since national courts did not 
have the power to consider the agreement unlawful and thus void, because of the EU 
Commission’s exclusive competence in granting an exemption. Second, it offered 
great benefits for companies, namely legal certainty that the agreement, even if illegal, 
would not lead to fines imposed by the EU Commission, at least for the period after 
the notification.133 
2.3.3 The role of national courts under Regulation 17/62 
To understand the underdevelopment of private antitrust enforcement in EU it is im-
portant to elaborate on the role of the national courts until the adoption of Regula-
tion 1/2003 in 2003.  
Increasing the role of competition authorities’ in the area of EU competition en-
forcement under the old regulation (Regulation 17/62), resulted in a weaker role for 
national courts in accomplishing the same task. It is true that the EU Commission’s 
exemption monopoly did not apply to the application of Articles 101(1) and 102 
TFEU, for which national authorities and courts have concurrent competence with 
the EU Commission. National courts had (and still have) the power to decide wheth-
er an agreements infringes Article 101(1) TFEU or whether a company abuses its 
dominant position on a given market under Article 102 TFEU. Moreover, concerning 
the application of the nullity sanction of Article 101(2) TFEU, national courts have 
exclusive competence. It is for national courts – and for national courts only – to 
declare null and void unacceptable agreements prohibited by this provision. Although 
there is no explicit nullity sanction covering contractual abuses of a dominant posi-
tion that are prohibited under Article 102 TFEU, behaviour resulting in an abuse of a 
dominant position does not preclude national courts from declaring agreements or 
decisions null and void if they occur in the context of preparing, accompanying or 
implementing concerted practices.134 Nevertheless, the powers of the courts in appli-
cation of EU competition rules were diminished by the EU Commission’s monopoly 
on application of Article 101(3) TFEU. In the Delimitis case135 the Court explained 
that a national court may declare an agreement null and void under Article 101(2) 
TFEU, if there is no prior exemption decision by the EU Commission and the court 
is certain that the agreement could not be exempted.136 In all other cases it was sup-
posed to stay proceedings or adopt interim measures until the EU Commission 
adopted a decision. If the EU Commission has issued a decision granting an exemp-
                                                        
Administrative Law Project (2006), p. 5. On the topic, see also H.C.H. Hofmann, A.H. Turk (eds), EU 
Administrative Governance (2006) Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 233. 
133  I.S. Forrester and A.P. Komninos, EU Administrative Law Competition Law Adjudication Sectoral 
Report on Adjudication in the Competition Field, American Bar Association, European Union Admin-
istrative Law Project (2006(, p. 5 
134  In principle, however, the nullity sanction only applies to agreements between undertakings or deci-
sions by associations of undertakings covered by Article 101 TFEU. 
135  Case C-234/89, Delimitis v. Henninger Brau, [1991] E.C.R. I-935. 
136  Case C-234/89, Delimitis v. Henninger Brau, [1991] E.C.R. I-935, par. 50 
Theoretical Basis and Recent Developments 
33
 
tion under Article 101(3), the national court was bound by this decision and had to 
regard the agreement as enforceable.  
In addition to the rather ‘peripheral’ role of national courts in the process of ap-
plication of EU antitrust rules (taking into account the EU Commission’s exclusive 
competence with regard to Article 101(3)), national courts were empowered to exer-
cise their powers in the context of national procedural law. This brings some advan-
tages to national courts and extends their role in the field of EU competition law 
enforcement. As discussed earlier, opposed to the EU Commission or even the 
CJEU, the national courts137 are the only authorities who can award compensation 
for loss caused by breach of Article 101 and 102 TFEU.138 The role of national 
courts (when deciding on damages claims) in the EU antitrust enforcement system 
has also been recognised by the EU institutions. As mentioned above, from the early 
stages of EU construction, the EU Commission has considered actions for damages 
– which are a core element of system of private enforcement – as additional means of 
enforcement of EU competition rules.139 In 1962 (at the time of the introduction of 
Regulation 17/62), the Derringer Report for the European Parliament had accepted 
the desirability and necessity of private actions for the effective enforcement of EU 
competition law and had proposed a study of the national laws of the then six mem-
bers states, in order to identify the relevant issues for further action. Furthermore, 
there are also documents such as the 13th Report on Competition Policy,140and the 
15th Report in which this issue was discussed extensively. Nevertheless, as the EU 
Commission itself admitted in the White Paper on modernisation of the rules imple-
menting Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, Regulation 17/62 encouraged private enforce-
ment of competition law, but only to a minor extent.141 After all, the EU Commis-
sion’s monopoly in the application of Article 101(3) TFEU also affected the powers 
of the courts with regards to damage awards. Although it was clear that damages ac-
tion had to be brought in the national courts, the EU Commission’s exclusive powers 
to grant individual exemptions under 101(3) TFEU represented in practice a signifi-
cant obstacle to an effective system of damage actions based on violations of EU 
competition rules.142 Private actions before national court were paralysed by a notifi-
cation of an agreement by the defendant undertaking to the EU Commission. The 
EU Commission itself noted in the White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Im-
plementing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, that since the courts had no power to apply 
                                                        
137  On the role of national courts in the EU legal system see: J. Temple Lang, The Duties of National 
Courts under Community Constitutional Law, (1997) 22(1) E.L.Rev, p. 4. 
138  This will be discussed in chapter 3 to a greater extent. 
139  See also: K. Holmes, Public Enforcement or Private Enforcement? Enforcement of Competition 
Law in the EC and UK (2004) 25(1) E.C.L.Rev. 
140  European Commission, XIIIth Report (on Competition Policy), 1983, pp. 135–136. 
141  White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, sec-
tion 100 et seq. 
142  See, for example, F. Montag and A. Rosenfeld, A Solution to the Problems? Regulation 1/2003 and 
the modernization of competition procedure (2003) , pp. 107–135; M. Moti, Opening Statement: 
The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, in Ehlermann & Atanasiu (eds.), European Competition 
Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (2001) Hart Publishing, Oxford and Port-
land Oregon, pp. 4–5. 
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Article 101(3) TFEU, undertakings could bring court proceedings to a halt simply by 
lodging a notification with the EU Commission.143 They had used the centralised 
authorisation system not only to get legal security, but also to block private action 
before national authorities, in particular national courts. Moreover, it might sound 
contradictive, but a broad interpretation of Article 101(1) by the CJEU and the EU 
Commission, increased the importance of Article 101(3).144 The real interpretation of 
Article 101 was transferred to Article 101(3), and consequently to the EU Commis-
sion, which had a margin of discretion. 
All things considered, the centralisation of the competition enforcement and the 
weaker role of national courts meant a modernisation of EU competition law was 
necessary. The next section examines the creation of Regulation 1/2003, which was 
created with the aim of replacing Regulation 17/62 so as to provide much needed 
impetus for private enforcement.  
2.4 Modernisation of EU competition law (Regulation 1/2003)
145
 
The antitrust reform of 2004 has been described as the most radical ‘modernisation’ 
since the 1950s.146 It came in the form of a package of both substantial and proce-
dural changes that amounted to a shift in the mode of regulation (towards private 
enforcement in the form of civil antitrust disputes before the courts.). 
2.4.1 Need for reform 
Regulation 17/62 corresponded to the concepts and perspectives and also the needs 
of the early years of the EU. The legal and administrative culture of the EU was fairly 
centralist and the centralised notification system established by Regulation 17/62 was 
well suited to a Union of six Member States.147At the time of its adoption, the Union 
was small and competition law was under developed. When Regulation 17/62 was 
adopted the prohibition on restrictive agreements was new and revolutionary in 
Europe.148 While the prohibition on abuse of a dominant position, first in the ECSC 
                                                        
143  White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, par. 
100. 
144  A. Kingston, A “new division of responsibilities” in the proposed regulation to modernise the rules 
implementing Articles 81 and 82 EC? A warning call (2001) 22(8) E.C.L.Rev, p. 340. 
145  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002. 
146  See Interview with M. Monti, (former commissioner responsible for competition): The EU gets new 
competition powers for the 21st century, Competition Policy Newsletter, Special Edition (May 2004), 
where he said that, “the date 1 May will usher in a mature system in which law-abiding companies 
that do business in Europe will be freed from decade old legal straightjackets and will benefit from 
less bureaucracy and a more level playing field in the European single market.” Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/interview_monti.pdf (last consulted on 15 May 
2013). 
147  Until 1973, the EU consisted of six countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands. 
148  See W.P.J. Wils, Regulation 1/2003: A Reminder of the Main Issues, in D. Geradin (ed.), Modernisa-
tion and Enlargement: Two Major Challenges for EC Competition Law (2004) Intersentia, Antwerp, pp. 9–
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Treaty of 1951 and subsequently in Article 86 of the EEC Treaty of 1957 (now Arti-
cle 102 TFEU), was not without precedent,149 the prohibition on restrictive agree-
ments first laid down in Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty and then also in Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty (now Article 101 TFEU) was a “fundamental innovation in 
Europe”.150 The decision to confer exclusive competence upon the EU Commission 
to apply Article 101(3) TFEU reflects a conscious choice to limit the role of national 
authorities. There were hardly any administrative structures in the Member States that 
would have allowed an efficient decentralised application of EU competition law in 
general and of Article 101(3) TFEU in particular. Even if such structures had already 
been present, it would have been too risky to share the responsibility for exemption 
decisions with national authorities.151 In this context the lack of uniformity or even 
the presence of competition law in Member States meant that a centralised system 
ensured consistency and coherency in the development of EU competition law. A 
centralised notification and authorisation system guaranteed that the new provision 
was interpreted and applied by the EU Commission152 that was dedicated to the new 
practice. In other words, it enabled the EU Commission to build up a coherent body 
of precedent cases and to ensure that the competition rules were applied consistently 
throughout the Union. In addition, the new notification system had an educational 
function, as companies were educated by the EU Commission through the authorisa-
tion process (see Recital 1 of the Regulation No 1/2003). As an entirely new provi-
sion,153 the meaning of the prohibition on restrictive agreements was almost un-
known to companies in the market, as well as to most lawyers in Europe.154 Any 
other system, as an ex post enforcement system, would likely be ineffective as under-
takings would not understand it well enough to anticipate its application and adjust 
their behaviour accordingly.155 
With the development and rapid growth of the culture of competition across 
Europe at the beginning of the 21.st century, the EU Commission’s monopoly was 
no longer necessary. Article 101 TFEU is no longer revolutionary. Experience with 
competition matters has increased substantially through extensive practice and a large 
                                                        
81; W.P.J. Wils, The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Essays in Law & Economics (2002) Kluwer 
Law International, pp. 121–122. 
149  In Germany, for instance, an Ordinance against the Abuse of Economic Power had been enacted in 
1923. 
150  J. Monnet, Mémories (1976) Fayard, Paris, p. 413. 
151  C.D. Ehlermann, The modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution 
(2000) 37(3) C.M.L.Rev, p. 540.  
152  Wils also argues that the choice of a centralised system had been influenced by nature of Article 
101(3). At the time Regulation 17 was adopted, Article 81(3) could be also understood as a tool for 
discretionary political decisions. (on the subject see W.P.J. Wils, The Optimal Enforcement of EC Anti-
trust Law, Essays in Law & Economics (2002) Kluwer Law International, chapter 5.) 
153  Before the IIWW, cartels were a wide-spread institution throughout Europe. 
154  W.P.J Wils, The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Essays in Law & Economics (2002) Kluwer 
Law International, chapter 5; or W.P.J. Wils, Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement (2005) Hart 
Publishing, Oxford/Portland, Oregon, p. 5. 
155  Ex post enforcement works well if the actor knows with certainty whether the action violates the 
substantive rule. On the subject see: W.P.J Wils, The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Essays in 
Law & Economics (2002) Kluwer Law International, London, p. 88. 
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body of decisions made by the EU Commission or the EU Courts. The EU Commis-
sion has developed a comprehensive competition policy and, together with the 
CJEU, has established basic principles and abundant case law. Additionally, with the 
emergence of widespread competition expertise, the EU Commission is no longer 
seen as the sole guardian of competition within the Union. After several decades of 
the application of EU competition rules, the individual Member States have adopted 
similar provisions in their national laws. 
Furthermore, throughout the intervening years there have been significant 
changes. The size of the Union has grown considerably and from 1957 to 2013 the 
number of member states has grown to 28.156 There have been six enlargements, in-
cluding the biggest of these occurring on May 1st 2004, when 10 new Member States 
entered into the European Union. The accession of new members undoubtedly in-
creased the number of cases notified to the EU Commission.157 Confronted with the 
difficulties of granting an individual exemption158 or negative clearance159 to all the 
agreements notified to it each year, the EU Commission was faced with the serious 
problem of lack of resources to deal with all the notifications of agreements brought 
to it. In order to avoid total administrative paralysis, it subsequently attempted to 
stem the augmentation of individual notifications. It adopted a number of block ex-
emption regulations, in particular for vertical restraints of competition. On this basis, 
if the case an agreement falls within the terms of the Regulations, parties can be con-
fident that their agreement is not anti-competitive. It was also long established in the 
case law of the EU Courts that the EU Commission is not obligated to conduct an 
investigation in each case, but is entitled to refer to the EU interest, in order to de-
termine the degree of priority to be applied to the various complaints it receives.160 In 
addition, the EU Commission established the informal instrument of so-called com-
fort letters. Instead of adopting a decision granting a formal exemption or issuing 
negative clearance, the EU Commission in many cases could write an informal letter 
to the parties concerned, stating that in the EU Commission’s view the agreement 
does not restrict competition or is of a type that qualifies for exemption. However, al-
though a positive answer of the EU Commission normally speeded up the process,161 
                                                        
156  Six rounds of enlargement: 
 First enlargement (1973): Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom 
 Second ‘southern’ enlargement (1981): Greece 
 Third ‘southern’ enlargement (1986): Portugal, Spain 
 Fourth enlargement: Austria, Finland, Sweden 
 Fifth ‘eastern’ enlargement: Czech republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
 Fifth ‘eastern’ enlargement (2007): Bulgaria, Romania 
 Sixth enlargement (2013): Croatia 
157  A. Stephan, Editorial – Reforming EU Competition Law (2010) 6(2) C.L.Rev, p. 139. 
158  An individual exemption could be granted only when the cumulative conditions of Article 101(3) 
TFEU were satisfied. If granted, it was binding for national judges and competition authorities.  
159  A negative clearance was a formal decision that the agreement, based on the facts in the Commis-
sion’s possession, does not infringe Articles 101(1). A negative clearance was not binding for na-
tional judges and competition authorities. 
160  See case 24/90 Automec v Commission (Automec II)[1992] ECR II-2223, par. 76. 
161  Unlike a formal decision granting an individual exemption, a comfort letter did not require the ap-
proval of the ‘college’ of Commissioners. 
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the system of comfort letters was far from being satisfactory162 and did not operate in 
real life as had been intended by Regulation.163 Although assuring the parties that the 
EU Commission would not pursue the matter further, the letter was not a decision 
that would have legal force. If the agreement was challenged in a national court, the 
national court could take these letters into account, but it was not bound by them.164 
As such, it did not give the parties the same degree of legal certainty as a decision. 
Consequently, although various block exemptions were enacted and the use of non-
binding comfort letters was developed by EU Commission, those practices still con-
sumed a significant amount of the EU Commission’s time and effort. Overloaded by 
notifications, the EU Commission was hampered in detection and punishment of 
more serious competition law infringements such as hard-core cartels,165 and as such 
it presented a significant argument in favour of reform. 
2.4.2 Changes brought by the modernisation package 
To address the changing environment, the Commission began a broad process of 
modernisation in the 1990s. In this process the Regulation 1/2003 was adopted; this 
established a new legal framework for enforcing EU competition law. In the words of 
Venit, the adoption of the new framework presents the “beginning of the end of an 
era and style of EU competition law enforcement and the end of the beginning of a 
great leap forward.”166 To strengthen the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
at national level, it was essential to end the EU Commission’s monopoly and to in-
volve more national authorities and courts in the application of EU competition 
rules. To do so, a new division of responsibilities between the EU Commission and 
NCAs and national courts, was necessary.167 The new objective was that the national 
courts and NCAs should be the front-line enforcers of EU competition law and the 
EU Commission should deal only with very important cases that impact on EU com-
petition principles.168  
                                                        
162  F. Montag, A. Rosenfeld, A Solution to the Problems? Regulation 1/2003 and the modernization of 
competition procedure (2003) 2 Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, p. 109. 
163  With the abolition of the notification requirement comfort letters are no longer issued and negative 
clearance is no longer relevant. Although comfort letters were not formally binding, they carried a 
certain degree of authority that a national courts hearing an Article 101 TFEU case were de facto 
expected to take into account 
164  Joined Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79 Procureur de la Republique v Bruno Giry and Guerlain SA [1980] 
ECR 2327; Case 31/80 NV L’Oréal v PVBA “De Nieuwe AMCK” [1980] ECR 3775, 3805. On the 
problems which arise from comfort letters, see C.S. Kerse, E.C. Antitrust Procedure (1998) 4th edition, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, pp. 275–276. 
165  F. Montag, A. Rosenfeld, A Solution to the Problems? Regulation 1/200’3 and the modernization of 
competition procedure (2003) 2 Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, p. 109. 
166  J.S. Venit, Brave New World: The Modernization and Decentralization of Enforcement under 
Articles 81 and 82 the EC Treaty (2003) 40(3) C.M.L.Rev, p. 545. 
167  S. Kingston, A “new division of responsibilities” in the proposed regulation to modernise the rules 
implementing Articles 81 and 82 EC? A warning call (2001) 22(8) E.C.L.Rev. 
168  S. O’Keeffe, First among equals: the Commission and the national courts as enforcers of EC com-
petition law, (2001) 26(3) E.L.Rev, p. 309.  
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Among the changes brought about by the modernisation package,169 the two 
most radical and important with regard to the development of private enforcement of 
EU competition law were the elimination of the notification and authorisation system 
created by Regulation 17/62 and the elimination of the EU Commission’s monopoly 
on granting such exemptions (decentralisation of the application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU.170 As a result of the first change, the obligation of companies to notify the 
EU Commission of agreements that might damage competition was abolished. 
Agreements that satisfy the criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU are automatically exempt-
ed from the Article 101(1) TFEU prohibition, without the need for prior notification 
to the EU Commission.171 In the new system undertakings have to make a ‘self as-
sessment’172 whether their conduct and agreements satisfy the conditions of Article 
101(3) TFEU. When disputes on the application of the competition rule arise, the 
national courts are able to rule on the case (including on the applicability of Article 
101(3) TFEU).173 As such, the new system, based on ‘ex post control’ made Article 
101(3) TFEU directly applicable.174 Taking into account the direct applicability of 
Articles 101(1) and 101(2) TFEU, Article 101 TFEU is now applied as a unit.175  
2.4.3 Strengthening the competition culture 
Regulation 1/2003 modernised the procedures for the enforcement of EU competi-
tion law, including private enforcement before national courts. Although the new sys-
tem enhanced the importance of private enforcement mechanisms, former EU Com-
petition Commissioner Monti probably went slightly too far when he drew a com-
parison of the new system with the system in the US. He believed that “through a 
gradual increase in private law-suits, the courts in Europe should make an ever 
greater contribution to the over-all enforcement of the rules, leading to a situation 
more similar to that already prevailing in the US.”176 
                                                        
See also G.. McCurdy, The Impact Modernisation of the EU Competition Law System on the Courts and 
Private Enforcement of the Competition Laws: A Comparative Perspective (2004) 25(8) E.C.L.Rev, 
p. 510. 
169  The reform encompassed not only Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but includes all other areas of EU 
competition law such as merger control, state aid, and covers secondary legislation and a series of 
secondary legislation as well as non-legislative measures.  
170  On the subject see: D.J. Gerber, Modernising European Competition Law: A Developmental Per-
spective, (2001) 22(4) ECLR; C.D. Ehlermann, The modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal 
and Cultural Revolution (2000) 37(3) C.M.L.Rev. 
171  This is already the existing enforcement system for Article 102 TFEU. 
172  R. Whish and D. Bailey, Competition Law (2012) 7th edition, Oxford University Press, p. 167. 
173  The new system consolidates the interpretation of the third paragraph of Article 81 EC as a ‘true 
rule of law’ and not as a ‘discretionary political tool’ (See: W.P.J Wils, The Optimal Enforcement of EC 
Antitrust Law, Essays in Law & Economics (2002) Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/ 
New York, p. 246). 
174  Article 1 of Regulation No. 1/2003. 
175  S. O’Keeffe, First among equals: the Commission and the national courts as enforcers of E.C. 
competition law (2001) 26(3) E.L.Rev, p. 309. 
176  The Commission’s proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on compe-
tition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, 
(EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 (‘Regulation implementing Articles 
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As said above, one of the stated aims of the modernisation of EU competition 
law was to promote private enforcement in the national courts. As in recital 7, the 
Regulation states that national courts “have an essential part to play in applying the 
EU competition rules. When deciding disputes between private individuals, they pro-
tect the subjective rights under EU law, for example by awarding damages to the vic-
tims of infringements.”177 Although Regulation 1/2003 does not rise to the level of “a 
systematic private remedies code”,178 it includes provisions favourable to supporting 
private actions in national courts. For example, Article 6 empowers national courts to 
apply Article 101 TFEU in its entirely, including Article 101(3) TFEU; Article 2 fixes 
the burden of proof of meeting the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU on the party 
claiming its benefit; Article 15(3) empowers the EU Commission to intervene in a 
national courts’ proceedings as amicus curiae. 
The main innovation of the Regulation 1/2003 in terms of private enforcement 
is the abolition of the EU Commission’s exemption monopoly under Article 101 
TFEU, which has been described earlier. It was a widely shared conviction among 
authors that the EU Commission exemption monopoly under Regulation 17/62 was 
an obstacle to private enforcement.179 It limited the amount of private litigation likely 
to occur by depriving national authorities, in particular national courts, from “whole-
hearted enforcement of EU competition law.”180 It is clear that under the new regime 
parties to an agreement benefit from the fact that the decision under Articles 101(1) 
and 101(3) TFEU can be made in the same procedure. National courts are no longer 
obliged to suspend their proceedings pending the EU Commission decision on the 
applicability of Article 101(3) TFEU, and thus “leaving the agreement suspended in a 
twilight zone between validity and nullity”.181 The fact that the entire analysis under 
                                                        
81 and 82 of the Treaty’) (COM (2000) 582 final – 2000/0243(CNS)). Available at: http://europa.eu 
(last consulted on 3 May 2012). 
177  Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ (2003). 
178  The Regulation does not contain any express provisions that are likely to encourage the develop-
ment of damages actions as an enforcement mechanism. See: C.A. Jones, Private Antitrust En-
forcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality Check (2004) 27(1) World Competition, p. 14; J.S. 
Venit, Brave New World: The Modernization and Decentralization of Enforcement under Articles 
81 and 82 the EC Treaty (2003) 40(3) C.M.L.Rev, pp. 570–572. 
179  See, for example, F. Montag and A. Rosenfeld, A Solution to the Problems? Regulation 1/2003 and 
the Modernisation of Competition Procedure (2003) 2 Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, p. 132; H.L. 
Buxbaum, German Legal Culture and the Globalization of Competition Law: A Historical Perspec-
tive on the Expansion of Private Antitrust Enforcement (2005) 23(2) Berkeley Journal of International 
Law, pp. 489–491. 
180  J.C. Jones, A New Dawn for Private Competition Law Remedies in Europe? Reflections from the 
U.S., in: C-D Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private 
Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (2003) Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, Oregon, p. 96. 
181  J.S. Venit, Brave New World: The Modernization and Decentralization of Enforcement under 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, (2003) 40(3) C.M.L.Rev, p. 554; S. Martínez Lage and H. 
Brokelmann, Article 81(3) Before National Courts: The CAMPSA Doctrine of the Spanish Supreme 
Court and Articles 84 and 85 Revisited, in: D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds), European Competition 
Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (2001) Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, 
Oregon, p. 596. See also: D. Geradin (ed.) Modernisation and Enlargement: Two Major Challenges for EC 
competition law (2004) Antwerp: Intersentia; D. Woods, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Rules – 
Modernization of the EU Rules and the Road Ahead (2004) 16 Loyola Consumer Law Review. 
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Article 101 TFEU now takes place in one forum is also better in an economic sense. 
It eliminates the cost and burden of the notification system. The companies no 
longer have to notify the EU Commission of – sometimes relatively harmless – 
agreements in order to “enhance the procedural enforceability and protect themselves 
against the deployment of the so-called ‘Euro-defence’ in a contractual dispute.”182 
Although some authors argued that the decentralised system did not change the 
outlook for private enforcement dramatically183 and that direct application of Article 
101(3) TFEU is not sufficient for an effective system of private enforcement,184 it is 
clear that the modernisation was a necessary step in that direction. Overall, the new 
regime has increased the “pressure to strengthen private enforcement”.185 Member 
States, in particular national courts, and undertakings have greater responsibility for 
enforcement.186 They no longer play a peripheral role but became full players in en-
forcing the competition rules (although their role complements that of public anti-
trust authorities).  
The fact that Regulation 1/2003 is only the first step in strengthening private en-
forcement before national courts was also clear to the EU Commission. In the 2004 
annual report on competition policy,187 it held that “many follow-up problems re-
mained, in particular, relating to the weaknesses of the substantive and procedural 
                                                        
182  J.S. Venit, Brave New World: The Modernization and Decentralization of Enforcement under 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (2003) 40(3) C.M.L.Rev, p. 553. 
183  A.P. Komninos argued that the possibility of an exemption under the old system rarely came into 
play in cases where damage was caused as a result of a serious violation of competition rules. It is 
more likely that damage was a result of either “very serious anticompetitive practices that were not 
previously notified and would in any case not benefit for Article 101(3) TFEU, or abuses of a domi-
nant position which is not affected by the reforms.” See: A.P. Komninos, EC Private Antitrust En-
forcement, Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts (2008) Hart Publishing, pp. 
141. 
184  See, for example, A. Riley, EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely – 
Thank you! Part One: Regulation 1 and the Notification Burden (2003) 24(11) E.C.L.Rev, pp. 612-
613; idem, EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely – Thank you! Part Two: 
Between the Idea and the Reality: Decentralisation under Regulation 1 (2003) 24(12) E.C.L.Rev, pp. 
665 et seq; J.S. Venit, Private Practice in the Wake of the Commission’s Modernization Program 
(2005) 32(2) Legal Issues of Economic Integration, p. 151; N. Reich, The ‘Courage’ doctrine: Encouraging 
or discouraging compensation for antitrust injuries? (2005) 42(1) C.M.L.Rev.; T. Eilmansberger, The 
Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules and Beyond: Reflections on 
the Utility and Feasibility of Stimulating Private Enforcement Through Legislative Actions, (2007) 
44(2) C.M.L.Rev, p. 434. 
185  H.-W. Micklitz, Consumers and Competition – Access and Compensation under EC Law (2006) 
17(1) European business law review. See also: M. Brkan, Procedural Aspects of Private Enforcement of 
EC Antitrust Law: heading Toward New Reforms? (2005) 28(4) World Competition, p. 481. 
186  F. Montag and A. Rosenfeld, A Solution to the Problems? Regulation 1/2003 and the Modernisation 
of Competition Procedure, (2003) 2 Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht. 
187  Commission’s Report on Competition Policy – 2004, SEC (2005) 805 final. See also for example 
speech by S. Norberg, director of Directorate-General Competition European Commission, of 20 
June 2003 (Regulation 1/2003 was “a necessary but not sufficient condition to promote private ac-
tion in Europe”). Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches, pp 29 (last con-
sulted on 3 May 2013) 
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framework of civil litigation in the EU, which is to a large extent governed by na-
tional laws.”188 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
For long time, enforcement of the EU competition rules has been seen as the respon-
sibility of the EU Commission (and national competition authorities). More than fifty 
years after the Treaty of Rome, this conviction seems to be changing both at EU and 
the national level of the Member States. With the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 
damage actions became an important pillar of the enforcement system of EU compe-
tition law. They compensate those who have been harmed by anticompetitive behav-
iour but they also contribute to the overall level of deterrence generated by the com-
petition regime. 
The reasons for the growing importance of private enforcement in the EU are 
three fold. First, the interest in enforcement of EU competition rules through dam-
age actions seems to be supported by the recognition that private enforcement can 
effectively complement public enforcement. Second, following the EU-enlargements 
in 2004, 2007 and 2013, the EU Commission is interested in involving national courts 
and EU citizens into the enforcement of EU competition law. Third, the reform 
brought by Regulation 1/2003 set a course towards increased private enforcement of 
European competition law. It abolished the notification system with regard to Article 
101 TFEU set out by former Regulation 17/62, and allowed national courts to apply 
Article 101 TFEU in its entirety.  
 
                                                        
188  A.P. Komminos, Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap? 
(2006) 3(1) C.L.Rev, p. 8. 
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Decentralised Enforcement of EU Competition Policy 
 
 
 
In order to get a complete picture of the private enforcement system of EU competi-
tion law, it is necessary to explore some basic elements of European and national 
legal systems, especially the relationship between them. In this context, the first sec-
tion will describe the role of national courts within the system of EU law. Basic EU 
principles, including the principle of national procedural autonomy, the twin princi-
ples of effectiveness and equivalence will be addressed in the second and third sec-
tions. 
The culmination of the EU’s principles and doctrines was the CJEU’s ruling in 
Francovich, in which a completely new damages remedy – state liability – was created 
and which grants individuals and companies the right to financial compensation from 
non-compliant Member States. Since the Court’s recognition of the right to damages 
against Member States for breach of EU rules, the question whether the same princi-
ple could be applied between private parties arose. It was not until 10 years later that 
the Court expressed its view in the Courage case and recognised an EU right to dam-
ages for breach of EU competition rules. Thus, the third section will regard private 
party action in the context of the EU legal order, and the fourth and fifth sections 
will focus particularly on the EU based right to damages. 
3.1 National courts addressed as EU Courts  
EU law is not an external regime for the Member States. Its evolution represents a 
creation of a distinctive legal system which operates alongside the legal systems of the 
Member States. As the CJEU explained in the Costa v ENEL case,1 the EU Treaty 
has created a new legal order that has been integrated into the legal system of Mem-
ber States and has become part of their valid law.2 Responsibility for its (effective) 
enforcement lies not only within the European Union’s own institutions but also 
within national courts of Member States. The fact that the responsibility for en-
forcement of EU law is put in the hands of national courts was made clear by the 
CJEU as early as the 1960s in the famous case Van Gend en Loos.3 In that case the 
                                                        
1  Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
2  The question that was referred to the CJEU by the Italian court was whether a provision of the 
Italian law, adopted after Italy had signed the Treaties of Rome 1957, had precedence over the con-
flicting EU law. Italy argued that a subsequent Italian law, by reason of the rule of lex posterior, should 
have taken priority. The CJEU held that, although the Italian domestic law had been adopted later 
and therefore the principle of lex-posterior could be believe to apply, the supremacy belonged to the 
EU law. 
3  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR. See also 
Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239: “Since the national courts have the function of apply-
ing the law, including Union law, they inevitably constitute an essential cog in the Union legal order. 
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CJEU established the so-called direct effect for the Treaty Articles, holding that the 
EU Treaty creates rights for individuals that should be upheld and protected by the 
national courts.4 As the provisions of the EU Treaty are directly applicable there is no 
need for the Member States to transpose them into domestic law. In other words, the 
Treaty provisions automatically penetrate the national systems. By the reasoning of 
this judgment, national courts of Member States function as EU courts5 (in the wider 
sense of the word) when it comes to the application of EU law. Every national court 
– even if it is taken to be an organ of the State – operates as an ordinary court in 
matters of EU law.6 In the words of Lang, the national courts are the “allies of the 
CJEU”.7 National judges have a duty to ensure that EU law is respected. In fact most 
of the court application of the EU law is in the hands of the national courts within 
the Member States. They apply EU law on a daily basis when dealing with litigations 
and requests, and they are obliged to uphold EU law when it clashes with national 
laws. If national courts carry out properly the duties and responsibilities imposed on 
them by the EU Treaty, it could be said that – in terms of quantity – they probably 
interpret and apply EU law more often than the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereinafter ‘CJEU’).8 The CJEU’s task – as an EU court – is to cooperate 
closely with the national courts and guide them in the interpretation of EU law so 
that it can be applied correctly. To ensure effective and uniform application of EU 
legislation, the national courts may – and sometimes must9 – in course of ‘preliminary 
reference procedure’10 refer to the CJEU to clarify the interpretation of EU law so 
that they can ascertain for example, whether their national legislation complies with 
that law.11 The CJEU’s reply takes the form of a judgment and the national court to 
which it is addressed is bound by the interpretation given. It should be noted that the 
                                                        
At the ‘crossroads’ of a number of legal systems, their role is to make an important contribution to 
the effective application of Union law and, eventually, to the development of the process of Euro-
pean integration. ” (par. 53) 
4  See also section 3.3.1. 
5  On the subject see: A-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet, J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The European Courts and 
National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (1997) Hart Publishing, Oxford; B. Hofstötter, Non-compliance 
of national courts, Remedies in European Community Law and Beyond (2005) Tź0ź&$VVHU3UHVV7KH+DJXH
pp. 14–16. 
6  G. Tesauro sees national courts as “the natural forum for EU law” (quoted in X. Groussot, The Role 
of the National Courts in the European Union: A Future Perspective, Swedish Institute for European Policy Stud-
ies, Rapport 10-2005 (November 2005) p. 7). F.G. Jacobs describes national courts as “EU courts of 
general jurisdiction” (see F.G. Jacobs, T. Deisenhofer, Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private 
Enforcement of EC Competition Rules, A Community Perspective, in C.-D. Ehlermann, European 
Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EU Antitrust Law (2003) Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, p. 214). 
7  Speech by J. Temple Lang (Institute of European Law) of 23 February 1996. Available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1996_019_en.html (last consulted on 3 May 2013). 
8  See speech by J. Temple Lang (Institute of European Law) of 23 February 1996. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1996_019_en.html (last consulted on 3 May 
2013).  
9  Article 267(3) TFEU clearly specifies that national courts involved in the final stage (against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy) are obliged to exercise the reference for a preliminary ruling. 
10  See on the topic C.O. Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure (1994) 
18(2) Fordham International Law Journal. 
11  Article 267 TFEU (formerly Article 234 EC). 
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use of preliminary references led to the establishment of a European-wide right for 
damages in competition cases12 – the CJEU is the only body which has the power to 
give a definitive ruling on the content of EU law. 
In addition to the ‘legal reason’ for involvement of national courts in the en-
forcement of EU law (reflected in the rationale of the principle of ‘direct effect’), 
there is also a ‘policy reason’ justifying national courts’ involvement.13 None of the 
EU courts have jurisdiction to rule on actions brought by individuals.14 As a creature 
of the EU Treaty, the EU courts can only hear actions and give remedies where pro-
vided for in the constitutive Treaties, and this does not include award of damages 
against neither a Member State nor individual. The EU Commission is not a court of 
law to protect individuals’ rights and therefore not empowered to award damages to 
an individual complainant. The only court systems to which a private party has access 
to claim for compensation are the national courts. Putting it differently, at the EU 
level, the EU Commission can investigate violations of competition law and can, by 
decision, fine enterprises it finds to have infringed it, but in the end only courts at the 
national level can give remedies to individuals and companies who have suffered loss 
due to the antitrust violation. Being part of the EU’s judiciary, national courts are the 
primary judicial guarantors of the rights that individuals have at the EU level.  
It is important to note that at the current stage of EU integration, even if rights 
are provided by EU law, remedies for their breach are available not only in national 
courts but also under national rules. In particular, when national courts deal with 
violations of EU antitrust law it will apply national rules of law and procedure. Euro-
pean law generally does not provide for remedies or procedural rules or sanctions 
that are necessary for its enforcement. There is no general EU competence for har-
monisation, and most authors agree that any attempts at harmonisation by means of 
EU legislative activity should remain selective and piecemeal.15 Therefore, civil and 
procedural rules vary substantially across EU Member States. In the last decade ef-
forts have been made to find a common ground for approximation or even harmoni-
sation of these rules across the EU. The EU institutions often highlight the need to 
reduce the current diversity in European tort law, in particular in the field of antitrust 
private enforcement, and the efforts of the EU Commission in this regard will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. Apart from the efforts made by the EU insti-
tutions, initiatives aimed at harmonising civil and procedural rules across the EU have 
been taken up by experts on private law, such as the attempts to draft the Principles 
of European Tort Law16 and other projects, such as the European Civil Code. In-
                                                        
12  See section 3.4.2. 
13  Speech by J. Temple Lang (Institute of European Law) of 23 February 1996. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1996_019_en.html (last consulted on 3 May 
2013). 
14  The only exception thereto is Article 263(4) TFEU (ex Article 230(4) EC) affording individuals 
standing in narrowly defined instances in actions for annulment before the CJEU. 
15  B. Hofstötter, Non-compliance of national courts, Remedies in European Community Law and Beyond (2005) 
7ź0ź&$VVUH3UHVV7KH+DJXHS 
16  See European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law: text and commentary (2005) Wien, 
Springer. 
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tense debates occurring among European scholars on the projects illustrate that har-
monisation in the area of private law is highly controversial.  
3.2 Principle of national procedural autonomy17 
All claims for damages based on breaches of EU competition law have to be filed in 
national courts and these are subject to national rules of private law and procedure 
raising a complex question about the extent of the EU expansion into the national 
sphere. When national courts apply EU law they do so according to national proce-
dural rules in conformity with the principle of ‘national autonomy’, the application of 
which is not absolute. 
3.2.1 Limits of national procedural autonomy – principle of equivalence and 
effectiveness 
As noted in the previous section, the EU legal system relies heavily on the national 
laws of the Member States for its enforcement. Traditionally, EU rights – including 
rights recognised in the case law of the CJEU – are enforced by the judicial institu-
tions (in addition to the administrative institutions) according to national rules. This 
approach to the enforcement of EU law, which is commonly referred to as ‘national 
procedural autonomy,’ is the starting point for granting remedies for breach of EU 
rights in the Member States. The principle has often been emphasised by the CJEU,18 
including in the famous cases of Courage19 and Manfredi20 in which the right to 
damages for victims of EU antitrust infringements was recognised.21 In the wording 
of the CJEU, “in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic 
legal system of each Member State to prescribe the detailed rules governing the exer-
cise of that right”.22 
The doctrine of national procedural autonomy is not only conditional (‘in the ab-
sence of EU rules on the subject’), but is also limited. In areas characterised by the 
‘absence of EU rules’, Member States have not retained their entire sovereignty and 
                                                        
17  It is generally accepted that the term ‘procedural’ is misleading. The scope of the term in reality 
covers all procedural and substantive rules at national level that can be used to enforce of EU law. 
This includes, besides procedural rules strictu sensu, jurisdictional and even remedial rules (see A.P. 
Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement, Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National 
Courts (2008) Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 147). The division between ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ 
rules is important because national substantive rules are subject to the principle of supremacy, while 
national procedural rules must comply only with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence (see 
F.G. Jacobs, T. Deisenhofer, Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Com-
petitin Rules, A Community Perspective, in C.D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds), European Competi-
tion Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (2003) Hart Publishing, Ox-
ford/Portland, Oregon, p. 216). 
18  Case 33/76, Rewe, [1976] ECR 1989; case 45/76, Comet, [1976] ECR 2043. 
19  Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297. 
20  Joined cases C-295/04-C-298/04 Manfredi [2006] ECP. 
21  See sections 3.4.2. and 3.4.4. 
22  Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, par. 29. 
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might be confronted by restraints imposed by EU law. In a decentralised system of 
application of EU law there is a risk that the rights which individuals could derive 
from European law would not only be less protected than the rights based on na-
tional law but would also undermine effective and uniform application of EU rules.23 
To minimise the risk, the Court formulated two requirements that apply to the Mem-
ber States procedural autonomy, known as ‘Rewe/Comet formula’. It held that the 
applicable national rules used to adjudicate claims based on EU law must not be less 
favourable than those related to similar claims of a domestic nature (‘principle of 
equivalence’), nor render it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise EU 
rights (‘principles of effectiveness’).24 
From the perspective of national courts, the first element of the Rewe/Comet-
formula – known as the principle of equivalence – permits national procedural rules 
to be applied provided they are not less favourable than those which apply to domes-
tic actions.25 In the context of civil litigation based on a breach of EU competition 
rules, a national court must not apply national rules if they are less favourable than 
those governing the damage action based on the national competition law, as has 
been illustrated in the Manfredi case.26 In Manfredi – the case where the scope of the 
EU right to antitrust damages has been clarified – the CJEU referred to the principle 
by saying that it must be possible to award exemplary or punitive damages, pursuant 
to actions founded on EU competition rules, if such damages may be awarded pursu-
ant to similar actions founded on national law.27 
The second element of the Rewe/Comet-formula – commonly referred to as the 
principle of effectiveness – provides that national procedural rules may not render 
virtually impossible or excessively difficult28 the exercise of rights that the national 
courts are obliged to protect by EU law. Like the principle of equivalence, it is based 
on a presumption that it is the Member States that provide the procedural rules that 
national courts apply to substantive EU law. It implicitly assumes that the procedural 
rules and remedies provided under the national judicial orders are sufficient to safe-
guard EU rights. In contrast to the principle of equivalence, which by requiring an 
extension of judicial protection already being offered, is deferential to the procedural 
prerogative of the Member States, the principle of effectiveness is deferential by the 
                                                        
23  F.G. Jacobs, T. Deisenhofer, Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Com-
petitin Rules, A Community Perspective, in C.D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds.), European Competi-
tion Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (2003) Hart Publishing, Ox-
ford/Portland, Oregon, p. 215. 
24  Case 33/76, Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, par. 5; Comet [1976] ECR 2043, par. 13. 
25  See, for example, case C-326/96, Levez [1988] E.C.R. I-7835. 
26  Joined cases C-295/04-C-298/04 Manfredi [2006] ECP. 
27  Joined cases C-295/04-C-298/04 Manfredi [2006] ECP, par. 93. 
28  In its earliest cases the Court used the expression to describe that national procedural rules shall not 
make it ‘impossible in practice’ (Case C-33/76 Rewe and Case C-45/76 Comet) to exercise rights 
conferred by EU law. One of these phrases was also followed by an ‘excessively difficult’ expression 
(Case C-199/82 San Giorgio). In its later case-law the CJEU preferred to use the expression as ‘vir-
tually impossible’ (Joined Cases C-205-215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor) or simply ‘impossible’ (Case 
C-228/98 Charalampos Dounias v. Ypourgio Oikonomikon). 
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way it is formulated, i.e. as negative requirement.29 It requires that national procedural 
autonomy might be limited for the interest of promoting the effectiveness of EU law. 
Consequently, the procedural rules that a national government has instructed a na-
tional court to apply should be set aside when their application would detract the 
effectiveness of Union law to an unacceptable extent. The CJEU developed a rich 
case law on examination particular aspects of national rules in order to assess whether 
they are compatible with the conditions of effective protection. In the sphere of 
competition law remedies, an example of a rule of national law that was found to 
neglect the EU requirement of effectiveness was the in pari delicto principle. The prin-
ciple was a theoretical basis of the English ruling in Crehan v Courage30 – the case in 
which the court recognised the existence of a right to damages for breach of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. According to the principle, a party to an illegal contract is pre-
vented from claiming damages against the other party to that contract. In Crehan v 
Courage31 the court stressed that the effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU would be put 
at risk if individuals were unable to claim damages.32 Thereupon the CJEU consid-
ered the English bar to a damage action brought by a party to an illegal contract and 
declared that such an ‘absolute bar’ is incompatible with the EU principle of effec-
tiveness. It did not raise an objection to the English rule preventing a claim for dam-
ages itself, but to the absolute character of the rule. In particular, under EU law, any 
person – including a contracting party – is, in principle, entitled to claim damages for 
breach of EU competition rules from the other contracting party.33 A bar in bringing 
a claim for compensation (such as the English rules of in pari delicto) could only be 
admissible if the claimant bears ‘significant responsibility’ for the breach in question. 
34 Traditionally English law construes the in pari delicto rule strictly: where a defendant 
is sued under an agreement that is prohibited under Article 81, he may rely on that 
prohibition as a defence. Only a person who is not a party to a prohibited agreement 
may sue those who are parties to it for the damage caused to him by their operation 
of the agreement.35 Hence, as far as the English law is concerned, Crehan could not 
claim damages arising from an illegal agreement. However, following the CJEU rul-
ing, the Crehan case was remitted to the English High Court for a trial in accordance 
with the CJEU's view that the Court of Appeal misapplied the English principle of ‘in 
pari delicto,’ and to ensure effective protection of Crehan's rights under Article 101 
TFEU. 
                                                        
29  M. Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice, Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation (2004) 
Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 26. 
30  Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297. 
31  [2001] ECR I-6297. 
32  2001] ECR I-6297, par. 26. 
33  G. Monti, Anticompetitive agreements: the innocent party’s right to damages (2002) 27(3) E.L.Rev. 
34  Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, par. 36. 
35  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2011) 4th edition, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 1217.  
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3.2.2 Legal basis for intervention into ‘national procedural autonomy’ 
The legal basis for the scope of EU intervention into procedural autonomy is shaky 
and the commentators are divided on the subject.36 There is no express legal basis in 
the TFEU and the CJEU does not have jurisdiction to rule directly on questions of 
national (procedural) law. Some authors argue that according to CJEU’s case law the 
requirements of equivalence and effectiveness could be seen simply as specific mani-
festations of the Member States general duty of loyal cooperation to the Union, 
which is also binding upon the national courts with regards to matters that fall within 
their jurisdiction (the duty of national courts under Article 4(3) TFEU).37 Another 
position is that the Court’s case law is based on a combination of those two princi-
ples, as well as a third, rather more general principle of EU law, the principle of effec-
tive judicial protection. Stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, the principle of effective judicial protection has been enshrined in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights as a fundamental human 
right.38  
Although, the views of the legal basis for the EU intervention are diverse, the is-
sue is not of great importance in the context of the private enforcement. All the ap-
proaches mentioned provide a general basis for the EU intervention in the process of 
decentralised enforcement. The facts that are relevant in this context are the follow-
ing: first, the Member States’ autonomy is not absolute.39 Second, through the appli-
cation of the Rewe test, the EU legal order provides for a level of homogeneity and 
convergence in the field of legal remedies. The Rewe test is one of the approaches to 
the ‘Europeanisation’ of national procedural law. In contrast to the approach of the 
creation of unified or harmonized remedies, the Rewe test does not require replace-
ment of national procedural rules by EU standards. Instead, it leaves a scope for 
divergences in the fields of legal remedies above the minimum level of protection 
required by EU law through the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The 
national courts are obliged to apply EU law, as interpreted by the CJEU,40 and if 
                                                        
36  See: M. Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice, Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation, 
(2004) Hart Publishing, Oxford, pp. 53–54; F.G. Jacobs, T. Deisenhofer, Procedural Aspects of the 
Effective Private Enforcement of EC Competition Rules, A Community Perspective, in C.-D. 
Ehlermann, European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EU Antitrust Law 
(2003) Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, Oregon, p. 217. 
37  Case 33/76, Rewe [1976] ECR 1989 (par. 5), Comet [1976] ECR 2043 (par. 12). Similarly, it was 
stated in Factortame (par. 19), Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965.  
38  In particular, Article 13 requires the State to provide an effective national remedy for individuals 
whose rights are violated (Article 13 of ECHR, is actually based on Article 8 of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. It has also been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental 
rights of the European Union.) 
39  Due to the EU requirements of effectiveness and equivalence, the appropriateness of the term 
‘national procedural autonomy’ has been questioned (see C. Kakouris, Do the Member States pos-
sess judicial procedural ‘autonomy’? (1997) 34(6) C.M.L.Rev). W. Van Gerven has suggested that is 
more appropriate to refer to national procedural ‘competence’ instead of national procedural ‘auton-
omy’ (see W. Van Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures (2000) 37(3) C.M.L.Rev, p. 502). 
40  Article 267 TFEU (formerly Article 234 EC) enables the courts or tribunals of Member States to 
refer points of EU law to the CJEU for interpretation. 
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necessary set aside any obstacles arising from national law. In this way the CJEU has 
intruded into the area of the Member States’ procedural autonomy by developing 
some limitation to the principle with the aim of ensuring a balance between the ob-
jective of protecting national procedural autonomy and the need to protect EU rights 
and the effectiveness of Union law.  
Here it should be emphasised that the Rewe test is of great relevance to the dis-
cussion on EU right to antitrust damages, which was established by the CJEU’s ruling 
in the Crehan case. As will be explained later, in the Courage case the CJEU intro-
duced a new EU right to damages, but it did not go so far as in the Francovich case 
in which state liability was established. In particular, the CJEU did not introduce 
common Union conditions of liability. Instead, it held that national court should 
apply national rules provided that those rules comply with the established Rewe test. 
3.3 Private party action in the context of EU legal order 
 
In purely doctrinal terms, it is important to understand the rationale behind a system 
of private party actions in the EU legal system. The CJEU, whose duty is to “ensure 
that in the interpretation and the application of this Treaty, the law is observed,”41 
felt a need to maximise the effective enforcement of EU law by judicial means. The 
development of principles of direct effect and supremacy of EU law represented the 
CJEU’s first major contribution to this sphere.42 Recognition of ‘private party action 
for damages’ in the field of EU competition law was an expected follow-on. It was 
stressed many times by the CJEU that ‘full effectiveness’ can only be given to EU 
competition law if private parties have direct rights of action against an antitrust of-
fender. It should also be remembered that although citizens of the EU may bring 
Member States to court for failing to give effect to Union law, the possibility of 
bringing a damage action against an individual for infringement of EU competition 
rules until 2001 was unclear, if not uncertain. 
3.3.1 Private enforcement as up-gradation of principle of direct effect 
The idea that individuals should have a right to compensation for damages caused by 
infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is rooted in the special nature of the EU 
legal order. As mentioned earlier, in Van Gend en Loos43 the CJEU explained that 
the EU Treaty constituted “a new legal order of international law,44 which has the 
more far-reaching effects than other international treaties. While traditional interna-
tional law governs mutual obligations between states, the subjects of the EU legal 
                                                        
41  Article 19 TEU. 
42  J. Steiner, From direct effects to Francovich: shifting means of enforcement of Community Law 
(1993) 18(1) E.L.Rev. 
43  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR. 
44  O. Spiermann, The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making of the European 
Community Legal Order (1999) 10(4) European journal of international law, pp. 765–766. 
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order are not only the Member States, but also their nationals”.45 In particular, EU 
law recognises private parties (i.e. both natural and legal persons) as subjects of the 
new legal order. This legal order imposes obligations on private parties but also in-
tends to confer upon them rights, which national courts have to protect. 46 In this 
context, the CJEU in Van Gend en Loos47 established the principle of ‘direct effect’, 
and enabled individuals to bring an action for the breach of EU law directly before 
their national courts.48 Not all EU provisions produce ‘direct effect’, but the ones 
that do can be relied on before the national courts without the need for national 
legislation.  
By introducing the concept of ‘direct effect’ into EU law, the CJEU set up a 
mechanism for the individual enforcement of EU law and recognised private en-
forcement as an important complement to the public enforcement of EU law.49 As it 
explained, “the vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to 
an effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 258 and 
259 TFEU (ex Articles 226 and 227 EC), to the diligence of the EU Commission and 
of the Member States.”50 In other words, in order to ensure effective compliance 
with obligations imposed by the EU Treaty, rights should be entrusted not just to the 
EU Commission and the Member States, but also to individuals. It has to be stressed 
that the motivation for conferring upon individuals the right to bring actions before 
national courts was plainly not to confer rights on individuals per se, but rather to 
achieve the effective enforcement of EU law, i.e. effective compliance by Member 
States with their EU obligations.51 In Van Gend en Loos, the CJEU explained that it 
would violate the obligations that all Member States undertook by signing the Treaty, 
if a Member State were able to take measures contrary to the applicable EU law. 
Ezrachi talks about “public value of private actions.”52 National courts have become 
                                                        
45  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR, par.12. 
46  [1963] ECR, at. 11. 
47  [1963] ECR. 
48  In this case, the CJEU ruled that Article 30 TFEU (Ex Article 12 of the EEC Treaty) can be invoked 
directly by a private individual against the state authorities before a national court, even though the 
provision has not been transformed into domestic law. 
49  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC antitrust rules (SEC (2005) 1732), pp. 8. See also S. Drake, Scope of Courage and the 
Principle of Individual Liability for Damages: Further Development of the Principle of Effective Ju-
dicial Protection by the Court of Justice (2006) 31(6) E.L.Rev, pp. 842–843; A. Ezrachi, From Cour-
age v. Crehan to the White Paper – The changing landscape of European private enforcement and 
the possible implications for Article 82 litigation, in M-O. Mackenrodt, B. Conde Gallego, S. 
Enchelmaier (eds), Abuse of dominant position: new interpretation, new enforcement mechanisms? (2008) 5 MPI 
Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Springer, Berlin, pp. 117–118. 
50  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR. 
51  See P. Nebbia, Damages Actions for the infringement of EC Competition law: Compensation or de-
terrence?, (2008) 33(1) E.L.Rev, p. 28; R. Nazzini, The Objective of Private remedies in EU Compe-
tition Law (2011) 4(4) G.C.L.R., p.136. 
52  A. Ezrachi, From Courage v. Crehan to the White Paper –The changing landscape of European 
private enforcement and the possible implications for Article 82 litigation, in M.-O. Mackenrodt, B. 
Conde Gallego, S. Enchelmaier (eds.), Abuse of dominant position: new interpretation, new enforcement mecha-
nisms? (2008) 5 MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp. 117–120. 
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“primary enforcers with individuals playing the additional role of EU policeman.”53 
For Jacobs the judgement in Van Gend en Loos sets up the national courts as “in-
struments for securing compliance with EU obligations.”54 Similarly, for Nebbia 
empowering individuals to invoke EU law in national courts was not driven by the 
goal of conferring a subjective right to a particular individual. The judicial protection 
of the individual rights was seen rather as an instrument to ensure the effective com-
pliance of the states with their obligation.55 Private litigation has been seen as a 
mechanism for the effective enforcement of EU rules, and therefore as the corner-
stone for the functioning of the EU legal order.  
Concerning EU competition provisions, they were held by the CJEU to produce 
such direct effects at an early stage in the development of the Union. In BRT v Sa-
bam,56 on a reference from a national court, the CJEU ruled that since Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU are directly effective in all Member States, they create directly effec-
tive rights and – as any other enforceable rights – they can be invoked before a na-
tional court, in principle without the interference of the EU Commission or the 
European Courts. Although in the past national courts could already consider that 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU applicable directly between individuals, following judge-
ment BRT v SABAM, the ‘could’ became a ‘must’ under EU law.57 By expressing the 
direct effect of EU competition rules,58 the CJEU confirmed that Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU were part of the national law that could be invoked before national courts. 
In this way it encouraged national courts to enforce the application of EU competi-
tion law. After all, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and the derived rights, decentralised 
EU law to the level of the national courts. National courts were endowed with the 
power to exercise a ‘concurrent jurisdiction’59 with the EU Commission to enforce 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.60 The enforcement of EU competition law is the first 
duty of the EU Commission, but it is a duty that the EU Commission alone cannot 
accomplish fully. 
                                                        
53  S. Drake, Scope of Courage and the Principle of Individual Liability for Damages: Further Devel-
opment of the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection by the Court of Justice (2006) 31(6) E.L.Rev, 
pp. 842–843. 
54  F.G. Jacobs, Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law (1984) 82(5) Michigan law review, p. 1373. 
Although in the article the author refers to the state obligations to comply with the EU rules, it can 
be interpreted in a broader sense. 
55  X. Groussot, General principles of Community Law (2006) Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, p. 240. 
56  Case 127/73 BRT v. Sabam [1974] ECR 51. 
57  6HH90LOXWLQRYLýThe ‘Right to Damages’ under EU Competition Law: from Courage v. Crehan to the Whiter 
Paper (2010) Wolters Kluwer, pp. 53–54. 
58  That EU competition rules have a direct effect now follows also from Arts 1 and 6 of Regulation 
1/2003. 
59  On the subject see: M. Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice, Issues of Harmonisation and 
Differentiation (2004) Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 361; M. Andenas, F. Jacobs, European Community 
Law in the English Courts (1998) Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 266–267. 
60  Consequences of concurrent jurisdiction between the Commission and the national courts are dealt 
with by the Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 (before the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 the 
main principles dealing with the issue were established by the CJEU in Delimits (Case C-234/89) 
and Masterfoods (Case 344/98) and elaborated by the Commission in its 1993 Cooperation Notice.) 
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Establishing the principle of direct effect was arguably one of the most important 
and revolutionary decisions given by the Court.61 In words of Mancini and Keeling, 
“if the European Union still exists 50 or 100 years from now, historians will look 
back on Van Gend en Loos as the unique judicial contribution to the making of 
Europe.”62 It is important to note that the importance of the direct effect is also 
reflected in the evolution of a mechanism of private enforcement of EU rights. There 
is a considerable link between the doctrine of direct effect and the enforcement of 
EU law.63 As mentioned above, the rationale for the introduction of the principle of 
direct effect into EU law was to achieve effective enforcement of EU law. In addi-
tion, once it is accepted that EU law is directly effective (principle of direct effect) 
and prevails over national law (principle of supremacy), it is open for an individual 
with a right under EU law to bring proceedings in the national courts and thus to 
make use of national legal remedies to enforce it. The individuals who have their 
rights enforced by national judges – together with the court – become principal ac-
tors in that level of enforcement.  
3.3.2 Union right to compensation as means of enforcement 
The EU based individual right to compensation has been developed, in the first 
place, as means for effective enforcement of EU law. The limitations of the principles 
of direct effect to achieve effective enforcement of EU law when Member States had 
failed to fulfil their obligations64 has led the CJEU to establish a new means of pri-
vate enforcement – ‘state liability system’. In particular, in the Francovich case65 – the 
case that arose from a preliminary reference made by an Italian Court – the main 
issue was whether the workers injured by the failure of the Italian government to 
implement a EU Commission Directive to protect workers in bankrupt firms may 
bring an action for damages against the Italian government. The CJEU had no doubt 
that the claimants had the right to damages. The question was whether there was a 
remedy against the state that had failed to implement the directive, and thus denied 
the claimants the benefit of the EU right. By giving a positive reply, the CJEU laid 
down an obligation upon national courts that a new remedy of EU law must be avail-
able in national legal systems.66 It held that the full effectiveness of EU rules would 
be impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if 
individuals were unable to obtain redress when a Member State infringes its EU law 
                                                        
61  D. Chalmers, G. Davies, G. Monti, European Union Law: Cases and Materials (2010) second edition 
Cambridge University Press, p. 145. 
62  G.F. Mancini and D.T. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice (1994) 57(2) The 
modern law review, p. 183. 
63  See A.P. Komninos, New Prospects for Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law: Courage v. 
Crehan and the Community Right to Damages, (2002) 39(3) C.M.L.Rev, pp. 471–472. 
64  On the developments of ‘effective enforcement of Union law’ prior to Francovich see: D. Curtin, 
Directives: The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individual Rights (1990) 15(3) C.M.L.Rev. 
65  Case C-6 and 9/90, [1991] ECR I-5357, [1993] 2 CMLR 66. 
66  The conditions for existence of remedy are the same as those for rights (see: A.H. Türk, The concept of 
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obligations.67 It premised ‘state liability’ on two principles: (i) a principle of effective 
judicial protection of the rights conferred by Union law and (ii) a principle of effec-
tiveness (‘effet utile’) of EU law.68 There are different opinions on the relationship 
between the two principles. For Nebbia for example, the basis for state liability is the 
‘principle of judicial protection’ and ‘enforcement of Union law’ only the additional 
basis.69 She bases her argument on the paragraph 36 of Francovich ruling in which 
the CJEU stated that a further basis for the obligation of Member States to make 
good such loss and damage is to be found in Article 5 (ex Article 10 EC), according 
to which Member States are required to take all appropriate measures to ensure ful-
filment of their obligations under EU law. Among these is the obligation to nullify 
consequences of a breach of Union law.70 In Steiner’s71 view the breakthrough in 
Francovich was not so much in the fact that individuals were entitled to seek com-
pensation for a Member State’s violation of EU law, but the fact that their claim to 
damages was independent of the principle of direct effect. In Steiner’s opinion in the 
Francovich case the CJEU could have easily found the provisions in question to be 
of direct effect, but did not do so because it wished to establish a remedy for Member 
States’ violations of Union law that did not depend on the need to prove direct effect. 
The reason behind this was that if individuals were not able to recover damages when 
their rights were violated by Member States, then the protection of their rights would 
be undermined, but also the full effectiveness of Union provisions would be af-
fected.72 The prospect of state liability would provide States with the incentive to 
comply fully with the duties imposed upon them by EU legal order in knowledge 
that, in the case of failure, their unlawful activity will be ‘punished’. Creation of a legal 
remedy, in the words of Steiner, “was a ‘small step’ to guarantee their full effect by 
holding states liable in damages for infringement of those rights for which they were 
responsible.”73 Looking at it from another perspective, the national courts are the 
guardians of the effectiveness of EU law under Article 4(3) TEU (ex Article 10 EC). 
According to Groussot, there is an interaction between the principle of effective 
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judicial protection and the requirement of the effectiveness of EU law.74 In other 
words, there exists a strong link between the principle of effective protection of 
rights conferred by EU law and other principles developed by the Court in the light 
of Article 5 (such as principle of state liability). An effective remedy offered to the 
individual for the protection of his EU rights contributes to enforcing the correct 
application and the enforcement of EU law.  
Despite of different opinions on the nature of the relationship between the prin-
ciple of effective judicial protection and the principle of effectiveness, most of legal 
scholars agree that the judgement in Francovich presents a shift in the CJEU’s juris-
prudence towards a more remedies-oriented case-law,75 in which judicial protection 
of individuals in national courts acquired a central role.76 The role of the principle of 
“full effectiveness of EU law” does not automatically mean that the right to damages 
in EU law has the objective of punishing and deterring perpetrators of public 
wrongs.77 The primary function of private action remains compensation. In the 
AGM case the CJEU emphasised that the purpose of state liability is not deterrence 
or punishment but compensation for the damage suffered by individuals as a result of 
breaches of EU law by Member States.78 With regard to the competition rules (Arti-
cles 101 and 102 TFEU), the EU Commission and national competition authorities 
are entrusted with the punishment and deterrence of the perpetrators as their primary 
function in the area of enforcement of EU competition law.79 
3.4 Union right to compensation for violations of EU competition rules 
Following the case law started with Francovich judgement, the CJEU has extended 
the scope of non-contractual liability from national authorities to the EU administra-
tion itself,80 but not to the private parties. Since there is no reference in Articles 101 
or 102 TFEU to compensation as a remedy for contracting parties or third parties for 
loss sustained as a result of their infringement, it would mean that it is for the na-
tional courts, while applying their domestic law, to determine whether compensation 
can be obtained and, if so, which conditions should be fulfilled. However, in 1999, it 
became clear that that is not the case. In the Courage ruling,81 and later in Manfredi, 
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76  On the subject see M. Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice, Issues of Harmonisation and 
Differentiation (2004) Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 235. 
77  See R. Nazzini, The Objective of Private remedies in EU Competition Law (2011) 4(4) G.C.L.R. 
p. 138. 
78  C-470/03, AGM Cos.Met v. Tarmo Lehtinen and Finland, Defensor Legis No. 4 (2007), par. 88. 
79  See Council Regulation No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002. 
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the CJEU confirmed that EU law provides for the possibility of actions for damages 
in cases of breach of the EU Treaty’s competition provisions.  
3.4.1 The impulsion g iven to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
The CJEU recognition of the right to damages to victims of EU antitrust infringe-
ments derives from a long line of progressive case law of the CJEU, and was “eagerly 
awaited.”82 In 1997, in GT-Link,83 the CJEU held in the context of a breach of Arti-
cle 106 TFEU (ex Article 86 EC), read in conjunction with article 102 TFEU, if the 
Francovich criteria are satisfied an individual can claim reparation of loss caused. 
Although in this case the Court was clearly dealing with the state liability,84 it empha-
sised the existence of the rights conferred upon individuals by Article 102 TFEU. It 
did not consider what Article 102 TFEU seeks to protect but concluded simply “that 
even within the framework of Article 106 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU has direct effect 
and confers on individuals rights which the national courts must protect.” Similarly, it 
would seem clear that Article 101 TFEU is designed to prevent undertakings exploit-
ing their customers by, for example engaging in a price-fixing cartel.  
The first overt suggestion of extension of the principle of state liability and rec-
ognition of a general principle of individual liability came in 1993, shortly after Fran-
covich. It was brought up by Advocate General Van Gerven in H. Banks & Co Ltd v 
British Coal Corporation,85 a case on abuse of dominant position. The Court was 
asked to rule, inter alia, on whether EU law imposes on national courts a duty to 
award damages in respect of losses sustained by a company as a result of breaches of 
the competition rules of the ECSC Treaty (and in the alternative, Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU) by another company. The CJEU in a cautious ruling avoided discussing 
these questions by finding that the relevant provisions that were at issue in that case 
did not have direct effect in the first place, and thus did not create directly enforce-
able rights. Considering the availability of remedies as such was therefore irrelevant. 
However, Van Gerven took the opportunity to suggest the recognition of an EU 
right to damages, although not in the expressed terms. Analysing Francovich liability 
as part of general system of EU law,86 he argued that individuals are liable for breach 
of EU law. A mere infringement of the rules is sufficient to establish liability. Accord-
ingly, in his opinion, the Francovich principle should also apply when “an individual 
infringes a provision of Union law to which he is subject, thereby causing loss and 
damage to another individual.”87  
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Ltd v. British Coal Corporation [1994] ECR I-1209 at pars. 36 to 54. 
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Although the issues raised in the opinion of Van Gerven were not addressed by 
the CJEU in the case of Banks,88 the opinion provided an important argument in 
favour of recognition of the principle of individual liability. Referring to the rationale 
for the introduction of the principle of state liability, he stated that “the full effect of 
EU law would be impaired if the former individual or undertaking did not have the 
possibility of obtaining reparation from the party who can be held responsible for the 
breach of EU law”. In his view, the availability of remedy is not only the logical con-
sequence of horizontal direct effect, but also an important step in the more effective 
enforcement of decentralised competition law.89 
3.4.2 Courage v. Crehan (a new EU remedy of ‘individual liability’ in the 
field of EU competition law) 
After 40 years of application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in 2001, in Courage v 
Crehan90 the CJEU finally recognised that a right to damages is available not only to 
individuals (i.e. companies) acting against the Member States, but also to individuals 
acting against each other, as a result of the direct effect of Article 101 TFEU. Until 
that time, no ruling of the CJEU had given an explicit answer to the question of 
whether or not there was a right to compensation.91 The reason for the late pro-
nouncement of the ECJU’s approach to the availability of compensation for in-
fringement of EU competition rules can be found in the fact that prior to this event 
the CJEU had never been asked to rule on the issue. As said above, the right to dam-
ages is not explicitly provided in TFEU. Most of the cases involving private rights 
come before the CJEU through the mechanisms of preliminary ruling. Taking into 
account that the CJEU may give a preliminary ruling only on questions referred to it 
by the national courts, 92 it is easy to understand that recognition of the right (and its 
clarification) is dependent on the occasions of the cases brought before national 
courts and the initiative of these courts to refer questions to the CJEU.93 Contrary to 
the CJEU’s rich case law on state liability to date, there has been a lack of case law 
concerning the liability of individuals for breach of EU competition rules.94 The 
reason for this is to be found in the fact that unlike the state liability, individuals’ 
liability is not a remedy specific to EU legal system. Rules on individuals’ liability have 
                                                        
88  See also the Opinion of A-G Van Gerven of 27 October 1993 in Case C-128/92 H.J.Banks & Co 
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developed for centuries in all legal systems. Unless evidence to the contrary is pro-
vided, they can be applied for the infringements of the EU competition rules.  
The Courage case arose from a preliminary reference made by the English Court 
of Appeal in the context of a tied-pub contract. In that case Crehan entered into 
agreements to take leases of two public houses from Innterpreneur. The leases in-
cluded a beer tie which required Crehan to purchase beer exclusively from Courage. 
Courage sued Crehan in the English High Court for unpaid beer supplies. Crehan, as 
part of his defence, contested that the ‘beer tie’ was contrary to Article 101 TFEU. In 
addition, he launched a counter-claim for damages, arguing that the failure of his 
business and his ability to pay debts originated from these illegal agreements. From 
the point of view of private antitrust enforcement, the Courage case is an ‘a-typical 
case.’95 It does not concern a claim made by a third party (competition, indirect pur-
chaser or consumer) who wants the restrictive practice to be stopped and reparation 
to be made in order to safeguard his freedom of action under the most favourable 
competition circumstances. In contrast, the case concerns a claim for damages made 
by a contracting party who relied on EU law to get rid of a contract with terms unfa-
vourable to him. Since Crehan was essentially seeking to escape a bad bargain, some 
believe that from the point of view of antitrust enforcement the case is not only ‘a-
typical’, but also the CJEU’s ‘plaintiff favourable’ decision issued in the case should 
be avoided.96 In terms of private enforcement, the interest should be in encouraging 
those who are damaged by anti-competitive conduct to take action, and not encour-
aging those who chose to enter into anti-competitive agreements and then find that 
they will not receive the benefits that they were expected. The latter are not the 
“champions of consumer welfare.”97 
Coming back to the case, the problem with Crehan’s argument was that under 
English law if the courts were to declare the agreement to be illegal, Crehan would 
not be allowed to seek damages from Courage. There were two issues of the case that 
formed the context of the refusal. First, under English law a party to an illegal agree-
ment could not claim damages from the other party. Under English law both parties 
to a void contract are considered to be equally at fault: and where the parties are 
equally at fault the defendant retains the enrichment and no action for restitution will 
lie.98 Accordingly, an antitrust defendant could, in principle, shield himself from li-
ability to culpable plaintiffs with the equitable defence of in pari delicto. In the early 
case of Holman v Johnson99 Judge Mansfield set out the rationale for the in pari delicto 
defence. After saying that the court would not lend its aid to a man who founds his 
cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act, he continued that if the plaintiff 
and defendant were to change sides and the defendant were to bring his action 
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against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the advantage, for both were equally 
at fault. The application of this general rule of in pari delicto became even more rigid in 
the 19th century and continued to be applied in the 20th century.100 Following this 
rule, the English Court in a number of cases in the 1990s denied that a plaintiff who 
has been party to an illegal agreement has a right to damages.101 Despite the general 
reluctance to allow a plaintiff to recover for injuries caused by his own wrongdoing, 
the English law did accept some narrow exceptions,102 such as the case when the 
claimant belongs to the vulnerable class the statute seeks to protect.103 If a party to an 
illegal agreement is one of those that statute seeks to protect, then the Courts’ assis-
tance is not denied to that party claiming damages. For this exception to be applicable 
it is necessary to determine whether the statute in question aims at the protection of 
people like the plaintiff.104 According to earlier case law, the English court was of the 
opinion that scope of Article 101 TFEU is limited to the protection of competitors. 
As it stated in Gibbs Mew Plc v Gemmell,105 “it is third party competitors who are 
intended to be protected by provisions such as Article 101 TFEU” and not the par-
ties to the illegal agreement who are “the cause and not the victims of the distortion, 
restriction or prevention of competition.”106 This reasoning is in symmetry with the 
opinion previously discussed that underlined the encouragement of concluding anti-
competitive agreements if the contracting parties were able to rely on Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU in order to claim damages for their participation in a prohibited 
agreement. It leads to the second issue of the refusal of standing to Crehan. Article 
101 TFEU had been interpreted by English court as protecting only third parties and 
not co-contractors. Therefore, feeling bound by English law, the Court would have 
to deny the plaintiff standing to sue for alleged damages. When the case reached the 
appellant court, the Court of Appeal referred it to the CJEU. The Court of Appeal 
had not doubted that a right to damages for breach of competition law was avail-
able.107 The question referred to the CJEU was, inter alia, whether a person in Cre-
han’s position, who may be party to a contract that is illegal under Article 101 TFEU, 
has a right to damages despite the fact that the rule under English law precludes it.  
The CJEU recognised that ‘any individual’ injured by conduct that infringed EU 
competition rules can claim damages before a national court, even in those cases in 
which he is “a party to a contract that is liable to restrict or distort competition”.108 
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Its statement was supported by a three-stage argument109 that identifies EU law as 
supranational law.110 First, the CJEU commenced its analysis with a reference to the 
EU legal order, whose rules impose burdens on individuals, but at the same time 
grant them rights.111 In its second argument, the CJEU stressed the centrality of the 
competition rules to the Union project, i.e. the functioning of the internal market.112 
This centrality was explained by reference to the old Article 3(1)(g) EC113 but also 
Article 101(2) TFEU. The Court thereby stressed that Article 101(2) was drafted in 
order to explicitly provide that any agreements or decisions that contravene Article 
101(1) TFEU are to be automatically void. The defence of nullity can be raised before 
national courts.114 This fundamental principle allowed the Court to decide that any 
individual (including the contracting parties) must be able to rely on a breach of Arti-
cle 101(1) TFEU before a national court.115 If it was argued earlier that a case that 
involves a claim made by a third party is ‘a-typical’ from a point of view of private 
enforcement of competition rules, it is ‘typical’ from the point of view of EU compe-
tition law.116 In the third argument, the CJEU reaffirmed that Articles 101(1) and 
102(2) TFEU have “direct effects in relations between individuals and create rights 
for the individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard.”117  
Having recognised the right to damages for the breach of EU competition rules, 
the CJEU went on to explain the rationale for such recognition. To do so, it referred 
to the ‘full effectiveness’ of Article 101 TFEU. In particular, it held that the full effec-
tiveness of the EU competition rules would be put at risk if it were not open to any 
individual (also on a co-contractor) to claim damages for loss caused to him by a 
contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition.118 Ironically, the par-
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ties that are best situated to bring private antitrust actions are often those who have 
themselves been involved in anticompetitive activity. On one hand, they might pos-
sess evidence of illegality that makes past violations easier to detect and prove. On 
the other hand, they might influence entities contemplating joint anticompetitive ac-
tivity to be less willing to trust each other. The CJEU continued that actions for dam-
ages before the national courts can make a significant contribution to the mainte-
nance of effective competition in the EU.119 By the term ‘significant contribution,’ it 
refers to the role of private actions for the efficiency of antitrust enforcement, with a 
view of maintaining effective competition in Europe. It follows from the CJEU’s 
reasoning that if ‘any individual’ can claim compensation for harm suffered on the 
basis of a infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the ‘full effectiveness’ of EU 
competition rules and the enforcement system of competition law would increase. 
In the context of ‘full effectiveness’, Komninos talks about a double facet of the 
term used in Courage ruling. One is EU-law specific and the other is competition law 
specific. The first, EU-law specific, is that when individuals pursue their EU rights in 
the national court, in addition to serving their private interest, their civil damages 
claims are also of an instrumental character for EU interest. Acting in the public in-
terest, they become ‘the principal guardians’ of the legal integrity of Union law in 
Europe. In addition, by being able to effectively bring a damages claim, individuals in 
Europe are brought closer to competition rules and will be more actively involved in 
the enforcement of the rules.120 The second facet, competition law specific, refers to 
the ‘private attorney-general’ role of individuals in antitrust cases. In such a system, 
private enforcement complements public enforcement.121 Based on the second facet 
of the effectiveness of EU competition law, or in particular, in the words of the 
CJEU in the Courage decision “a significant contribution to the maintenance of ef-
fective competition in the Union”, some authors see the compensation objective of 
private enforcement as a “tool to increase private parties’ motivation to be vigilant 
and monitor other actors’ anti-competitive behaviour on the market.”122 For 
Hoseinian compensation is only a “first-step or short-term objective, serving the 
long-term and ultimate goal of antitrust enforcement: deterrence.”123  
Based on the above arguments, the CJEU concluded that the EU Treaty confers 
a right (also on a co-contractor) that has to be protected and an effective remedy 
                                                        
tional Antitrust – From Comparative to Common Competition Law (2003) Kluwer Law International, 
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must be provided. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that the fact that the CJEU 
has created an autonomous action for compensation does not necessarily mean that 
EU law will always insist upon claimants being able to pursue a remedy in damages in 
respect of breach of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU. The CJEU made clear that only 
maintenance of a rule that a priori excludes the contracting parties’ right to reparation 
contravenes EU law.124 In contrast, it accepted national laws recognising exceptions 
and denying parties the right to damages within the constraints imposed by EU law 
(subject to the minimum requirement of equivalence and effectiveness). Such excep-
tions include situations in which the party bears ‘significant responsibility’ for the 
breach of competition law.125 To determine this, the national court has to look at the 
relevant “bargaining power and conduct of the parties to the contract” and conduct 
deliberations on whether the claimant was in a clearly weaker position in respect to 
the other contracting party. The position will be considered as weaker if it compro-
mises or even eliminates the claimant’s freedom of negotiation and his capacity to 
avoid or reduce any potential losses. “A litigant should not profit from his own 
unlawful conduct, where this is proven.”126 It can be argued that the position of the 
applicant, who benefits from the protection, in fact, is more like that of a consumer 
rather than that of a party.127 
3.4.3 Courage v. Crehan – application of the ruling in the English Court 
Following the CJEU ruling, the Crehan case was remitted to the English High Court 
for a trial that was heard in 2003. The English judge recognised Crehan’s right to 
bring a damage claim and treated him as one who was in a markedly weaker position 
since his bargaining power was limited due to the position of Innterpreneur Estates 
Ltd that controlled an entire network of leased public houses.128 The Court of Appeal 
upheld the view of the High Court: “[The plaintiff] was not of course compelled to 
enter into any agreement with Inntrepreneur. To that extent he had bargaining 
power. But he was dealing with the single largest tied house landlord in the United 
Kingdom who made it clear that the offending tying terms in their agreement were 
not negotiable. There was no equality of bargaining power in any real sense […] if 
[Crehan] wanted to lease the pubs he had to agree to the tie.”129  
As said, the High Court recognised Crehan’s standing. However, after a lengthy 
trial the court rejected the Crehan’s claim and no damages were awarded. Based on 
the evidence presented by the claimant the court ruled that Article 101(1) TFEU had 
not been infringed and the UK beer market was not foreclosed by the beer tie. This 
was despite the fact that the EU Commission had stated that Inntrepreneur’s lease 
agreement infringed Article 101 TFEU when it rejected Inntrepreneur’s attempts to 
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gain an individual exemption from the Article’s application. The decision also de-
parted from the EU Commission’s findings in the Whitbread decision, which despite 
having been adopted with respect to agreements other than those at issue in the Cre-
han case, concerned the same relevant market. In that case (‘Whitbread case’), the EU 
Commission found that during the period from 1990 to 1999 beer tie arrangements 
in the UK had the cumulative effect of ‘considerably hindering independent access to 
that [beer supply] market for new national and foreign competitors’.130 The High 
Court judgement therefore raised serious issues with regard to the extent to which 
the EU Commission’s decision is binding on national courts. Crehan appealed against 
the decision. 
The Court of Appeal reversed this decision in 2004 and awarded damages of 
£ 131,336 (plus interest) to Mr Crehan.131 It held that by not respecting the EU 
Commission’s view in Whitbread,132 the High Court had failed to comply with the 
duty of sincere co-operation owed by national courts to the EU Commission and 
therefore it had erred in law.133 This was followed by a further appeal to the House of 
Lords,134 which was decided in 2006. It reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, 
restoring the first instance decision. The House of Lords clarified that it was the duty 
of national courts not to make decisions that contradict the EU Commission decision 
concerning the same subject matter between the same parties. Where the EU Com-
mission’s decision concerns a different matter arising between different parties, it 
does not bind the national courts. In these cases, the EU Commission’s decision 
serves as evidence, which a national court shall evaluate in “a conscientious judicial 
manner” before giving judgement. To hold otherwise, third parties would be denied 
an opportunity to challenge findings of the facts affecting them. 
3.4.4 Manfredi – affirmation of the right to antitrust damages 
The Courage case was bolstered by the subsequent judgment in the Manfredi case in 
2006.135 In that case the CJEU confirmed that private parties that have suffered a loss 
as a result of an infringement of the EU competition rules have a right to obtain 
damages and that this right is directly derived from the EU Treaty. The Court was 
also presented with the opportunity to revisit various legal issues connected with this 
new remedy. 
The case followed-on from a finding of the Italian competition authority 
(‘Autorità Garante’) that the insurers Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Fondiaria-
Sai SpA and Assitalia SpA had implemented an unlawful agreement for the purpose 
of exchanging information on the insurance sector. As a result of an unlawful con-
duct, the premiums charged to consumers who had purchased liability insurance for 
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motor vehicles were inflated twenty per cent on average. Manfredi and the other 
applicants, who alleged they had suffered an overcharge, brought damage actions 
against their insurers to recover damages before an Italian court. Faced with the diffi-
culty of resolving certain legal issues, the court asked the CJEU to address a range of 
questions, including questions on jurisdiction of national courts and national limita-
tion periods for punitive damages. In particular, it asked the EU’s highest court to 
provide guidance on the interpretation of certain EU competition law principles that 
would allow it to determine the case at hand. 
The CJEU first dealt with the question of whether consumers could claim under 
EU law. At the time of the proceedings, Italian law provided that consumers were 
not entitled to sue for damages for loss resulting from an infringement of Italian 
competition rules,136 which were otherwise identical to EU competition rules in terms 
of their substance. In replying to the question, the CJEU followed the wording in 
Courage and held that “any individual can claim compensation for the harm suf-
fered.”137 It reiterated a statement of principle given in the Courage case, in particular 
that the effectiveness of the Article 101 TFEU would be put at risk if it were not 
open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by 
conduct liable to restrict or distort competition.138  
By emphasising ‘any individual’ who has been adversely affected by an infringe-
ment has a right to claim damages from the infringing party, the CJEU proceeded to 
define the individual liability for damages as a matter of EU law, what Van Gerven 
calls ‘constitutive’ conditions of the right to damages.139 Standing is an “indispensable 
element of a legally enforceable right contained in a directly applicable provision of 
the EU Treaty”140 and therefore it has to be governed by EU law. The CJEU clarified 
that the right to damages is open to ‘any individual’ including consumers, provided 
that there is (a) an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, (b) harm, (c) causal link 
between that harm and the prohibited agreement or practice.141 The CJEU did not 
refer to fault as a condition of obtaining damages. It is important to note that under 
the tort law of several Member States fault is (in addition to unlawful act, damage, 
and causal connection) considered as the basic element for a tort liability to arise. In 
Komninos’ view, the absence of reference to fault in the CJEU’s judgement in Man-
fredi clearly implies that the EU right for antitrust damages is based on a non-fault 
(strict) liability.142 In civil proceeding, (where the reversal of burden of proof does 
not apply) this means that the plaintiff does not need to show that the defendant 
acted at least negligently. Komninos went further, arguing that since EU law does 
refer to fault as a condition for tort liability to arise, no such requirement should be 
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imposed by national law. In other words, Member States should not apply national 
rules when dealing with a case based on EU competition law if the national rules 
require fault as a necessary prerequisite for a damages action. As a counter-argument 
to Komninos’s reasoning, it should be argued that with the Courage judgment the 
CJEU introduced a new EU right to damages, but it did not create common Union 
conditions of liability.143 These are to be determined by national law. Accordingly, 
also fault requirement should be determined by national rules that apply to antitrust 
damage actions. 
3.4.5 Manfredi – ‘national procedural autonomy’ as guiding principle for 
the right to antitrust damages 
The CJEU went on to emphasise that more detailed rules governing the exercise of 
the right to antitrust damages should be prescribed by national law (as long as there is 
no EU body of rules governing the matter).144 In particular, while causality is an es-
sential condition for EU right to antitrust damages to arise as established by the 
CJEU145 the detailed rules governing the application of the concept of ‘causal rela-
tionship’ are a matter of national law. Based on the principle of procedural autonomy, 
national rules will be subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.146 The 
CJEU at this point refers to more detailed “executive” conditions of the EU right to 
damages, as defined by van Gerven.147 In the contrast to constitutive rules, executive 
rules are governed by national law (in the absence of EU rules governing the matter).  
With regard to the extent of damages available, the CJEU confirmed that some 
compensation must be available to a claimant injured by antitrust violation. The 
Court reiterated the need to ensure that EU rights take full effect. Re-emphasising the 
principle of effective redress, it held that not only actual loss (damnum emergens – 
for instance a price increase), but also loss of profit (lucrum cessans – for instance 
through a reduction in sales) plus interest must be available to injured persons. Any 
exclusion of loss of profit would not be acceptable with regard to a breach of EU law 
as otherwise reparation of damage would be practically impossible. With regard to the 
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issue of punitive damages, which was also part of the question that has been referred 
to by the Italian court, the CJEU – following its early case law – held that in the ab-
sence of EU rules on the matter, it is governed by national law subject to principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness.148 It explained that punitive damages as such are not 
incompatible with the EU law.  
The next set of queries put by the Italian court concerned the procedural ques-
tions of the jurisdiction of the national courts and limitations periods, which also 
raised the issue of national procedural autonomy. The CJEU was asked whether Arti-
cle 101 TFEU should be interpreted as precluding a national provision under which 
third parties must bring their damage actions for infringement of EU rules before a 
court other than that which usually has jurisdiction in actions for damages of similar 
value.149 In particular, the Italian competition law established that the Corte d’Ap-
pello (which is normally an appeal court) has exclusive jurisdiction on civil actions 
based on national competition law (i.e. to actions for damages, nullity and interim 
relief).150 Conversely, actions for damages based on infringement of EU competition 
rules fall within the competence of the ordinary courts. Putting it differently, if the 
plaintiff pleads a breach of national law the competent court is the Corte d’Appello, 
while in cases in which he pleads a breach of EU law the competent court is the 
Tribunale or the Giudice di Pace (depending on the value of the claim). When the 
claim is based only partly on an infringement of EU competition law the Court 
d’Appelo has the jurisdiction. It was argued that the fact that different judges are 
competent to hear first instance actions for breach of national competition law and 
EU competition law constitutes a structural weakness of the Italian competition law 
system.151 It should be noted that civil proceedings before the Giudice di Pace are 
“less expensive, less complex and less formal” than civil proceedings before the Corte 
di Appello (which also do not allow a second instance judgment).152 
To evaluate the compatibility of the domestic rule regarding the jurisdiction of 
the national courts and (to a more limited extent) with EU competition law, the 
CJEU reverted to the Rewe/Comet formula.153 It pointed out that in the absence of 
the EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member 
State to designate the courts having jurisdiction to hear claims for damages. Never-
theless, such provisions cannot be less favourable than those applicable to similar do-
mestic actions (test of equivalence) and cannot survive if they render practically im-
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possible or excessively difficult154 the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (test of 
effectiveness).155 To evaluate the compatibility of the Italian rule, the Court used the 
‘test of equivalence’ and concluded that the Italian provision establishing the exclu-
sive competence of the Corte d’Appello to hear civil cases based on infringement of 
national competition law (and not cases based on infringements of EU competition 
law) is not in contradiction with the principle of equivalence. On one hand, if a dam-
age claim based on EU law is filed with the Giudice di Pace, it may be argued that 
damage actions alleging violations of EU competition law are afforded preferential 
treatment compared to actions brought in the Corte d’Appello under national compe-
tition law. This could be seen as a “kind of unwilling discrimination in melius, or even 
an incentive to private enforcement of the EU competition law.”156 On the other 
hand, if a damage based on EU law is filed with the Corte d’Appello, it is accorded 
the same treatment as a claim based on national law. 
In response to the procedural question regarding the applicable time-limits, the 
CJEU again reverted to its Rewe and Comet formula. It held that limitation periods 
are within the scope of the national procedural rules of each Member State, subject to 
the principles of effectiveness (that the limitation periods may not be so short to 
make a claim for redress excessively difficult) and equivalence. That means that time-
limits for damages actions that are currently available in every Member State can be 
applied by national courts if they do not endanger the right to seek compensation. 
Regulating the access to courts in time, the limitation periods are seen as one of the 
most important procedural issues that could jeopardise the effectiveness of private 
enforcement of competition law within the Europe. In particular, if limitation periods 
are too short a claim might already be statute barred once a judgment is finally ren-
dered so that potential claimants are no longer able to bring a case.157 With regard to 
the Italian rules on limitation periods, the Court found that the limitation period 
would begin to run from the day on which the agreement or concerted practice was 
adopted. In the Court’s view this rule could make it practically impossible to exercise 
the right to seek compensation, particularly if that national rule also imposed a short 
limitation period, which is not capable of being suspended.158  
3.4.6 Scope of the EU right to antitrust damages 
A consequence of the establishment of an EU based remedy is that the margin of 
discretion for national courts has diminished. The CJEU’s rulings in the Courage and 
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Manfredi cases have limited national procedural autonomy to the benefit of uniform 
application of EU law and effective enforcement of EU law rights.159 As van Gerven 
has asserted, “the need for harmonised legal remedies […] is inherent in the concept 
of uniformity: in the absence of (sufficiently) harmonised legal remedies, uniform 
rights cannot be adequately secured throughout the EU”.160  
However, the regime governing the individual’s liability for damages incurred as 
result of a violation of EU law does not require complete harmonisation of national 
tort and civil procedural rules and thereby does not depart from the principle of na-
tional procedural autonomy that has been accepted as the main rule by which effec-
tive judicial protection of rights conferred by EU law is generally assured in the EU 
legal order. The EU regime of right to damages preserves rather a ‘minimalist charac-
ter’ and provides for “limited uniformity.”161 It is clear from the judgments (Cour-
age162 and especially Manfredi163) that the CJEU made no attempt to prescribe – as a 
matter of EU law – the substantive conditions for establishing the individual’s right 
to damages under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It emphasised that, although the prin-
ciple of individual’s right to damages derive from the EU Treaty, national liability 
rules apply. Issues such as causation, the establishment of the actual amount of dam-
ages and the determination of the authority of the Member States having jurisdiction 
to hear actions for damages are firmly based on the principle of national autonomy. 
In particular, they are a matter of national laws, subject to ad hoc surveillance through 
the principle of effectiveness and equivalence. EU law is relevant only for the pur-
pose of scrutinising whether those national rules are being applied in an unreasonable 
manner. It is true that the CJEU did not deal with all issues relevant to the EU right 
to damages, but its explicit reference to national autonomy clearly indicates that only 
the minimum EU requirements will be imposed. The approach taken by the CJEU, 
therefore, provides for balance between ‘national procedural autonomy’ and ‘effec-
tiveness’ of EU competition rules. As an author said, the decision in Manfredi works 
like an “updated anti-virus filter.”164 It protects the effectiveness of EU antitrust rules 
against the national procedural hurdles. In other words, the judgment provides a clear 
basis for plaintiffs to challenge procedural rules that are interpreted in a way that 
hamper claims. 
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3.5 Recent developments with regard to private antitrust enforcement 
through the CJEU’s court practice  
After the judgments in Courage and Manfredi, some further developments with re-
gard to private antitrust enforcement in Europe have been made through the CJEU’s 
court practice. In particular, in 2011 in the Pfleiderer case165 for the first time the 
CJEU was called upon to provide a balance between the right to damages and the 
protection of leniency programmes, and in 2012 in the Otis case166 it was asked to 
clarify the EU Commission’s legal standing in claims for EU antitrust damages. 
3.5.1 Pfleiderer – tension between private enforcement and leniency 
After the judgments in Courage and Manfredi, it has become clear that the EU anti-
competitive prohibitions aim at detecting and punishing antitrust behaviour (public 
enforcement), on one hand, and compensating those who claim to have suffered 
damages resulting as a consequence of the antitrust behaviour (private enforcement), 
on the other hand.167 Although, in principle, private enforcement complements pub-
lic enforcement, this is not always the case in practice. There is a tension between the 
two, in particular, when it comes to ‘disclosure of leniency material.’ While damage 
claimants seek to obtain evidence from public enforcers to prove their case in dam-
age actions, public enforcers are reluctant to disclose the information given to them 
under leniency programmes. Such disclosure could undermine the purpose of a leni-
ency programme, which is to reward the whistleblower for cooperation. Disclosure of 
evidence submitted in the leniency programme might affect the willingness of poten-
tial leniency applicants to cooperate with the public enforcers. Potential applicants 
would be aware that information given under a leniency programme could be dis-
closed in civil proceeding and used by the plaintiffs as evidence to establish a case 
against them. The issue of ‘disclosure of leniency material’ and tension between pri-
vate enforcement and leniency material was also the reason for the CJEU’s decision 
in the Pfleiderer case.168 
The Pfleiderer case was referred to the CJEU by the Bonn court (Germany). In 
the Bonn court, Pfleiderer was seeking access to the file from the competition au-
thority in relation to its 2008 cartel decision. The Bonn court refused access to leni-
ency documents. However, the Bonn court was concerned that the order could con-
flict with EU competition rules, and stayed the order pending a request to the CJEU 
for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. It asked the CJEU to consider 
whether a national competition authority should allow antitrust victims access to 
leniency material.  
The CJEU held that EU law does not preclude a third party who has been ad-
versely affected by an infringement of EU competition from being granted access to 
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leniency material acquired under a national leniency programmes. However, rather 
that adopting a definitive rule, the CJEU concluded that a national judge when decid-
ing on disclosure of leniency material must balance the various competing factors on 
a case-by-case basis. In particular the important role that leniency programmes play in 
ensuring effective enforcement of EU competition rules must be balanced against the 
need to ensure that individuals harmed by breaches of EU law can obtain effective 
redress.169 After all, effective redress could significantly contribute to overall EU 
competition law enforcement.170 The CJEU also recalled that national rules affecting 
the disclosure of leniency materials are no less favourable than those governing simi-
lar domestic claims. 
Although not all practitioners are in favour of the CJEU’s ruling in the Pfleiderer 
case,171 the case clearly highlights that just as an effective system of private enforce-
ment could contribute to the public enforcement objective of deterrence, a well-
established system of public enforcement can also contribute to the compensation of 
victims of antitrust behaviour. 
3.5.2 Otis – EU Commission’s standing in antitrust damage actions 
The ruling in Courage and the CJEU’s subsequent judgement in Manfredi revealed a 
clear EU policy in favour of private antitrust enforcement and damages actions in 
specific. This was recently confirmed by the CJEU’s controversial judgment in EU 
Commission v Otis NV.172 The case is of particular interest since it was for the first 
time that the EU itself has sought damages for harm it suffered as a consumer. The 
EU Commission was not acting as a public authority entrusted with the enforcement 
of competition law, but rather as a private party. 
The case concerns a preliminary ruling referred to the CJEU by the Brussels 
Commercial Court in the course of a dispute between Otis and the other businesses 
and the EU, represented by the EU Commission. In February 2007, the EU Com-
mission imposed fines of about €992 million on the Otis, Kone, Schindler and 
ThyssenKrupp groups for the infringement of Article 101 TFEU by allocating ten-
ders and other contracts in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
The companies brought actions for annulment of this decision before the General 
Court, who dismissed those actions. In parallel, the European Union – represented 
by the EU Commission – brought proceedings before the Brussels Commercial 
Court claiming the sum of € 7.051.688 to compensate the loss suffered as a result of 
the anti-competitive practice. The EU had concluded with the defendants several 
contracts for the installation, maintenance and renewal of elevators and escalators in 
various buildings of the EU institutions, the price of which was allegedly higher than 
                                                        
169  [2011] 5 CMLR 219, par. 31. 
170  See section 2.2. 
171  M. Dolmans observed that “the worst is Pfleiderer v. Bundeskartellamt. Leniency statements should 
not be disclosed. The Court did not distinguish self-incriminating leniency applications from pre-
existing documents. That is a mistake and could interfere with public policy to encourage revealing 
and closing down cartels.” Available at http://chillingcompetition.com/2012/03/23 (last consulted 
on 3 May 2013). 
172  Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis and Others (CJEU, 6 November 2012). 
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the market price as a consequence of the cartel declared unlawful by the EU Com-
mission. Against that background, the Brussels Commercial Court decided to refer 
questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. It asked, inter alia, whether the EU 
Commission is precluded from bringing an action on behalf of the EU due to the 
special role played by the EU Commission as competition authority. The fact that 
was at issue was that the EU Commission, which had previously found an infringe-
ment in an antitrust proceeding, presented the EU in civil proceeding, whereby the 
national court felt bound by the EU Commission’s decision issued in the antitrust 
proceeding. After all, under Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003, the EU Commission’s 
decisions in the public enforcement phase of antitrust proceedings are binding on 
national courts. The double role of the EU Commission as both enforcer of competi-
tion law and private complainant in this case risked infringing the principle of effec-
tive judicial protection, which is a general principle of EU law, and to which expres-
sion is given by Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.173  
The CJEU noted that the issue of the legal representation of the EU by the EU 
Commission cannot be completely answered without taking into consideration the 
principle of effective judicial protection, but also the importance of private enforce-
ment and the greater attention paid to it in the recent years.174 The ability to seek 
damages constitutes an indispensable foundation of that private enforcement system. 
The CJEU recalled that any person can claim compensation for the harm suffered 
where there is a causal link between that harm and a prohibited agreement or practice 
and that the EU may thus also avail itself of that right.175 It emphasised that the right 
to damages ensures the full effectiveness of article 101 TFEU and discourages the 
breach of the EU competition rules, thus making a “significant contribution to the 
maintenance of effective competition in the Union.”176 The CJEU held in this case 
that the “EU, therefore, also enjoys this right.”177 It continued that when that right is 
exercised, the fundamental rights of the defendants must be observed, such as the 
principle of effective judicial protection (Art 47 Charter) which entails (i) right of 
access to a tribunal, (ii) principles of nemo iudex in sua causa (no one can be a judge in 
his own cause) and (iii) equality of arms.178 
With regard to the right of access to a tribunal, the CJEU made it clear that the 
rule – according to which national courts may not take decisions running counter to a 
EU Commission decision (Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003) – is a specific expression 
of the division of powers between the national courts and the EU Commission and 
consequently does not mean that the defendants are denied their right of access to a 
tribunal. When the EU Commission issues a decision against a party (defendant), the 
                                                        
173  Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis and Others (CJEU, 6 November 2012), par. 46. 
174  I. Kampouridi, Representing the European Union in Follow-On Actions for Damages: A Battle 
between the EU Institutions (2012) Global Antitrust Review, p. 147. 
175  Case C-453/99. Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan and Others; and Joined cases C-295/04 to C-
298/04, Manfredi. 
176  Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan [2001] ECRI-6297, par. 27. 
177  Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis and Others (CJEU, 6 November 2012), par. 44. 
178  Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis and Others (CJEU, 6 November 2012), par. 45, 46, 
48. 
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party has at its disposal the system of judicial review of EU Commission decisions, 
which affords all the safeguards required by Article 47 Charter provided by EU law. 
With regard to principle of nemo iudex in sua causa (the EU Commission being 
both judge and party in its own cause), the Court makes clear that national court has 
the power to consider all the questions of fact and law that are relevant to the case 
before it. While the national court is bound by the EU Commission’s decision as to 
the existence of an anticompetitive practice, finding such anticompetitive practice is 
only one element of a private action for damages. Other elements (the existence of 
a loss suffered by the plaintiff and the direct causal link between the loss and the 
anticompetitive practice) still need to be determined by the national court.179 For 
that reason the EU Commission cannot be regarded as a “judge and party in its 
own cause in the context of a dispute”.180  
The third element of the principle of effective judicial protection deals with the 
principle of equality of arms. It has been argued that due to the role of the EU 
Commission as enforcer of competition law, it is in a privileged position compared to 
the defendants. It can gather and use (confidential) information that would not nor-
mally be available to the defendants. The CJEU refused this argument. According to 
the CJEU, in the case at hand, the EU Commission did not rely on any confidential 
information at all. In addition, EU law contains a sufficient number of safeguards to 
ensure that the principle of equality of arms is observed,181 such as Article 339 
TFEU, Article 28 of the Regulation 1/2003 and point 26 of the EU Commission 
notice on the cooperation between the EU Commission and the courts of the EU 
Member States in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Consequently the 
Court did not find any reasons to preclude the EU Commission from bringing a 
damage claim before a national court on behalf of the EU in cases in which the same 
EU Commission had earlier found such infringement. The EU Commission can 
claim compensation like any other person from companies that it has found violated 
the EU competition rules. 
From a perspective of the EU private enforcement policy, the decision of the 
CJEU is not by any means surprising. The ruling put a considerable weight in support 
of the EU Commission’s policy of promoting and enhancing private enforcement 
within the EU.182 As ‘any individual’ is entitled to claim damages, also the EU Com-
mission, representing the EU, has standing in a private damage action. However, if 
the decision in European Commission v Otis NV is in line with the EU policy of 
enforcement of competition rules, it is by no means surprising from the perspective 
of the interpretation of fundamental rights. The CJEU recognised the ability of the 
EU Commission to play a double role in the enforcement, as an authority in the pub-
lic phase of competition law enforcement and as a private party in a private phase of 
competition law enforcement. 
                                                        
179  Case C-199/11, par. 65. 
180  Case C-199/11, par. 67 
181  Case C-199/11, par. 75. 
182  See chapter 4. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
From the EU point of view, it is clear that greater importance should be given to the 
private enforcement and it should be treated as being complementary to public en-
forcement of the EU competition rules. There are several indications for that. First, 
Regulation 1/2003 modernised the procedures for the enforcement of EU competi-
tion law and placed not only NCAs, but also Member States’ national courts at the 
heart of the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Second, the CJEU irrefutably laid down the principle of EU law-based right to dam-
ages for antitrust violations by declaring that everyone who has suffered losses from a 
violation of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU is entitled compensation as long as a causal 
link is shown between the violation and the harm. The establishment of the EU right 
to damages by the Courage ruling, and clarified in the Manfredi case, confirms the 
principles already instituted by former case law of the CJEU. Furthermore, such a 
right goes further and not only compensates victims of harm, but also works towards 
a stronger enforcement of EU competition law. Also the CJEU’s subsequent judge-
ment in Pfleiderer and Otis revealed a clear EU policy in favour of private antitrust 
enforcement and damages actions specifically. 
However, as long as the principles of equivalence and effectiveness remain the 
only limitations on what Member States can do vis á vis private damages actions there 
is a fear that the benefits of the right will likely be very limited. They both lack any 
necessary connection to the enforcement of the EU Treaty’s competition rules. In-
stead, they merely preclude application of national rules that render the enforcement 
of EU rights impossible. Rosch183 used a gardening analogy to describe the current 
situation. As he said “lawsuits are seeds that take root and grow into plants, the prin-
ciples of equivalence and effectiveness simply make clear to Member States that they 
have to give EU-based seeds the same amount of sun, water and fertiliser as they give 
seeds they have planted themselves, and that they cannot allow the soil to get so hard 
that it will be “practically impossible or excessively difficult” for EU-based seeds to 
take root”. He emphasised that there is no requirement regarding how the plants 
should be trained, pruned or pollinated so as to yield the desired fruits of law en-
forcement. If damages actions are confined to an ‘instrumental role’, as it appears 
from Courage and Manfredi rulings, or just to make the right more effective, a certain 
positive approach towards private antitrust enforcement in the form of harmonisa-
tion or unification is not only presupposed but also necessary/indispensable. As 
Kroes said there is a need to “put some extra wind in the sails of [the] enforcement 
boat,”184 and this cannot be achieved by case law of the EU courts. The Courts can 
contribute mainly to a negative harmonisation by removing national procedural ob-
stacles to the enforcement of EU rights, determining which national rules must be set 
aside because they hinder the effective enforcement of the EU competition rules. The 
                                                        
183  Speech by J.T. Rosch, member of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, of 23 2011. Available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/110923privatecomp.pdf (last consulted on 3 May 2013). 
184  Speech by N. Kroes, former European Commissioner for Competition matters, of 22. September 
2005 (speech 05/533). Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-533_en.htm 
(last consulted on 13 May 2013). 
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Courts, however, do not state new EU law. The competence to create new EU law 
belongs to the Council of the EU and EU Parliament, under the requirement that 
there is a legal basis in the Treaty for such creation. 
As said, from the EU point of view, it is clear preference to promote damage ac-
tions based on violations of EU competition rules through harmonisation of tort and 
civil procedure rules of the Member States, which will be discussed further in Chapter 
4. Nevertheless at this point, from the national perspective, the questions arise 
whether private law can accommodate to the needs of the EU law and to what extent 
harmonisation is necessary (given the special features of the private law systems). 
These questions will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 4 
EU Commission’s Policy Enforcement 
 
 
 
With the Courage1 and Manfredi2 judgements the CJEU recognised that the full 
effectiveness of the Treaty would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual 
to claim damages for loss caused to him by conduct liable to restrict or distort com-
petition. In doing so, the CJEU has clearly advanced the effective enforcement of EU 
competition law – especially when located within the context of the EU Commis-
sion’s modernisation programme3 – and provided the EU Commission with an in-
centive to promote damage actions for breach of EU antitrust rules. Against this 
background, the EU Commission published the Green Paper,4 followed by the White 
Paper5 in order to work towards an effective European framework for antitrust dam-
ages actions. There the EU Commission identified fundamental issues that are likely 
to facilitate or discourage private antitrust litigation, and therefore are critical to the 
success of effective private enforcement systems in Europe.  
Chapter 4 will map the efforts taken towards harmonisation of issues put forward 
in the White Paper at EU level. These efforts will play a key role throughout the sec-
ond part of the thesis. They will serve as the point of departure for the analysis taken 
in chapters 5 and 6, and form the basis for addressing the question of whether private 
law is an appropriate instrument for enforcing EU competition law. 
4.1 The EU Commission’s ambitious intentions followed by the Ashurst 
Study and represented in the Green Paper 
As most authors agree, the modernisation project contained in Regulation 1/2003 has 
contributed towards development of a system of effective private enforcement,6 but 
to have an effective system further steps were necessary. In the words of a commen-
tator, “Regulation 1/2003 was “a necessary but not sufficient condition to promote 
private action in Europe”.7 For the majority the key problem8 lay in the framework 
                                                        
1  Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297. 
2  Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi and Others [2006] ECR I-6619. 
3  Council Regulation No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002. 
4  Green Paper on Damages actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2005) 672. 
5  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165. 
6  See e.g. A. Riley, EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely – Thank you! 
Part One: Regulation 1 and the Notification Burden (2003) 24(11) E.C.L.Rev, pp. 612–613; A. Riley, 
EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely – Thank you! Part Two: Between 
the Idea and the Reality: Decentralisation under Regulation 1 (2003) 24(12) E.C.L.Rev, p. 665. 
7  Speech by S. Norberg, director of Directorate-General Competition European Commission, of 20 
June 2003, pp. 29. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/ (last consulted on 8 May 
2013). 
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(substantive and procedural) of civil litigation in the EU, which is to a large extent 
governed by national law.9 That there is a range of national procedural and substan-
tive obstacles to the more efficient development of a system of private competition 
litigation has been also recognised by the Ashurst Report.10 The report, based on a 
study comparing the status of private antitrust enforcement in all of the Member 
States requested by the EU Commission, revealed that levels of private enforcement 
through damages claims in Europe were very low at the time of the report. In the 40 
years in which the competition enforcement system has been functioning11 there 
were only about 60 reported damage cases based on European or national competi-
tion law, and in only 23 cases were damages awarded. The number of successful 
damage cases in which compensation has been awarded on the basis of EU antitrust 
law was not more than 12. While the EU Commission acknowledged that some prob-
lems regarding reparation of harm resulting from an infringement of directly applica-
ble EU rules also exist in other areas of tort litigation, it pointed to the particular 
difficulties in bringing an antitrust damage action and to the complexity with regard 
to competition litigation.12 In order to justify possible legislative intervention to facili-
tate EU antitrust damage actions, it asserted that in the absence of intervention most 
of the harm caused by competition law infringements will continue to be left uncom-
pensated. As a consequence, undertakings in breach of the EU competition rules gain 
illegal advantage at the expense of other players in jurisdictions where they are 
unlikely to have to compensate for the harm they have caused. This would adversely 
affect the aim of increasing deterrence for potential infringers.13 As an author de-
scribed the situation by applying Adam Smith’s paradigm of the “invisible hand”, 
“through the individual interest of obtaining compensation for losses suffered, claim-
ants also pursue the collective interest to challenge restrictive conduct within the 
market”.14 
Considering the various barriers in national tort law and civil procedure regula-
tions that jeopardise the effectiveness of a privately enforced competition system, the 
EU Commission decided to open a reform process. Based on the Ashurst report,15 it 
published the Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules16 
                                                        
8  See for example: A. Dashwood, M. Dougan, B. Rodger, E. Spaventa and D. Wyatt, European Union 
Law (2011 6th edition, Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 842; A.P Komninos, Public and Private Antitrust 
Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap? (2006) 3(1) C.L.Rev. 
9  M. Todino, Modernisation from the Perspective of National Competition Authorities: Impact of the 
Reform on Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law (2000) 21(8) E.C.L.Rev, pp. 350–351. 
10  Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, 
comparative report, Ashust (August 2004). 
11  The period that was taken in the study was from 1962 to 2004. 
12  Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying Document to the White Paper on Damages Ac-
tions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2008) 404, pp. 95. 
13  Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying Document to the White Paper on Damages Ac-
tions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2008) 404, pp. 95. 
14  V. Carbonelli, Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law between Public and Private Issues 
(2012) 2(4) International Journal of Public Law and Policy, p. 2. 
15  Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, 
comparative report, Ashust (August 2004). 
16  Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672. 
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in which it listed nine categories of ‘obstacles’ to such actions, and posed fifteen 
questions about how best to overcome the obstacles. Each of the questions was fol-
lowed by one or more options designed to facilitate private actions for antitrust dam-
ages.17 With the presentation of the Green Paper the EU Commission triggered a 
broad consultation process and an open public debate, involving the EU institutions, 
Member States and civil society aimed at the facilitation of private damages actions 
across the EU. With the launch of the Green and White Papers, Jones18 even consid-
ered the EU to be at the “beginning of Third Devolution” of EU competition law 
enforcement, in which private enforcement (through damage action) might become a 
major factor in this process.19  
4.2 Cautious approach of the White Paper 
When comparing the ideas put forward in the earlier Green Paper and the proposals 
made in the White Paper, the most obvious observation is that the White Paper takes 
a step back on the road to effective antitrust enforcement system. 20  
In the Green Paper, the EU Commission focused on ‘enforcement’ of EU com-
petition rules and viewed tort law primarily as an instrument for that enforcement. It 
put forward a number of proposals that are known in the U.S and were ‘deterrence’ 
oriented, such as the disallowance the passing-on defence, the introduction of claims 
for double damages. Indeed, when tort is used as an ‘instrument’, by definition, the 
focus shifts from compensation to deterrence.21 The problem here comes from the 
fact that the legal rules relating to deterrence (in addition to not being in conformity 
with the legal systems of the Member States) might either have insignificant or no 
effect in securing the right to compensation for injured parties. For instance, the 
deterrent effect can be similar whether the individual of the awarded damages actually 
suffered any losses or not, but this does not ensure that one who actually suffered the 
loss will be compensated.22  
In contrast to the instrumentalist view of tort law adopted in the Green Paper, 
under considerable pressure of the Member States,23 the EU Commission took a 
                                                        
17  See, for example, J. Pheasant, Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: The Euro-
pean Commission’s Green Paper, (2006) 27(7) E.C.L.Rev; C. Diemer, The Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (2006) 27(6) E.C.L.Rev. 
18  C.A. Jones, After the Green Paper: The Third Devolution in European Competition Law and Pri-
vate Enforcement (2007) 3(1) C.L.Rev, p. 2. 
19  ‘First Devolution’ was the Commission’s first Cooperation Notice (OJ 1993, C39/06) following 
BRT v SABAM in 1974 and Delimitis v Henninger Btäu in 1991. ‘Second Devolution’ was the 
‘modernised’ Regulation 1/2003 (Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002). 
20  J. Kortmann and C. Swaak, The EC White Paper on Antitrust damage Actions: Why the Member 
States are (Right to be) Less Than Enthusiastic (2009) 30(7) E.C.L.Rev, p. 341. 
21  On the subject, see: J. Kortmann, The Tort Law Industry (2009) 17(5) European Review of Private Law, 
2009. 
22  See section 4.4.1. 
23  There were concerns in many Member States about the excessive competition litigation culture and 
introduction of ‘enforcement tools’ that are inimical to Continental legal traditions. See comments 
on the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, available at: 
ĺ 
Chapter 4 
78 
 
more ‘radical’24 and compensation oriented approach in the White Paper.25 The EU 
Commission also acknowledged that the overall legal context in the U.S. is very dif-
ferent from the one in Europe. US mechanisms, such as class actions in antitrust 
cases, are characterised by a combination of features that is very specific to the US, 
including jury trial, one-way shifting of costs, wide pre-trial discovery, contingent fees 
agreements and an opt-out mechanism. Therefore, the introduction in Europe of 
features similar to the US-style might not produce the same effects.26  
The White Paper begins by recalling the findings of the 2005 Green Paper that 
the deficiency of private litigation is caused by “legal and procedural hurdles in Mem-
ber States”. It emphasised that the primary goal of the White Paper is to lower these 
hurdles. Pursuant to the White Paper, the focus needs to be firmly fixed on how to 
provide effective redress for the victims of competition law infringements.27 In the 
words of former European Competition Commissioner Kroes, “the suggestions in 
the White Paper are about justice for consumers and businesses, which lose billions 
of Euros each and every year as a result of companies breaking EU antitrust rules.” 
Clearly the approach taken in the White Paper confirms the views of some scholars 
that the action for damage should be primarily based on compensation and not on 
deterrence. The deterrent effect, which was previously identified as equally important 
goal, in White Paper is identified only as a welcome side effect. Damages actions for 
breaches of EU competition rules shall in the first place aimed at compensation, 
while the enforcement of competition law, by its nature, is primarily a matter for 
public authorities.  
Emphasising the compensatory function of tort law, at least overtly, the phrase 
“private enforcement” is mostly avoided in the White Paper. As it was marked by 
Kortmann and Swaak, it has been referred to the term “private enforcement” 46 
times in the Staff Working Paper accompanying the Green Paper (977 pages),28 and 
                                                        
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/green_paper_comments.html (last con-
sulted n 8 May 2013). See also K. Middleton, B. Rodger, A. MacCulloch: UK & EU Competition 
Law (2009) 2nd edition, pp. 126. 
24  H.K.S. Schmidt talks about a “guarded approach to private enforcement” (H.K.S. Schmidt, Is Arti-
cle 82 EC special?, in M. Mackenrodt, B. Conde Gallego, S. Enchelmaier (eds), Abuse of dominant posi-
tion: new interpretation, new enforcement mechanisms?, 5 MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
(2008) p. 163. For some, it is “conservative approach” (see J. Pheasant and A. Bicarregui, Striking 
the right balance towards a ‘competition culture’ not a ‘litigation culture’? Comment on the Euro-
pean Commission’s White Paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules (2008) 1(2) 
G.C.L.R., p. 99; T. McQuail and C. Rawnsley, Does the Commission’s White Paper lack Colour? 
(2008) 78 Euro. Law, p. 10). 
25  See also Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Original Proposal by the EC Commission of 
22 July 2003, COM (2003) 427, in which the EU Commission noted that the modern concept of the 
law of civil liability is no longer oriented towards punishing for fault-based conduct; nowadays, it is 
the compensation function that dominates. 
26  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC antitrust rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 17 (note 24). 
27  Full compensation for victims, which is also enshrined as a fundamental right in Art. 17(1) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and recognised by to the case law of the European Court 
of Justice. 
28  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC antitrust rules, SEC (2005) 1732. 
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only seven times in the Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper (98 
pages).29 Nevertheless, it has been noted that a more careful study of the White Paper 
and accompanying documents suggests that the enforcement idea has not been com-
pletely omitted.30 The EU Commission is hoping that effective redress mechanism 
will have a beneficial effect in terms of compliance with the competition rules and, 
consequently, create a deterrent effect.31 Kortmann and Swaak even suggest that the 
EU Commission remains determined to employ tort law as an enforcement tool and 
is creating the potential for overcompensation.32 In their opinion this is nothing but 
expected. As they explained, it is only natural for the EU Commission to be inclined 
towards an instrumentalist view of tort law where compensation is seen as a short-
term objective (even though indispensable as a complement to the deterrence) that 
serves the ultimate goal of antitrust enforcement – deterrence. No matter what the 
main goal of competition law is, it is clear that the system would function best if there 
were no infringements. Therefore a competition enforcement system is viewed as a 
system of deterrence and the actions taken in this respect designed to uphold respect 
for the prohibitions in the said system. In the EU antitrust system the EU Commis-
sion is viewed as the main authority responsible for an effective enforcement of these 
rules. When the EU Commission decided to drop some options from the list of sug-
gestions, it did so because the resistance of the Member States with regard to that 
option. The gesture of the EU Commission in these cases can be described as a 
“friendly gesture of the Commission vis-à-vis Member States.”33 
4.3 The objectives followed in the White Paper 
The stated objectives of the White Paper, broadly interpreted, are threefold, (i) the 
necessity to fully compensate injured parties, (ii) the establishment of a genuinely Eu-
ropean legal framework, and (iii) the preservation of strong public enforcement under 
Articles 101/102 TFEU. 
                                                        
29  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC antitrust rules, SEC (2008) 404. See: J. Kortmann and C. Swaak, The EC White Paper on 
Antitrust damage Actions: Why the Member States are (Right to be) Less Than Enthusiastic (2009) 
30(7) E.C.L.Rev, p. 342 
30  J. Kortmann and C. Swaak, The EC White Paper on Antitrust damage Actions: Why the Member 
States are (Right to be) Less Than Enthusiastic (2009) 30(7) E.C.L.Rev; J. Kortmann, The Tort Law 
Industry (2009) 17(5) European Review of Private Law; M. Ioannidou, Enhancing the Consumer’s Role 
in EU Private Competition Law Enforcement: A normative and practical approach (2011) 8(1) 
C.L.Rev, pp. 59–85. 
31  See Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for 
Breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC (2008) 404, pp. 10. See also, for example, C. Rawsley, Does 
the Commission’s white paper lack colour? (2008) (28) European lawyer, p. 10. 
32  For example, tacitly aiming at deterrence is evident from its proposal on collective consumer actions. 
For other examples see J. Kortmann and C. Swaak, The EC White Paper on Antitrust damage Ac-
tions: Why the Member States are (Right to be) Less Than Enthusiastic (2009) 30(7) E.C.L.Rev, 
pp. 344–347. 
33  Editorial Comments, A little more action please! – The White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of EC antitrust rules (2008) 45(3) C.M.L.Rev, p. 613. 
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The EU Commission emphasised that the first and foremost guiding principle of 
private damages is to ensure ‘full compensation’ to all the victims of EU competition 
law infringements.34 It aimed to achieve that by improving the legal conditions for 
victims to exercise their right under the EU Treaty to reparation of all damage suf-
fered. By emphasising “full compensation”, the EU Commission clearly proclaims 
corrective justice as the goal of the EU system of private enforcement of competition 
rules.35 According to the corrective justice theory, when one person has been wrong-
fully injured by another person, the injurer must make the injured party whole. 
Although the White Paper focused on compensation rather than on deterrence, 
the documents accompanying the White Paper, in particular the Staff Working Paper, 
recognised that damages actions based on compensation might also produce benefi-
cial effects in terms of deterrence. 36 As said earlier, one of the main ideas behind 
increasing private competition law enforcement is the desire to create a greater deter-
rent effect. This could also be possible without paying much attention to the other 
major issue related to antitrust damages: compensation of the victims. However, 
following the reluctance of Member States, the EU Commission considered the de-
terrent effect of actions for damages in tort a side issue. Successful damages claims, 
based on compensation, might increase the deterrent effect of the competition law 
regime overall. They could provide additional deterrence to infringements contem-
plated in the future, as well as improve the detection of antitrust breaches already 
taking place. Therefore the EU Commission acknowledged that the creation of a 
realistic possibility to exercise the right to compensation effectively might contribute 
significantly to the effectiveness of the EU antitrust rules. 
With the second stated principle, the EU Commission emphasised the need to 
preserve a “genuinely European approach.” It explained that the policy choices with 
regard to effective antitrust damages actions should be discussed carefully and they 
should consist of “balanced measures” rooted in the European legal culture and tra-
ditions. By referring to a “genuinely European approach” and “balanced measures”, 
one can clearly discern that the principle was mainly designed to diminish fears of a 
US style approach.37 This conclusion could arguably be drowned from the unfavour-
able responses found within the public consultation launched by the EU Commission 
in the Green Paper. Indeed, after receiving the responses, the EU Commission has 
not further expressly proposed any measure originally contemplated in the Green 
                                                        
34  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, pp. 3. See 
also speech by N. Kroes, former Commissioner for Competition matters, of 3 April 2008 (speech 
/08/167). Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-167_en.htm (last con-
sulted on 13 May 2013). 
35  H-W. Micklitz, The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law (2011) Edward Elgar Publish-
ing, Cheltenham, pp. 437–438. 
36  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying Document to the White Paper on Damages Ac-
tions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules SEC(2008) 405, pp. 10. See also "Making antitrust dam-
ages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios", final report submit-
ted to the Commission on 21 December 2007, pp. 70. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf (last consulted on 16 May 
2013). 
37  See, for example, J.G. Delatre, Beyond the White Paper: Rethinking the Commission’s Proposal on 
Private Antitrust Litigation (2011) 8(1) C.L.Rev, p. 31. 
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Paper that would have fostered US style litigation. The Green Paper did not propose 
a wholesale adoption of the American model, but it acknowledged that the US system 
of antitrust litigation offers strong incentives to bring antitrust suits.38 As mentioned 
earlier, guided by’deterrence’ and the ‘instrumentalist view’ of tort law, it put forward 
some of the enforcement policy options familiar to the US system of procedures and 
substantive rules that would contradict established civil law cultures of many Member 
States, such as punitive damages, class actions and contingency fees. In contrast to 
the Green Paper, suggestions set out in the White Paper are more severe according to 
that issue. The aim of the White Paper was to make antitrust damages claims more 
efficient while at the same time respecting and taking into account as much as possi-
ble European legal systems and traditions should. . 
The third principle is the principle of preservation of strong public enforcement. 
At first glance, one might think that public enforcement is inferior to the system of 
damages actions. An attentive reader cannot omit the quotation from the White Pa-
per “another important”, which explains that the EU Commission believes the two 
aims to be on the same level. Putting forward the objective of preservation of strong 
public enforcement, the EU Commission clearly distanced the European approach 
from that of the US by emphasising the importance of preserving the central role of 
public authorities in the overall enforcement of EU competition rules. The objective 
of the preservation of strong public enforcement comes into play in situations in 
which stronger initiatives for private antitrust litigation could endanger public en-
forcement. In particular, too much private enforcement can undermine the EU 
Commission’s leniency programme;39 if a firm applies for leniency but is then liable 
to pay considerable sums in damages, it could decide to keep its involvement in car-
tels secret.  
With the principle of preservation of strong public enforcement, the EU Com-
mission recognises the importance of the public role for EU competition law en-
forcement, but also highlights that different objectives are to be pursued by public 
enforcement on one hand and private actions on the other hand. The Staff Working 
Document40 explains that public enforcement, through imposition of public fines, 
and damages actions with compensatory damages serve two different objectives that 
are complementary. On one hand, the main objective of public fines is to deter the 
undertakings concerned and other undertakings from engaging or persisting in behav-
iour contrary to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. On the other hand, the main objective 
of private damages actions is to provide compensation for those who suffered dam-
ages as a result of infringements of these rules. In this way, private damages actions 
based on an infringement of competition rules complements the public antitrust 
enforcement. Therefore the White Paper focuses particularly on private follow-on 
claims brought by victims of anti-competitive conduct after a competition authority 
                                                        
38  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2005) 1732, p. 15. 
39  A little more action please! – The White Paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules 
(2008) 45(3) C.M.L.Rev, p. 610. 
40  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 10. 
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has found an infringement. It does less to encourage stand-alone actions41 that would 
generate greater effect in terms of deterrence compared to follow-on cases.42 The 
White Paper clearly indicates that public enforcement remains at the forefront of 
antitrust prevention, detection and deterrence. 
The importance of public enforcement, but not its prevalence public over private 
enforcement, could also be explained on the basis of the relationship between the EU 
Commission (public enforcement) and national courts (private enforcement). At this 
point it is useful to recall the CJEU’s decision in Masterfoods, in which the CJEU 
made clear that when the national court applies EU competition law, it is obliged to 
take into account administrative decisions adopted by the EU Commission. The 
binding effect of administrative decisions adopted by the EU Commission on the 
national court was also later codified by Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003. This 
principle is sometimes misinterpreted by public enforcement officials who tend to 
take an expansive view of the ambit of public enforcement. The relation between the 
EU Commission and national courts is not based on primacy. Introducing a rule of 
primacy of the EU Commission over national courts would cause problems due to 
the principles of separation of powers and judicial independence. It would also un-
dermine the role of courts as enforcers of equal standing. Therefore Masterfoods and 
the Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 do not make national courts subject to the EU 
Commission’s authority, but do make it subject to the CJEU. In particular, “the pri-
macy of the EU Commission over national courts’ is not seen as one of the Commis-
sion, as competition authority, over civil courts, but rather of the EU Commission, as 
supranational EU organ, over national courts”.43 A Commission decision is not to be 
followed based on the fact that the EU Commission adopted it as superior law, but 
on the fact that it has been upheld as valid by the CJEU. A national court may still 
attack a EU Commission decision before the CJEU if it intends to contradict the 
Commission’s decision. In the light of the foregoing, the CJEU held that when a EU 
Commission decision has been attacked, a national court is not bound by that deci-
sion but may decide to stay proceedings and await the outcome, ‘unless it considers 
that, in the circumstances of the case, a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary rul-
ing on the validity of the EU Commission decision is warranted.’ Thus Masterfoods 
and Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 are based on cooperation between the EU 
Commission and the national courts and not on precedence of public over private 
enforcement. Accordingly, it can be said that there is no hierarchical relationship be-
                                                        
41  For example, the proposed discovery provisions might be seen as very limited from the aspect of 
stand-alone actions. They were designed to supplement proceedings based on facts set out in a final 
EU Commission or Member State decision and they do not make it easier for a private plaintiff to 
build up a case de novo. See, for example, Bakker& McKenzie’s comment on the White Paper on 
Damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules, pp. 3. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/bakmck_en.pdf (last consulted on 8 
May 2013). 
42  Damage actions filed after the CPO or the Commission have detected and investigated the violation 
do not contribute anything to the detection of antitrust violations.  
43  R. Komminos, Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap? (2006) 
3(1) C.L.Rev, p. 16. 
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tween the public authority and the ‘private attorney-general‘, there is also no hierar-
chical relationship between private and public enforcement. 
4.4 Proposed options 
As said, the content of the White Paper was a reflection of the comments on dam-
ages actions in the Green Paper received from the Member States, the European Par-
liament, the European Economic and Social Committee and stakeholders.44 In light 
of these considerations, the EU Commission set out concrete measures aimed at fa-
cilitating antitrust damages claims in order to create an effective EU private enforce-
ment system. At the same time, in line with the objective of preserving a “genuinely 
European approach,”45 it purported to avoid greater interference with the EU Mem-
ber States’ legal systems. In doing so, it proposed action in a number of areas.46 In 
particular, it addressed the policy choices in relation to specific competition law-con-
nected issues, such as standing for indirect purchasers and availability of the passing-
on defence. In addition, it addressed specific issues which might interfere with EU 
competition law, such as the binding nature of competition authorities’ decisions on a 
violation in public enforcement proceedings on follow-on actions for damages and 
the issue relating to the interaction between leniency programmes and damages ac-
tions. In other proposals it suggested measures with regard to the introduction of 
representative and collective actions – access to evidence through inter partes disclo-
sure, introduction of a fault requirement and modifications of limitation periods, 
costs of damages actions and the definition of damages.  
As a general point, all of the solutions represented in the White Paper embody 
tensions between the promotion of an effective enforcement of EU competition 
rules and the integrity of national legal systems. This tension has been also described 
as a “problem child”.47 At the EU level, there is an important correlation between the 
effectiveness of the right to damages and the principle of full effectiveness of EU 
antitrust law. Ensuring effective protection of individual rights has positive effects on 
enforcement of competition rules, or in other words, it contributes to the functioning 
of effective competition. From the EU perspective (perspective of antitrust enforce-
ment), it would seem to cut more across the differences between the tort law systems 
of the Member States and to promote the introduction of instruments that would 
encourage antitrust damages actions in order to enforce EU competition laws 
through the courts.  
                                                        
44  The comments received by the Commission are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/anti-
trust/ actionsdamages/green_paper_comments.html (last consulted on 16 May 2013). 
45  See section 4.3. 
46  The White Paper itself is a rather short document that summarises the measures envisaged by the 
EU Commission to enhance private actions for damages. It should be read together with the Staff 
Working Paper, which provides additional details and it is in reality the most important policy instru-
ment. 
47  J. Fitchen, Allocating Jurisdiction in Private Competition Claims within the EU (2006) 13(4) Journal 
of European and Comparative Law, p. 382. 
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4.4.1 Standing: indirect purchasers 
Antitrust damage cases are greatly complicated by the fact that loss is often not con-
fined to the market in which the infringement occurs. Rather, the effects of the anti-
trust infringements are likely to be spread down the distribution chain. A direct pur-
chaser who bought a product directly from the infringer might pass-on a part or all of 
the illegal over-charge to his own customers by raising his prices. As a result of this 
passing-on of the overcharge, the direct purchaser’s costumers might (also) suffered 
loss.  
One of the questions that private antitrust enforcement has to deal with is the 
redress of purchasers who are indirectly harmed by anti-competitive practices occur-
ring in upstream wholesale markets. In particular, the question arises whether or not 
to deny standing to indirect purchasers.48 The legal position of standing of indirect 
purchasers (together with passing-on defence)49 is one of the most important points, 
but also as the UK’ OFT has called it “the most controversial issue” in relation to 
private actions in competition law.50 In the United States, the Supreme Court has 
denied indirect purchasers standing for compensatory claims under the federal anti-
trust law in judgement in Illinois Brick.51 The argument for the exclusion of indirect 
purchaser suits rested upon a deterrence rationale underlying Hanover Shoes, Inc. v. 
United Shoe Machinery Corp.52 In this case the Court rejected the defence of pass-
ing-on and thus gave direct purchasers the right to recover the full overcharge even if 
they passed on some or all of it to the indirect purchasers. The court explained that 
denying the passing-on defence could improve the deterrent effect.53 The direct pur-
chasers are – compared to indirect purchasers – more likely to bring effective damage 
claims. Entitled to the entire damage award, they are more motivated to pursue their 
claims.54 In dissent, Justice Brennan emphasised that “from the deterrence stand-
                                                        
48  Generally on standing in private antitrust actions see E. Gellhorn, W.E. Kovacic, and S. Calkins, 
Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell (2004) 5th edition, Thomson/West, Minnesota, pp. 547–548; 
H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, The Law of Competition and Its Practice (2005) 3rd edition, 
Hornbook Series, pp. 601 -651; M-O. Mackenrodt, Private Incentive, Optimal Deterrence and 
Damage Claims for Abuses of Dominant Positions – The Interaction between the Economic Re-
view of the Prohibition of Abuses of Dominant Positions and Private Enforcement, in M-O. 
Mackenrodt. B.C. Gallego, S. Enchelmaier (eds), Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New 
Enforcement Mechanisms? (2008) Springer, pp. 169–170. 
49  See section 4.4.8. 
50  OFT, Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumers and Business, Discussion Paper 
(April 2007), pp. 37. See also C. Petrucci, The Issues of the Passing-on defence and Indirect Pur-
chasers’ Standing in European Competition Law (2008) 29(1) E.C.L.Rev; B.J. Rodger, A. Mac-
Culloch, Community Competition Law Enforcement Deregulation and Re-regulation : The Com-
mission, National Authorities and Private Enforcement (1998) 4(3) Columbia Journal of European Law, 
p. 602. 
51  Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977). In this case the State of Illinois, which bought bricks 
from masonry contractors as an indirect purchaser, brought a claim against the brick producers for 
damages caused as a result of a price-fixing conspiracy. 
52  Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
53  Relying on economic analysis, direct purchasers are seen as better enforcers than indirect buyers 
(see: C. Petrucci, The issue of the Passing-on Defence and Indirect Purchasers’ Standing in Euro-
pean Competition Law, (2008) 29(1) E.C.L.Rev, pp. 35–36). 
54  Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977), at 494. 
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point, it is irrelevant to whom damages are paid, so long as someone redresses the 
violation.”55 Following the Hanover Shoes judgement, in the Illinois Brick case the 
Court systematically denied indirect purchasers the right to damages for any passed-
on overcharge. As the court reasoned, denying the passing-on defence while permit-
ting the indirect purchaser’s suit would create a serious risk of multiple recovery of 
the same damages by both direct and indirect purchasers.56 Again, the Court ap-
proached the matter exclusively from an efficiency and deterrence standpoint, ob-
serving that the antitrust laws would be “more effectively enforced by concentrating 
the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing 
every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge” to bring damages actions.57  
In contrast to the U.S. federal law,58 the White Paper gave preference to a 
broader rule of standing.59 The EU Commission acknowledged that in the European 
context the deterrence-based approach, although effective in motivating claims, 
would run counter to the compensatory function of private actions. Besides, exclu-
sion of indirect purchasers‘ standing would not be compatible with EU law. In par-
ticular, it would conflict with the CJEU’s case law,60 which suggests that EU law itself 
requires that “any individual”61 harmed by an antitrust violation has a right to com-
pensation for damages. As made clear by the CJEU in Courage, “[…] the full effec-
tiveness of article [101 TFEU] and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibi-
tion laid down in article [101(1) TFEU] would be put at risk if it were not open to any 
individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable 
to restrict or distort competition […].” 
Indeed, in EU competition law, locus standi is closely related to the doctrine of ‘di-
rect effect‘,62 which is reflected in case-law. In the Brasserie du Pecheur case the 
CJEU explained that, “the right to reparation is the necessary corollary of the direct 
                                                        
55  Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S., at 494, 88 S.Ct., at 2232. 
56  Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977), at 730. 
57  Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977), at 734–735. 
58  The indirect purchaser rule of the U.S. doctrine has been subjected to criticism for under-
compensating remote antitrust victims and at the same time over-incentivising direct purchasers to 
bring suits for damages (e.g. see: B.D. Richman and C.R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinos Brick: A Func-
tionalis Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule (2007) 81 Southern California Law Rev). The U.S. An-
titrust Modernization Commission formally recommended in 2007 that Congress overrule the Su-
preme Court’s decision to the extent necessary to allow indirect purchasers standing (and a passing-
on defence) under federal law. There was however, significant dissent from that recommendation 
and Congress has not adopted the proposed revision but granted the states the possibility to enact 
different legislation, which many have utilised. 
59  See C. Petrucci, The Issues of the Passing-on Defence and Indirect Purchesers’ Standing in Euro-
pean Competition Law, 29(1) E.C.L.Rev, pp. 40–41. 
60  Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297, and Joined Cases C-î0Dn-
fredi, [2006] ECR I-6619. 
61  Some legal experts urged that position taken by EU Court ruling should be interpreted ‘cum grano 
salis’ (with a grain of salt). They argue that only direct purchasers can claim damages, because other-
wise the number of damages claims would become excessive (see: L. Varanelli, Odškodninska odgo-
vornost zaradi kršitve pravil o konkurenci (2005) (28) Pravna praksa, p. 15). 
62  C. Jones. Private enforcement of antitrust law in the EU, UK and USA (1999) Oxford University Press, 
p. 186–187. See also F. Cengiz, Antitrust Damages Actions: Lessons from the American Indirect 
Purchasers’ Litigation (2010) 59(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 51. 
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effect of the Union provision whose breach caused the damage sustained”.63 As ex-
plained earlier,64 where EU legislation has ‘direct effect’ it creates “individual rights 
which national courts must protect”.65 Categorical elimination of indirect purchaser 
standing for the sake of deterrence would drastically conflict with the principle of 
direct effect. Accordingly, the CJEU implicitly66 recognised that both direct and indi-
rect purchasers should be entitled to claim damages in antitrust cases.67 In the light of 
case law, it would appear superfluous to make a distinction between direct and indi-
rect purchasers since the right to damages is open to any individual who has suffered 
loss regardless of where in the commercial chain he is positioned. Therefore, the EU 
Commission proposes recognition of indirect purchaser standing at the EU level. It 
acknowledged that there should be no legal or statutory provisions impeding indirect 
purchasers’ claims. Based on the jurisprudence of the CJEU, under the EU regime 
the success of a claim will be dependent on whether the plaintiff is actually able to 
prove causation.68 In other words, an indirect purchaser will have to demonstrate the 
causal link between the upstream overcharge and the higher price of the final product 
in order to recover damages.69 
Finally, indirect purchasers standing is also compatible with the protection of the 
consumer welfare aim of EU competition policy (the subject has been discussed 
earlier).70 Since indirect purchasers are often retail consumers, limiting redress actions 
to the direct purchasers would lead, de facto, to limiting the possibility for consumers 
to get redress. The difficulty in bringing evidence that the unfair competition has 
been the cause of the damages suffered has not been accepted as sufficient reason to 
deny standing of consumers. As one author said “the mere fact that damages are dif-
ficult to prove, and that their apportioning is difficult to determine should not result 
in toto negation of standing.”71  
In the context of competition policy, one may argue that ‘consumer welfare‘ has 
always been of central importance in U.S antitrust law,72 but the federal authorities 
                                                        
63  C-46/93 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur [1996] ECR I-1029, par. 22. 
64  See section 3.3.1. 
65  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR. 
66  The cases (Courage and Manfredi) dealt with a question whether a party to an illegal agreement 
could recover damages and not indirect purchaser’s issue. However, the CJEU held that “the full ef-
fectiveness of Article 81 [now Article 101] of the Treaty […] would be put at risk if it were not open 
to any individual to claim damages for loss caused by a contract or conduct liable to restrict or dis-
tort competition” (Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan). 
67  C. Petrucci, The issue of the Passing-on Defence and Indirect Purchasers’ Standing in European 
Competition Law, (2008) 29(1) E.C.L.Rev, pp. 40–41.  
68  See Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, ECR [2006] I-6619, par. 61, when the CJEU 
stated that “any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal re-
lationship between the harm and an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 81 EC.”  
69  This refers to the ‘offensive use’ of passing-on. 
70  See section 2.1.4. See also F. Cengiz, Antitrust Damages Actions: Lessons from the American Indi-
rect Purchasers’ Litigation (2010) 59(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 52. 
71  M. Brkan. Procedural aspects of private enforcement of EC antitrust law: heading toward new 
reforms? World Competition (2005) 28(4) Law and Economics Review, p. 494. 
72  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) refers to “the 
antitrust laws traditional concern for consumer welfare and price competition”. In Atlantic Richfield 
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) it is stated that “low prices benefit consumers re-
ĺ 
EU Commission’s Policy Enforcement 
87
 
have nevertheless refused standing to the indirect purchaser. In this regard it is im-
portant to note that the reason for refusal was based on the role of private actions in 
establishing the US system of antitrust enforcement. In the U.S. the federal competi-
tion enforcement authorities have never had a position equivalent to that of the EU 
Commission in the EU. Private actions were intended to be the primary tool for 
deterring anti-competitive activity.73 Accordingly, in the US they approached the 
standing issue exclusively from the perspective of effectiveness and efficiency. The 
purpose of the refusal was not to determine access to the courts for certain classes of 
individuals, but to provide an effective system of antitrust enforcement. As the court 
reasoned, the main concern has been the general purpose of federal antitrust laws 
rather than on the limited issue of indirect purchaser suits.74 
4.4.2 Collective redress 
As said above, the effects of infringement of the competition rules are likely to 
spread down the supply chain and cause damages to large parts of the society. The 
EU Commission acknowledged that in cases where the damage is spread across a 
significant number of individuals (persons or undertakings) and the damage to each 
individual is relatively small, it is likely that only a few, if any, of the victims will 
bother to pursue individual claims. The obstacles to private damages actions in this 
situation are not restrictive national rules on standing but the economic behaviour of 
those persons harmed.75 In civil litigation, if the individual damage does not exceed a 
certain limit it is not worthwhile bringing an action.76 Who is going to sue a super-
market chain for €5 because it sold an iron for a price that exceeded a competitive 
level? As pointed out by former European Competition Commissioner Kroes, “sepa-
rate individual actions are highly inefficient for all involved”.77 Thus economic con-
siderations of individual claims undoubtedly represent an obstacle to start civil pro-
                                                        
gardless of how those prices are set.” See also statement of T. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, 
before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, (March 2006): “this Commission should reaffirm 
that consumer welfare is the correct touchstone for competition law and enforcement.” Available at 
http://www.takingthehill.com/transcripts/barnett.pdf (last consulted on 8 May 2013). 
73  See, for example, Minnesota Mining v. New Jersey Wood Finishing, 381 U.S. 311 (1965) in which 
the Supreme Court held that Congress “has expressed its belief that private antitrust litigation is one 
of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.” See also Antitrust Moderniza-
tion Commission Report and Recommendations, April 2007 (available at http://govinfo.library.unt. 
edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf); E. D. Cavanagh , The Private Antitrust 
Remedy: Lessons from the American Experience (2010) 41 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 
p. 633; K. Roach, M. J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition Laws (1996) 34(3) Osgoode 
Hall Law Review.  
74  Comes v. Microsoft Corp, 646 N.W.2d at 446. 
75  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 4. 
76  The cost for the individual consumer of bringing such an action before the courts will normally 
exclude a financial interest in bringing an action. See, for example, R. Van den Bergh, L. Visscher, 
The preventive Function of Collective Actions for Damages in Consumer Law (2008) 1(2) Erasmus 
Law Review, pp. 18. 
77  Speech by N. Kroes, former Commissioner for Competition matters, of 22 April 2008 
(speech/08/212), pp. 3. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-212_en. 
htm?locale=en (last consulted on 8 May 2013). 
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ceedings and as a result, victims of antitrust violations hardly ever receive compensa-
tion.78  
Following this, the EU Commission emphasised that an injured party should 
have a realistic possibility of recovery, irrespective of the amount involved. Availabil-
ity of mechanisms allowing aggregation of the individual claims of antitrust victims 
can significantly enhance the victims’ ability to access justice in order to allow them 
to be fully compensated.79 Taking the case of the iron, if the claims of 10,000 pur-
chasers, each of whose damages are assessed at € 5, were brought together, proceed-
ings against the chain would be viable. In such case, the aggregate amount of dam-
ages awarded against the defendant would be € 50,000. In addition to the compensa-
tion aspect of encouraging injured parties to pursue damage claims, such action 
would have the positive effect of enhancing competition and deterrence. The perpe-
trator of an infringement will be held liable for the loss it caused. 
In order to increase individuals’ ability to obtain compensation and thus access to 
justice, the EU Commission has suggested the introduction of two complementary 
mechanisms. Firstly, it proposed that designated bodies, such as officially designated 
consumers’ associations, would have the right to bring ‘representative actions‘ on 
behalf of identified or, in limited cases, identifiable victims.80 Such entities would 
either be officially designated in advance by their Member State or certified on an ad 
hoc basis according to the national procedure of a Member State, in which the repre-
sentative action is brought in relation to a particular infringement. Once the represen-
tative association has filed a claim, notice would be given to possible class members 
who then have to agree explicitly to be included in the action.  
Secondly, the EU Commission suggested the introduction of ‘opt-in collective 
actions’, in which victims expressly decide to combine their individual claims into one 
single action. As explained by former European Competition Commissioner Kroes, 
there is a need for such a complementary form of collective redress due to the fact 
that the representative entities will not always be able or willing to bring the case 
because of limited resources, conflicts of interest etc.81 Suggesting the type of collec-
tive actions, the EU Commission in the White Paper did not put forward – at least 
not expressly – the US model of ‘opt-out‘ class actions in which one party litigates on 
behalf of a defined class of affected individuals. The individuals who are defined in 
                                                        
78  From the competition point of view it might be paradoxical that although competition is intended to 
bring about the best results for the consumer, the consumers in practice have been more or less de-
nied standing to bring an antitrust claim for damages. As indicated by N. Kroes, the Competition 
Commissioner, in 2005 “a private enforcement system which disables or even discourages final con-
sumers from bringing actions for damages is unacceptable.” 
79  Claims aggregation is also beneficial for defendants. It minimises their exposure to multiple lawsuits 
and multiple liabilities. See Allen & Overy LLP’s comment on the White Paper on Damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules, pp. 3. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/anti-
trust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/alov_en.pdf (last consulted on 8 May 2013). 
80  The White Paper does not specify the meaning of identifiable members nor cases in which a repre-
sentative body (which has officially been designed in advance) could bring a representative action on 
behalf of identifiable members).  
81  See speech by N. Kroes, former Commissioner for Competition matters Consumers, of 22 April 
2008 (speech/08/212), pp. 4. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-212_ 
en.htm?locale=en (last consulted on 8 May 2013). 
EU Commission’s Policy Enforcement 
89
 
the class are all bound by the outcome of the litigation unless they explicitly opt-out 
of the action. Although such a mechanism can certainly be seen to facilitate bringing 
claims, the rejection of the mechanism was mainly due to the fears of some Member 
States that opt-out actions would lead to excesses.82 In particular, there is the princi-
pal-agent problem and a risk of unmeritorious suits. It is believed that a large scale 
law suit is might risk being initiated to inflict reputational harm on enterprises.83 For 
that reason enterprises prefer to settle at the early stage. Concerning the principal-
agent problem, it is well known from the literature that the clients (principals) face 
the risk of the agent seeking his own interests in pursuing the claim.84 To reply to 
these concerns, the EU Commission noted that the overall legal context in the US, 
which goes well beyond the mere class action mechanism, is very different from the 
one in Europe. US class actions in antitrust cases are characterised by a combination 
of features that is very specific to the US, including jury trial, one-way shifting of 
costs, treble damages, wide pre-trial discovery, contingent fees agreements and an 
opt-out mechanism. Therefore, in the EU Commission’s opinion, it is difficult to see 
that the introduction in Europe of the US style class action will lead to the excesses 
similar to ones know in the US.85 Nevertheless, the EU Commission in the White 
Paper rejected the ‘opt-out’ model. It recognised that the adoption of such a mecha-
nism might not follow a form of collective proceeding already in existence in the 
majority of the Member States.86 In particular, the main ‘default’ of the mechanism is 
that if a member of the class, does not take a ‘positive action’ not to be presented in 
the action, the action is brought on his behalf. 
Although the EU Commission rejected the opt-out model, the proposition on 
representative actions raises some doubts on its consistency. In particular, it endorses 
the introduction of representative actions on behalf of victims who are only ‘identifi-
able’, which means that the actual identity of the victims may not need to be known. 
This implied that the resulting ruling will be applicable to anyone who falls within the 
category of identifiable victims on whose behalf the claim has been brought, even 
though the victim has not taken any steps to join the litigation. Although not directly 
                                                        
82  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, pp. 21. See also, for example, CCIP and CEA comments 
on the Green Paper (COM (2005) 672). Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust. 
83  R. Van den Bergh and L. Visscher, The Preventive Function of Collective Actions for Damages in Consumer 
Law (2008) 1(2), p. 24. 
84  White Paper Impact Report, SEC(2008) 405, 2.4.2008, pp. 38 (“in opt-out class actions, the very 
large group of victims included in the class may not always be able to control the lawyers acting for 
the class (principal/agent problem)”). See also R. Van den Bergh, and L. Visscher, The Preventive 
Function of Collective Actions for Damages in Consumer Law (2008) 1(2), p. 5. 
85  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 17. 
86  There are a few Member States where an opt-out collective redress mechanism has been imple-
mented into their legal system (Denmark, The Netherlands, Portugal). However, these mechanisms 
are only a “version of opt-out collective redress regime” which donot justify an EU-wide approach 
based on an opt-out system. For a contrary opinion, see J.G. Delatre, Beyond the White Paper: Re-
thinking the Commission`s Proposal on Private Antitrust Litigation (2011) 8(1) C.L.Rev, pp. 29–58.  
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stated by the EU Commission, this would appear to be a form of an opt-out action,87 
which is sometimes referred to as an action brought on behalf of ‘consumers at 
large’.88 Here, the EU Commission’s private enforcement project clearly goes beyond 
ensuring that there are well-functioning national procedures in place and, accordingly, 
better redress for citizens. The purpose, it seems, is to employ civil litigation as an 
instrument to increase litigation (deterrence) in Member States. The EU Commis-
sion’s rationale is thus very similar to the rationale behind US class actions that were 
introduced in order to give more incentives to bring actions to consumers who on 
their own are not enough to achieve effective private enforcement of competition 
law. Therefore, if the aim followed is to provide sufficient incentives, the European 
model might risk moving closer to the US model of collective litigation that the EU 
Commission initially rejected in the words of the White Paper. 
4.4.3 Access to evidence through inter partes disclosure 
Antitrust damages actions are often complex and require the presentation of a broad 
and complex range of evidence. Plaintiffs, who are usually in the position of bearing 
the burden of proof, typically neither know nor possess the evidence for revealing the 
anti-competitive activities. Most of the relevant evidence is usually held by the party 
committing the anti-competitive behaviour (the defendant) and it is not readily avail-
able to the claimant, unless the claimant himself is a party to the breach and therefore 
has access to it. This ‘information asymmetry‘89 that exists between the plaintiff and 
the defendant hinders the bringing of damage claims.90  
The EU Commission therefore believes that the extent to which the claimants 
can obtain disclosure of relevant documents entails important consequences with 
regard to the victim’s initiative to sue. It recognised that as the national rules stand, in 
the European jurisdictions there is a lack of pre-trial discovery that exists in the US. 
In the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure91 provide for a broad range of discovery. 
In particular, the FRCP imposes an obligation on the parties to retain, search for and 
produce documents and information requested by the other party. It gives the party 
the right to seek discovery relating to any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the 
claim or defence of any party and all information ‘‘reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.’’ It is believed by the EU Commission that the ab-
                                                        
87  See speech by J. Almunia, Commissioner for Competition matters, of 15 October 2010 
(speech/10/554) pp. 15; D-P. Tzakas, Effective Collective Redress in Antitrust and Consumer Pro-
tection Matters: A Panacea or a Chimera? (2001) 48 C.M.L.Rev, pp. 1138. See also comments on the 
White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules received from European 
Mortgage Federation (pp. 2) and Freshfields Bruckhaus Derin http://ec.europa.eu/competition/an-
titrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/fresh_en.pdf (last consulted on 8 May 2013). 
88  See, for example, C. Leskinen, Collective Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU: The Opt-In v. The Opt-Out 
Model, IE Law School Working Paper (April 2012), p. 26. 
89  The ‘information asymmetry‘ between the plaintiff and the defendant is even more likely to occur in 
stand-alone actions, where the claimant does not have the decision of the Commission or a national 
competition authority to rely on as a source of evidence to make out the claim. 
90  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 23. 
91  (1938) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (‘FRCP’). 
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sence of a mechanism equivalent to US discovery-based systems or other forms of 
broad inter-partes disclosure made it very difficult, if not impossible, for a private 
party to bring a successful competition case.92  
In order to remedy the situation, the EU Commission has held that “a minimum 
level of disclosure inter partes for EU antitrust damages cases” should be ensured 
across Europe.93 However, it did not opt for a US style of automatic discovery – the 
option that was contemplated in the Green Paper.94 In the White Paper the EU 
Commission acknowledged that overly broad disclosure obligations could lead to 
procedural abuses with defendants settling merely to avoid heavy costs that broad 
discovery can create.95 To avoid the abuses, it outlined a system that is based first, on 
the fact pleading requirement,96 and second, on strict judicial control. By contrast to 
the less stringent U.S. system of ‘notice pleading‘,97 in the ‘fact pleading’ system the 
plaintiff is required to show a credible case before he can oblige the other party to 
disclose documents. In this respect, the EU Commission recommended that disclo-
sure is ordered when the facts and evidence presented by the claimant are “sufficient 
to make out a plausible claim”.98 What constitutes sufficient fact pleading would de-
pend on the circumstances of each case. Further on, the EU Commission emphasises 
that disclosure should be subject to strict conditions. First, the claimant must show to 
the satisfaction of the court that he is unable – after having applied all efforts that can 
reasonably be expected of him – to produce the requested evidence. Second, the 
claimant has specified sufficiently precise categories of evidence to be disclosed. 
Third, the claimant has to prove that the requested information is both relevant to 
the case and necessary and proportionate to proving its case. As for the requirement 
that the disclosure should be proportionate, the EU Commission stresses the need to 
protect secrets or otherwise confidential information from disclosure during the pro-
ceedings.99 Similarly, it recommends granting special protection to documents sub-
mitted to the EU Commission or a national competition authority by applicants for 
leniency. 
                                                        
92  Generally speaking, while a party in a common law system is under an obligation to the court to 
disclose all the evidence, both supportive and harmful to his case, a party in a civil law system is 
obliged only to produce to the court those materials which are necessary to prove the case (see sec-
tion 6.8.5.) 
93  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 5. 
94  Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672, p. 5. 
95  Discovery known in the U.S. is open to the risk of abuse through ‘discovery blackmail’ where the 
threat of extremely broad or even automatic full discovery can be used by either party to pressure 
the other into a settlement. 
96  The Green Paper (COM (2005) 672) defines ‘fact pleading‘ as a document in which the party re-
questing discovery sets out the relevant facts of the case in detail and presents reasonably available 
evidence in support of its allegations (p. 5). 
97  In the U.S, based on ‘notice pleading‘, the plaintiff must only give the defendant notice of the nature 
of his claim for him to require discovery. 
98  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 31. 
99  The White Paper (with the Staff Working Paper) provides that national laws will govern the question 
of what constitutes confidential information. 
Chapter 4 
92 
 
As mentioned above, in addition to the fact pleading standard, at the core of the 
EU Commission’s recommendation was reliance on the “central function of the 
court” in the disclosure procedure. The EU Commission emphasised that disclosure 
of evidence held by the opposing party or a third party can only be ordered by judges 
and is subject to “strict and active judicial control as to its necessity, scope and pro-
portionality”.100 
Moreover, in order to strengthen the proposed measures and to make access to 
evidence more effective the EU Commission empowers the Member States to give to 
the courts the power to compel parties to disclose categories of relevant evidence. In 
particular, in the event of failure or refusal to comply with a disclosure order, destruc-
tion of relevant evidence, failure to comply with obligations to protect confidential 
information or abuse of the rights relating to the disclosure of evidence, national 
courts should have the possibility of imposing sanctions. Such sanctions should in-
clude the option to draw adverse inferences concerning the undisclosed information. 
It means that the court will interpret the party’s failure to comply with the court`s 
orders as circumstantial evidence contrary to the party. If there is no other evidence 
on the same issue, the court may rely upon an adverse inference in deciding that is-
sue. 
An issue of concern that has been raised in the comments received on the White 
Paper was related to the fact that the EU Commission suggested that national courts 
should (under specific conditions) have the power to order parties to proceedings or 
third parties to disclose precise categories of relevant evidence. For many jurisdic-
tions, such a level of disclosure constitutes a major departure from existing rules. 
Although it is believed that a certain level of disclosure inter partes should be ensured 
and expanding the powers of national courts to allow them to order the disclosure of 
precise categories of relevant evidence could help to achieve this objective, it could 
be argued that this could lead to abuses. In certain circumstances the term ‘category’ 
could be interpreted very broadly and the safeguards envisaged in the White Paper 
might not be sufficient to avoid these negative effects. 
4.4.4 Limitation periods 
The limitation period is one of the most important procedural issues which could en-
hance, but also jeopardise, the effectiveness of antitrust private enforcement. Defined 
as a period of time during which an individual can bring a claim, it regulates the ac-
cess to courts in time. Once the limitation period has ended there will be a complete 
defence that the claim has been brought outside the period of limitation available to 
the defendant against claims by the claimant.  
The EU Commission in its White Paper points out that limitation periods play an 
important role in providing legal certainty for market players, but that they can also 
create considerable obstacles to the recovery of damages.101 In certain cases, the 
limitation periods, which are regulated by national laws, “could make it practically 
                                                        
100  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 33. 
101  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 8. 
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impossible to exercise the right to seek compensation for the harm caused by that 
prohibited agreement or practice. This is particularly true if the national rule also 
imposes a short limitation period which is not capable of being suspended”,102 espe-
cially in cartel cases. Cartel activity is generally undertaken in secret, and those likely 
to have been harmed are unlikely to know the anticompetitive activity exists or that 
they are suffering losses. Limitation periods might expire without victims having ever 
been aware of the infringement. 
To avoid the scenario where victims of antitrust behaviour cannot benefit from 
their EU rights due to the limitation periods regulated by the Member States, the 
Commission proposed that certain measures should be implemented. In particular, it 
makes two groups of suggestions towards harmonisation of limitation periods. First, 
it proposes that the limitation period should not begin before the victim of the in-
fringement can reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the infringement and of 
the harm it caused him. If the infringement is continuous or repeated – as often is the 
case in competition law – the limitation period should not start to run before the day 
on which the infringement ceases. Concerning this first group of suggestions, the EU 
Commission recognised that there are currently wide disparities regarding limitation 
periods throughout the Member States, but it did not render it necessary to suggest a 
(minimum) duration for stand-alone cases.103 It recalled that in any event national 
rules on duration of the limitation period are subject to the directly applicable princi-
ples of EU law.104 In this respect, in Manfredi105 the CJEU held that, in the absence 
of unified rules governing the matter, it is for each Member State to lay down detailed 
rules – including limitation periods – governing actions for safeguarding rights which 
individuals derive directly from EU law. The rules will be subject to the EU law prin-
ciples of equivalence and effectiveness. It follows that a national limitation period 
cannot be such that it renders the right to seek compensation practically impossible 
or excessively difficult. The limitation period must be long enough for claimants to 
become aware that they have a cause for action and to begin proceedings. As the 
CJEU held, ‘[a] national rule under which the limitation period begins to run from the 
day on which the agreement or concerted practice was adopted could make it practi-
cally impossible to exercise the right to seek compensation for the harm caused by 
that prohibited agreement or practice, particularly if that national rule also imposes a 
short limitation period which is not capable of being suspended.’106  
Second, although the EU Commission believes that Member States should re-
main free to set their own limitation periods with reference to stand-alone actions, it 
does not share the same opinion in the case of follow-on actions. Unlike stand-alone 
actions, in which the length of the limitation period is affected by the time period that 
elapses between the time of infringement (or the occurrence of the damage) and 
awareness of the damage, follow-on actions warrant a different approach. As these 
                                                        
102  Manfredi and Others. v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] ECR I-6619, par 78. 
103  Setting a different limitation period for allegations of anticompetitive conduct would also create 
excessive complexity in the legal system.  
104  See section 3.2.1 
105  Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, ECR [2006] I-6619, at pars. 62, 72 and 81. 
106  Manfredi, ECR [2006] I-6619, par. 78. 
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lawsuits follow a previous public decision, the problem of detection and awareness 
seem far less important. In these cases, the problem is that the victims of antitrust 
infringement may have no reasonable opportunity to bring a damage claim after a 
public authority has established an antitrust infringement. The time limit in which 
damages actions have to be brought might expire while the EU Commission’s or 
NCA’s investigation is still ongoing. This results in deprivation of claimants of their 
fundamental right to effective compensation. To address the problem, the EU Com-
mission proposes a new limitation period of at least two years, which begins to run 
once the NCA has adopted an infringement decision and that decision has become 
final. The White Paper explicitly states that the EU Commission prefers the option of 
a new limitation period over the option of suspending limitation periods, when the 
limitation period would stop running when a competition authority starts a proceed-
ing.107 In this case the limitation period continues running at the moment when the 
proceeding of competition authority has come to its end, either because the competi-
tion authority has decided not to proceed or because a last instance court has issued a 
final decision, which cannot be challenged. The limitation period continues running 
from the point when it stopped, and hence it will not restart (as in interruption). The 
EU Commission acknowledged that if the limitation period is suspended, parties 
might find it difficult to calculate the remaining period precisely, especially when they 
do not know about the opening and closing of proceedings by the competition au-
thorities. Moreover, depending on the time elapsed before the competition authority 
initiated a proceeding, the remaining time before the limitation period expires might 
not be long enough for plaintiffs to prepare a claim and to commence proceedings 
(e.g., two months). This could lead to an ineffective coordination of public and private 
enforcement and a consequent reduction in corrective justice. 
4.4.5 Costs of damages actions108 
According to the EU Commission, litigants experience two kinds of problems with 
regard to costs. The first one is the obligation of the claimant to pay certain fees up-
front. Competition cases are complex, requiring expert economic evidence and a 
need for specialist legal and economic advice. As a consequence, the costs tend to be 
high109 and thus might discourage potential claimants from bringing a claim. “[…] in 
all countries it appears that on the basis of a 1 million claim where the level of dam-
                                                        
107  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 9.  
108  According to the Commission Staff Working Paper, the notion of costs generally covers two differ-
ent categories of costs, court costs (e.g. court fees, fees for experts appointed by the court and ex-
penses incurred by witnesses ordered by courts) and party costs (e.g. lawyers’ fees, experts appointed 
by the parties, parties’ expenses). See: Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 74. 
109  Even in cartel cases where the EU Commission or NCA has adopted a decision finding an in-
fringement of antitrust rules, the burden of proving the extent of the damage caused to the plaintiffs 
is likely to be considerable. 
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ages is relatively easy to establish, costs would run into tens of thousands of euro. In 
the UK and Ireland this figure is even higher, going well above 100,000.”110  
The second problem is related to the general application of the ‘loser pays‘ prin-
ciple, pursuant to which the unsuccessful litigant has to bear the costs of the civil 
action.111 The EU Commission explained that the ‘loser pays’ principle, which applies 
in many of the national courts throughout Europe, might deter unmeritorious or 
speculative claims, but it could also discourage real victims from bringing damages 
actions before the national courts. In the Green Paper the EU Commission consid-
ered options to modify the ‘loser pays’ rule. One of the proposals entailed limiting the 
‘loser pays’ rule to those cases where the unsuccessful claimant “acted in a manifestly 
unreasonable manner by bringing the case.” In the White Paper however, it did not 
propose any harmonisation with regard to costs at the EU level. Instead, it simply en-
couraged Member States to reflect on their existing cost rules so as to promote meri-
torious antitrust claims where costs would otherwise prevent claims being brought. 
This would be particularly important for claimants whose financial situation is signifi-
cantly weaker than that of the defendant.112 To that end, the EU Commission sug-
gested that the Member States provide rules that deal with three aspects of costs. 
First, it proposed to set court fees in a way that they are not a disproportionate disin-
centive to competition damages claims. Second, national courts should have the pow-
er to issue cost orders that derogate from the usual cost rule, including an upfront 
guarantee that the claimant, even if unsuccessful, will not have to bear all the other 
party’s costs. Third, Member States should design procedural rules encouraging set-
tlements as a way to reduce costs. After all, arriving at a settlement is the primary goal 
of dispute resolution in civil and commercial disputes.113 As evidence suggests, many 
of actual competition law cases do not lead to a judgement because a settlement be-
tween parties was reached.114 Especially, the parties to competition law litigation will 
frequently have a common interest in avoiding the costs and uncertainties of bringing 
a case to trial. When the economic interests of commercial relations become more 
important, the readiness to litigate diminishes, caused by the mutual dependence of 
the undertakings and because the outcome after court proceedings is too uncertain, a 
non-judicial resolution of claims for damages might often be preferable for victims as 
well as for infringers.115 In the legal practice of civil enforcement, settlement of a 
great many cases is very important.  
                                                        
110  Ashurst, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, Analysis of 
Economic Models For the Calculation of Damages (2004), p. 96. A concern about high litigation cost has 
prompted a review of litigation costs and litigation funding in the UK (see Lord Justice Jackson’s 
Report on Civil Costs (2009), which addresses the problem of high litigation costs in the UK). 
111  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 74. 
112  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 9. 
113  H. Brown, A. Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice (1999) second edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
p. 10. 
114  See: B. Rodger, Private enforcement of competition law, the hidden story: competition litigation 
settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005 (2008) 29(2) E.C.L.Rev, pp. 96–116. 
115  G. Cumming, M. Freudenthal, Civil Procedure in EU Competition Cases before the English and Dutch Courts 
(2010) Kluwer Law International, p. 217. 
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In the White Paper, the EU Commission has not put forward proposals on con-
ditional fee arrangements or third party funding,116 which are seen by some as a po-
tential solution to the discouraging effect of the ‘loser pays‘ rule on bringing antitrust 
damages actions.117 In this respect, the OFT has commented that “third party fund-
ing is an important potential sources of funding […] and should be encouraged”. 
Although not addressed in the White Paper, funding issues were included in the 
Commission’s Public Hearing in relation to collective redress. Following the Com-
mission’s Public Hearing, in June 2011 the Civil Justice Council issued a response 
stating that third party funding should be pursued. Based on this development, it 
seems possible that proposals on funding will be made in the future.  
4.4.6 Damages 
Important elements of antitrust enforcement are the definition of types of damage 
awarded and the calculation of damages. Concerning the definition, the EU Commis-
sion proposes to codify the existing acquis communautaire. Firstly, victims of an EU 
competition law infringement must receive, at a minimum, ‘full compensation’ of the 
real value of the loss suffered. Real value of the loss suffered includes ‘actual losses’ 
(damnum emergens) but also ‘loss of profit‘ resulting from it (lucrum cessans) plus inter-
est. The ‘actual loss‘ is the overcharge itself. By buying the product at the overcharged 
rate the costs are raised. Consequently, when selling the same product to subsequent 
customers at higher prices, less of the product will be sold. ‘Loss of profits’ in the 
form of revenue, and profits will be lost. As stressed by the CJEU, “total exclusion of 
loss of profit as a head of damage for which compensation may be awarded cannot 
be accepted in the case of a breach of EU law since, especially in the context of eco-
nomic or commercial litigation, “total exclusion of loss of profit would be such as to 
make reparation of damage practically impossible.”118 Secondly, the EU Commission 
suggested that victims of an EU competition law infringement are entitled to particu-
lar damages, such as exemplary or punitive damages, if and to the extent to which 
damages may be awarded pursuant to actions based on violations of national compe-
tition law. Thirdly, in the absence of harmonisation at EU level, Member States may 
ensure that the protection of the right to damages for loss caused by an antitrust 
infringement does not entail the unjust enrichment of the victims. 
The White Paper did not retain the Green Paper’s proposal for double damages 
or any other punitive damages, which are well known in the United States.119 Indeed, 
                                                        
116  ‘Third party funding’ is a funding where a third party, which could be a company, bank or hedge 
fund, would pay all or a part of the costs of an action. 
117  See, for example, C. Leskinen, Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules 
(2011) 8(1) C.L.Rev, pp. 87–121; A. Riley and J. Peysner, Damages in EC antitrust actions: who pays 
the piper? (2006) 31(5) E.L.Rev, pp. 752–754. 
118  See Manfredi and Others. v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] ECR I-6619 (par. 
96). 
119  Although punitive damages are a settled principle of common law in the US, they have been criti-
cised, and many legal commentators call for reform (see, for example, M.E. Wheeler, A Proposal for 
Further Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability 
Litigation’ (1989) 40(3) Alabama Law Review, pp. 919–973; T. Preston Klein, Experimenting With 
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in their responses to the Green Paper, most Member States rejected the possibility of 
the introduction of punitive damages for breaches of EU competition law.120 The re-
jection was supported by various arguments. Not only are punitive damages seen as 
being incompatible with tort principles, adding a penalising element to damages 
claims would risk of ‘unfair enrichment’ of the victims of any antitrust violations. The 
introduction of punitive damages would also contradict the full compensation princi-
ple, which is indicated by the EU Commission as the main objective pursued in the 
White Paper, and was discussed earlier.121 Moreover, due to their penal nature, puni-
tive damages raise a problem of ne bis in idem122 in cases where a competition authority 
has already imposed a fine on the undertaking. One could also argue that since one of 
the main objectives followed in the White Paper is to “preserve strong public en-
forcement,” any need for stronger deterrence should be achieved through public 
fines and not resorting to a punitive approach at the private level.123 
An important remark that has to be made is that ‘double damages’ are no longer 
mentioned in the White Paper, but they are also not explicitly ruled out. The EU 
Commission acknowledges that exemplary or punitive damages124 are not contrary to 
the European public order. It refers to the Manfredi decision in which the CJEU 
allowed for the possibility to go beyond mere compensation and award punitive dam-
ages.125 Based on that, the EU Commission decided to leave the question on intro-
ducing or maintaining non-compensatory damages to the discretion of the individual 
Member States. 
The second issue dealt with by the White Paper in the context of damages is the 
calculation of damages. In contrast to the codification of the type of damages 
awarded, the EU Commission suggested leaving the calculation of damages to the 
Member States. Furthermore, the EU Commission acknowledged that while the 
scope of recoverable damages is more easily ascertainable, the calculation of damages 
could be a “very cumbersome exercise” in antitrust cases.126 It requires comparison 
of the victim’s actual position with the economic situation of the victim in the hypo-
                                                        
State Constitutional Limits on Punitive Damages in California: Application of the California Exces-
sive Fines Clause (1990) 17(2) Constitutional Law Quarterly, pp. 439–482). 
120  See comments received by the Commission in response to its Green Paper (available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html). However, some 
argue that the introduction of a double damages rule for hard-core cartels seems reasonable in cartel 
cases. Chances of cartel members paying full compensation to their victims are low and therefore 
there is a high risk that antitrust victims will be under-compensated (see: Editorial Comments, A lit-
tle more action please! – The White Paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules 
(2008) 45(3) Common. Law Market Review, p. 613). 
121  See section 4.3. 
122  The principle is a fundamental principle of EU law (Joined Cases C-238 etc Limburgse Vinyl v 
Commission [2002] ECR I-8375 at 59). In essence it requires that the same person should not be 
sanctioned more than once for the same conduct in order to protect the same legal interest. 
123  See section 4.3. 
124  Punitive damages, also called ‘exemplary’ or ‘penal’ damages, are sums awarded apart from any 
compensatory or nominal damages, usually because of particularly aggravated misconduct on the 
part of the defendant. The primary objective for punitive damages is to punish and deter certain 
conduct. See L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages (2005) 5th edition, Matthew Bender & Co. 
125  Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] ECR 1-6619 at par. 99. 
126  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 7. 
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thetical scenario in which the illegal act had not taken place.127 As such, it involves 
estimations while working with imperfect data and judgments about what might have 
happened in the absence of a competition law infringement. The damage calculation 
can become notoriously difficult, or even practically impossible, if the idea that the 
exact amount of the damage caused by a competition law infringement has to be fully 
compensated is strictly applied. Therefore, in order to facilitate the calculation of 
damages, the EU Commission decided to “draw up a framework with pragmatic, 
non-binding guidance on the calculation of damages, e.g. by means of approximate 
methods of calculation or simplified rules on estimating the loss”.128 To that end, in 
June 2011 the EU Commission released for consultation a draft Guidance Paper on 
quantification of damages for EU antitrust violations.129 The Draft Guidance Paper 
gave insights into the harm caused by infringements of these rules to different cate-
gories of potential claimants and set out the main methods and techniques currently 
available to quantify such harm. It focused on the role of expert economic evidence, 
in particular, how economic techniques and models can be best employed for the 
purpose of quantifying harm in damages actions. The Paper has been criticised for its 
focus.130 Quantification techniques are more of an ‘economic’ and ‘technical’ matter 
than a matter in which fundamental principles of EU law should determine the 
choices to be made by the parties or the courts. The choice of whether and how to 
apply such techniques should not be a matter that is driven by the EU “principle of 
effectiveness”. It was also arguable that a sufficiently clear and detailed reference to 
the non-binding nature of the Guidance Paper is needed. While the Guidance Paper, 
in principle, is non-binding (particularly in the part setting out the various techniques 
for quantification) the reference to the EU principle of effectiveness gives the guid-
ance paper a sort of obligatory force. This “tempers the non-binding character of the 
guidance paper”.131 Therefore, when recently, in June 2013, the EU Commission 
adopted a Communication on quantifying harm in actions for antitrust damages (and 
accompanying Practical Guide), it emphasised that the Communication is purely 
informative, does not bind national courts and does not alter the legal rules applicable 
in the Member States.132 The document intends to provide ‘guidance’ (assistance) to 
courts and parties involved in actions for damages by making more widely available 
                                                        
127  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 28. 
128  Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 
165, p. 7. 
129  Draft Guidance Paper on quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages for Breaches of the EU Anti-
trust Rules, June 2011. 
130  See, for example, comments from the Italian Court of Cassation (at http://ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/consultations/2011_actions_damages/corte_di_cassazione_italiana_en.pdf); comments of the 
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2013. 
132  Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C(2013) 
3440 (11.6.2013), at 12. 
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information relevant for quantifying the harm caused by infringements of antitrust 
rules.133  
4.4.7 Fault 
The EU Commission acknowledged that Member States take different approaches to 
the question of fault (intention or negligence)134 in order to establish liability for dam-
ages. The EU Commission distinguished between three groups of Member States. 
The first group of Member States does not require fault as a condition of obtaining 
damages. The second group of Member States require fault in addition to illegality, 
but fault is presumed (rebuttably or irrebuttably) as soon as illegality is shown.135 The 
third group are Member States where claimants are required to demonstrate the exis-
tence of fault in relation to the infringement or in relation to the effect of infringe-
ment.  
Despite the differences that exist among the Member States, the EU Commission 
does not consider it necessary to propose a general harmonisation in this field. As it 
explained, regarding the Member States that fall into the first and second groups 
characterised above the fault is not viewed as a hurdle to damage actions. Hence, 
there are no grounds for policy changes in the legal regimes of these countries.136 The 
situation is different in the Member States that fall into the third group. With regard 
to these jurisdictions, the EU Commission believes that a fault requirement consti-
tutes an additional obstacle to damage claims. The problem is not the fault regime as 
such, but rather the fact that claimants do not benefit from any legal presumption 
concerning the fault. To remedy the situation, the EU Commission suggests that in 
the Member States that fall into the third group the defendant is presumed to have 
acted with fault, once the claimant has shown an infringement of EU competition 
law. The only exception that might apply to that rule is if the defendant demonstrates 
that the infringement was due to a “genuinely excusable error”. According to the EU 
Commission, an error would be only excusable when “a reasonable person applying a 
high standard of care could not have been aware that the conduct restricted competi-
tion”.137 It is important to note that the concept of “genuinely excusable error” is 
intended to apply as a minimum standard. It means that Member States would not be 
allowed to go below this standard, but they could still go beyond it. They could intro-
duce less restrictive alternatives, such as lifting the fault requirement, but they could 
not apply additional or stricter exception rules to the rule of fault presumption.  
                                                        
133  Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
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Chapter 4 
100 
 
4.4.8 Availability of the passing-on defence 
Inextricably linked to the question of indirect purchasers standing138 is the question 
whether the defendant facing a damage claim is entitled to argue that the plaintiff (di-
rect purchaser) has raised his prices in response to the anticompetitive overcharge, 
and subsequently passed the damages on to his customers (indirect purchaser). For 
example, for the last few years a shoe seller has been buying shoes from the shoe 
producer who has been involved in an illegal cartel, at prices that have been 10 per 
cent too high. When setting the customer prices, the shoe seller has taken into ac-
count the price that he paid to the shoe producer, including the overcharge. As a 
retailer he adjusted retail prices to his own costs. In this process, the burden of extra 
10 per cent has been passed on to his own customers. The extra costs incurred due to 
illegal cartel activity have been already compensated for when the shoe seller sells the 
shoes to his own customers. Hence, if the passing-on defence is available, arguing 
and proving such defence successfully, the defendant can escape damage liability. In 
the EU there has been a debate as to whether such a defence should be allowed in 
competition cases.139 In the United States, the US Supreme Court excluded the pos-
sibility of passing-on defence.140 It feared that the tracing of the overcharge would 
unduly complicate antitrust litigation that is already complex.141 In addition, the court 
noted that denying the passing-on defence could improve deterrence. By concentrat-
ing the entire overcharge in the hands of direct purchasers, it would increase the 
direct purchasers’ incentive to sue and thereby the deterrent impact of such suits.142 
As Justice Brennan said, “from the deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant to whom 
damages are paid, so long as someone redresses the violation.” 
In the Green Paper the EU Commission attempted to find the best possible solu-
tion to the issue of the passing-on defence. It put forward four options,143 including 
two options suggesting the exclusion of the passing-on defence. One of the option 
suggested exclusion of the passing on defence and only allowing the direct purchaser 
to bring actions for damages (option 22), while the other option provided for exclu-
sion of the passing-on defence but allowing both direct and indirect purchasers to 
bring actions (option 23). In the White Paper, however, the exclusion of the passing-
on defence is no longer advocated. Instead, the EU Commission suggests that defen-
dants should be entitled to invoke the passing-on defence against a claim for com-
pensation of overcharge. It recalls the CJEU’s emphasis on the compensatory princi-
ple, which requires compensation to be available to any injured person who can show 
                                                        
138  See section 4.4.1. 
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140  See section 4.4.1. See also B. D. Richman and C. R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functional-
ist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule (2007) 81 Southern California Law Review, p. 76.  
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a sufficient causal link with the infringement. In this perspective, “infringers should 
be allowed to invoke the possibility that the overcharge might have been passed on. 
If passing-on arguments were not permitted, this would create significant distortions 
in the redress system, which would fail to achieve its fundamental goal of allowing all 
victims to obtain full compensation. Indeed, to deny this defence could result in un-
just enrichment of purchasers who passed on the overcharge and in undue multiple 
compensation for the illegal overcharge by the defendant.”144 Allowing the passing-
on defence therefore, provides for a fair solution. Although it might increase the 
complexity of damages cases,145 it ensures that each participant in the supply chain 
can only claim the damage that it has actually suffered.  
The EU Commission goes further in the White Paper. It noted that recognition 
of indirect purchaser standing (passing-on offence) and passing on defence will not 
by itself provide for effective private enforcement. The EU Commission emphasised 
that private enforcement will only fulfil its objective of both full compensation and 
deterrent effect if the system ensures that the entities to whom the excessive prices 
have been passed, in particular the indirect purchasers, have a proper means of re-
dress. It acknowledged that the indirect purchasers have to face some difficulties 
relating to the passing-on. Depending on the length of the supply chain, they might 
find it difficult to produce sufficient proof of the existence and the extent of the 
passing-on of an illegal overcharge. As a consequence, there is often a risk that these 
indirect purchasers would be unable to recover compensation for losses incurred due 
to anticompetitive behaviour. To assist such claimants, and thus to avoid the infringer 
maintaining his illegal gains, the EU Commission has made an additional proposal. It 
suggested easing the burden of proof, but only in favour of indirect purchasers. In 
particular, it proposed that indirect purchasers should be able to rely on the rebut-
table presumption that the whole of the alleged overcharge has been fully passed-on 
to him.146 A draft proposal for a Council Directive on rules governing actions for 
damages for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU clarifies that a plaintiff 
would be permitted to take advantage of this presumption if he can show (1) the 
defendant committed an antitrust violation, (2) the violation resulted in an overcharge 
to the direct purchasers and (3) the plaintiff purchased the goods or services that 
were the subject of the infringement, or purchased goods or services derived from or 
containing the goods or services that were the subject of the infringement.  
There are some concerns with regard to the EU Commission proposition. If in-
direct purchasers are able to rely on the rebuttable presumption that an illegal over-
charge was passed on to them, this implies that the defendant bears the burden of 
proof. Thus, the EU reverses the burden of proof from the claimant to the defen-
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dant. The indirect purchaser will not need to establish the fact of damages; instead, 
the defendant has to demonstrate the non-existence of damages.147 This would be the 
case, even when the defendant has not tried to rely on the passing-on defence against 
direct purchasers for whatever reason. Moreover, it might be argued that the intro-
duction of the rebuttable presumption might result in an unfair position for the de-
fendant against an indirect purchaser claimant. The relevant proof to rebut this pre-
sumption might not be in his possession. As the defendant may need information 
from other parties, especially the direct purchasers, it is questionable if the defendant 
will be able to prove that the overcharge was not passed on. 
4.4.9 Binding nature of competition authorities’ decisions 
As mentioned above, by virtue of the established case law148 and Article 16(1) of Reg-
ulation 1/2003 national courts are not permitted to take a decision that runs counter 
to decisions adopted or contemplated by the EU Commission. Following this rule, 
the claimant in subsequent proceedings before national courts may rely on the EU 
Commission’s decision finding a breach of the competition rules as binding proof.149 
In contrast to the EU Commission’s decisions, decisions of national competition 
authorities (hereinafter “NCAs”) are deprived of any legal effects beyond national 
boundaries. The nature of NCAs’ decisions was highlighted in the Modernisation 
Regulation on implementation of the antitrust rules and the Network Notice.150 Al-
though the text of Article 5 is silent on the effects of the decisions taken by the 
NCAs, in its explanation of the Proposal,151 the EU Commission unambiguously 
states that: “Decisions adopted by national competition authorities do not have legal 
effects outside the territory of their Member State, nor do they bind the EU Commis-
sion”.152 Within the jurisdiction of each Member State the value of a decision taken 
by an NCA is governed by national rules. The EU Commission found that as the 
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rules stand, in most Member States NCAs’ decisions do not formally have a binding 
effect on national courts.153  
A proposal by the EU Commission in the White Paper goes beyond the existing 
acquis communautaire by suggesting the binding effect of Member State competition 
authority decisions on national courts throughout the EU. Based on the EU Com-
mission’s proposal, if an NCA has already found an infringement under Article 101 
or Article 102 TFEU the national courts are bound by that decision.154 The NCA’s 
decisions envisaged by the White Paper should be binding not only in the NCA’s 
Member State, but also upon the courts in every Member State throughout the EU. 
Putting it differently, victims could bring a damage action before a court of another 
Member State, with respect to the Member State of the NCA concerned, without the 
court being forced to take evidence abroad in order to establish the facts relevant to 
the infringement.155 For example, if a Slovenian national competition authority finds 
an infringement of the EU antitrust rules, a complainant would be able to rely on that 
finding as irrefutable proof, not just as a presumption, when bringing a damages 
claim based on that breach in an English court. The English court would not be per-
mitted to re-examine the facts already investigated by the Slovenian competition 
authority. This rule would put NCAs’ decisions on a par with those of the EU Com-
mission, with some limitations. The EU Commission clarifies that first, the rule 
would only apply where the damages action relates to the same practices and the 
same undertakings as covered by the NCA decision.156 Second, with the aim of pro-
tecting the infringers’ rights of defence, all legitimate avenues of appeal against that 
decision need to be exhausted or not used. That means that only the final decisions 
of NCAs would be given such a binding effect. Consequently, a national court would 
be required not to make a decision that runs counter to any infringement decision of 
an NCA under EU competition rules that “either have been accepted by their ad-
dressees (by refraining from an appeal), or which were confirmed upon appeal by the 
competent review courts.”157 While appeal against an NCA’s decision is still pending 
on grounds relating to the finding of the infringement, or while time-limits for appeal 
have not yet expired, national courts seised with a damage action are encouraged to 
consider whether it would be appropriate to stay their proceeding.158 Third, the rule 
is subject to the important qualifier that it is without prejudice to the right, and possi-
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bly obligation, of national courts to seek clarification on the interpretation of Articles 
101 or 102 TFEU by preliminary reference to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU.159  
The White Paper and the Working Paper include extended references to the ad-
vantages of the rule about the binding effect of NCA decisions on civil courts. In this 
respect, the EU Commission underlines that the binding rule would increase the 
effectiveness of competition law and the compensation of the victims. This provides 
an element of legal certainty to follow-on cases since the private claimant, in princi-
ple, can rely on the outcome of the previous public enforcement case.160 From a 
pragmatic standpoint, the benefits of the proposal would be that it would contribute 
to judicial economy by avoiding re-litigation of the facts and legal issues already in-
vestigated and assessed by a public authority. In other words, instead of examining 
whether there was an infringement of the competition rules, the national court seised 
with an antitrust damages claim would (only) have to concentrate on examining the 
causal relationship between the infringement and the alleged harm, calculating the 
quantum of damages. When no longer obliged to find and rule whether the alleged 
infringement has taken place or not, it significantly reduces the work load of the na-
tional court. As a consequence, the binding effect proposal also simplifies and accel-
erates the damages procedure and reduces the extra costs of re-litigation. In addition, 
as the question of antitrust infringement will not be reopened, the EU Commission’s 
proposal would inevitably incentivise victims to bring follow-on actions. Proving the 
relevant facts might present the main difficulty in hard-core infringements. Since 
these antitrust infringements are often committed secretly and the claimants do not 
have special investigatory powers, they might be confronted with an insurmountable 
obstacle at this stage. If there exists a previous administrative decision on the same 
case, the claimant may rely upon it as regards the assessment of the antitrust infringe-
ment.  
The EU Commission’s proposal could prove controversial. As the EU Commis-
sion recognises, in a number of EU jurisdictions the NCA’s decisions are not legally 
binding on national courts.161 In contrast to the binding effect of those of the EU 
Commission that apply by virtue of the supremacy of EU law, the binding effect a 
NCA decision might bring the risk of subjugation of private enforcement to public 
enforcement. It would thus create a model for administrative decisions over judicial 
rulings and therefore unduly interfere with judicial independence.162 Specific reserva-
tions have been expressed with regard to the binding effect of infringement decisions 
of NCAs of other Member States. It has often been argued that the experience and 
expertise of NCAs are not identical across the EU,163 and there is no uniformity 
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across Member States as to the levels of tests and standards used in the procedures 
before NCA.164 
To address these criticisms, the EU Commission has foreseen in its proposal cer-
tain safeguards. In particular, it suggested the introduction of a provision analogous 
to Article 34(1) of Regulation 44/2001 allowing a court, as an exception, to refuse 
recognition of a decision of another Member State on ground of public policy. This 
public-policy exception which would apply in cases in which the right to fair legal 
process has not been respected during the proceedings leading to the NCA decision 
would also be in line with the European Convention on Human Rights and EU Char-
ter on Fundamental Rights and as foreseen in the case law of the EU courts. In addi-
tion, the EU Commission explained that national courts could avoid the binding 
effect of NCAs’ decisions also by referral to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling under 
article 267 TFEU. As it held, binding “obligation should apply without prejudice to 
the right, and possible obligation, of national courts to seek clarification on the inter-
pretation of Article 81 or 82 EC under Article 267 TFEU.”165 
4.4.10 Interaction between actions for damages and leniency programmes 
Last but not least, the White Paper considered the issue that had provoked many re-
actions in the comments to the White Paper, in particular the interaction between ac-
tions for damages and leniency programmes. The leniency programmes166 are among 
the most effective tools employed by antitrust authorities for the “detection, investi-
gation and punishment of cartels as well as for providing effective deterrence against 
cartelisation.”167 At this point the relevant aspect is related to the concern that the in-
centive of leniency programmes could be considerably reduced if the leniency appli-
cant is confronted with private follow-on claims for compensation.168 In particular, 
there is a fear that the statements given by a leniency applicant who is cooperating 
with the competition agency would be later used as evidence against him in civil pro-
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ceedings, especially by ordering the disclosure of documents that were produced spe-
cifically for the purpose of a leniency application.  
To ensure that leniency programmes remain effective, the EU Commission with-
held the proposal to exclude the discoverability of leniency applications. It proposed 
to apply the protection against disclosure against all corporate statements submitted 
by leniency applicants in relation to breaches of Article 101 TFEU. This is regardless 
of the success of the application, i.e. whether the leniency application is accepted, re-
jected or does not lead to a competition authority decision.169 The proposal on leni-
ency is consistent with the EU Commission’s current practice and it is a good exam-
ple that the measures proposed in the White Paper were designed to create an effec-
tive legal framework for antitrust damages actions that would complement and at the 
same time not jeopardise public enforcement.170 The EU Commission was aware that 
the twin objectives of a strong private enforcement regime and an efficient public 
enforcement of European competition rules, in particular an effective EU leniency 
regime, do not coexist easily side by side. Coexistence of public and private enforce-
ment proceedings requires a coordination or equalisation. In particular the EU Com-
mission pointed out that increased private enforcement should not result in decreased 
public enforcement. Encouraging private actions for breaches of competition law 
without regard to public enforcement could in particular put the effectiveness of the 
leniency system at stake. Since firms would be reluctant to come forward to the EU 
Commission, the probability of detection and of successful public enforcement of 
Article 101 would be reduced. This would seem highly undesirable in light of the 
White Paper’s aim to “preserve strong public enforcement of Articles 101 and 
102”.171 Moreover, in words of Riley, without whistleblowers’ not only anti-cartel de-
tection and enforcement are substantially undermined, but also without leniency ap-
plications damages claims will remain rare.172 A significant consequence of the large 
scale of detection and punishment of anticompetitive practices is likely to be in rise of 
private antitrust litigation, as the ability of private plaintiffs to rely on the facts and 
legal analysis of EU Commission prohibitions facilitate plaintiffs in bringing a suc-
cessful antitrust civil litigation. Not required to prove an infringement of the Article 
101 TFEU, the plaintiffs are likely to be willing to tackle the secondary barriers, such 
as standard of proof or causation.173 
In the White Paper the EU Commission also invites Member States to consider 
restricting civil liability of immunity recipients to claims by direct and indirect con-
tractual partners. 174 In other words, the immunity recipient would be liable only to 
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pa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf (last consultes on 8 May 2013). 
171  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 3. 
172  A. Riley, Beyond Leniency: Enhancing Enforcement in EC Antitrust Law (2005) 28(3) World Compe-
tition, p. 379. 
173  A. Riley, Beyond Leniency: Enhancing Enforcement in EC Antitrust Law (2005) 28(3) World Compe-
tition, p. 389. 
174  A ‘direct contractual partner’ is the one who directly bought the cartelised products or services from 
the immunity recipient; an ‘indirect contractual partner’ is the one who is situated further down in 
ĺ 
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direct purchase of the products or services in question or those down the supply 
chain that bought such products or services from the direct contractual partners 
themselves. A victim that did not buy cartelised products or services directly or indi-
rectly from the immunity recipient or a harmed competitor would not be able to 
claim damages. While such an approach might be attractive on a basic level, the EU 
Commission’s proposal is often labelled as being “problematic”175 or having its “pu-
nitive effect –similar to the US system of multiple damages”176 As it is structured, it 
creates a risk of running counter to the principle of full compensation that is the 
primary objective of the White Paper. It is also not in line with general principles of 
torts. 
4.5 Follow-up to the White Paper 
Year 2013 marked twelve years from the CJEU’s Courage ruling. Since then, in the 
legislative context, there have been important developments in the area of private 
antitrust enforcement. At the EU level, the EU Commission published a Green Paper 
in 2005, followed by a White Paper in 2008. Despite these developments in the field 
of private antitrust enforcement, the legislative proposal on private damages actions 
has been mooted for several years. Under the direction of the Competition Commis-
sioner at the time, Kroes, the Commission had been drafting a Directive on rules 
governing actions for damages for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in 2009. Although it has 
never been officially published, a proposal was made. Its content leaked out before it 
was retracted.177 It had revealed some controversial issues. Perhaps the most contro-
versial was the provision qualifying entities ability to bring damages actions on behalf 
of merely identifiable claimants.178 This type of collective redress mechanism had 
been already a subject of disagreement in the White Paper,179 as it raises fears of in-
troducing a US style opt-out class action. Although the reason it was retracted before 
its publication is not known, the EU Commission’s gesture of not taking further 
                                                        
the supply chain and who bought these products from direct contractual partner (see Commission 
Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC An-
titrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404; p. 88.) 
175  White & Case, Comments on the Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules, p. 6. Available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/f89af1be-6ceb-4786-a637-
a995a3cad3f9/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c92259ca-fb4a-491a-b9c8-1186dbc15a12/Com 
ments_on_the_European_Commissions_White_Paper_2.pdf (last consulted on 8 May 2013). 
176  Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, Comments on the Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust rules, p. 3. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/ 
white_paper_comments/bdi_en.pdf (last consulted on 8 May 2013). 
177  P. Boylan, Which way now for the Commission’s damages directive?, CDR news, 14 October (at 
http://www.cdr-news.com-www.cdr-news.com/categories/european-commission/which-way-now-
for-the-commissions-damages-directive); P. Boylan, Draft damages directive: off the agenda for now (avail-
able at http://plc.practicallaw.com/8-500-5687). Last consulted on 16 May 2013. 
178  A.A. Foer and J.W. Cuneo (eds.), The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law 
(2010) Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 330. 
179  See section 4.4.2. 
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action indicates that private enforcement of antitrust rules is highly controversial 
topic. 
For a long time it was unclear what would be the next steps that the EU Com-
mission would take in regard to antitrust damage actions. Finally, after an eight year 
long debate and years of uncertainty, on 11 June 2013 the EU Commission issued a 
draft Directive on private damages actions for breaches of EU competition law.180 If 
adopted, the Directive would oblige EU Member States to bring their laws in accor-
dance with its provisions. Nevertheless, the EU Commission’s proposal for a draft 
Directive is only the first step in the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure. Before being 
adopted the proposed Directive will now be sent to the European Parliament and the 
Council of the EU for consideration. The draft Directive contains a number of con-
troversial proposals. It is expected that an extensive debate will follow and it is likely 
that not all proposals will survive, and which of the proposals will be accepted can 
only be known in the course of time. 
To a great extent the draft Directive follows the Commission’s policy suggestions 
set out in the previous Green Paper and White Paper. It restates the right to full 
compensation that was established by the CJEU in Courage and Manfredi. At the 
heart of the draft Directive is the EU Commission’s proposal to allow national courts 
to order defendants or third parties to disclose evidence (to the extent such disclosure 
is “proportionate”) where a claimant has presented reasonably available facts and evi-
dence showing plausible grounds for suspecting that he has suffered harm caused by 
the defendant’s infringement of competition law. The draft Directive contains signifi-
cant limitations to disclosure when it comes to leniency programmes. First, absolute 
protection from disclosure is granted to leniency corporate statements and settlement 
submissions (provided to either the EU Commission or a national competition au-
thority). Second, temporary protection is granted to information prepared during a 
competition authority’s investigation. Disclosure of these documents can be ordered 
only after proceedings are closed. 
The Directive covers a number of other issues with regard to private antitrust 
damage actions such as the effect of decisions by national competition authorities 
(NCAs), limitation periods, the applicability of joint and several liability and passing-
on defence. It proposes that national courts cannot take decisions for damages that 
run counter to the finding of any decision by a NCA or by a review court in any 
Member State. With regard to limitation periods the draft Directive marks a departure 
form the proposal included in the White Paper. It suggests that the victim should 
have a period of at least five years after they become aware of the infringement to 
bring a claim. This period would not begin to run before the day a continuous or 
repeated infringement ceases. It would also mean that if a competition authority 
starts proceedings then the victims can decide to wait until the public proceedings are 
over before bringing a claim. Further, the draft Directive proposes that any partici-
pant in an infringement should be responsible to the victims for the whole harm (the 
actual loss suffered but also for the lost profits) caused by the infringement, with the 
                                                        
180  Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404. 
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possibility of obtaining a contribution from other infringers for their share of respon-
sibility. However, this should not apply to infringers who cooperated with an investi-
gation and obtained immunity from fines before a competition authority. These com-
panies should compensate only their own purchasers. When it comes to passing-on, 
the draft Directive explicitly recognises the passing-on defence, by which a defendant 
in an action for damages can invoke as a defence the fact that the claimant has passed 
on the whole or part of the overcharge resulting from the infringement. The burden 
of proof of the passing-on rests with the defendant. An exception to recognition of a 
passing-on defence applies when the overcharge had been passed on to indirect pur-
chasers for whom it was legally impossible to claim compensation for the harm suf-
fered. Significantly, with regard to passing-on the draft Directive distinguishes be-
tween ‘competition law infringements’ and ‘cartel infringements’. With regard to 
‘cartel infringements’ it establishes a rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm. 
In conjunction with the draft Directive, the EU Commission has published non-
binding guidance in the form of a Practical Guide on qualifying harm in action for 
damages on breaches on competition law. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between the White Paper and the draft 
Directive is the absence of provisions concerning collective redress. Although the EU 
Commission has long been in favour of collective redress for competition cases, the 
question of collective redress, including ‘class actions’, is not dealt with in the Pro-
posed Directive. The exclusion of the question of collective redress from the pro-
posed Directive might be explained as a result of the absence of political consensus 
on this subject within the European Parliament and Council of the EU arising from 
the differences in the legal traditions of the Member States in this area. The develop-
ment of a specific procedure for infringements of competition law has been put on 
hold. Instead, the EU Commission has adopted a non-binding recommendation 
encouraging EU Member States to set up collective redress mechanisms to improve 
access to justice for victims of violations of EU law in general, and not just competi-
tion rules. In his speech Competition Commissioner Almunia reasoned that, although 
the private enforcement of competition rules is one of the key areas of interest in the 
collective redress strategy in the EU, there are also additional areas that would benefit 
from the reform. There are fields, such as environment and consumer protection, 
where violations of EU law could harm a large group of citizens and businesses in the 
EU, and make individual redress an ineffective means of stopping the violations or 
obtaining compensation.181 
4.6 Conclusion 
As often mentioned, from the EU point of view, the preference is to promote dam-
age actions based on violation of EU competition rules. At the core of the EU 
                                                        
181  For more see the speech by J. Almunia, Commissioner for Competition matters, of 15 October 2010 
(speech/10/554), p. 4. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
SPEECH/10/554&format=PDF (last consulted on 8 May 2013). 
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Commission’s motivation in bringing forward proposals regarding the introduction 
of damage actions is its conviction – substantiated by contested evidence – that only 
positive action at EU-level action can ensure access to effective redress for the vic-
tims of the EU competition law infringements. National rules fail – not withstanding 
probable compliance with the equivalence principle – to comply with the principle of 
effectiveness. They make the bringing of actions for infringements of EU competi-
tion extremely difficult, if not practically impossible. 
The EU Commission remains convinced that reliance on the developments in 
the Member States alone is unlikely to bring about a significant improvement with re-
gard to the position of victims of EU competition law infringements and, accordingly 
creation of a more effective competition law enforcement system. Also the strategy 
of ‘spontaneous harmonisation‘, through the CJEU’s elimination of national rules – 
that are believed to be obstacles to the principle of effectiveness – is limited, and 
would not necessarily remove all the obstacles prevailing in national laws of the 
Member States. Therefore, the EU Commission suggests that certain national reme-
dies to protect EU law based rights must be harmonised.  
While from the EU point of view there is clear need to encourage damage actions 
based on violation of EU antitrust law, this might not be always feasible from the 
national (private law) point of view. The harmonisation (as proposed by the EU 
Commission) would encompass alteration of national rules or development of new 
rules to consider damages caused by EU competition law infringements. Although 
the EU Commission’s proposals in the White Paper are claimed to be “[…] balanced 
measures that are rooted in European legal culture and traditions,” the introduction 
of new mechanisms and rules could require significant changes in the substantial and 
procedural laws of Member States. There is a risk that implementation of certain 
measures would bring about a serious break with fundamental principles and prac-
tices of national tort law and litigation. Moreover, as civil rules in question tend to be 
closely linked to other procedural or substantive rules of the national legal systems, 
adoption of the proposed EU rules might have a serious impact on the entire national 
legal system with unforeseen consequences.  
From national point of view the question arises as to the extent the changes in 
national law are necessary to accommodate the EU goals (given the special features 
of the private law systems). To do so, the framework of the law of damages of two 
markedly different legal systems (England and Slovenia) will be explored and analysed 
in the following two chapters (chapters 5 and 6). In addition to the feasibility of the 
introduction of antitrust enforcement measure in terms of their compatibility with 
the procedural and tort law, the analysis will aim to assess whether existing English 
and Slovenian legal provisions in fact are sufficient to ensure effective private en-
forcement of EU antitrust law. The next part of the thesis will aim to pinpoint those 
areas where the English and Slovenian law needs to be changed in order to develop 
and promote private enforcement of EU antitrust law. The EU Commission’s White 
Paper will remain a natural background for all the considerations. In this part it is 
important to remember that, since the research question concerns identification of 
obstacles for private enforcement of EU competition law, the issue of leniency will 
not be considered in the following analysis. Leniency is regarded as a matter belong-
ing to the sphere of public law. As such, in the context of private antitrust damage 
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actions, it raises a broader question of the relationship between private and public 
enforcement, which falls outside the scope of the research question of this thesis.  
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Chapter 5 
Private Enforcement in England 
5.1 Introduction 
Although private enforcement of competition law has attracted considerable interest 
in recent years, the use of private suit for enforcement of public law is not a new idea 
in England. It has a number of historical antecedents.1 The idea of joint public and 
private responsibility of enforcement dates back 600 years, when the English Parlia-
ment enacted a water pollution statute,2 which gave public officers and private parties 
– who “felt themselves grieved” or who “would complain” – the right to seek judicial 
sanctions for the violations of health and safety standards.3 This practice, referred to 
as double enforcement, continued through the years, allowing parties to bring “qui 
tam actions”4, and litigate on behalf of the government (the King).5 Even today Eng-
land is considered to be at the forefront of developments in private enforcement of 
competition law in Europe and it has a legal environment conducive for victims seek-
ing damages through antitrust disputes, as demonstrated in Provimi.6 A great part of 
England’s position as a forerunner in antitrust private enforcement is attributable to 
the features of the English legal system that facilitate the way in which a claim can be 
brought, such as costs rules and disclosure rules (which are more extensive than in 
other European jurisdictions). Instead of resting on England’s laurels as a leader in 
antitrust litigation the English Government has instituted a number of measures over 
the years to bring about a more effective system of private antitrust enforcement. 
One of these measures is the establishment of a special tribunal (the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal – ‘CAT’) that has been created to deal with competition-based dam-
age claims in cases where a prior decision of the English national competition au-
thorities or the EU Commission exists. Following the recent proposals of UK Gov-
ernment regarding private competition actions,7 it can be expected that powers of the 
                                                        
1  See generally B. Boyer and E. Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Analy-
sis of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws (1985) 34 Buffalo Law Review, pp. 833–964.  
2  Statue of 12 Rich. II, ch. 12 (1388). 
3  B. Boyer and E. Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of 
Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws (1985) 34 Buffalo Law Review, p. 947. 
4  ‘Qui tam’ is shorthand for the Latin phrase ‘qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte 
sequitur,’ which translates to ‘who sues in this matter for the king as well as for himself’. See on the 
subject in: D. Kwok, Coordinated Private and Public Enforcement of Law: Deterrence under Qui Tam, pre-
sented at Twentieth Annual Meeting of American Law and Economics Association (2010), pp. 1–19. 
5  D. Dickinson, Is “Diligent Prosecution of an Action in a Court” Required to Pre-empt Citizen Suits 
Under the Major Federal Environmental Statutes? (1997) 38(4) William and Mary Law Review, p. 1548. 
6  The claimants in Provimi Ltd v Aventis Animal Nutrition SA [2003] EWHC 961 chose the UK as 
their preferred jurisdiction. See also Cooper Tire & Rubber Company Europe Ltd and others v Dow 
Deutschland Inc and others [2010] EWCA Civ 864. 
7  See Government’s response to a consultation “Private Actions in Competition Law”, January 2013. 
Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/private-actions-in-competition-law-a-
consultation-on-options-for-reform (last consulted on 6 May 2013).  
Chapter 5 
114 
 
CAT will only increase. In this sense, the English antitrust enforcement can be ex-
pected to maintain its status of pre-eminence among the European jurisdictions.  
For this reason, the English system provides a case study to analyse whether pri-
vate law is an effective means of bringing about private enforcement of competition 
rules. Even more importantly, the English system provides for extensive disclosure 
rules, although not to the extent of US style excesses, but enough to encourage vic-
tims of antitrust damages, even if evidence is lacking before the start of the proceed-
ings. However, issues do exist in the English system in the context of private enforce-
ment, and these are the most likely explanation for the lower than expected rate of 
private actions (although, still high relative to a continental law country such as Slove-
nia). Furthermore, the general consensus or sentiment among UK businesses is that 
private enforcement is the ‘least effective’ aspect of the UK competition law regime.8 
In order to remedy this situation, the UK Government, in addition to the enhancing 
the powers of the CAT, has also instituted some of the most controversial proposals 
such as the collective opt-out action for competition law claims on behalf of busi-
nesses and consumers.9 Although this has led to concerns some of the excesses of 
US-style class action system could follow,10 it is believed that an opt-out system could 
significantly improve access to redress in England. If such changes were to be legis-
lated, they might dramatically alter the competition landscape. However, any such 
changes will require the enactment of legislation and this might take many years to 
come into effect. For this reason the analysis in this chapter will focus only on the 
current private competition damages regime. 
The analysis of the private enforcement regime in this chapter will explore 
whether civil substantive and procedural rules that can result in an effective private 
antitrust enforcement already exist in the English system or if new measures are 
needed. In other words, can private law be used as a tool to enforce competition law? 
The issues that are relevant to the proposals of the White Paper include (but are not 
limited to) aspects of English tort and civil procedure law, such as the system of 
nominated torts, disclosure rules, limitation periods and the judicial case manage-
ment, all of which not only make for interesting study, but also fruitful when analys-
ing their inherent advantages in view of the White Paper proposals. 
                                                        
8  Foreword from the Minister of State in Private actions in competition law – a consultation on op-
tions for reform, p. 4 (at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 
data/file/31528/12-742-private-actions-in-competition-law-consultation.pdf). Last consulted on 6 
May 2013. 
9  See the draft Consumer Rights Bill (published by the UK Governement on the 12 th of June 2013). 
Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/draft-consumer-rights-bill (last con-
sulted on 29 June 2013). 
10  See responses received to a consultation “Private Actions in Competition Law” are available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/private-actions-in-competition-law-a-consultation-
on-options-for-reform (last consulted on 6 May 2013). 
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5.2 Action for antitrust damages in the English legal system 
As is generally the case in other EU jurisdictions, the legal basis for actions for dam-
ages arising from a breach of the national competition rules in the English law system 
is enshrined in the competition act, discussed in section 5.2.1, while the damage ac-
tions are governed by rules applicable to tort law, outlined in section 5.2.2. However, 
the English system differs from other European jurisdictions in the following. In ad-
dition to the question of whether an undertaking that infringed competition law com-
mitted a wrong that was actionable in tort proceedings, an important question that 
arises is how the ‘cause of the action’ can be classified under tort law.11 Unlike other 
legal systems of various EU jurisdictions, English tort law is based on a system of 
nominate torts in which the person bringing the lawsuit has to ensure that the claim 
fits into one or more categories of torts. For competition law violations, claims for 
damages are classified as claims in tort for breach of statutory duty. 
5.2.1 Legal framework of antitrust damage actions 
In the English system the legal framework for antitrust damage actions is governed 
by two acts, namely the Competition Act 1998 (CA 98) and the Enterprise Act 2002. 
The CA 98, which came into force on the 1 March 2000, had the central objective of 
aligning national competition law with EU law.12 The Enterprise Act of 2002, of 
which the main provisions came into force in June 2003, amended the CA 98 sub-
stantially, including facilitation of private enforcement of competition rules. 
The CA 98 introduced two new competition prohibitions into the UK regime 
that mirror Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, namely a prohibition against anti-competitive 
agreements (referred to commonly as the Chapter I prohibition) and a prohibition 
against an abuse of a dominant position (referred to commonly as the Chapter II 
prohibition).13 In addition to changes brought to substantive rules, it appears that CA 
98 created a legal basis for antitrust private enforcements. Although the Act did not 
make any specific reference to the right of action, it has been clear that the prohibi-
tions introduced by the CA 98 should be enforced by means of private action in civil 
courts in addition to public enforcement.14 Generally in cases in which the statute 
does not state specifically that private law remedies are available, the courts purport 
to interpret and determine the true intention of Parliament.15 Only if the U.K Parlia-
ment intended to create a duty the breach of which is actionable, is a remedy for 
                                                        
11  A cause of action is a “group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing” (defini-
tion from B. A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (2009) 9th edition, West Group). 
12  P.S. Mehta (ed.), Evolution of Competition Laws and their Enforcement: A Political Economy Perspective (2012) 
Routledge, London, p. 201. 
13  See B.J. Rodger and A. MacCulloch (eds), Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK (2004) 3rd 
edition, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, p. 292. 
14  D. Simon, during the debate on the passage of the Act, said that, “it is true that third parties have 
rights to seek damages in the courts as a result of actions held here.” (17 November 1997), at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldhansrd/vo971117/text/71117-28.htm (last 
consulted on 16 May 2013). 
15  See section 5.7.3.  
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damages sustained under breach of statutory duty available. In any event, in the first 
reported case on the substance under the Competition Act 1998, Claritas (UK) Ltd. v 
The Post Office,16 the matter of right to antitrust damages was not raised. The case 
was brought on the basis of an alleged breach of the national competition rules, but 
later failed because the court found that the alleged abuse did not take place in the 
relevant market. It was believed that the case could proceed on the assumption that 
the antitrust prohibitions could be enforced in private litigation.17 The existence of 
the right has not been disputed in any of the later case law.18 It has been generally 
accepted that damage claims arising out of a breach of the UK competition rules can 
be brought before the High Court (based on the tort of breach of statutory duty). 
The Enterprise Act 2002 (EA 02) amended the CA 98 substantially. By adopting 
EA 02 Parliament clarified that the cause of action for damages for infringement of 
competition law exists by making special reference to follow-on damage cases. In 
particular it established a new route for pursuing damage claims (or other monetary 
claims) that can be made after antitrust infringement has been established by the 
regulator. 19 For that reason, it created the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT).20 It 
empowered it to hear, inter alia, damage actions after the Office of Fair Trading (as a 
national competition authority) or the EU Commission has made a decision estab-
lishing an infringement of the relevant prohibitions. Further, the EA 02 created a 
right of specified bodies to bring an action for damages or other monetary claims be-
fore the CAT on behalf of consumers where they have suffered loss or damage as a 
result of an infringement of either UK or EU competition law.21 All these provisions, 
which are also relevant in the context of antitrust private enforcement, will be ana-
lysed to greater extent in the following sections.22 However, prior to any further dis-
cussion of the scope of private enforcement in the U.K competition regime, it is 
essential to describe and discuss the English tort law system. 
5.2.2 English tort law  
There exists a difference in approach to tort law between civil law systems and com-
mon law systems.23 Since English law is categorised as common law, it has implica-
tions for how the competition law breaches are classified under the system of nomi-
nated torts. However, before we consider this matter in more detail, it is helpful to 
see how the tort law differs between civil law and common law systems. 
                                                        
16  Claritas (UK) Ltd. v The Post Office [2001] UKCLR 2 (first application for an injunction under the 
Competition Act).  
17  B.J. Rodger and A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK (2004) 3rd edition, 
Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, p. 72. 
18  B. Rodger, Private Enforcement and the Enterprise Act: An Exemplary System of Awarding Dam-
ages? (2003) 24(3) E.C.L.R, p. 103. 
19  Section 47A of the Competition Act 1998, inserted by section 18 of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
20  Section 12 and schedule 2 to the Enterprise Act 2002. 
21  Section 47B of the Competition Act 1998, inserted by section 19 of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
22  See, in particular, sections 5.3.2. and 5.6.2.3. 
23  See for example, W. van Gerven, J. Lever, P. Larouche, C. Von Bar, G. Viney, Cases, Materials and 
Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, Scope of Protection (1998) Hart Publishing, Ox-
ford, pp. 1–15. 
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Generally speaking, tort law in civil law systems is based on a general principle of 
tort liability.24 In civil law systems a general principle is formulated, which is applica-
ble mutatis mutandis to all torts, and it is viewed as a single model of tort law. Diamet-
rically opposed to that is the Anglo-American common law approach that eschews 
any general theory of all torts, rather it sets a system of nominate torts. In the words 
of Stone, while the French legal system (as representative of continental civil law 
jurisdiction) met new problems of the nineteenth century with a “wide standard of 
liability”, the British and Americans did it with a “pigeonhole system of nominate 
torts”.25 For this reason, in English common law it is more appropriate to talk about 
the law of torts, as meaning the system of separate and independent torts,26 rather 
than a single law of torts. Some time ago Rudden argued that there were 70 identifi-
able torts at the time of counting.27 This number however, is not limited. As a Chief 
Justice in the 18th century put it “torts are infinitely varied, not limited or confined.”28 
Different torts deal with different type of harm or wrongful conduct, and the “ingre-
dients” for each of them are different. Each tort has its own preconditions and its 
appropriate defences.29 As mentioned earlier, it has been recognised by the English 
courts that claims of infringement of UK competition law are categorised as breach 
of statutory duty. In order to succeed in a claim for breach of statutory duty, it is 
necessary to establish30 first, there is a statutory duty that has been breached second, 
this breach has caused damage third, the legislator intended to create a private right 
of action and fourth, the provision aims to protect the victim against the damage he 
suffered.  
With regard to infringements of the EU competition rules, it was speculated 
whether they concentrated upon a breach of statutory duty or they tended to create 
new torts.31 It was clarified by the position that the Court took in the Garden Cottage 
case.32 The case concerned a refusal by the Milk Marketing Board to supply bulk 
                                                        
24  There also exist differences in approaches among civil legal systems. On one side, the French ‘Code 
civil’ systemises the entire tort law into one general theory of tort liability. On the other side the 
German ‘Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’ (or ‘BGB’) steers a middle course between the English and 
French legal systems by laying down three heads of tortuous liability. See: J. Gordley: Foundations of 
Private Law, Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (2006) Oxford University Press, pp. 160–181; G. 
Brüggemeier, Western Tort Law: A Jurisprudence of Injury, in M. Bussani and F. Werro (eds), Euro-
pean Private Law: A Handbook Volume I (2009), Durham, Carolina Academic Press, pp. 293–334. 
25  J.A. Jolowicz, Touchstones of Tort Liability (1950) 2 Stanford Law Review, p. 272, cited by B. Ruden, 
Torticles (1991-1992) 6/7 Tulane Civil Law Forum, p. 105. 
26  K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law (1992) Clarendom Press, Oxford, p. 47. 
27  B. Rudden, Torticles (1991-1992) 6/7 Tulane Civil Law Forum, pp. 105–130. 
28  Chapman v. Pickersgill (1762), 2 Wils 145, at 145. 
29  R.W. de Very, Towards a European unfair competition law, A clash Between Legal Formalities (2005) 
Koninklijke Brill, Leiden, p. 204. 
30  J.S. Davidson, Actions for Damages in the English Courts for Breach of EEC Competition Law 
(1985) 34(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 183. See also section 5.7. 
31  Judge Denning in Application des Gaz S.A. v Falks Veritas [1974] Ch 381 suggested that, as Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU have direct effect, they are part of English law and create new torts called “un-
due restriction of competition within the Common Market” and “abuse of dominant position within 
the Common Market.” See also J.S. Davidson, Actions for Damages in the English Courts for 
Breach of EEC Competition Law (1985) 34(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 178–189. 
32  Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] 1 AC 130; [1983] 2 A11 ER 770. 
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butter to Garden Cottage. The Board said that bulk butter supplies would be sold 
only to the four nominated distributers, and Garden Cottage was not on that list. 
Garden Cottage alleged that the Board was in breach of Article 102 TFEU and raised 
an action primarily seeking an injunction to stop the Board refusing to maintain nor-
mal business relations, contrary to Article 102 TFEU. The Court of Appeal, and later 
House of Lords, decided that there had been breach of Article 102 TFEU. As regards 
remedies, the House of Lords suggested that damages would normally be a sufficient 
remedy, so that interlocutory injunctions to prevent the conduct that was the subject 
of the complaint generally would not be granted. 
As judge Diplock said, it was “difficult to see how it can ultimately be success-
fully argued […] that a contravention of article [102 TFEU] which causes damage to 
an individual citizen does not give rise to a cause of action in English law of the na-
ture of a cause of action for breach of statutory duty […]”. 33 Following this case it 
was generally accepted in subsequent cases before the lower courts that the cause of 
action, in English law, for infringement of EU competition law was the tort of breach 
of statutory duty, and henceforth the English law rules applicable to the tort of 
breach of statutory duty will apply (subject to principles of effectiveness and equiva-
lence). In particular, in the Crehan case (the case that followed on from the CJEU 
preliminary ruling in the Courage v. Crehan34) the Court of Appeal accepted that the 
cause of action under English law was the tort of breach of statutory duty. It also 
ruled that the English law rule (which is generally a pre-requisite to claiming damages 
for breach of statutory duty) requiring the damage to fall within the scope of the type 
of damage covered by the statute, has to be disregarded in favour of the EU principle 
of effectiveness. As it will be explained later,35 to hold otherwise would have meant 
that English law did not, as a matter of EU law, provide an effective remedy in dam-
ages for breach of EU competition law. 
5.3 English ‘private antitrust enforcement system’ 
In England damage actions can be brought before the High Court based on the tort 
of breach of statutory duty arising out of a breach of the EU or UK competition 
rules. When there exists an infringement decision of the competition authority of the 
EU Commission, damage actions can also be brought before the CAT. 
5.3.1 CAT – the role of the CAT in private antitrust enforcement 
England is one of the European jurisdictions that at the institutional level have a 
specialised competition court competent to hear private enforcement actions. In 
particular, within the initiatives aimed at encouraging civil actions against breaches of 
the national and the EU competition rules, a specific follow-on procedure by EA 02 
(under Section 47A of the CA 98) has been introduced. The creation of the new 
                                                        
33  Garden Cottage v Milk Marketing Board [1983] 2 All E.R. 770, at 777. 
34  Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297. 
35  See section 5.6.1. 
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procedure has allowed the specialist tribunal, the CAT – in addition to its role as an 
appeal tribunal under the CA 98 – to hear claims for damages where there has already 
been an infringement finding by a relevant competition authority.36  
The CAT was established by EA 02 and replaced the Competition Commission 
Appeal Tribunal (‘CCAT’) created under the 1998 Act. It was established as an inde-
pendent37 specialised judicial body with “cross-disciplinary expertise in law, econom-
ics, business and accountancy”,38 to hear appeals against certain decisions of the UK 
competition and sectoral regulatory authorities made under the CA 98, the EA 02 and 
the Communications Act 2003.39 The first actions under section 47A CA 98 were 
brought in 200440 following the EU Commission’s vitamins cartel decision.41 The 
claims were later dismissed by consent and no trial took place.42 These cases were 
subsequently followed by a number of actions brought on the back of infringement 
decisions of both the OFT and the EU Commission,43 of which only two resulted in 
final judgements on merits. The first judgement was handed down in December 2009 
in Enron Coal Services.44 The claim was dismissed for failure to establish that the 
defendant’s unlawful conduct had caused the damage claimed by the plaintiff. The 
second judgement, which is also the first judgement in which damages were awarded 
by the CAT, is 2 Travel Group plc (in liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services 
Limited.45 In that case an award of £33,818.79 (plus interest) and an additional award 
of £60,000 for exemplary damages have been ordered to be paid to the claimant. 46 
Pursuant of the CA 98, the CAT’s jurisdiction with regard to damage claims is 
limited to follow-on actions.47 After all, the objective of section 47A CA 98 is to 
provide the means for a claim to be brought before an expert tribunal against parties 
                                                        
36  On the subject see: B.J. Rodger, Private Enforcement and the Entreprise Act: An Exemplary System 
of Awarding Damages? (2003) 24(3) E.C.L.R, pp. 102–113. 
37  Competition Appeal Tribunal Guide to proceedings, October 2005, at. 1.3. 
38  See UK Governent’s website (https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-appeal-
tribunal). Last consulted on 10 May 2013. 
39  See A. MacCulloch, B.J. Rodger, Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK (2004) 3th Edition, 
Cavendish Publishing, London, p. 65. 
40  Case No. 1028/5/7/04 BCL Old Co Limited, DFL Old Co Limited, PFF Old Co Limited v Aventis 
SA et al. and case No. 1029/5/7/04 Deans Foods Limited v Roche Products Limited, F Hoffmann-
La Roche AG, and Aventis SA.  
41  Case COMP/37.512 Vitamins, Commission Decision of 21st November 2001 (OJ 2003 L6). 
42  F. Randolph and A. Robertson, The First Claims for Damages in the CAT (2005) 26(7) E.C.L.Rev, 
pp. 365–368. 
43  Subsequent actions include: Case 1060/5/7/06 Healthcare at Home v Genzyme Limited, following 
the OFT’s abuse of dominance; Case 1077/5/7/07 Marshall Food Group Limited and Others v (1) 
Evonik Degussa GmbH (2) Degussa Limited, based on the EU Commission’s decision finding a 
cartel; Case 1078/7/9/07 The Consumers Association v JJB Sports PLC, following the OFT`s cartel 
decision relating to football shirts, etc. 
44  Enron Coal Services Ltd (in Liquidation) v English, Welsh and Scottish Railway Ltd [2009] CAT 36.  
45  2 Travel Group plc (in liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited [2012] CAT 19. 
46  On the award of exemplary damage, see section 5.10.3. 
47  The UK Government has proposed to allow stand-alone claims (i.e. claims brought where there is 
no prior infringement decision) to be brought before the CAT (see Government’s response to a 
consultation ‘Private Actions in Competition Law’, January 2013, p. 5, available at https://www. 
gov.uk/government/consultations/private-actions-in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-options- 
for-reform). Last consulted on 10 May 2013. 
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who had been held to have infringed the relevant competition law prohibition for 
loss which that infringement had caused to the claimant.48 In this case the claimant is 
relieved of the need to prove the infringement, which is often difficult to prove in 
competition damage cases.49 The claimant is ‘only’ required to prove causation and 
quantum of loss in order to succeed with the claim.50 Moreover, claimants who bring 
a damage claim under section 47A CA 98 benefit from the limitation period, which is 
two years from the date on which the relevant decision became final.51 It is therefore 
sometimes possible to bring a follow-on claim in the CAT when the time for doing 
so in the High Court has expired (the cut-off for bringing such claims in High Court 
is six years from the date on which the damage happened). 
As said, a claim under section 47A CA 98 cannot be made until a decision by a 
competition authority or the EU Commission has established that the competition 
prohibition in question has been infringed.52 A claim can also not be made for con-
duct that is distinct from the prior infringement finding, even when the infringement 
is an element that has to be established to complete the cause of action, as demon-
strated in the WH Newson case.53 In this case the damage action was brought in the 
CAT under section 47A CA 98, following a decision by the EU Commission that the 
defendants had participated in a copper plumbing tubes cartel. The claimants had – in 
addition to a claim for breach of statutory duty – pleaded two claims of unlawful 
means conspiracy, which the defendants applied to strike out on the basis that they 
fell outside the scope of section 47A CA 98. Justice Roth held that Section 47 is 
“cause of action neutral” and that the scope of the section is not restricted to a par-
ticular cause of action. It emphasised that whether a particular cause of action can be 
used to bring a claim under section 47A will depend upon the factual nature of the 
claim, that is, whether the claim is based on the established infringement. For exam-
ple, a breach of warranty or restitutionary claim for money paid under a void contract 
will fall within section 47A as long as the infringement of competition law constituted 
the breach or established the entitlement to restitution.54 In light of this reasoning, 
the judge struck out one of the conspiracy claims that relied upon a prior agreement 
between certain of the defendants to enter into the cartel and was not the subject of 
the EU Commission’s decision. In contrast, it refused to strike out the other conspir-
acy claim, as it was essentially based on infringement of Article 101 TFEU, which was 
also the object of the EU Commission’s decision. 
5.3.2 Dual System: Interplay between the CAT and the English High Court 
Although the CA 98 created a special tribunal for bringing competition-based damage 
claims, it is clear that the Act did not institute a unitary system for dealing with dam-
                                                        
48  WH Newson Holding Ltd and others v IMI plc and others [2012] EWHC 3680 (Ch), par. 29. 
49  See sections 5.7.1 and 5.9.1. 
50  See section 5.9.1. 
51  Rule 31 of the Tribunal Rules. See also section 5.11.2. 
52  See Section 5.9.1. 
53  WH Newson Holding Ltd and others v IMI plc and others: [2012] EWHC 3680 (Ch). 
54  [2012] EWHC 3680 (Ch), at 29. 
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ages claims under UK or EU law.55 Section 47A (10) provides that the right to bring 
a claim for damages before the CAT does not affect the right to bring ordinary civil 
proceedings in the English High Court in relation to that claim.56 While the CAT’s 
powers with regard to damage claims are statutory, ordinary courts, in particular the 
English High Court, are courts of ‘inherent jurisdiction’.57 Thus, following the 
changes introduced by the EA 02, actions in the ordinary courts are not diminished. 
As demonstrated in Devenish,58 they become an alternative in cases where the claim-
ant has the benefit of an infringement decision. The choice of whether or not to 
pursue a claim for damages in the CAT or the ordinary courts rests with the claim-
ants59 as long as the claim is brought as a ‘follow-on‘ claim.60 After having submitted 
the claim to the High Court61 under Section 16 of the EA 02 the presiding judge may 
transfer a case, or part of a case, to the CAT. However, the provision of Section 16 
has not yet been activated.62 This means the High Court is not yet authorised to im-
plement the transfer. Nevertheless, there is already provision for the CAT to transfer 
a case to the High Court, as evidenced recently in the WH Newson case63 in which 
the CAT utilised its power64 and transferred the copper plumbing tubes cartel dam-
ages action to High Court at the request of the claimant. Here, the transfer of pro-
ceedings was driven, in part, by the concern about the CAT’s jurisdiction, as has been 
explained above. 
In addition to the transfer power, section 16 of the EA 02 provides for the pos-
sibility for extending of CAT competence to stand-alone actions. In particular, it 
                                                        
55  B.J. Rodger, Private Enforcement and the Enterprise Act: An Exemplary System of Awarding 
Damages? (2003) 24(3) E.C.L.Rev, p. 106; K. Middleton, B.J. Rodger, A. MacCulloch, J. Galloway, 
Cases & Materials on UK & EC Competition Law (2009) 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, p. 130. 
56  Section 47A(10) of the CA 98. 
57  Section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provides that an application for mandatory, prohibiting or 
quashing orders, declarations and injunctions may be made to the High Court, but the circumstances 
in which the Court will grant relief, and the kind of review it is prepared to conduct, are matters for 
the Court’s own ‘inherent jurisdiction’, governed by rules of precedent. 
58  The Devenish case (Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) & Ors [2007] EWHC 
2394 (Ch)) was a follow-on action for damages pursuant the EU Commission’s 2001 vitamin cartel 
decision. See also, for example, National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd & Ors [2009] 
EWHC 1326. 
59  On the reasons why claimants would prefer to bring a follow-on damage case before the High Court 
instead of CAT see B.J. Rodger, Why not court? A study of follow-on actions in the UK (2013) 
33(4) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, pp. 104–131. 
60  As said, under the current rules, the CAT is forbidden to determine liability in stand-alone action. All 
stand-alone actions must be brought to the ordinary civil court, in particular to the High Court 
61  In order to improve its competition law expertise, in May 2004 the Department of Constitutional 
Affairs issued a new Practice Direction on competition law providing that all claims relating to an in-
fringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU or the Chapter I and II prohibitions must be transferred 
to the Chancery Division of the High Court. 
62  See C. Brown, Section 16 Enterprise Act 2002 – Time for Activation? (2007) 28(9) E.C.L.Rev, 
pp. 488–493. See also consultation on options for reform, at http://www.bis.gov.uk/Consulta-
tions/consultation-private-actions-in-competition-law?cat=open (last consulted on 10 May 2013). 
63  Case No. 1194/5/7/12, Order of the Chairman July 24, 2012.  
64  Under Rule 48 of the CAT Rules, the CAT may, at any stage of the proceedings on the request of a 
party or of its own initiative, and after considering any observations of the parties, direct that a claim 
for damages be transferred to the High Court. 
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empowers the Lord Chancellor (now Secretary of State for Justice) to adopt secon-
dary legislation endowing the High Court with the ability to “transfer to the Tribunal 
for its determination so much of any proceedings before the court as relates to an 
infringement issue.” Although there are strong arguments against activation of the 
article,65 recently the Government made a decision to propose an introduction of a 
new regulation in this regard.66 It is important to note that in case section 16 of the 
EA 02 is to be brought into force, the new regime will not deprive a claimant of the 
choice of where to begin stand–alone (or follow-on) proceedings. The claimant will 
be still be allowed to bring a claim for damages where no prior infringement decision 
has been made by competition authority (and therefore the claimant must prove the 
infringement) to the ordinary civil court. Compared to the regime still in force it will 
mean that under the new regulation the claimant will have choice of where to bring 
an antitrust damage claim in the general Court or the CAT even in cases where there 
is no pre-existing infringement decision of the competition authorities or the EU 
Commission. In this respect the jurisdiction of the CAT will extend to the level of 
jurisdiction that the general court has with regard to antitrust damage claims. 
As mentioned previously, both the specialist CAT and the ordinary court (High 
Court) are at the centre of the private enforcement regime when the onus is on re-
dress for victims. In addition, the UK competition regime also provides for criminal 
prosecutions in most egregious cases of antitrust infringements. 
5.4 English criminal antitrust enforcement system 
The aspects of the antitrust competition enforcement discussed in previous sections 
come under civil law enforcement. In addition to the civil enforcement (and adminis-
trative enforcement not discussed here), UK competition law provides for criminal 
enforcement. With regard to criminal enforcement, EA 02 set up a clear distinction 
between hardcore competition law infringements, such as price-fixing, market shar-
ing, bid-rigging etc, on the one hand, and other infringements such as vertical re-
straints and the abuse of dominant market positions on the other. It made the most 
serious competition law infringements a criminal offence. In particular, section 188(1) 
of the EA 02 provides that the individuals who are found guilty of dishonest partici-
pation in a cartel can face imprisonment for up to five years, and/or an unlimited 
fine. Vertical restraints do not fall within the scope of the offence. 
                                                        
65  The arguments include the risk of inconsistency of approach by High Court, an undesirable ‘frag-
mentation’, the risk of losing the increasing competition law expertise on the part of the High Court, 
potentially negative impact on the “institutional balance.” On the subject see: C. Brown, Section 16 
Enterprise Act 2002 – Time for Activation? (2007) 28(9) E.C.L.Rev, p. 491. 
66  See U.K. Government’s response to a consultation ‘Private Actions in Competition Law’ (January 
2013). Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/private-actions-in-competition-
law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform (last consulted on 10 May 2013). 
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5.4.1 Individual liability 
In contrast to civil and administrative enforcement, it is the individual rather than the 
company who will be prosecuted under section 188(1) EA 02. Prior to the enactment 
of the EA 02, the CA 98 was in force, and by way of that Act, liability (i.e. administra-
tive and civil liability) was only imposed on enterprises engaging in cartel activities. 
Since such a system was found incapable of preventing cartel activities a criminal 
regime was formed to assist the current regime in such prevention. The EA 2002 has 
placed the focus on the individual’s behaviour. Although an enterprise itself has a 
legal identity separate from its members (as established in Salomon v Salomon & Co 
Ltd67), at the end of the day an enterprise is comprised of individuals who are “the 
controlling minds of corporate undertakings, either as directors, officers or managers 
of the corporate undertaking involved in a criminal conspiracy”.68 With the enact-
ment of the EA 02 the persons working behind the “the controlling minds of corpo-
rate undertakings,” are exposed to liability for involvement in the cartel conduct. This 
was believed to produce a greater deterrent effect.69 While earlier only fines were 
imposed on enterprises for engaging in cartel activities, with EA 02 enactment the 
persons engaging in them are also exposed to fine or imprisonment or both. Besides, 
director disqualification orders – that can be taken against directors of companies 
that have committed any competition law infringement (not just the cartel offence)70 
– have a limited deterrent effect. They only apply to directors and not to other senior 
executives involved in collusion. The possibility of criminal prosecution thus supple-
ments the regime of the CA 98. 
In order to increase effectiveness of competition law investigations, and therefore 
deterrence, the CA 98 has introduced a leniency programme in relation to individuals. 
Pursuant to section 190(4) of the EA 02, immunity from prosecution for the compe-
tition offence can be obtained in the form of a ‘no-action letter,’ if the individual 
admits this offence and satisfies a number of additional conditions. These imply that 
the individual provides the Office of Fair Trading (hereafter ‘OFT’) with all the in-
formation he has available on the cartel, he cooperates with the OFT investigation 
and he had taken steps to coerce others to join the cartel. 71 
                                                        
67  Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
68  D. McFadden, Some Thoughts on Criminalising Cartels, A Paper presented at the European Competition 
Day (May 2011), p. 7. Available at http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/2011-05-
30%20Some%20Thoughts%20on%20Criminalising%20Cartels.pdf (last consulted on 10 May 2013). 
69  In the Department of Trade and Industry’s White Paper ‘A World Class Competition Regime’ (July 
2001), in which the idea of the formation of criminal cartel offence was first proposed, it was stated 
that “there is a strong case for introducing criminal sanctions against individuals who engage in 
hard-core cartels.” M. Bloom explained that it is expected that “there will be a relatively small num-
ber of prosecutions – but they will have a significant deterrent effect” (see speech by M. Bloom, of 
17 May 2002, at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0402.pdf (last consulted on 10 
May 2013)). See also, A. Stephan, The UK Cartel offence: Lame Duck or Black Mamba?, CCP 
Working Paper 08-19 (November 2008), p. 5 – 8. 
70  Section 204 of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
71  See ‘Leniency and no-action: Guidance on the issue of no-action letters for individuals’ (OFT 513, 
April 2003), p. 81. 
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5.4.2 Criminal prosecution of cartels 
Although criminalisation of cartel activity was an important step, the cartel offence 
has not had the significant impact which the UK Government had hoped for. It was 
originally believed that the introduction of it as a criminal offence in the UK would 
lead to six to ten prosecutions a year.72 However as yet there has been only one suc-
cessful contested prosecution for cartel offence under the EA 0273 – and this was in 
June 2008 in R. v Whittle case.74 Three company directors were sentenced to impris-
onment for periods of between two-and-a-half and three years: on appeal these sen-
tences were subsequently reduced to between twenty months and two and a half 
years. The defendants pleaded guilty to dishonestly participating in an international 
cartel to rig bids, fix prices, restrict supplies and allocate customers in respect of the 
worldwide supply of marine hose products.75 In addition, all three were also disquali-
fied from acting as directors for periods of between five and seven years.  
According to the U.K. Government, the reason for the low number of cases is to 
be found in the ‘dishonestly’ requirement.76 While it is true that the agreements that 
are cartel agreements for the purpose of the cartel offence are types of agreements 
that are prohibited under Article 101 TFEU, for holding an individual liable under 
EA 02 it is important to show that he has acted ‘dishonestly’ while he was engaged in 
cartel activity. Mere negligence is not sufficient to convict him of a cartel offence. In 
determining whether or not participation in a cartel has been ‘dishonest’, the appro-
priate standard is whether the individual has (a) behaved in a way which, by the stan-
dard of reasonable people, would be considered dishonest, and (b) known that, 
judged by the standards of reasonable people, he would be considered dishonest.77 
This is quite a stiff test because the cartel offence is a new one in UK law. By refer-
ring to a number of civil cases before the 20th century78 the defendant could well 
                                                        
72  A. Hammond and R. Penrose, The proposed Criminalisation of cartels in the UK – a report prepared for the 
Office of Fair Trading (November 2001), p. 14. Available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/re-
ports/comp_policy/oft365.pdf (last consulted on 16 May 2013). 
73  The first contested prosecution – of four British Airways executives charged under section 188 of 
the EA 02 for behaviour in the period from July 004 to April 2006 – did not reach the courts until 
April 2010. Shortly after, the trial dramatically collapsed. The defendants were acquitted mainly be-
cause it emerged that the prosecution had failed to disclose a significant volume of electronic mate-
rials to the defence. The defence had not been given an opportunity to review and analyse them 
properly without unacceptable further delay. The OFT withdrew its case.  
Another example is in December 22, 2011, the OFT abandoned a criminal investigation in relation 
to the truck-manufacturing sector due to a lack of evidence. Equally, in August 2011, the OFT 
dropped a criminal investigation due to insufficient evidence. See also M. Furse, The cartel offence – 
“great for a headline but not much else!”? (2011) 32(5) E.C.L.Rev, p. 225. 
74  R. v Whittle [2008] EWCA Crim 2560, [2009] U.K.C.L.R. 247.  
75  OFT, Three Imprisoned in First OFT Criminal Prosecution for Bid Rigging (11 June 2008) 72/08, online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2008/72-08 (last consulted on 10 May 2013). 
76  See also A. Stephan, How dishonesty killed the cartel offence (2011) 6 Criminal Law Review, pp. 446–
455. 
77  R v Ghosh [1982] 2 ALL ER 12 689. 
78  See, for example, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co 
Ltd [1913] AC 781, Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1888) 21 QBD 544. See also 
A. Stephan, How dishonesty killed the cartel offence (2011) 6 Criminal Law Review, pp. 449–450. 
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argue that anti-competitive agreements had not been treated as dishonest in common 
law. Secrecy and participation in secret meetings in and of themselves could not sat-
isfy the dishonesty standard.79 The fact that British opinion is not in favour of label-
ling price-fixing as being dishonest is evidenced by a public survey commissioned by 
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy in 2007.80 Only 25 per cent of respondents felt 
strongly that price-fixing is dishonest. Due to these difficulties imposed by the ‘dis-
honesty’ requirement, the Government is currently considering reforming the crimi-
nal cartel offence and removing the dishonesty requirement.81 After all, as has been 
said, the cartel offence was adopted in the UK to enhance deterrence in cartel en-
forcement. If the cartel offence with the “dishonesty” requirement is unlikely to act 
as a meaningful deterrent, then the dominant reason of the criminalisation project has 
not been achieved. 
To some extent the current debate in relation to criminal competition law en-
forcement in the UK echoes the wider debate on enhancing deterrence in competi-
tion law enforcement and the extent to which private enforcement is able to effec-
tively replace the public enforcement by introduction of punitive damages. In this 
context, while enhancement of deterrence is generally to be welcomed, the future 
success of reforms to the competition regime depends on the functioning of both 
public and private realms rather than just the prioritisation of the private regime by 
the introduction of punitive damages.  
The criminal antitrust enforcement system is touched on only briefly in this sec-
tion. Although it is valuable as a deterrent for the most egregious antitrust activities, 
its relevance to private enforcement is due mainly to its role in diminishing the need 
for punitive damages, which as a deterrence option has been treated with less favour 
within Europe. The aspects that have impact on the effectiveness of private enforce-
ment as a compensatory tool are civil procedural aspects such as the role of judges 
and access to justice.  
5.5 Role of judge and parties in civil (tort) proceeding 
Once the civil proceeding for damages in a case related to antitrust infringement has 
been initiated, the nature of the civil proceeding has implications for the effectiveness 
of private enforcement. To understand why this is the case, it is important to look at 
the how the English courts deal with the cases at hand in a civil proceeding and the 
basis for how decisions and rulings are made. Compared to legal systems of Euro-
pean civil-law countries, the English system can be to a greater extent ascribed to 
what can be termed as passive non-interventionist judge and active parties, – an ad-
versarial form of civil justice system – and can often impact on the plaintiff’s ability 
                                                        
79  Norris v Government of the United States of America [2008] UKHL 16. 
80  See A. Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel Enforcement in Britain (2008) CCP 
Working Paper 07-12 (2012), pp. 17–19. 
81  A Competition Regime for Growth – a Consultation on Options for Reform (March 2011), p. 61. Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31411/11-657-
competition-regime-for-growth-consultation.pdf (last consulted on 6 May 2013). 
Chapter 5 
126 
 
to prove his case. However, since the introduction of new civil procedure rules in 
1998 the role of the judge has been increased to bring the English system closer to 
the continental legal systems. However, before this is explored any further, two im-
portant observations must be made.  
First, rules and procedures governing the hearing and determination of claims 
and disputes in English and Welsh Courts are set out in Civil Procedure Rules that 
came into force on 26 April 1999, replacing the Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 and 
County Court Rules 1981 and changing forever the landscape of civil justice in Eng-
land and Wales. More specifically, by granting wide management powers to the court 
they alter the former adversarial culture of the English system.82  
Second, as a consequence of the creation of a specialised tribunal to hear anti-
trust damage actions in parallel with ordinary courts, English rules of civil procedure 
applicable for damages claims under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and their UK 
equivalents, i.e. Chapters I and II of the CA 98 involve rules of procedure that are 
utilised in two different venues. On one hand, the UK courts’ Civil Procedure Rules 
(hereafter ‘CPR’) are employed by the High Court of England and Wales when deal-
ing with either stand-alone or follow-on damages actions for antitrust infringement. 
On the other hand, the rules of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’) apply when 
follow-on damage claims are brought before the CAT. The analysis will focus mostly 
on the rules applied before the ordinary courts. 
5.5.1 Adversarial nature of the civil justice system  
One of the main features of civil procedure as it is practiced in England rather than in 
other European civil law countries is its adversarial character.83 In contrast to the 
inquisitorial type of procedure in which the court plays an “active, authoritative and 
interventionist role,” the courts in an adversarial system traditionally have a passive 
and non-interventionist role.84 “The judges sit in Court, not in order that they may 
discover the truth, but in order that they may answer the question “how’s that?”. The 
English judge will, if he can, play the umpire rather than the inquisitor.”85 Whether it 
concerns framing of the issue, presentation of matters of fact, the judge will not, with 
certain exceptions, initiate any actions of his own. According to this approach, the 
ideal would be that the judge would “enter the court unprepared, without any prior 
knowledge of the case”. Putting it into rather strict terms, “the judge is to do nothing 
but declare a winner at the end of the trial.”86 
The passive role of the court means the parties play an active role during the trial. 
As Jacob put it in The Fabric of English Civil Justice, “the responsibility for the ini-
                                                        
82  K.M. Vorrasi, England’s Reform to Alleviate the Problems of Civil process: A Comparision of 
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tiation, conduct, preparation and presentation of civil proceedings is shifted from the 
court to the parties, mainly of course the legal practitioners.” Under the principle of 
party control – but subject to compliance with the rules, practices and orders of the 
court – the parties retain the initiative at all stages of civil proceedings.87 In the adver-
sarial system civil disputes are seen as “a matter of private concern of the parties 
involved, and may even be regarded as their private property, though their determina-
tion by the courts may have wider, more far-reaching, even public repercussions, and 
that the parties are themselves the best judges of how to pursue and serve their own 
interests in the conduct and control of their respective cases, free from the directions 
of or intervention by the court.”88 One might think that private litigation that follows 
the adversarial system presents an obstacle for plaintiffs where the ‘asymmetry of 
information‘ is in favour of defendant, as often is the case in competition litigation.89 
Competition law presupposes an extensive degree of market information, which is 
normally in the hands of defendants. Since courts rely only on information provided 
by the parties, any reluctance on the part of the defendant to reveal information in his 
possession creates the risk of negative consequences for the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
might find it difficult to prove his case. As a consequence, a potential plaintiff will be 
less willing to bring a claim and in turn, this could affect the effectiveness of the pri-
vate enforcement system. Nevertheless, due to certain procedural mechanisms that 
exist in the English legal system and which will be explained more fully later,90 the 
‘asymmetry of information’ is less of a problem in England than it could be in any 
other legal system. 
5.5.2 Rise of judicial case management 
It was not until 1999 that English civil procedure reduced the management powers of 
the parties and their lawyers in the course of civil litigation, at the same time increas-
ing the case management powers of the judge. The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 
(‘CPR’), which came into force in April 1999, laid down a new framework within 
which civil litigation, including tort litigation, should be conducted. The new rules, 
which were advanced by the proposals and recommendations for reform of the civil 
justice system made by Woolf in the interim and final reports of his Working Party,91 
are regarded by most commentators as the most radical reform of civil procedure 
since the reforms of 1873 to 1875.92 The object of the reform was to reduce delays, 
cost and complexity, and to increase fairness and certainty for litigants. Woolf was 
particularly concerned with the ‘adversarial culture’ which had been a key feature of 
the English litigation processes. He believed that without effective judicial control 
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this adversarial process and culture was likely to “deteriorate into an environment in 
which the litigation process is too often seen as a battle field where no rules apply.” 
To avoid this, he advocated a shift from a “traditional adversarial approach to adjudi-
cation to an adversarial approach that is substantially checked and curtailed by an 
active and interventionist judge.”93 The new act endowed the judge with a wide range 
of case management powers to direct the legal proceeding,94 including its wide discre-
tionary powers related to combining individual claims into group litigation (discretion 
over whether or not to order a GLO) 95 and its powers to order disclosure.96 Never-
theless, it has to be added that although under the new CPR the English judges have 
the power to be much more “interventionist than hitherto in controlling procedures, 
curbing delay, capping costs and encouraging settlements,”97 the case management 
role of the court does not exclude case management by the parties. The parties are 
the ones who have to place before the judge evidence of the facts that they consider 
relevant, and the court’s main task is still, by tradition, to settle a dispute between the 
parties concerned (to resolve individual disputes). It does it, according to the conven-
tional definition, by applying the law impartially and objectively to a given state of 
facts. In competition law context this means resolving disputes between two eco-
nomic operators or an economic operator and consumer on the basis of competition 
law.  
As said, the CPR entrusted the control of litigation to the court (CPR 1.4) and 
brought English civil procedural law closer to the continental civil procedural systems 
than it had been in the past. If in the past the contrast between English civil proce-
dural law and that of the Continent was mainly in the role of English judge, which 
was more passive compared to the continental judges, this contrast has diminished 
somewhat with the adoption of the new CPR. Not only that, the extensive case man-
agement powers which allow judges to control the civil litigation are also closer to the 
EU Commission’s proposals in the White Paper. It can be argued that active and 
effective ‘case management’ by courts is crucial for creation of an effective private 
antitrust enforcement system. For example, as noted earlier, when a damage claim is 
brought before a national court dealing with competition claims without relying on a 
prior infringement decision, claimants face difficulties in proving breach of competi-
tion rules. In order to improve the situation of the claimant in bringing evidence 
before the court, improvements are necessary. As proposed in the White Paper, an 
effective way to improve the situation is the introduction of disclosure rules. Disclo-
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sure rules might improve access to relevant documents, necessary to prove the case, 
but could also risk frivolous or abusive claims, which is not a goal of the private anti-
trust enforcement policy. To minimise that risk the EU Commission proposed giving 
a certain degree of case management powers to the courts. English courts already 
have significant case management tools when it comes to disclosure of documents: 
this will be discussed in more detail in section 5.8.3. 
Recent changes to the civil procedural frame work have provided for a more ac-
tive role for judges and consequently a less adversarial system. These changes, while 
not specifically intended to follow the White Paper, are in line with the spirit of some 
of the recommendations in it, such as active role for judges regarding disclosure rules. 
Although the active role for judges does indeed have a positive impact on a tort pro-
ceeding once an action for damages has been brought to court, it has no influence on 
whether a potential claimant might bring an action for damages. Before the initiation 
of a claim the question is whether a potential claimant has the right to claim damages 
and have access to justice. In the next section, the discussion will centre on issues 
such as access to justice, collective redress, group litigation orders and representative 
consumer actions. 
5.6 Access to justice 
Access to justice is of fundamental importance for victims seeking redress. It enables 
the victims to enforce their rights and obtain redress. Without access to justice, no 
compensation can be awarded. Traditionally, the right to access to justice in terms of 
redress has been exercised individually. In order to complement and improve the 
access to justice, and thus the legal system, a number of multi-party mechanisms have 
been created under English law. 
5.6.1 Right to claim damages and standing restrictions  
Before a claim can be brought into court, national law has to address the question of 
whether the injured party involved in the case will have competence to assert the 
matter before the court. While in some legal systems such as Slovenia,98 this is dealt 
with according to procedural rules of legal standing (locus standi), in England it is a 
question in tort law. The main requirement to commence an action in the court is to 
submit the appropriate form of claim and satisfy the particular requirements of that 
claim. If the cause of the action is the breach of a statutory duty – as it is the case of 
antitrust damages – it must be shown that the plaintiff is one of the ‘classes of per-
sons’ for whose benefit the statute was passed. If the plaintiff cannot place himself in 
this finite and ascertainable class of people, the action for damages will fail.99 In addi-
tion to the requirement of ‘class of persons’, it also has to be established that the 
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‘type of loss’ the claimant has suffered was one that the statue in question was in-
tended to prevent.100 Specification of the ‘type of loss’ is an essential requirement 
since statutory duty is usually imposed to prevent some particular form of harm and 
not all kinds of harm.101 No one is liable for a violation of a statute if the damage 
claimed is separate from the purpose of the statute. Therefore it is always necessary 
to identify precisely what the damages claim is for and to link it to the wrong perpe-
trated. An illustration of the issue and difficulties arising is to be found in the Court 
of Appeal’s judgement in Crehan v Inntrepreneur.102 The case was later brought to 
the CJEU by way of preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, and was the cause 
for the CJEU’s famous judgement in the Courage case.103 In Crehan v Inntrepreneur, 
Crehan claimed that he suffered damage that occurred at a different level of the mar-
ket from that at which the distortion of competition was caused. He held that he was 
prevented by virtue of the beer tie from purchasing the same brand of beer as from 
third parties. In other words, he claimed that the tie agreement forced him to pur-
chase the beer (Courage Best) at a higher price than he could otherwise obtain on the 
open wholesale market. In contrast, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s loss was 
not the kind of loss against which Crehan was protected by virtue of Article 101 
TFEU. He argued that Article 101 TFEU was intended to protect entrants to a mar-
ket from being confronted with excessive difficulties in entering into the market by 
reason of agreements that restrict or distort competition. Accordingly, loss addressed 
by Article 101 TFEU was limited to the loss caused by distortion at the distribution 
level where the infringement occurred (i.e. brands supplied by third parties). In this 
case, Crehan was essentially claiming losses at the retail level, given that he could not 
compete effectively against other public houses.  
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that as a matter of English law the defen-
dant’s argument was correct and the Crehan’s claim could not succeed.104 Neverthe-
less, it concluded that Crehan’s claim was still valid under the EU principle of effec-
tiveness. It noted that the CJEU did not give an explicit answer to the question 
whether Crehan could, in principle, be entitled to the loss suffered at other levels of 
the market than the distribution level.105 However, the CJEU indirectly gave a posi-
tive answer by making a reference to the possibility of giving a damages award to 
Crehan. It clearly stated that national rules must not “render practically impossible” 
the exercise of rights conferred by EU law.106 Based on the CJEU’s ruling, the Court 
of Appeal concluded that the national rule that restricts the application of the right to 
damage conferred on Crehan by EU law (to certain type of claim) renders practically 
impossible the exercise of that right. Therefore, as a matter of EU law, a claim of the 
type made by Crehan (i.e. at a different level of the market from that at which the 
restriction of competition arose) had to be allowable.  
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As illustrated by the English court judgement in Crehan v Inntrepreneur, UK law 
and EU law take different approaches to the availability of the right to damages. If it 
was for English law, in cases where an allegation of breach of statutory duty is at 
issue, the Court will determine with precision what the ‘kind of loss’ ought to be 
protected by the statute, and whether the plaintiff is included in the ‘class of persons’ 
that was intended to benefit from the statute. While the UK law severely restricts the 
claims for breach of statutory duty, the EU law does not allow an absolute bar to the 
right antitrust damages claim. Any individual should be entitled to claim damages in 
EU antitrust cases. In the light of the CJEU’s case law,107 it would appear superfluous 
to make a distinction between individuals who have suffered damages at distribution 
level and those who have suffered damages at retail level. The right to damages is 
open to any individual who has suffered loss regardless of the level the loss was suf-
fered. Therefore if the English court undertakes an analysis of whether TFEU in-
tended to protect a particular class by applying English rules on breach of statutory 
duty, any rule that does not permit the action to proceed would ‘render practically 
impossible’ the exercise of the EU right to damages. Such a rule therefore, will have 
to be disregarded. In other words, in order for EU antitrust law to be enforced under 
the tort of breach of statutory duty, English courts must disregard certain tort law 
requirements that are supposed to be fulfilled under English law. As a consequence, 
the inquiry into the ‘type of loss’ element of the tort of statutory duty is left out when 
antitrust damages are claimed for a breach of EU antitrust law. Whether the EU ap-
proach to the breach of statutory duty is desirable from a domestic law perspective is 
a different question. On one hand, if the tort law requirement (‘type of loss’) does not 
apply in the EU context, this would create a disparity with the application of the tort 
law in domestic cases. There the ‘type of loss’ element is required to establish the tort. 
On the other hand, elimination of the ‘type of loss’ requirement in the national con-
text would go against the tort system.  
So far as standing is concerned, another important issue in the context of compe-
tition litigation is whether indirect victims have standing to sue. Under English law, 
according to the general rule, an indirect purchaser – as any other victim – may claim 
damages if he can prove that he is in a class of persons intended to be protected by 
the statute and the type of loss he has suffered was of a kind that the statute in ques-
tion was intended to prevent. There were several cases where indirect purchasers 
brought an action into English courts. In all these cases their ability to do so has been 
accepted in principle, even though to date there has been no judgment awarding 
damages to indirect purchasers. For example, in the case of BCL Old Co v. BASF108 
a claim was brought by indirect purchasers, and the defendants did not challenge the 
standing of the indirect purchasers. The case did not proceed further because it was 
time barred.109 In another case, the Emerald case,110 the English Court of Appeal 
rejected the attempt to use Rule 19.6 of the English Civil Procedure Rules to claim 
damages on behalf of all direct and indirect purchasers of air freight services without 
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having identified all the affected parties.111 Usually the problem that indirect purchas-
ers have to face under English law is not ‘standing,’ but question of ‘causality‘. The 
indirect purchaser, as any other victim, may claim damage if he can prove that his loss 
was a ‘natural and probable’ or ‘foreseeable’ consequence of that antitrust act. It is 
often said that their loss is ‘indirect’ and ‘derivate’. At this point it should be recalled 
that EU law does not object to national law, whose application leads to the barring of 
damages actions brought by certain individuals, including indirect purchasers, for 
reasons of causation and remoteness. In other words, the national rules – that were 
the basis for the denial of the damage claim – will not be considered to go against the 
principle of effectiveness, as part of Rewe test.112 
It follows form above that, broadly speaking there is one category of victims who 
may bring an action for damages with regard to antitrust violation under English law. 
The group consists of third parties who have not been privy to an infringement 
agreement, but have suffered damages due to other parties entering such agreements, 
such as competitors, suppliers, direct purchasers and also indirect purchasers. Anti-
trust victims who are parties to the antitrust agreement are not entitled to damages 
under English law. This category of victims may bring a claim for damages only un-
der EU law by application of the principle of effectiveness. 
5.6.2 Collective redress (aggregation of claims) 
The English legal system has a ‘very longstanding record of legislative and judicial 
pronouncement for multi-party litigation.’113 In addition to the ‘traditional mecha-
nism’,114 there are three procedures that are relevant in the competition context and 
will be explained in following paragraphs. These include, first, representative actions 
brought under the Civil Procedure Rules (here after ‘CPR’) and second, group litiga-
tion orders, which were introduced in May 2000 in response to the problems associ-
ated with bringing representative actions.115 The third procedure that is available to 
the antitrust victims, in particular to consumers, is a form of a representative action 
brought under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998. 
                                                        
111  See section 5.6.2.1. 
112  See section 3.2.1. 
113  R. Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: a comparative perspective (2004), Hart Pub-
lishing, Oxford, p. 67. 
114  Term ‘traditional mechanism’ covers test case, joinder, consolidation (see Justice Council Report: 
Improving. Access to Justice Through Collective Action, Developing a More Efficient and Effective 
Procedure for Collective Actions, November 2008, p. 82). Available at: http://www.judicia-
ry.gov.uk/ (last consulted on 6 May 2013). 
115  Another way in which the courts can manage a multiplicity of claims efficiently is through a test 
case, even though this is not strictly speaking a formal collective redress procedure. The CPR pro-
vides the English courts with a power to stay cases and carry out test case. An example includes 
Crehan case (Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company [2003] EWHC 1510), which was taken forward 
as a test case for other Inntrepreneur tenants with Courage ties (see A.A. Alvizou, Individual Tort 
Liability for Infringements of Community Law (2002) 29(2) Legal Issues of Economic Integration, p. 178. 
Private Enforcement in England 
133
 
5.6.2.1 Representative action (CPR 19.6) 
Under the representative rule (CPR 19.6), a named claimant or defendant (the repre-
sentative party) brings an action on his own behalf and also on behalf of the class of 
individuals who have the ‘same interest’ in the claim. While the representative party is 
the only dominus litis, i.e. master of the proceeding, the represented members of the 
group do not themselves become party to the claim. Accordingly, they are not subject 
to documentary disclosure or costs obligations.116 Nevertheless, they will receive the 
benefits of a res judicata decision.117 Under the res judicata doctrine, once a lawsuit is 
decided the represented members will be barred from raising the same issue again in 
the court. As one judge described the situation, “[t]he plaintiff is the self-elected rep-
resentative of the others. The representative party does not need to obtain consent of 
the represented members. It is true that consequently they are not liable for costs, but 
still they will be bound by the estoppel created by the decision.”118 Due to its formu-
lation, the representative action under CPR 19.6 is believed to be the closest to the 
form of ‘opt-out‘ class actions of US-style available in the English legal system.119 
However, even if it is arguable that they have the same basis, the representative action 
under CPR 19.6 applied to competition cases cannot be classified as a US model of 
class action.120 This is already evident from the limitations on its accessibility, which 
will be considered in greater details below. 
Despite the fact that a representative claim under CPR 19.6 can be brought on 
behalf of parties who do not take any positive action to be included in the claim, this 
form of action has been a relatively uncommon way of bringing claims for compensa-
tion. This is primarily due to strict interpretation of the ‘same interest’ requirement.121 
In order for the ‘same interest’ requirement to be fulfilled, the claimants and the class 
they sought to represent must all have (i) a common interest, (ii) a common grievance 
and (iii) a remedy that is beneficial to all of them.122 In other words, it is not enough 
that the group of individuals is suing for the same cause of action nor that their 
claims arise from the same incident, but the possible presence of different defences 
would preclude a representative action. In competition cases in which an antitrust 
conduct could cause damages to both direct and indirect purchasers, the presence of 
different defences being available to different class members will often be the reason 
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for non-applicability of Article CPR 19.6., as demonstrated by a judgement of the 
Court of Appeals (upholding the decision of the High Court)123 in Emerald Supplies 
Ltd & Southern Glass Produce Ltd v British Airways Plc.124 The claim arose from the 
EU Commission’s air freight cartel investigation. The EU Commission subsequently 
found British Airways and other airlines guilty of violation of Article 101 of the 
TFEU. Emerald Supplies Limited, a flower importer and wholesaler, claimed that it 
was a victim of the alleged cartel and so suffered damages as a direct purchaser. It 
commenced proceedings against British Airways. The claim was framed as a repre-
sentative action. Emerald sought to be representative party of ‘all other direct or 
indirect purchasers’ affected by the alleged anti-competitive conduct. The Court de-
nied the permission that was sought for a group representative action, stating that the 
claimants could not be said to have the same interest in recovering damages for 
breach of competition law. Since the class of claimants, as defined in the case, in-
cludes entities at different levels of the distribution chain (direct and indirect pur-
chasers) this could lead to conflict of interest among them. The defendant could have 
successfully run a particular defence against some claimants but not others; the de-
fendant could raise passing-on defence only with respect to direct purchasers. On 
one hand, if the defendant is faced with a direct purchaser he will argue that the over-
charge was not passed onto the next link in the chain and consequently the claimant 
did not suffer any loss. On the other hand, if the defendant is faced with an indirect 
purchaser, then he will argue either that the overcharge was not passed on to the 
claimant by the purchaser earlier in the chain, or alternatively that the claimant him-
self passed it on. This also means there are differences in how direct and indirect 
purchasers would respond to that defence. In such cases, the direct purchaser will 
wish the court to conclude that the overcharge was not passed on, while the indirect 
purchaser will need to establish that the direct purchaser did pass it on. G. Barling 
has described this situation as being “liable to put the claimants at each others’ 
throats, whereas the infringer/defendant is likely to be indifferent as to where the 
parcel was when the music stopped.”125  
Further, the court explained that the case failed in the first place because the vic-
tims (members of the class) who have the ‘same interest’ in the action could not be 
identified at the commencement of the proceeding. It is essential that the claimant 
and the individuals to be represented must have the same interest at the time of 
commencement of action. In this case, the class was identified only with reference to 
the parameters that could be known at the outcome of the action itself.126 As the 
class in the claim had been defined as “direct or indirect purchasers of air freight 
services the prices for which were allegedly inflated by agreements or concerted prac-
tices,” there were many stages in the distribution chain from producer to consumer at 
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which a direct or indirect purchaser might have passed on its losses. It followed that 
it was not necessary that all direct and indirect purchasers had been injured by unlaw-
ful conspiracy. In order to establish a cause of action against the airlines it was neces-
sary to show that the claimants had absorbed the losses associated with paying the 
alleged inflated prices. In that case, damages were an integral element in the cause of 
action pleaded.127 As long as the claimants were unidentified, assessing whether they 
shared the ‘same interest’ was considered to be impossible. If it had followed from 
the findings that only individuals who had directly purchased from the defendant 
would necessarily have suffered loss, a representative claim might have been possible. 
Whereas, the indirect purchaser faces the question whether the price paid to his own 
supplier included or did not include the whole or part of that overcharge element, the 
position of direct purchaser is more straightforward. The direct purchaser has paid 
the infringer’s overcharge and can therefore ‘easily’ assess prima facie loss, at least in 
theory. It is more likely that members of the class, that is only direct purchasers, 
could be identified at the beginning.  
Based on the reasoning of the court, one may argue that the problem of having 
the ‘same interest’ could be solved by removing standing for indirect purchasers as 
suggested in the Green Paper, but later retained in the White Paper.128 In the Emer-
ald Supplies Ltd case,129 all the claimants before the court would be at the same level 
of supply, their defences would be likely to be sufficiently similar and therefore also 
their ‘common interest’. Even if the refusal of indirect purchasers’ standing would 
ease direct purchasers’ access to justice, it in turn would raises concerns of its com-
patibility with the EU approach to legal standing in competition damage cases.130 
Another argument that individuals included in the group action are known from 
the beginning of the commencement of action comes from the function of damages. 
Under tort law, damages cannot be awarded globally without reference to a particular 
loss suffered by members of the relevant class of interested persons.131 As F. Moul-
ton stated: “Damages are personally only […] no representative action can lie where 
the sole relief sought is damages, because they have to be proved separately in the 
case of each plaintiff […].”132 After all, even though victims suffer damages caused 
by the same infringement, the amount of their damages, and so the final compensa-
tion, might vary. It follows that individual assessment of damages undoubtedly limits 
the use of representative mechanism in actions for damages.133 A good example of 
this is the Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd. case,134 where the 
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134  Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204. 
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judge allowed the representative claimant to establish a common basis of liability, 
with each represented person being then left to establish his own damages in a sepa-
rate action. In these subsequent individual actions they relied upon the res judicata of 
the representative action as establishing the defendant’s liability to members of the 
represented class. The use of the representative action procedure has been regarded 
therefore, more as creating a “declaratory class action”135 and not a damage class 
action.136 This approach to representative actions has been generally acknowledged 
and described by Jolowicz: 
 
“[T]he idea that there can be a representative action for a declaration that members of a class 
are entitled to damages, an idea which does not have the corollary that there may actually be a 
representative action for damages, is capable of helping to solve some of the problems that are 
raised by multitudinous small claims of similar character while avoiding the obnoxious features, 
and especially the “punitive” character, of the American massive class action. It opens the door 
to an economical procedure for dealing with questions of liability without at the same time 
involving the risk that the defendant is ordered to pay damages to or for the account of those 
who do not seek them.”137  
5.6.2.2 Group litigation orders 
The principal court procedure for multi-party actions in England is the Group Litiga-
tion Order (here after ‘GLO’). It was enshrined in the new Civil Procedure Rules by 
Woolf in his civil procedure reforms in 2000. As a part of the general approach of the 
courts to civil litigation to overcome excessive complexity, delay and avoid unneces-
sary costs in civil procedure,138 it was created as a means to provide effective case 
management for a large number of unitary and individual claims. As explained by 
Lord Woolf, the GLO “seeks to achieve its objective, so far as this is possible, by 
reducing the number of steps litigants, who have a common interest, have to take 
individually to establish their rights and instead enables them to be taken collectively 
as part of a GLO Group. This means that irrespective of the number of individuals in 
the group each procedural step in the actions need only be taken once.”139  
The GLO has not yet been used in a competition case,140 but the procedure pro-
vides the potential for a number of claims relating to the same antitrust infringement 
(e.g., a cartel) to be consolidated in the court. The certification criteria for making an 
                                                        
135  See K. Oliphant (ed.), Aggregation and divisibility of damage (2009) Springer, Wien, p. 121. 
136  Although representative proceedings have rarely been used in claims for compensation, there are 
some decisions on successful damages claims in such proceedings: Monarch SS Co Ltd v. Greystoke 
Castle (Cargo Owners) [1947] AC 265, H, in which the claimants’ total loss was ascertained at the 
time of the litigation; or EMI Records Ltd v. Riley (1981), in which the class members consented 
that the payment of all damages is to be paid to a body representing them.  
137  J.A. Jolowicz, Comment, Representative Actions, Class Actions and Damages – A Compromise 
Solution (1980) 39 Cambridge L. J, p. 239. 
138  C. Hodges, Global Class Actions Project Country Report: England and Wales (2007), p. 11. Available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/category/categories/country-reports?page=3 (last consulted 
on 16 May 2013). 
139  Boake Allen [2007] UKHL 25 at. 31.  
140  Slaughter and May, Competition litigation in the UK (August 2012), p. 10. 
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Order are deliberately simple, so as to allow the courts a wide discretion as to 
whether or not to order a GLO.141 In particular, the criteria are (a) there must be a 
‘number of claims’; (b) these must give rise to ‘common or related issues of fact or 
law’142; (c) managing the litigation by means of a GLO must be consistent with the 
overriding objective of the CPR, which is to enable the court to ‘deal with cases 
justly’; (d) the court must approve a group litigation order; (e) a GLO will not be 
commenced if consolidation of the claims or a representative proceeding would be 
more appropriate (the ‘superiority’ criterion); and (f) the class needs to be identified 
by the number of claims already issued and the number of parties likely to be in-
volved, with the provision of sub-classes if necessary. The essence of a group action 
includes, in the words of Andrews:  
 
“a set of parties (normally claimants, but they might be defendants) shepherded into a single 
flock, travelling the long road to settlement without the separate consideration of a multiplicity 
of identical or similar issues.”143  
 
It is important to note that the GLO is not a type of traditional class actions known 
in other common law jurisdictions. It ‘only’ integrates collective elements into a tradi-
tional individual procedure.144 Unlike US type of class action,145 it maintains an essen-
tially individualistic approach to group litigation.146 The individualistic approach – 
which is a traditional method of dealing with English civil proceedings – is largely 
based on the private law’s philosophy of ‘corrective justice‘ between individuals. In 
Brougham’s often repeated words, the purpose of English civil proceedings is “to do 
justice between man and man.”147 This philosophy is usually used as an explanation 
of English resistance to the class action mechanism and a way of dealing with group 
litigation in general.  
Following the individualistic approach, before a GLO can be made it is required 
of each individual potential member to make an individual claim under CPR Part 7 or 
Part 8 and become party to a legal dispute independently from other group mem-
                                                        
141  C. Hodges, Global Class Actions Project Country Report: England and Wales (2007), p. 13. 
142  The ‘issues’ are wider than the ‘interests’ under the representative rule (see R. Mulheron, The class 
action in common law legal systems: a comparative perspective (2004) Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, 
p. 68). 
143  N. Andrews, Multi-party Proceedings in England: Representative and Group Actions (2001) 11 
Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 258. 
144  H-W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, The Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, especially in 
German Civil Procedure (2006) 17 European Business Law Review, p. 1489. 
145  For N. Andrews “group actions are different from class actions because each group litigant is a 
member of a procedural class as a party, rather than as a represented non-party.”(N. Andrews, Multi-
Party Proceedings in England: Representative and Group Actions (2001) 11(2) Duke Journal of Com-
parative & International Law, p. 249). See also R. Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Sys-
tems: a comparative perspective (2006), Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, p. 30 (He describes the GLO 
as “schemas which are not representative class actions in the true sense, as they require that class 
members actively participate in the action as parties, and in that sense, they have been judicially and 
academically described as nothing more than ‘permissive joinder devices’.”). 
146  Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales – A perspective of need (a research paper for submission to 
the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales, February 2008) p. 29, p. 144. 
147  Speeches of H. Brougham (1838) vol. 2 at 324. 
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bers.148 Mulheron describes the GLO regime as a case management umbrella under 
which a conglomeration of individual actions is managed, and in that regard individ-
ual actions are not only encouraged, but are required.149 The requirement is the 
commencement of numerous unitary actions (the claims might be filed across many 
courts) which then later have to be gathered under one ‘umbrella’. A potential claim-
ant must opt-in to the group by a date which is specified by the court. If the GLO 
deadline has been missed, a claim can be brought separately, thus independently of 
the group register procedure.150 This process of active commencement (‘opt-in’)151 
contrasts with traditional common law class actions, where a representative claim is 
brought for the benefit of a class of individuals who do not have to be party to the 
proceedings but who – unless they opt-out – are bound by the result of the action. 
Although the procedure becomes collective from the time the Group Litigation 
Order is issued and individual actions are grouped, ‘group procedure’ is a stage of the 
lawsuit. It is not regarded as a new kind of procedure.152 At this stage ‘common or 
related issues of fact or law’ are discussed,153 while the cases themselves are decided 
in the subsequent individual lawsuits. Such ‘common or related issues of fact or law’ 
issues will normally concern questions of liability or the availability of a particular 
head of loss, but each claimant still has to establish that he has suffered loss.154 Thus 
a decision on one of the ‘group issues’ will bind the other cases within the Group, 
while individual issues that are resolved in individual cases bind only a particular 
case.155 In this way, cases that have been grouped together maintain their individual 
aspect.  
The GLO is therefore seen only as a management tool for efficient administra-
tion of individual claims. It allows the court to consider fully both common issues 
and individual divergences from that common ground within the same action.156 It is 
                                                        
148  H-W Micklitz and A. Stadler, The Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, especially in 
German Civil Procedure (2006) 17(5) European Business Law Review, p. 1489. 
149  Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales, A perspective of need (a research paper for submission to 
the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales, February 2008), p. ix, p. 144. 
150  A variation upon this is where the court orders a claim, originally brought as separate proceeding, to 
be transferred to a GLO register (CPR 19.11(3); 19.13(f). 
151  C. Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach (2001) Oxford University Press, p. 345. 
152  H-W Micklitz and A. Stadler, The Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, especially in 
German Civil Procedure (2006) 17(5) European Business Law Review, p. 1489. 
153  The judge determines which aspects of the cases are desirable to be treated as common issues and 
which are to be left as individual matters. See: C. Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Ap-
proach, (2001) Oxford University Press, p. 346. C. Leskinen argues that this flexibility makes it diffi-
cult for the parties to predict to what extent a judge will make use of a GLO (C. Leskinen, Collective 
Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU: The Opt-In v. The Opt-Out Model (April 2010), p.11)  
154  English law does not award damages without proof of actual loss suffered by individual claimants. 
See N. Andrews, Multi-Party Actions and Complex Litigation in England, University of Cambridge – Fac-
ulty of Law, paper no. 12/ 2011 (December 2010), p. 22; N. Andrews, The Modern Civil Process: Judicial 
and alternative forms of dispute resolution in England (2008) Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Germany, p. 301. 
155  C. Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach (2001) Oxford University Press, p. 345. See also 
“Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions” Developing a More Efficient and Effec-
tive Procedure for Collective Actions, A Series of Recommendations to the Lord Chancellor , July 
2008. 
156  N. Andrews, Multi-party Proceedings in England: Representative and Group Actions (2001) 11 
Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 264.  
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based on the creativity of the managing judge, taking into account that the relevant 
circumstances of each particular case could differ widely.157 In the judgment of 
Tew and others v BoS (Shared Appreciation Mortgages) No 1 plc and others,158 the 
High Court stressed, among other things,159 that the GLO procedure cannot be used 
as a means to avoid or evade dealing properly with individual issues that arise in the 
particular type of claim. The court has refused to seek determination of common 
issues in such a way that the determination of those issues would make further indi-
vidual considerations unnecessary. Preservation of the traditional individual approach 
to civil procedure makes GLO suitable for cases in which individual damage is high 
enough to file an action, but less suitable for the legal assertion of minor and dis-
persed damages, which are common in competition cases. Each victim is still required 
to file an individual action, which makes the GLO a complex and potentially expen-
sive procedure. Moreover, the judge has the final decision in considering whether it is 
worthwhile to invoke the GLO procedure. 
5.6.2.3 Representative consumer actions 
The latest addition to the set of procedural mechanisms available to manage multi-
party litigations was a consumer redress mechanism available exclusively in the field 
of competition law. In particular, in order to reinforce links between competition law 
and consumers, Section 19 of the EA 02 inserted a new section 47B into the CA 98. 
It provided for ‘specified bodies’ to bring damage claims before the CAT on behalf 
of a group of two or more ‘named individual’ consumers. A typical example of such a 
claim is a situation in which consumers buy a product affected by the price-fixing 
agreement. A unique feature of section 47B is to allow associations with no claim to 
sue on behalf of persons who have a cause of action. In other words, the association 
does not need to have an ‘interest in the proceeding.’ Instead, it simply has to fulfil 
the requirement that it is an appropriate body to represent the interests of the indi-
viduals concerned. 
Due to its unique feature, the provision of section 47B is limited in scope and na-
ture. In this regard, several observations can be made. First, a representative action 
may be brought only by a ‘specified body’ appointed by the Secretary of State. Any 
body may apply to the Secretary of State to be ‘specified’ on the basis of published 
criteria.160 To date, only one entity has been granted ‘specified body’ status pursuant 
to section 47B of the EA 02; that is the Consumer Association with the remarkable 
name ‘Which?’. Second, the mechanism extends only to consumer claims. Currently, 
there is no statutory basis for representative actions involving businesses, including 
                                                        
157  GLOs have been issued in a range of areas, including product liability, personal injury, tax and 
insurance. A list of GLOs cases is available on the English court website at http://www.hmcourts- 
service.gov.uk. 
158  Tew and others v BoS (Shared Appreciation Mortgages) No 1 plc and others [2010] EWHC 203 
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(last consulted on 6 May 2013). 
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small and medium-sized enterprises, harmed by upstream conduct. Third, the repre-
sentative action is a follow-on action. No damages claim may be brought until it has 
been established by either the EU Commission (47A(6)) or the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (CAT) that an infringement of competition law has occurred. This require-
ment leads to separation of the functions of infringement enforcement and the issue 
of compensation.161 Responsibility of enforcement remains with the regulator, while 
the consumer organisation has responsibility related to compensation. However, 
following the Government’s proposal in January 2013 it is expected that the CAT’s 
jurisdiction to hear damage claims will be extended to stand-alone claims.162 Fourth, 
representative action is based on an ‘opt-in‘ mechanism,163 although changes in this 
regard are also envisaged.164 Under the current regime, a consumer will be included in 
the action only if he expressly agrees to join, or opts-in. He has to agree explicitly to 
take part in the action if he wants to be included. It follows that the consumer body 
may bring an action only on behalf of named consumers.165 The members of the class 
that are not specifically named and represented in the proceedings will not be bound 
by the resulting court order. In this way, there is no risk that a decision is binding on 
an individual who is unaware that proceedings of potential interest to him have even 
begun. At the same time, according to the general rule the damages can be awarded 
directly to individual consumers. It is still possible for the CAT to order that the sum 
awarded must be paid to the specified body representing individual consumers, but 
that will only be possible with the consent of the specified body and the individual.  
The new mechanism maintains – as did GLO – the emphasis on the individual 
perspective of claims. It has helped to overcome some problems related to multi-
party action, such as lack of individual consumer’s expertise, but it has not completely 
solved problems related to ‘gathering claimants’.166 The problem in particular is asso-
ciated with the fact that representative action can only be brought on behalf of 
‘named’ individuals rather than a ‘class’ of victims. When large numbers of people 
suffer the same, or similar, damage from the defendant’s antitrust conduct, but the 
damages to each individual are small, it is likely that only a few, if any, of the victims 
will bother to be involved in the action. The participation requirements of opt-in and 
to be ‘named’ represent difficulties for consumer associations to find and recruit 
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p. 21. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 
file/69124/13-502-private-actions-in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform-final-
impact.pdf (last consulted on 16 May 2013). 
163  Opting into a group action must be distinguished from intervening in an action. By opting in, an 
individual becomes a member of the group and not a party to the suit. 
164  See Government’s response to a consultation ‘Private Actions in Competition Law’ (January 2012), 
p. 3. 
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claimants (especially with a low value of individual claims) into the action. The prob-
lem can be illustrated by the cartel damage case, which also has been the only case 
brought under section 47B to date. In that case, Consumers’ Association v JJB 
Sports,167 Which? brought a representative action against JJB Sports plc to compen-
sate consumers who were overcharged when they bought replica football shirts. The 
action arose after the OFT’s 2003 decision finding that the respondent retailer had 
entered into price-fixing agreements in relation to replica football shirts for Manches-
ter United and the England team between 2000 and 2001.168 JJB was fined £6.7 mil-
lion. Despite the fact that there were thousands of potential claimants,169 approxi-
mately 500 consumers were identified on the claim form. Ultimately, in January 2008 
the case was settled on the basis of compensation of up to £20 per individual con-
sumer who joined in Which?’s claim.170 The agreement was also valid for those indi-
viduals who also bought one of the shirts in question, but did not (for whatsoever 
reason) opt-in to the action. They could claim £10 compensation.171 If this was not 
agreed upon, the victims who did not join the action and did not become a party to 
the action would remain completely uncompensated (with the agreement they were 
entitled at least to a part of compensation). It would be interesting to see how many 
of the victims who did not join the action claimed back £10.  
The Consumers’ Association v JJB Sports case can be seen only as a partial suc-
cess. On one hand, it was a success because the initiation of the representative action 
resulted in a positive outcome for the consumers. Which? succeeded in obtaining 
compensation for victims of JJB Sports’s antitrust behaviour by means of a settle-
ment agreement. In addition, JJB voluntarily offered compensation to the consumers 
who bought the relevant shirt, and were not included in Which?’s action. On the 
other hand, the success of the case was lessened by the number of consumers who 
signed up for the action. That number was low considering the degree of publicity, 
the amount of resources spent and the external legal costs. It has been argued that the 
low level of participation in the action was due to the ‘opt-in‘ form of representative 
action.172 Under the current law governing antitrust representative actions, the con-
sumers – on whose behalf the action is brought – have to agree to participate in the 
action and have to be named (“opt-in” system). In contrast to the US ‘opt-out‘ class 
action system, where eligible consumers are automatically included in the action 
(unless they expressly opt out), Which? faced difficulties finding and recruiting claim-
ants to join the action. Despite a large media campaign, it was able to get together 
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and name only 130 consumers (0.1% of those affected).173 The total amount of the 
settlement payout was around £18,000, plus reasonable litigation costs (an individual 
payout of £ 20), which is a small fraction of the total compensation that would have 
been awarded if all affected consumers had opted-in. In order to get a complete pic-
ture of the situation, it should be mentioned here that (in addition to the ‘opt-in’ 
form of representative action) there were also other factors that contributed to the 
low participation rate, and were not directly linked to the collective actions mecha-
nism. In particular, JJB Sports made an offer to give anyone who could prove they 
had bought a relevant shirt (either by presenting the receipt, or the shirt itself) a free 
England shirt and a mug.174 Consumers who chose to claim their free England shirts 
and mug from JJB Sports lost their right to be part of the consumer group’s action. 
In practice, it is likely that many potential claimants preferred to take the offer, rather 
than signing up to the Which? collective action seeking compensation.  
Despite the fact that there were different factors contributing to the low partici-
pation in the action, the case clearly demonstrates the shortcomings (weaknesses) of 
the ‘opt-in‘ mechanism,175 and therefore a lack of effective result. If the representa-
tive association wants to bring an action under section 47B, it is likely to face difficul-
ties related to identification of potential claimants and their recruitment into the ac-
tion, as presented above. As a consequence, there is a risk that a representative action 
will be brought only on behalf of a small number of those who have been harmed, or 
might not be brought at all. A representative action that does not attract a sufficient 
number of individual consumers to take part does not make economic sense.176 At 
the end of the JJB Sports action, the head of Legal Affairs at Which? concluded that 
under the current ‘opt-in’ regime, the low value of the payout, combined with various 
procedural and practical difficulties makes it very unlikely that the consumer organi-
sation will bring similar actions in future.177 As she said, “Would we do it again? 
Never say never, but it’s not looking likely.”178  
In response to the shortcomings of the representative action under section 47B, 
and after the consultation taken in 2012, the Government decided to introduce an 
‘opt-out‘ collective regime with cases to be heard only in CAT.179 After all, the possi-
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bility of individuals to file group claims through the specially appointed organisations 
on opt-out basis would enhance the effectiveness of the private enforcement of 
competition law. While large companies usually do not hesitate to apply to the court 
and claim damages, the opt-out collective redress mechanism is ideal for the consum-
ers and small businesses that are unlikely to go to the court if “their losses do not 
justify the costs of litigation and the uncertainty of the outcome.”180 The reluctance 
of individual claimants to take active steps to bring actions (in terms of individual or 
collective redress mechanisms) benefits the perpetrators of an infringement. In con-
trast, facing a risk of having to compensate for the harm that the antitrust violations 
have caused, companies would be more reluctant to get involved in an infringement 
of the EU antitrust rules. The right to damages would act as a deterrent from engag-
ing in anti-competitive conduct. 
5.6.3 Conclusions on indirect purchasers 
It is generally recognised that in competition cases any person who suffers damage as 
a result of an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and who makes a claim in 
England for a breach of statutory duty can recover damages resulting from the in-
fringement. A case in support of this generic recognition is that of Garden Cottage 
Foods Limited v Milk Marketing Board181 in which the House of Lords held that a 
breach of a statutory duty is imposed “not only for the purpose of promoting the 
general economic prosperity of the common market, but also for the benefit of pri-
vate individuals to whom loss or damage is caused by a breach of that duty.” In view 
of the discussion above, the scope of possible victims could clearly include competi-
tors, suppliers, direct purchasers and also indirect purchasers. Moreover, allowing 
indirect purchasers to sue also complies with the fundamental principles in awarding 
damages, which is to compensate for the damage, loss or injury suffered, which will 
be further elaborated in Section 5.10. 
The problem related to indirect purchasers‘ standing may come from the fact that 
a breach of the competition rules (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and their equivalents 
in national law) is characterised as a breach of a statutory duty. The law of tort appli-
cable to breaches of statutory duty governs the matter of antitrust standing in the 
sense that the claimant is in a class of persons intended to be protected by the statute, 
and the type of loss he has suffered was of a type that the statue in question was 
intended to prevent. This could potentially restrict indirect purchasers’ damages 
claims. Fulfilling this requirement is not always easy, particularly in antitrust cases, 
when an antitrust infringement might cause losses to a different group of actors in 
the market. The more distant the plaintiff is from the market disruption, the more 
difficult it will be to show that he is within the group of people protected by the in-
fringed provision, and the type of loss he has suffered was one that the statute in 
question was intended to prevent. Accordingly, in practice the class of persons who 
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may benefit from the provision is limited.182 The English rules relating to the scope 
of a statutory duty are reconcilable with the EU ‘open to any individual’ formula and 
indirect purchaser standing only to the extent that they are understood in the sense 
that indirect purchasers should not be excluded a priori from the claim. In other 
words, the requirement of ‘open to any individual’ means that national provisions or 
case law that result in damages actions brought by certain indirect purchasers being 
barred for reasons of ‘not being within the protected group of people’ would not be 
permissible.  
In addition, it is important to note that in any case disallowance of indirect pur-
chaser’s standing would go against the consumer protection that has been empha-
sised in the EA 02. The inclusion of a provision enabling representative damages 
actions brought on behalf of consumers183 ensures that indirect purchasers would 
have standing to claim damages under UK law (subject to the requirement of causal 
relationship between the prohibited agreement or practice and the harm suffered). 
5.6.4 Conclusions on collective redress 
It follows from the analysis so far that there are several ways in which multi-party 
private actions for infringements of competition law can be brought in England. A 
feature that is common to all of these mechanisms is that they operate on an ‘opt-in‘ 
basis. In this way they preserve a tradition of tort litigation requirement that damages 
awards should be assessed on an individual basis in order to provide complete com-
pensation to plaintiffs. So for example, the Group Litigation Order permits common 
or related issues of fact or law of claims to be discussed together, while the cases 
themselves are decided in the subsequent individual lawsuits. Although there is a high 
degree of flexibility given to the judge to define the common issues, it is difficult to 
predict how the assessment of damages can be included in the ‘common issues’.184 
Since damages have to be calculated with reference to the individual class members’ 
losses, they will be awarded for each individual in the subsequent cases. In line with 
the purpose of compensation, the court has no jurisdiction to award damages at large 
or universally without reference to the particular loss. The same applies to the repre-
sentative action under CPR 19.6. Although the procedure is seen as an ‘opt-out‘ sys-
tem – as the represented in the class do not need take any positive action to be repre-
sented in the claim – English case law has shown that the procedure can be seldom 
used in competition litigation. It is seen as a useful means of obtaining declaratory 
relief but not compensation award, because damages need to be proved individually 
for each of the claimants. The presence or even a potential existence of different 
defences (as it is the case of the existence of direct and also indirect purchaser) could 
preclude representative claim.185 In this respect the representative procedure for 
                                                        
182  See section 5.6.1.  
183  See extensively section 4.6.2.3. 
184  See section 5.6.2.2. 
185  The inclusion of indirect purchasers into representative action raises the conflict of interest issues. It 
can be initiated only if the loss is suffered by members of the relevant class of interested persons. 
Whereas direct customers all allegedly paying an anticompetitive surcharge are easily conceived as 
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competition damages actions introduced by the CA 98 is not in any way different. 
Even though it is the specified body that brings the claim, it may only do so on behalf 
of named individual claimants, with their consent.186 Identification of each con-
sumer’s claim is therefore required at the initial stage. This individual approach to the 
representative group makes it possible that any damages awarded by the CAT will be 
paid directly to the represented consumers individually. Only in those cases where the 
CAT is satisfied that all the individuals and the specified body are in agreement, may 
it order the damages be paid to the specified body (who will then enforce the award 
on behalf of the represented consumers).  
The current English approach to group litigation based on an ‘opt-in‘ model, in 
principle, is similar to the EU Commission’s approach to group litigation proposal, 
which requires a positive act on the part of the plaintiff in order to commence court 
proceedings. Any model (such as opt-out class action) that would permit a court to 
assess damages in an aggregate amount, without reference to the individual class 
members’ losses would not be consistent with the substantive law of damages as-
sessment, the way in which damages are calculated, and the basis upon which com-
pensation may be awarded for a breach of duty.187 It creates a potential risk of de-
priving people of an individualised determination of their dispute. Reference can be 
made to the Emerald case.188 The English court rejected adopting an ‘opt-out’ model 
(the closest form of US class action in English legal system) representative actions 
under CPR 19.6. The representative rule, as it stands at present, is not designed to 
facilitate multi-party litigation itself. As the Chancellor argued, any other policy argu-
ments in favour of such class actions are better dealt with by Parliament than by 
stretching the use of CPR 19.6 to accommodate this sort of case. 189 
The type of representative action recommended by the White Paper, insofar as it 
provides for an ‘identified group of victims’ and ‘opt-in system’, in principle corre-
sponds to the mechanism of representative action within the Competition Act 1998. 
To be fully in line with the EU Commission’s proposal, the availability of representa-
tive action should not be restricted to claimants who are consumers, as currently is 
the case under the CA 98. Instead, it should be also open to other victims of antitrust 
conduct – such as (small) businesses. In addition, the availability of the mechanism 
should not be limited to follow-on actions, but should be open also in stand-alone 
cases.190 
An important point is that the EU Commission proposed to limit the possibility 
of collective actions for damages of individuals to entities officially designed in ad-
vance or certified on an ad hoc basis by a Member State. This proposal corresponds to 
the English restricted approach to representative actions. General reluctance to avail-
                                                        
having the same interest, it is difficult to claim the same interest for the indirect purchasers who 
might have been spared any surcharge, paid the full amount, or some proportion of it. 
186  See section 5.6.2.1.  
187  A fundamental limitation of awarding damages in England is that punitive or non–compensatory 
damages are not available for a breach of contract or for the tort of negligence (see section 5.10.3.). 
188  Discussed in section 5.6.2.1. 
189  Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways PLC [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch), par. 37.  
190  See the Office of Fair Trading’s recommendations to government, OFT916, April 2007. 
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ability of representative actions brought by an entity with no interest in the action 
itself should be seen from a broader perspective. The mechanism of representative 
actions under the CA 98 was introduced within the UK regime with the specific aim 
of facilitating private enforcement of the competition rules. It entitles the bodies 
officially appointed by the State to bring a collective action only on behalf of con-
sumers in relation to claims brought before the CAT. This system is an exception to 
the English legal system, since the claim can be brought by an entity with no interest 
in the action itself. Generally, only a party with an interest in the action itself may 
bring a claim for damages. This applies to group actions as well as to representative 
actions. For example, before a group litigation order can be formed each member of 
the group is required to bring an action in its own right. Similarly, a representative 
action can be brought under CPR rule 19.6 only by a person as the representative of 
any other person who has the ‘same interest’ in a claim and this ‘same interest’ exists 
at the time the action was brought.191  
As said earlier, the White Paper’s proposal on representative actions corresponds 
to the existing English mechanism of representative action, insofar as it provides for 
an ‘identified’ group of victims. However, the White Paper goes further and suggests 
allowing an organisation to represent not only ‘named’ individuals but also ‘identifi-
able’ individuals. The presence of unidentified individuals in the group presents chal-
lenging issues regarding remedies. English tort law does not permit distribution of a 
monetary award to unnamed claimants. For that reason, all claimants in an action 
must be personally identified. Representative actions under CPR 19.6 should be seen 
as an exception, in that the individuals do not need to take any positive action to be 
represented in the action, nor must they be individually identified in the proceedings 
in order to be affected by the lawsuit. However, to date representative actions have 
not been widely used in English litigation, largely because of the strict interpretation 
of the ‘same interest’ requirement. In competition cases that involve direct and indi-
rect purchasers, the ‘same interest’ requirement will be satisfied only if the group 
involves either direct or indirect purchasers, but not both. After all, the final compen-
sation of each of the group will vary. Thus, for the requirement to be satisfied it is 
necessary that the class can be identified at the beginning.  
If the representative actions proposed by the EU Commission are introduced 
into English law they would be desirable from the point of view of effectiveness,192 
but they would raise a number of procedural concerns and risk undermining the legal 
system. There is the risk that injured individuals will become largely irrelevant to the 
proposed representative actions. They are not necessary to bring the action, which 
can be filed by an organisation with no claim. Likewise, claims on behalf of ‘un-
named’ individuals entails the risk of acquiring damage funds which cannot be paid to 
the individuals injured by the antitrust conduct because their identity is unknown. It 
may be questioned whether in this case compensation justice is not endangered. The 
defendant is ordered to pay more by way of damages that he would have had to pay 
as compensation for each individual victim. In other words, it has to pay more than if 
                                                        
191  See Emerald Supplies Limited v British Airways PLC [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch); [2010] EWCA Civ 
1284. 
192  See section 5.6.2.3. 
Private Enforcement in England 
147
 
such procedure is not available. Group litigation on behalf of ‘unnamed’ individuals, 
therefore, has the potential to punish, even though no award of punitive damages is 
made or contemplated by the judge.  
Of course, the situation changes, if a form of ‘opt-out‘ collective redress is 
adopted by changing the CAT’s procedural rules, as the Government has sug-
gested.193 England benefits from an exclusive feature of the system: claimants have a 
choice of forum in which to commence litigation for antitrust damages. An action 
can be started either in the High Court or in the specialist competition tribunal, CAT. 
Such a regime allows procedural rules that apply in the CAT to be different from the 
general rules that apply in court of general jurisdiction. Accordingly, the CAT’s rules 
are able to accommodate the needs for effective competition enforcement to a 
greater extent.  
5.7 Substantive conditions for damages claims in antitrust law 
The following section details the necessary substantive conditions that have to be met 
in tort proceedings for antitrust damage claims. As mentioned earlier in Section 
5.2.2., there is no general theory of tortious liability in the English tort law. Methods 
of attributing liability are much more fragmented compared to continental legal sys-
tems. To give rise to liability, each tort requires satisfaction of particular elements. It 
is generally accepted that in order to succeed in a claim for breach of statutory duty, 
which is a cause of action in antitrust damage cases, it is necessary to establish194 first, 
that there is a statutory duty, which has been breached; second, that this breach has 
caused damage; third, that the legislator intended to create a private right of action, 
and fourth, that the provision aims to protect the victim against the damage he suf-
fered. Since the breach of statutory duty is a distinct tort, separated from the tort of 
negligence, there is no requirement that the tortfeasor acted either intentionally or 
negligently (fault requirement).195  
5.7.1 Infringement of competition rules  
The first substantive condition in order to establish breach of statutory duty in pri-
vate proceeding is the infringement of UK or EU competition rules. While anti-com-
petitive behaviour that affects the trade between the EU-member states by Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, is anti-competitive behaviour that might affect trade within the 
UK is specifically prohibited by the CA 98 and contains two prohibitions. The so-
                                                        
193  See the draft Consumer Rights Bill (published by the UK Governement on the 12 th of June 2013). 
Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/draft-consumer-rights-bill (last con-
sulted on 29 June 2013). 
194  S. Davidson, Actions for Damages in the English Courts for Breach of EEC Competition Law 
(1985) 34(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 183. 
195  Evidence of negligence is only required if it is required by the statutory provision (for example, if the 
legal rule prescribes to take ‘due care’). This however, is not the case in the competition law context. 
See M.H. Matthews, Negligence and Breach of Statutory Duty (1984) 4(3) J Legal Studies, p. 429. 
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called “Chapter I prohibition’ is modelled on Article 101 TFEU and forbids deci-
sions, arrangements and concerted business practices that appreciably prevent, re-
strict or distort competition (or have the intention of so doing) and that affect trade 
in the UK.196 The Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act is modelled on 
Article 102 TFEU and forbids the abuse of a dominant position.197  
Anti-competitive practices might take various shapes and forms, such as price-
fixing, market-dividing cartel agreements, excessive pricing or exclusionary practices, 
and it is not always easy to establish the existence of such anti-competitive practices. 
This reflects the fact that where no investigation has been undertaken by a competi-
tion authority, antitrust damage actions are relatively rare and few have been taken to 
trial successfully.198  
One of the rare cases where the infringement was successfully established in a 
stand-alone action was the Article 102 TFEU action brought by Hendry and Williams 
against the snooker world association.199 The Court held that the defendant acted 
anti-competitively and abused its dominant position in adopting rules that prevented 
its members from participating in any unsanctioned tournament without the defen-
dant’s consent.200 However, in this case, no damages were awarded since the court 
concluded that there was no evidence that claimants had suffered the alleged loss.201 
Another stand-alone case in which the High Court established an abuse of dominant 
position under Article 102 TFEU and Section 18 CA 98 was Attheraces Limited v. 
The British Horseracing Board Limited,202 although the judgement was later reversed 
on appeal.203  
In English jurisprudence, there are more cases in which damages have been 
sought but breach of competition rules has never been successfully established. For 
example, in the Crehan case,204 as explained earlier, the claimant failed to recover any 
                                                        
196  For further see, for example, S. Marco Colino, Competition Law of The EU and UK (2011) Oxford 
University Press, pp. 219–233. 
197  For further see, for example, S. Marco Colino, Competition Law of The EU and UK (2011) Oxford 
University Press, pp. 296–303. 
198  Nevertheless, the fact that many of cases have been settled out of the court in which claimants have 
received substantial damages should not be disregard. See B.J. Rodger, Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law, the Hidden Story: Competition Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 
2000-2005 (2008) 29(2) E.C.L.Rev. 
199  Hendry & Williams et al. v. World Prof. Billiards and Snooker Association Limited [2001] 
U.K.C.L.R. 5. See also Purple Parking Limited and Meteor Parking Limited v Heathrow Airport 
Limited [2011] EWHC 987 (Ch), in which the High Court found that the defendant had abused its 
dominant market position, contrary to section 18 of the CA 98, by denying the claimants access to 
the forecourts of Heathrow Airport’s Terminals 1 and 3 to enable them to carry out valet parking ac-
tivities. 
200  See S. Elliott, (1) Stephen Gordon Hendry (2) Mark James Williams (3) The Sportsmasters Network 
Limited v. The World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association Limited (2001), European Law 
Reports, pp. 770–821. 
201  See S. Elliott, (1) Stephen Gordon Hendry (2) Mark James Williams (3) The Sportsmasters Network 
Limited v. The World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association Limited (2001), European Law 
Reports, European Law Reports, p. 818. 
202  Attheraces Limited v. The British Horseracing Board Limited [2005] EWHC 3015. 
203  Attheraces Limited v. The British Horseracing Board Limited [2007] EWCA Civ 38 
204  Crehan v Inntreprenneur Pub Co [2006] UKHL 38. The case was following on from the EUJC 
preliminary ruling in the same case (Courage v. Crehan) 
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damages as the judge held that the claimant failed to prove the alleged infringement 
of Article 101 TFEU.205 On similar grounds the court rejected the damage claim in 
the Arkin case.206 The case concerned an action brought by a managing director of a 
liner company against two liner conferences for breach of Articles 102 and/or 101 
TFEU. Although the judge found that the defendant hold a dominant position, he 
did not find that he committed an abuse of that dominant position or infringed Arti-
cle 101 TFEU. 
As the establishment of an antitrust infringement can be problematic for claim-
ants, damages claims are most likely brought on the back of existing infringement 
decisions of the EU Commission and the Office of Fair Trading (or the CAT on 
appeal from the OFT). Prior infringement decisions, without doubt, constitute an 
advantage for private plaintiffs who would otherwise have to prove the existence of 
the anticompetitive practices. After all, in order to encourage and structure civil ac-
tions against breaches of national and EU competition law, an express follow on-rule 
was introduced in the UK.207 More particularly, Section 58A of the Competition Act 
1998, as subsequently amended, provides that decisions of the OFT or CAT have a 
binding effect in private antitrust damage actions, provided that the decision is no 
longer capable of being overturned on appeal.208 The provision, which will be ana-
lysed in Section 9 of this Chapter, clearly specifies that it applies to proceedings be-
fore the court in which damages or any other sum of money is claimed in respect of 
an infringement. The purpose of Section 58A in the Competition Act 1998 was 
clearly to enhance third party rights to enforce competition law and therefore to fa-
cilitate a greater level of private enforcement.  
5.7.2 Causation 
The second substantive condition required to establish breach of statutory duty in 
tort proceeding is that the breach has caused damage. For all torts actionable on 
proof of damage, the question of causation is of great relevance, whether the defen-
dant’s wrongful conduct in fact did cause the claimant’s damage. English tort-law 
analysis of causation has tended to focus on a two stage test. Once a breach of duty 
has been established and before liability in tort can be established the plaintiff has to 
show first, that the defendant’s breach of statutory duty caused the damages (the 
causation issue) and second, that the injury or damage is sufficiently closely con-
                                                        
205  See section 3.4.3. 
206  Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd & Others. [2003] EWHC 687. The Court noted that even if the in-
fringement had been established the claimant’s business strategy would have constituted a consider-
able block to the success of the action in any case. 
207  B.J Rodger, Private Enforcement and the Enterprise Act: An Exemplary System of Awarding Dam-
ages (2003) 24(3) E.C.L.Rev, p. 108. 
208  For further details see: B.J Rodger, The Competition Act and the Enterprise Act Reforms: Sanctions 
and Deterrence in UK Competition law, in G. Dannecker and O. Hansen (eds), Competition Law 
Sanctioning in the European Union: The EU-law Influence on the National Law System of Sanctions in the Euro-
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nected to the breach (the remoteness issue). Clerk and Lindsell209 described the appli-
cation of this two stage approach as follows: “[…] the first stage looks to see what 
concrete evidence exists to link the defendant’s wrongdoing to the harm of which the 
claimant complains,” and the second stage “[…] is not strictly concerned with causa-
tion but with the limits of legal responsibility for damage which has undoubtedly 
been caused by the defendant. Even where it is patent that the defendant’s conduct 
caused the claimant’s loss the question remains whether the defendant should be held 
responsible for all the consequences flowing from his wrongdoing.” 
The first issue refers to the question of whether the damage would also have oc-
curred if the tortfeasor had not acted in the way he did. If the answer is negative, the 
requirement of causation is met. If the answer is affirmative, then the causal connec-
tion is not established. This test is known as ‘but for’ test. The test serves to exclude 
from consideration all the factors that made no difference to the final outcome of 
events. In other words, to prove causation the plaintiff needs to show that it is more 
likely than not that the damage would not have occurred ‘but for’ the breach of duty 
by the defendant. The claimant must prove that the damage is due to the tort. If the 
claimant has failed to prove this the defendant is not liable. The ‘but for’ test is a 
difficult issue when the damage might also be due to some other cause than the de-
fendant’s tort, such as a general economic slowdown or even the plaintiff’s own busi-
ness strategy.210 In the competition law context this means that the defendant’s in-
fringement of competition rules needs to be the predominant cause of the loss suf-
fered.211 In a recent antitrust case212 the claimant failed to prove that the defendant’s 
breach of statutory duty caused the damage. In 2006 the Office of Rail Regulation 
(‘ORR’), the antitrust regulator for the U.K. rail sector, found that English Welsh and 
Scottish Railway (‘EWS’) had engaged in unlawful discrimination between its custom-
ers, contrary to the UK Competition Act 1998 and Article 102 TFEU. In 2008, En-
ron brought a follow-on claim for damages against EWS in the CAT. Enron alleged 
that EWS’s antitrust conduct had caused it to lose both a tender for the haulage of 
coal by rail to power stations operated by Edison, and a real or substantial chance of 
winning a four-year E2E contract to supply coal to one of those power stations, Fer-
rybridge. The Court based its decision on Allied Maples Group v Simmons & Sim-
mons,213 which provides that in a ‘loss of chance’ case a claimant needs to demon-
strate, on a balance of probabilities, what it would have done ‘but for’ the infringe-
ment.214 In this context two main questions had to be decided.215 The first of these is 
whether the plaintiff (Enron) would have sought to negotiate with Edison for a con-
tract to supply coal to Ferrybridge in the ‘but-for’ world. The CAT considered that 
this depended only on the intent and actions of the claimant (Enron). The plaintiff 
had to show, on the balance of probabilities, that it would have actively sought-out an 
                                                        
209  Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 18th edition, at 2-03. 
210  J. Hodgson, J. Lewthwaite, Tort Law Textbook (2007) Oxford University Press, p. 52. 
211  Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613. 
212  Enron Coal Services Limited v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Limited [2009] CAT 36. 
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215  Enron Coal Services Limited (in liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Limited [2011] 
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opportunity to negotiate an agreement with Edison. The second issue is whether 
negotiations between Edison and Enron would also have led to the award of a con-
tract to supply coal to Ferrybridge ‘but for’ the infringement. The CAT considered 
that this depended on the actions of a third party (Edison). The claimant is required 
to show that there was a real or substantial chance that the third party would have 
acted in the way asserted by the claimant. The evidence that the CAT examined 
showed that there were other reasons why Enron would not have won the contract 
other than EWS’s anticompetitive conduct, including commercial reasons, the previ-
ous breakdown between Enron and EME, and a preference of EME to avoid inter-
mediaries and to contract directly with suppliers. The CAT dismissed the claim as the 
claimant had failed to establish that it suffered loss as a result of unlawful conduct by 
the defendant, which had been fined by the Office of Rail Regulation for abusing its 
dominant position. The decision has been upheld by the Court of Appeal. The case 
illustrates that even though an infringement might not need to be demonstrated in a 
follow-on damages claim, proving causation can still be challenging. 
The second issue of causation, the remoteness, is relevant at the stage following 
the establishment of a factual connection between tort and damage. In this stage, the 
court is not saying that the defendant was not the cause of the damage. As a legal 
issue, remoteness is said to be concerned with the question of which of the estab-
lished consequences is to be the subject of compensation. The question is one of 
limitation of liability. A defendant is not liable for every consequence stemming from 
the wrongful behaviour.216 The English law puts a strong emphasis on the foresee-
ability of the loss. Therefore, the loss sought to be claimed by the claimant must not 
be too remote from the breach of such duty. The rationale behind this principle is 
that it would be unfair to a defendant to hold him responsible for losses that were 
not reasonably foreseen. Thus, the defendant will not be held liable – even if a factual 
cause can be shown – if he is able to show that the damages were too remote.217 In 
the context of economic torts such as infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
remoteness of damage overlaps with ‘foreseeability’ to the extent that English law will 
not recognise as recoverable losses resulting from damage that is too speculative to 
be proved to have been caused by the tort. Causation requires a causal link between 
the infringement and the damage and that such damage is not too remote because it 
is not reasonably foreseeable. Pure economic loss, which is often a head of damages 
suffered as a result of breach of competition rules, is considered speculative (or too 
remote) from a causation perspective. The issue will be discussed in following sec-
tion.218 
                                                        
216  This is well brought out by Ward’s dissenting judgement in Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd [2007] QB 46; 
[2008] AC 884. In this case the majority of the Court of Appeal held that the employer was respon-
sible for the suicide of its employee who had been severely depressed following a serious injury at 
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218  See section 5.10.1. 
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5.7.3 Additional requirements 
In early case law no additional requirements needed to be established in order for an 
action for breach of statutory duty to succeed. Whenever a violation of a statute 
caused damage to an individual’s interest, a right of action in tort arose (ubi jus ibi 
remedium).219 During the course of the development of tort the court restricted the 
scope of the tort. It set out additional considerations to be taken into account. First, 
the court must be satisfied that, when drafting the legislative provision Parliament 
intended to create a private right to damages for its breach.220 This is the third sub-
stantive condition that has to be satisfied for establishing breach of statutory duty. 
Finally, the provision of the statute aims to protect the victim against the kind of 
damage he suffered, which is the fourth substantive condition that has to be satisfied 
to establish breach of statutory duty. 
The first requirement, the legislator intention, is a matter of construction of the 
particular statute. As observed by Steyn, “the central question is whether from the 
provisions and structure of the statute an intention can be gathered to create a private 
law remedy.”221 As Rodger and MacCulloch explained, granting standing to compen-
sation to a party without previously finding the intention of the legislator to create a 
civil remedy would cause “an undesirable potential for conflict between governmen-
tal discretion and the private right of enforcement.”222 Public bodies carry out duties 
and powers conferred upon them by statute. Application of the specific tort of 
breach of statutory duty depends on the construction and the purpose of the statute. 
If there is no evidence of Parliamentary intention to create an entitlement to damages 
(to confer a right to compensation on an individual injured by breach of statutory 
duty), then a private remedy is not available.223 Parliament can declare explicitly that a 
breach of statute should be actionable in tort, but usually the court itself has to find 
within the enactment the purpose of parliament in order to provide a civil remedy.224 
In doing so, courts tend to take into account a number of different factors.225 One of 
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the important indications against such an intention of Parliament is the availability of 
other remedies or means of enforcement provided by the statute in question.226 In 
such cases, the courts may still grant the plaintiff a further remedy in tort if the statu-
tory remedy was inadequate.227 It should be said that an action for a breach of a 
statutory duty has more often been denied than accepted by the court in areas other 
than workplace safety.228 With regard to violation of competition rules, the intention 
of Parliament to confer a right to compensation on a victim was already recognised in 
1984 in Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board.229 Later the EA 02 also 
expressly recognised the right to sue for breach of Chapters I and II Prohibitions of 
the CA 98 (or Articles 101 and 102 TFEU).230 In other words, the Act provides that 
claims can be made directly before the CAT, with the claimant relying upon the fact 
that a breach of EU or UK competition rules has been established by a relevant au-
thority.  
As said above, it is not enough simply to show that a statute was designed to pro-
tect the claimant in a general sense, but it has to be shown that the rule aims to pro-
tect the victims against the kind of damage he suffered. This requirement comprises 
two elements. First, to succeed in a claim for breach of statutory duty the plaintiff 
must show that he falls within a specific and limited ‘class of persons’ whom the 
statue aims to protect.231 Second, it has to be established that the ‘type of loss’ he has 
suffered was one that the statue in question was intended to prevent. 
The requirement of ‘kind of damages’232 operates in the same way as the rule of 
standing.233 On one hand, it aims at limiting and identifying the class of persons to 
benefit from the provision.234 If the plaintiff cannot bring himself under the finite 
and ascertainable class of people for whose benefit the statue was passed, the action 
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Mayoh & Co). 
232  Known also as a ‘protective scope’ requirement (see: T. Eilmansberger, The Green Paper on Dam-
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bility of Stimulating Private Enforcement Through Legislative Action (2007) 44 Common Market Law 
Review, p. 463). 
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regulation: The Commission, National Authorities and Private Enforcement (1998) 4 Columbia Jour-
nal of European Law, p. 604. See also section 5.6.1. 
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for damages will fail.235 This was also an issue that was raised in the Crehan v Inntre-
preneur case,236 and which has been explained earlier in section 4.6.1. On the other 
hand, the Court will consider whether the type of loss suffered by the victim was 
recognised as a head of damages under the general law of tort (loss of a kind for 
which the law normally awards damages). As judge Bridge in Pickering v Liverpool 
Daily Post and Echo Newspapers plc said, “I know of no authority where a statute 
has been held […] to give a cause of action for breach of statutory duty when the 
nature of the statutory obligation or prohibition was not such that a breach of it 
would be likely to cause to a member of the class for whose benefit or protection it 
was imposed either personal injury, injury to property or economic loss.”237 In most 
breach of statutory duty cases the plaintiff seeks damages to compensate him for 
actual physical harm which he has suffered. Economic losses have been found recov-
erable only in exceptional cases.238 This can be problematic from the perspective of 
EU law, since violations of competition law usually results in economic losses, as it 
will be explained later.239 
Furthermore, other requirements such as the need to show fault are not required 
for breach of statutory duty within the English system. As will be shown in the next 
section, establishment of infringement of antitrust rules alone is sufficient to prove 
the liability of the defendant.  
5.7.4 Fault 
In the English system, a violation of a statutory rule itself does not require that the 
defendant has acted at fault (intentionally or negligently) in order to recover damages. 
The absence of fault in the English system is markedly different from the conti-
nental civil legal systems. In the continental civil legal systems the breach of a statu-
tory rule and the general rule of negligence are more or less intertwined, whereas the 
violation of statutory duty and the tort of negligence are considered to provide two 
separate and independent bases for liability in the English law.240 Statutory duty is a 
tort in its own right and independent of the existence of the tort of negligence.241 
According to Wright, “the statutory right has its origin in the statute, but the particu-
lar remedy of an action for damages is given by the common law in order to make 
                                                        
235  It is not enough that the statute in question clearly identified a group of persons as being protected. 
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236  Crehan v Inntrepreneur [2004] Civ 637. 
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effective, for the benefit of the injured plaintiff, his right to the performance by the 
defendant of the defendant’s statutory duty. It is not a claim in negligence in the strict 
or ordinary sense.”242  
In the case of antitrust cases before an English court, since infringements are 
characterised as the tort of breach of a statutory duty, the plaintiff is not required to 
demonstrate that the infringer acted at fault (deliberately or carelessly) in order to his 
recover damages. In other words, the breach of a statutory duty is sufficient to give 
rise to liability.243 On this issue, the English principle applied in the tort of breach of 
statutory duty with regard to fault reflects the recommendations of the White Paper, 
which in order to facilitate antitrust damages actions, propose harmonisation in this 
area. In fact, the White Paper’s proposal on the issue is less favourable to claimants 
than the current English position. It suggests the introduction of a measure to ensure 
that once a breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is proven, the infringer would be 
liable for the damage he has caused ‘unless’ he demonstrates that the infringement 
was the result of a genuinely ‘excusable error’.244 Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that the White Paper suggests that the proposed defence should apply only in Mem-
ber States where there is currently a fault requirement. It does not suggest that coun-
tries such as England, which have no fault requirement, should import the proposed 
defence. Clearly the White Paper suggests that defence of ‘excusable error’ is only a 
minimum requirement. Member States are allowed to introduce or apply less restric-
tive alternatives, such as removing the fault requirement. 
5.8 Evidence and access to evidence 
As described in the previous section on the role of judges and parties (during a tort 
proceeding), evidence and access to evidence have a significant effect on the plain-
tiff’s ability to prove his case. A hurdle in any contested claim is to adduce sufficient 
evidence to persuade the court that a given allegation is founded. As a result, collec-
tion and presentation of evidence in addition to being an essential part of litigation 
process also has a significant bearing on private antitrust enforcement. While in the 
majority of the Member States there are limited powers for a party to obtain docu-
ments and information from the other party in the dispute,245 in England compulsory 
procedures are put in place to ensure that a party is able to successfully extract all 
relevant documents from his opponent. This has been perceived as being favourable 
in terms of antitrust damages in the context of White Paper. 
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Before focusing on the rules of evidence and access to evidence, it is important 
to briefly present two distinct but closely connected legal questions that are relevant 
when dealing with evidence. One is standard of proof: this refers to the level or de-
gree of proof necessary to prove the case. The other one is burden of proof, which 
determines who has to prove the case by meeting or exceeding the standard of proof.  
5.8.1 Standard of proof 
The applicable standard of proof to antitrust claims under the English law is the civil 
standard of proof, i.e. proof on the ‘balance of probabilities,’ known also as ‘more 
likely than not’ test. This standard is a lower level of certainty than that of beyond 
reasonable doubt required in a criminal case. It is sufficient for the plaintiff to show 
that his or her version of events, on balance, is more likely or more believable than 
that of the defendant.  
Over the past few years there has been debate over the question of what this 
standard requires in the context of infringement of competition law. In Shearson 
Lehman Hutton Inc v Watson Co Ltd246 J. Webster in the English High Court took 
the view that, since an infringement of Article 101 TFEU carries a liability of a pen-
alty, a standard of ‘high degree of probability’ should be applied, as opposed to less 
strict civil standard of ‘balance of probabilities’. The court reached this conclusion on 
the grounds that a possibility of the imposition of a penalty fine exists in competition 
proceedings with regard to the same infringement. However, the Court eventually 
accepted that it should be lower than the one required in criminal matters.247 In Mas-
terfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd,248 the judge in the Irish Court249 held that the 
standard of proof normally applicable in civil proceedings, namely the proof on the 
balance of probabilities, should apply. The balance of probabilities test also appears 
to have been applied by the English High Court in Arkin.250 Based on the evidence 
provided by the claimant, the judge had no alternative other than to find against the 
claimant. The plaintiff did not show that it is more likely than not that the breach was 
the cause of his damage. 251 
Refusal to apply a higher standard of proof to competition proceedings was also 
recognised by the CAT. In Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd and Subsidiaries v. 
Director General of Fair Trading,252 the CAT held that under domestic law the civil 
standard of proof that should be applied in finding an infringement of the Chapter I 
prohibition (equivalent to Article 101 TFEU) or the Chapter II prohibition (equiva-
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lent to Article 102 TFEU) proved is the civil standard. 253 It explained that the fact 
that penalty proceedings under the Competition Act 1998 are criminal for the pur-
pose of the Human Rights Act 1998 does not mean that they should be subject to the 
same rules of evidence or procedures as ordinary criminal proceedings. In other 
words, the CAT held that the Human Rights Act 1998 does not require that the 
criminal standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ should be applied instead of 
the civil standard ‘balance of probabilities,’ even if there was a fine previously im-
posed by competition authorities.254  
5.8.2 Burden of Proof 
The issue of standard of proof leads to the equally important question of the burden 
of proof. The burden of proof refers to the party on whom the onus falls to prove 
the facts of the cases. 
Some authors255 argue that in common law systems the significance of the bur-
den of proof applicable in the private law is minimised by lower standard of the bur-
den of proof. While in Slovenia the standard of proof that applies to damage claims is 
‘certainty’,256 in England, the applicable standard is the ‘preponderance of probabili-
ties’. The party who bears the burden of proof has to convince the court that it is 
more likely than not that the fact at issue is true. In the context of access of evidence 
in civil proceedings for antitrust damages, it would follow that such standard of proof 
at a lower level, i.e. lesser degree of likelihood that suffices to obtain a damage award, 
is favourable, as it compensates for any information asymmetry. While this has also 
been noted by the EU Commission,257 nevertheless in the White Paper the EU 
Commission decided against proposing a lower standard of proof. It argued that a 
reduced standard of proof does not always constitute an effective general remedy for 
the problem of information asymmetry as seen in competition cases. “Without better 
access to information and evidence held by infringers, all the claimants can show a 
plausible suspicion that an antitrust infringement has caused them harm”.258 In other 
words, the general approach followed by the EU Commission to address information 
asymmetry focuses on disclosure rules and not on standard of proof. 
Finally, even if it is accepted that the function of burden of proof – as a mecha-
nism to establish who has to prove what in order to succeed – is minimised under 
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English law, its overall importance is not reduced. As in the continental civil law 
countries, burden of proof in England works as a rule of adjudication. It allows the 
court to arrive at a conclusion when there is not enough evidence on the issue or 
when the court is in doubt with respect to the meaning of the evidence presented. 
The burden of proof in any particular case depends on the circumstances in 
which the claim arises. In general, the rule that applies in civil cases is that the burden 
of proof lies on the party who substantially asserts the affirmation of the issue in 
question.259 Hence the plaintiff has the burden to prove any fact which is an essential 
element of his claim to recover damages, while the defendant has the burden of any 
affirmative defence upon which he relies to defeat recovery of damages. This rule is 
based on the belief that the responsibility for proving the facts alleged falls on the 
party propounding those facts.260 It maintains a neutral balance between the parties, 
and seeks to keep them on even terms as far as possible.261 Maugham described the 
rule as an “ancient rule founded on consideration of good sense and it should not be 
departed from without reasons.”262 It operates regardless of whether or not there was 
anything the plaintiff could have done to establish the fact.263 In cases in which it is 
difficult to determine whether an assertion is essential to a party’s case or to his ad-
versary’s case the courts have tended to require proof of the party who will be least 
affected by the burden.264  
The principal exception to the general rule regarding the incidence of the burden 
of proof is legal presumption. Legal presumption is a “rule of law which provides 
that if a party proves a certain fact (the primary fact) then another fact (the presumed 
fact) will also be taken to be proved, unless evidence is adduced by the opponent to 
‘rebut’ the presumption.”265 Accordingly, the proponent who benefits from the pre-
sumption does not need to adduce further evidence on the presumed fact, at least 
until another party seeks to rebut the presumption. Legal presumption obviates the 
need for proof, or makes the process easier. The court has on several occasions em-
phasised the “danger of the artificial weight of presumptions”.266 To avoid this dan-
ger, judge Reid explained the effect of the presumption of legitimacy as the one of a 
general application. “The conviction does not merely shift the burden of proof. It is a 
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weighty piece of evidence in itself.”267 Hence even weak evidence against legitimacy 
must prevail if there is no other evidence to counterbalance it. The presumption will 
only come in at that stage in the very rare case of the evidence being so evenly bal-
anced that the court is unable to reach a decision on it.268 This is supported by the 
fact that in English courts a lower standard of conviction is required in order to con-
sider a fact as proved. No legal presumption applies to competition cases. 
Legal presumptions with regard to competition damage cases would also appear 
to be unnecessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of a private antitrust enforce-
ment system. The EU Commission believes (mentioned above) that shifting the bur-
den of proof does not constitute an effective general remedy for the consequences of 
the information asymmetry in competition cases, although measures to improve ac-
cess to evidence do help in countering the effects of information asymmetry. Some 
methods of obtaining information, such as disclosure, are more appropriate in this 
context. As will be seen in the next section, England already has in place a system of 
discovery rules, which is even wider than the disclosure rules proposed by the EU 
Commission in the White Paper.269 
5.8.3 Disclosure under the CPR and access to information 
 ‘Disclosure’270 of documents is an integral part of the English litigation system. Of-
ten referred to as a ‘cards on the table’ approach,271 disclosure assists the parties to 
prepare for the trial. It enables them to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their 
case in advance of the trial. As described by Cameron and Liberman, “the primary 
aim of discovery is to ensure that litigants disclose to each other all relevant, non-
privileged documents, whether that disclosure helps or hurts their respective cases, so 
that they will know the case they have to meet and judges will have the evidence they 
need to do their job effectively.”272 According to judge Donaldson it is “not a war or 
even a game,” but it is “designed to do real justice between opposing parties and, if 
the court does not have all the relevant information, it cannot achieve this object.”273  
In addition to helping the parties in preparing their cases, the function of disclo-
sure is to place the parties on an ‘equal footing’. Often the most relevant information 
is in the hands of the opposing party, who will not disclose it voluntarily if it may 
adversely affect his own case. To remedy the situation compulsory procedures of 
disclosure ensure that the parties are able to collect all relevant information from 
others and thereby find evidence supporting their own case and undermine that of 
their opponents.274 Disclosure rules are of particular importance in competition cases 
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where there is a risk of an asymmetric distribution of the available information be-
tween claimants and defendants, as noted by the EU Commission.275 Much of the 
key evidence needed to prove antitrust damages is often held by an antitrust infringer 
(the defendant), while victims (the plaintiff) usually do not have sufficient informa-
tion about such evidence. The fact that disclosure – as a means to ensure that parties 
are on equal footing – is an important part of the English litigation procedure, par-
ticularly in competition cases, has been confirmed in National Grid v ABB Ltd.276 
The claim was brought against members of the Gas-insulated switchgear cartel that 
had been the subject of a EU Commission’s infringement decision, and by that time 
the decision was already under appeal at the European courts in Luxemburg. The 
defendant sought a stay of the claim while appeals against the decision were heard. 
The High Court decided that there should be no immediate stay of proceedings and 
that the case could proceed as far as the close of pleadings and disclosure of docu-
ment. In so deciding the court balanced the requirement to avoid the risk of running 
counter to the possible outcome of the ongoing appeals against the EU Commis-
sion’s decision277 and the need to ensure that that the claimant was put on an equal 
footing with the defendants by obtaining disclosure of relevant evidence before it 
became outdated. As the court explained “unless the preparation of the follow on 
action continues, the parties will not be on an equal footing because the claimant will 
not know what are the relevant issues or what documents relevant to those issues, 
particularly causation, are available.” That the parties should exchange pleadings and 
engage in disclosure even before all appeal proceedings are exhausted is also the cur-
rent general approach adopted in the High Court with regard to other competition 
law cases.278 
It is commonly remarked by continental lawyers279 that extensive discovery pow-
ers exist for parties under English law.280 This has been also noticed by the EU Com-
mission when drafting the White Paper.281 In contrast to continental civil law jurisdic-
tions in which a party to litigation is obliged,282 generally speaking, only to ‘disclose’ 
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the material necessary to prove his case, in the English jurisdiction a party is entitled 
to require the opposing party to disclose all relevant, non-privileged documents in his 
possession.283 An author has described the situation saying that, while the continental 
European lawyer does not understand how an obligation to give general discovery 
can be effective, the Anglo-Saxon lawyer does not understand how it is possible to 
arrive at the truth without such obligation.284 The position in England is significantly 
more discovery-oriented than it is usually conceived by English lawyers to exist in 
Europe. Nevertheless, compared with the US discovery (disclosure) regime, the Eng-
lish regime is less far-reaching in its scope and more controlled.285 Under the US 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (‘FRCP’), at the outset of a lawsuit each party must 
reveal all documents, electronically stored information and tangible things that he 
may use to support his claims or defences.286 In addition, each party can seek discov-
ery ‘regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or de-
fence.’287 As such the discovery rules provide significant incentives for plaintiffs to 
file damages claims, even when they have very few relevant facts supporting their 
claim. By contrast, disclosure in England remains under the control of the court. 
There is no automatic obligation on a party to place any ‘cards on the table.’ Instead 
litigants come under an obligation to disclose or to communicate the existence of 
documents subsequent to an order for disclosure issued by the court. When disclo-
sure is ordered, parties have a positive obligation to conduct a reasonable search for 
documents.288 The court also regulates the extent of disclosure (so that this is propor-
tionate to the issues in question). The court’s power over disclosure is part of its gen-
eral case management powers and it is in accordance with the ‘overriding objective’289 
of the English civil procedure, which enables the court to deal with cases justly and to 
reduce the costs and delays inherent in the previous system.290  
In the English system, the court usually orders a ‘standard disclosure,’291 whereby 
a party is required to disclose only documents that adversely affect its own case or 
that support or adversely affect another party’s case.292 Whether to include a certain 
document in the group of documents that has to be disclosed, the question whether 
the document is relevant should in fact be phrased to whether the information con-
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tained in the documents something which is supportive of or adverse to the case of 
the party.293 As Woolf’s final report on Access to Justice made clear, documents that 
are broadly relevant or which could fairly lead to a ‘train of inquiry’ 294 that could 
produce relevant information are excluded from standard disclosure. It follows that 
for the English court to make the order two conditions have to be met, namely (a) 
the documents in question are likely to support the applicant’s case or adversely af-
fect another party’s case, and (b) disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of 
the claim or to save costs.295 If the so-called ‘threshold’ conditions are not met, the 
court cannot order a non-party disclosure. There is, however, no objection to an 
order of disclosure of a class of documents, provided that all the documents in the 
class satisfy the threshold conditions.296 In contrast, the applicant can seek an order 
for disclosure of a class of documents if all the documents in the class do not satisfy 
the threshold condition. In other words, the conditions cannot be circumvented by 
including documents that fall in this category and documents that do not fall in this 
category within the same application for a disclosure. 
Following the ‘standard disclosure‘ a party may ask the court to order additional 
‘specific disclosure ‘of documents that might not be covered by standard disclosure. 
The court will order this if it believes it to be ‘appropriate’. Here particular impor-
tance is given to the specification of the documents for which special disclosure is 
required.297 Paragraph 5.4 of the Practice Direction requires that the application no-
tice must specify the order that the applicant intends to ask the court to make. In 
deciding whether or not to make an order for specific disclosure the court will take 
into account all circumstances of the case298 and in particular, the ‘overriding objec-
tive’ of the CPR.299 If the court concludes that the party (from whom specific disclo-
sure was sought) has failed to comply with the obligations imposed by an order for 
standard disclosure, then the court usually makes such an order as is necessary to 
ensure the proper compliance with those obligations. The court may also order dis-
closure before the proceeding has commenced.300 Rue 31.16(3) gives the court the 
discretion to make an order for so-called pre-action disclosure when both the defen-
dant and claimant are ‘likely’ to be a party to subsequent proceedings;301 and if pro-
                                                        
293  Shah v HSBC Private Bank [2011] EWCA Civ 1154. 
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ceedings had started the respondent’s duty to give standard disclosure would include 
the documents of which the applicant seeks disclosure. The rules of pre-action dis-
closure are designed to facilitate the future conduct of litigation302 but also to assist 
the dispute to be resolved without proceedings or to save costs.303  
It appears that the use of the existing English procedural mechanisms in antitrust 
damage actions remedy the problem of ‘asymmetry of information‘ in favour of the 
party (which is usually the plaintiff in competition cases), which lacks the relevant 
information that is in hands of the other party. Moreover, the effectiveness of disclo-
sure rules is enhanced by negative consequences following the non-compliance with 
disclosure orders. 
To ensure that disclosure obligations have been carried out properly a party must 
provide a disclosure statement which sets out the extent to which a search has been 
carried out to locate relevant documents.304 The statement will also record that the 
party understands and has been informed about the duty to disclose documents.305 
Sanctions for not complying with a court order are procedural. Following CPR 31.21, 
it is submitted that a party may not rely on any document that he fails to disclose or 
in respect of which he fails to permit inspection, unless permitted by the court. CPR 
31.23 goes on to provide that “false disclosure statements, without an honest belief in 
its truth,” might equally result in contempt of court. The court is also entitled to draw 
adverse inferences in respect of the evidence when relevant material has been deliber-
ately destroyed after the commencement of the proceeding.306 In addition, deliberate 
destruction of documents in order to avoid disclosure may even constitute a criminal 
offence of perverting the course of justice.  
As presented, the system of disclosure known in England is considerably more 
extensive than the system of disclosure rules proposed by the EU Commission in the 
White Paper. The White Paper suggested that disclosure should not be ordered in 
every case. Rather national courts, under specific conditions, should have the power 
to order the parties and third parties to disclose precise categories of relevant evi-
dence. The EU Commission’s proposal appears to resemble to the English ‘specific 
disclosure’, when disclosure refers to ‘documents or classes of documents specified in 
the order’. As said earlier, under English law, the function of ‘specific disclosure’ is 
primarily to supplement ‘standard disclosure‘. Applications for specific disclosure are 
made after the standard disclosure process if a party seeks additional disclosure. Spe-
cific disclosure is reserved for situations in which standard disclosure is inappropriate 
or ineffective in enabling the court to ‘deal with cases justly’ (CPR Rule 1.1(1)).307 
                                                        
302  See, for example, Total E & P Soudan S.A v Edmonds & Ors [2007] EWCA Civ 50, where the court 
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From the English point of view, the disclosure mechanism proposed by the EU 
Commission therefore, is insufficient. The mechanism of ‘specific disclosure’ must be 
accompanied by provisions of standard general disclosure of all documents that are 
relevant to the case. 
5.8.4 Privilege from disclosure of evidence 
As noted above, under the general rule, parties to litigation are obliged to disclose to 
their opponent not only documents or information that a party wants to rely upon, 
but also those that may adversely affect its case. There is no exemption from the obli-
gation to disclose documents simply because the document is unfavourable for the 
party. However, there are certain recognised categories of privileges that operate as 
exemption from disclosure. The privileges are seen as counterbalance to the obliga-
tion of disclosure.308 They entitle a party to litigation or other adversarial proceedings 
to withhold documents from the other side. When a privilege is claimed and upheld 
no adverse inference may be drawn by the court against the person claiming the privi-
lege, based upon that party’s refusal to disclose the privileged document.309 This 
principle is fundamentally important to the effective operation of the privilege. As 
judge Laddie suggested without the existence of the principle pressure would be put 
on parties to waive their entitlement to privilege since “if they failed to do so there 
was a risk that the court would conclude that they had failed to make full disclo-
sure.”310 
It is necessary to note that because privilege involves deprivation of the court of 
relevant evidence, good cause to justify the existence of a privilege should exist and it 
always remains possible to consider whether this is true. The crucial question is 
whether an interest protected by the privilege is more significant than the administra-
tion of justice.311 Accordingly, privileges recognised by English law are ‘few and lim-
ited.’312 There are two groups of privileges relevant in the context of antitrust dam-
ages:313 (a) legal professional privilege and (b) privilege against self-incrimination.314  
Under the legal professional privilege the Court will protect from disclosure 
communications that are between a client and his professional legal adviser (known 
as ‘legal advice privilege’)315 or which are made in connection with or in contempla-
tion of legal proceedings (known as ‘litigation privilege’).316 The rationale for protec-
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tion afforded by legal professional privilege is found in the nature of the English legal 
system.317 It exists for the protection of the client and prevents the duty of confiden-
tiality from being overridden. The importance of legal professional privilege has been 
emphasised by a series of decisions in the House of Lords.318 These decisions recog-
nise that legal professional privilege extends beyond an ordinary rule of evidence that 
governs the admissibility of documents in court proceedings. “It is a fundamental 
condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests.”319 It is a substan-
tive legal right founded on public policy. It sought to limit the power of the state to 
compel disclosure of privileged documents. If it was simply a rule of evidence a client 
could only prevent disclosure in legal proceedings.320  
Here it has to be noted that UK legal professional privilege is wider than the 
standard applied in the context of antitrust investigations under EU law. While Eng-
lish law allows claims to privilege on the basis of advice from in-house lawyers, the 
privilege cannot be claimed in competition investigations by the EU Commission. 
The EU position has been confirmed by the CJEU decision in Akzo Nobel Chemi-
cals v. European Commission (Case C-550/07), when the CJEU refused to extend 
the privilege to exchanges between in-house lawyers and their clients within a corpo-
rate group. The CJEU reached this conclusion on the basis that in-house lawyers are 
not sufficiently independent of their employers to benefit from legal professional 
privilege. The conflict between this position and the wider privilege recognised in 
England could lead to tensions concerning the disclosure of legal professional privi-
lege in the context of damage claims that follow-on from decisions of the EU Com-
mission. When it comes to disclosure in follow-on civil procedures, in light of the 
Pfleiderer decision321 it is possible that claimants may attempt to have such advice 
disclosed before the English court.  
Concerning privilege against self-incrimination, a defendant in civil proceedings 
may withhold from disclosure incriminating documents by invoking the protection 
against self-incrimination. The privilege against self-incrimination has been described 
as a ‘deep-rooted principle’322 in English law.323 Insofar as it relates to civil proceed-
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ings, the privilege is restated in section 14 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968. According 
to the Civil Evidence Act, an individual has the right to refuse answer to a question 
or produce any document if doing so might incriminate him and expose him to pro-
ceedings for an offence or for the recovery of a penalty.324 Where privilege against 
self-incrimination applies it is a right that cannot be denied by the court as a matter of 
discretion.325 The rule against self-incrimination appears to remain valid as long as 
there is the possibility of a fine. In the context of antitrust cases this means that an 
individual has a right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination as long as there 
is the possibility of the imposition of a fine by antitrust authorities.326 Arguably it 
impedes disclosure in stand-alone actions in accordance with the Evidence Act. The 
position is more complicated in relation to follow-on actions where there is already a 
EU Commission or NCA decision and the privilege against self-incrimination refers 
to voluntary self-incriminating statements made by a leniency applicant. Under strict 
application of the concept of self-incrimination, then arguably statements submitted 
under leniency programmes should not be disclosed to follow-on claimants. Never-
theless, as explained earlier and will be also demonstrated in next section, in this case 
the court will have to weigh the effectiveness of leniency against safeguarding the 
principle of full compensation. 
5.8.5 Obligation to disclose confidential information 
English law does not recognise a privilege with respect to the disclosure of business 
secrets or confidential information. As said above, under a general rule, a party is 
entitled to see the case against him.327 It may not withhold from the court informa-
tion that is relevant to an issue before the court. It does not matter if documents con-
tain confidential business secrets or not.  
However, an English court’s standard request for disclosure of information does 
not automatically mean that preservation of business secrets is irrelevant in the course 
of the civil procedure. There are still a number of rules that limit the extent to which 
business information has to be divulged in legal proceedings before an English court. 
The first rule comes from the general principle that information will only be received 
as evidence if it is relevant (as it has been discussed above).328 Second, typically the 
access to evidence will be restricted to the parties, their legal representatives and ex-
perts who will be called to give evidence. Under CPR 31.22, the party will be under 
an obligation not to use the documents for any purpose other than that for which the 
documents are disclosed, except when (a) the document has been read aloud in court 
or referred to at a hearing which has been held in public (b) the court gives permis-
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sion or (c) the party who disclosed the document and the person to whom the docu-
ment belongs agree. Third, the court may go further and impose restrictions on the 
normal right to inspect documents disclosed during discovery.329 The purpose of the 
restriction is to protect sensitive information, such as trade secrets from the public or 
from business competitors, while at the same time allowing opposing parties to ac-
cess information relevant to the matter in dispute. Restrictions are important to en-
sure that justice is done between the parties, for litigants might otherwise be unwilling 
to resort to the courts or settle for fear that information will be misused.330 The deci-
sion whether to grant a protection order lies within the discretion of the court. In 
doing so, the court will balance the interest of the party seeking disclosure of docu-
ments that might help its case against the interests of the other party in not revealing 
business secrets to someone who is probably a competitor. What is necessary or 
unnecessary will depend upon “the nature of the secret, the position of the parties 
and the extent of the disclosure ordered.”331 English courts have historically rejected 
mere confidentiality as a justification for complete non-disclosure of relevant infor-
mation in litigation. As one author said, if the United Kingdom appears willing to 
restrict disclosure of confidential information, it is hesitant to impose strong protec-
tive orders that completely exclude the opposing party from viewing confidential 
information.332  
5.8.6 Limited disclosure of confidential information 
As said above, in line with the discovery rules, the English court can decide to allow 
the non-disclosure of confidential information. However, the court may still limit the 
disclosure. This was also the case in National Grid.333 This case is of particular im-
portance as it addressed a highly controversial issue of disclosure of leniency docu-
ments submitted to the EU Commission in the context of a civil damages proceed-
ing. 
The case was brought in 2008 as a follow-on damage claim in the English High 
Court. National Grid Electricity claimed for losses that it had allegedly suffered as a 
result of the gas insulated switchgear cartel found by the EU Commission in 2007. In 
November 2011 National Grid applied for disclosure of the confidential version of 
the EU Commission’s decision on the gas insulated switchgear cartel. This disclosure 
request included responses to the EU Commission’s Statement of Objections by the 
ABB group defendants (including the whistle-blower to the EU Commission which 
had thus obtained full immunity from fines) and certain requests for information 
issued by the EU Commission. National Grid did not apply for disclosure of the 
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corporate leniency statements, but the documents it applied for might have contained 
extracts from the leniency materials. The National Grid’s application was heard by 
the English court a day after the CJEU gave judgement in Pfleiderer.334 In Pfleiderer, 
on a reference from the Bonn court in Germany, the CJEU was asked to consider 
whether the court’s decision to require the German authority to grant a claimant in 
damage action access to documents within the authority’s file (including materials 
provided by a leniency applicant) was compatible with EU law. The CJEU held that 
courts of each Member State may decide – on a case by case basis – whether leniency 
documents may be disclosed, balancing their own national law with the interests 
protected by EU law (the respective interests in favour of disclosure of the informa-
tion balanced against the interest in favour of the protection of the information given 
under leniency programme by the leniency applicant).335 
The English court noted that, although the Pfeiderer case is related to access of 
documents produced for a NCA’ leniency programme, in the light of the general 
language used by the CJEU, the same principles applied to the disclosure of docu-
ments produced for the EU Commission’s leniency programme.336 Following the 
CJEU’s ruling in Pfleiderer, the English court recognised and emphasised that the 
mere fact that the documents are ‘relevant’ for ordinary disclosure purposes and 
would be disclosed under English disclosure rules was not a justifiable reason to 
order disclosure under the existing circumstances. Instead, it was necessary for the 
Court to consider the relevance of the documents to be disclosed.337 In deciding 
whether or not to order disclosure, the court carried out the Pfeiderer balancing exer-
cise and weighed the importance of disclosure against the need to protect an effective 
leniency programme. As for the factors to be taken into account the court recognised 
the potential increase of the immunity/leniency applicants’ exposure to liability com-
pared to the liability of parties that did not cooperate.338 Another relevant factor is 
whether the disclosure sought is proportionate in terms of whether (i) the informa-
tion sought was not available from other sources and (ii) the leniency materials were 
likely to be relevant.339 With regard to the negative effect that disclosure of leniency 
information might have on potential leniency applicants, it held that such effect had 
to be set against the gravity and duration of the infringement, and consequent scale 
of the penalties imposed here. In other words, if an undertaking was to decide not to 
seek immunity on the basis of the risk of disclosure being ordered in a private dam-
age case, that would be a ‘high risk gamble’ to take knowing that another party might 
seek immunity in its place and thereby expose it to a large fine. Another factor that 
has to be considered is the principle of legitimate expectations of defendants that the 
leniency materials would be protected from disclosure, although the court expressly 
rejected its relevance in the case at hand. It explained that the EU Commission’s 
Leniency Notice made clear that the grant of leniency did not protect the applicant 
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from the civil law consequences of its infringement of Article 101 TFEU. Moreover, 
the CJEU in Pfleiderer also expressed the view that immunity applicants had such a 
legitimate expectation.340 
Subsequently, the High Court in the National Grid case not only refused com-
plete disclosure of documents containing and/or referring to leniency materials but 
also a ‘blanket objection’ to it.341 Instead, it ordered disclosure of some of the leni-
ency materials sought. It decided that a number of passages from the confidential 
version of the EU Commission’s decision should be disclosed. With reference to the 
other documents sought by National Grid, the court held that “only very limited 
passages from a few of these”, namely responses to requests for information, should 
be disclosed.342 The court acknowledged that disclosure of leniency material might 
impair future EU Commission investigations because, if successful, it would make 
parties less willing to submit documents and cooperate with the EU Commission. To 
avoid the risk it established a ‘confidentiality ring‘ before it requested the EU Com-
mission to transmit the documents.343 The aim of the confidentiality ring was to 
protect the confidential information contained in the documents and make them 
available/disclosed only to certain parties within the pre-agreed ‘confidentiality ring’ 
(the counsels, external solicitors, experts). The High Court held that disclosure be-
tween parties to English court proceedings under the protection of a confidentiality 
ring would not undermine an EU Commission investigation. 
The National Grid case is a good example of the approach of balancing the right 
to effective compensation vis-à-vis the protection of confidential information, which 
has been also emphasised by the EU Commission in the White Paper.344 On one 
hand, the court followed the EU’s obligation imposed on the courts by the CJEU’s 
judgement in Pfeiderer, and took into account the effectiveness of the EU competi-
tion law system when applying the provisions of English law under which the access 
to documents relating to a leniency is given to a claimant in an antitrust case. On the 
other hand, the court confirms that under English law generally, all parties to civil 
proceedings before the courts in England must give disclosure of those documents 
that are relevant to the case. The possibility that potential leniency applicants (antici-
pating the risk of access to file for antitrust victims) would avoid providing informa-
tion to a competition authority investigating the matter in administrative proceeding 
does not constitute a sufficient reason to deprive claimants of their right to access to 
file. In order to protect the effectiveness of leniency programmes, the disclosing party 
may object to disclosing materials produced or submitted in the context of a leniency 
application. Whether a court should do so has to be addressed on a case-by-case basis 
with regard to the various factors, in particular the relevance of the documents. There 
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is no blanket bar against disclosure of leniency material, neither is there a presump-
tion in favour of disclosure. As the case shows, the court may protect the confidenti-
ality of documents by restricting who may see the documents e.g. viewing may be 
limited to counsel or experts. 
5.8.7 Conclusions on disclosure 
Broadly speaking, English law already contains the provisions suggested by the EU 
Commission in its White Paper. Under ‘specific disclosure’ the English courts may 
order disclosure of specified documents or classes of documents against a party to 
the civil procedure and against a non-party after the proceedings have commenced.345 
In addition, on the application of party who is ‘likely’ to be a party in an action, the 
court has the power to order a pre-action disclosure against a party who is ‘likely’ to 
be a party to that same action before the claim is issued. 346 As for further sanctions, 
if a party does not comply with a court order in respect of disclosure, in extreme 
cases its action may be struck out. In cases where it is found there has been deliberate 
destruction of documents, the party could be prosecuted for contempt of court, 
which is sanctionable with prison sentences.  
As a matter of fact, the English rules on disclosure go beyond the minimum dis-
closure rules proposed by the EU Commission. Compared to the White Paper, in 
England there are broad discovery rights. The EU Commission suggests that a court 
should be allowed to order parties to hand over evidence in their possession if the 
claimant specifies this evidence sufficiently and if it is relevant to the case. To that 
end, it suggests to limit disclosure to categories of evidence that have been specified 
in a sufficiently precise way by the applicant. Similarly, under English law, following 
the civil procedure reform in 1999, in the ordinary courts disclosure is no longer 
required for every document with a remote connection to the case. Besides the op-
tion to order ‘specific disclosure’ and ‘pre-disclosure’, both of which are limited to 
‘named documents’, a normal order to give disclosure is an order to give ‘standard 
disclosure‘. Standard discovery is also limited by the requirement of specification and 
allows the disclosure of evidence that is in the sphere of the defendant (and third 
parties) on the basis of more general factual contentions. However, the specification 
is broader than what is referred to in the White Paper. Disclosure obligation under 
standard disclosure applies to all the information that a party might have and which is 
relevant to the issues in dispute347. The parties may dispense with the request for 
disclosure or limit disclosure only if they obtain the court’s permission or on the basis 
of a written agreement concluded between them. The mechanism of named docu-
ments (‘specific disclosure’) applies only after ‘standard disclosure’ if a party seeks ad-
ditional information.  
Moreover, in England disclosure is an integral part of the civil procedure. Al-
though there is no automatic right to disclosure, the disclosure order will be given by 
the judge and usually it will be ‘standard disclosure‘. In contrast, the White Paper 
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suggests that disclosure should not be ordered in every case: rather, national courts, 
under specific conditions, should have the power to order disclosure. Besides the 
requirement of ‘sufficiently precise categories of documents’, the conditions include 
the claimant showing plausible grounds for the allegation of harm suffered, an inabil-
ity to obtain the evidence any other way and that the disclosure is relevant to the case 
and necessary and proportionate. 
It is not evident whether there is any viable justification for accommodating the 
existing disclosure rules to the EU Commission’s proposal. First, by reason of the 
wide scope of the disclosure provisions, the information asymmetry invoked in the 
White Paper does not appear to be a hurdle for private damage actions in England. 
Rather the contrary, as the case law demonstrates, disclosure pursues a function of 
ensuring that the parties to be on an equal footing, which is of particular importance 
in the competition context.348 Second, the aim of the White Paper was to formulate a 
minimum standard of rules applicable throughout the EU and thus to ensure the full 
effectiveness of the right to compensation. It does not prevent the Member States 
from maintaining or introducing a higher level of judicial protection of individuals 
than currently provided under EU law. Accordingly, the EU Commission proposal 
may be seen as a minimum requirement, leaving the possibility for each EU Member 
State to go beyond these minimum criteria and adopt more far-reaching discovery 
rules.349 Third, if the White Paper were to be enshrined as law, it will be a retrograde 
step for UK. English disclosure rules give the plaintiff the possibility to obtain a 
broad view of the documentary evidence in the defendant’s possession. As the disclo-
sure rules are an integral part of the English litigation process, changes to these rules 
would risk having negative effects on the entire national legal regimes of civil reme-
dies with unforeseeable consequences. 
The English approach to confidential information differs from the EU approach, 
in particular with regard to business secrets, which in principle should be protected. 
Accordingly, the EU Commission proposal on disclosure emphasises the necessity of 
allowing some degree of protection to business secrets and other confidential infor-
mation. Under English law – subject to certain defined exceptions such as the privi-
lege against self-incrimination or legal profession privilege – no person has the right 
to withhold from the court information that is relevant to an issue before the court. 
Confidentiality, unlike privilege, is not in itself a ground for refusing to disclose 
documents that are related to an issue being litigated.350 Only a document and infor-
mation, including business secrets, strategies and other types of confidential informa-
tion, that fits into one of the established categories of privilege will be protected from 
disclosure. When a party has in its possession relevant information and is unable to 
make out a case for non-disclosure going beyond mere confidentiality, the informa-
tion will be subject to the rules of disclosure. This however, does not exclude the 
possibility of restricting disclosure. Overall, as it was emphasised above, disclosure 
orders are subject to the court’s discretion. The court may set up a ‘confidentiality 
                                                        
348  National Grid v ABB [2009] EWHC 1326 (Ch); [2012] EWHC 869. See also sections 5.8.3. 
349  See section 4.4.3. 
350  See section 5.8.5. 
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ring‘ and restrict the number of individuals permitted to review confidential informa-
tion. The court therefore may grant the application for disclosure on the basis that 
additional protection would be granted to the confidential information through a 
‘confidentiality ring’. 
Introducing a general rule of excluding confidential information from disclosure 
would contradict the English principle of full disclosure, as well as the rationale of 
the disclosure process. The rationale for full disclosure of relevant information is that 
in doing so, the court can achieve a full understanding of the facts upon which to 
base its decision on. It is also a generally recognised principle of the English litigation 
system that each party ought to know all relevant information the other party has. It 
can be even argued that the exclusion of confidential information from disclosure 
could put the English legal system as a whole under the pressure. Disclosure is central 
to the common law tradition of dispute resolution. Access to evidence and disclosure 
rules are closely linked in English civil system with the roles allocated to the parties 
and the judge in the litigation. Therefore a change of disclosure rules would have a 
possible impact on the application of the other civil procedure rules. 
5.9 Binding effect of decision adopted by national competition authorities 
 
The courts and CAT are bound by the infringement findings of the competition 
authority and the EU Commission under EA 02. However, there is a difference be-
tween the rules that apply in the High Court and in the CAT, with regards to the 
binding effect. While the High Court may not reject the binding force of the decision, 
the CAT’s jurisdiction to hear claims is even restricted to claims for damages where 
there is a prior infringement decision by the EU Commission or UK NCA. However, 
the binding effect does not extend beyond the decision of antitrust infringement. In 
other words, elements of cause of action such as causation and damage have to be 
proved by the parties in the courts. 
5.9.1 On binding effect of infringement decisions in general 
With regard to the UK competition authorities’ decisions in civil courts, the English 
approach broadly mirrors the approach being adopted at EU level with respect to the 
decisions of the EU Commission.351 In order to increase effectiveness of the follow-
on provision (Section 47A of the CA 98, which creates the right of third parties to 
bring follow-on actions) and therefore facilitate follow-on legal actions,352 EA 02 has 
                                                        
351  See EU Commission Notice on the Cooperation between the EU Commission and the Courts of 
the EC Member States in the application of articles 81 and 82 EC (2004/C 101/04). See also Iberian 
UK Ltd v BPB Industries and British Gypsum (1996) 2 CMLR 601, where it was held that it would 
be an abuse of process to allow the defendants to challenge the EU Commission’s findings in na-
tional court proceedings. 
352  B.J. Rodger, Why not court? A study of follow-on actions in the UK (2012) 33(4) Journal of Antitrust 
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established a legally binding value of UK competition authorities’ decisions on na-
tional courts. In particular, under Section 20 EA 02 (which introduced a new Section 
58A into CA 98) the English courts are bound by ‘findings of infringement’ of the 
Chapter I and II prohibitions or Article 101 and 102 TFEU made by the OFT (or the 
CAT), provided that the time for an appeal against a decision has elapsed, or where 
an appeal has been filed, and it has been determined.353 In addition to the ‘findings of 
infringement’, courts are bound by ‘findings of fact’ made by the UK competition 
authorities (unless the court expressly directs otherwise).354 As noted earlier,355 in 
Enron356 the Court of Appeal made it clear that not every statement in an authority’s 
decision necessarily constitutes a ‘finding of fact’ that has binding effect. The Enron 
litigation centred on the decision of the UK Office of Rail Regulation (‘ORR’) that 
EWS had abused its dominant position in the market for coal haulage by rail. Enron 
subsequently brought a follow-on damage claim against EWS in the CAT.357 It ar-
gued, inter alia, that the defendant’s unlawful price discrimination had placed it at a 
competitive disadvantage and consequently deprived it of a chance of winning a con-
tract to supply coal to Edison Mission Energy Limited (EME). While the infringe-
ment itself had been established by the decision of the ORR, as provided by section 
58A, the CAT was asked to rule on issues of causation and quantum. In particular the 
CAT had to decide whether any loss in fact had been suffered by Enron by reason of 
the established infringement. To prove causation, Enron sought to rely upon the 
ORR’s decision. It argued that causation could be inferred from the ORR’s finding 
that EWS’s conduct had placed it at a competitive disadvantage and from other 
statements in the decision that referred to its business. In support of the loss claim, it 
argued that the CAT is bound by all the ‘findings of facts’ made by the competition 
authority in its decision on the basis of Section 58 of the Competition Act 1998.358 
The CAT disagreed with the claimant’s argument. It found itself not to be bound by 
‘other findings of facts’ in the decision, such as facts about causation. The Enron case 
subsequently failed because the claimant was not able to demonstrate with a suffi-
cient degree of evidence that the anti-competitive behaviour of which it complained 
had in fact caused any loss. The Court’s decision was taken to appeal, but the appeal 
was dismissed.  
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the CAT on the interpretation of section 
58A CA 98, holding that the CAT is bound by ‘findings of fact’ in a regulator’s deci-
sion, as well as by the infringement decision itself. However, it held that not all 
statements in the regulator’s decision are considered as ‘findings of fact’ having bind-
ing value for a court considering a damages claim. Only findings, challenging of 
which would be “tantamount to challenging the findings of infringement” are find-
                                                        
353  Section 58A(9) of the Competition Act 1998 (as introduced by Section 20 of the EA 02). 
354  Section 58 of the Competition Act 1998. 
355  Section 5.7.2. 
356  Enron Coal Services Limited (in liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Limited 1 [2011] 
EWCA Civ 2. 
357  Enron Coal Services Ltd (In Liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd [2009] CAT 36 
358  Section 58 stipulates that “[unless] the court directs otherwise”, a competition authority finding of 
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ings of fact for these purposes. Findings that are “peripheral or incidental” are not 
included. Thus, the party seeking to rely on a finding in a regulator’s decision must 
demonstrate that the regulator has made “a clearly identifiable” finding of fact to a 
given effect.359 As judge Jacob explained, it is not enough for a party claiming dam-
ages in a follow-on claim “to root around in the decision of the regulator to find stray 
phrases or sentences and say “look, here is a finding of fact, you cannot deny it”.360 
Having determined this, the Court concluded that in this case the finding of competi-
tive disadvantage (which is a necessary part of a finding of price discrimination in 
breach of Articles 102 TFEU) did not constitute proof that damage in fact has been 
caused. In other words, the regulator’s decision did not contain any “sufficiently 
clear” findings of fact in relation to Enron Coal’s intention of entering into a coal 
supply contract. Therefore the CAT was right to dismiss the claim for damages since 
the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to prove the damage that he had 
claimed. 
It follows from the court’s decision in the Enron case that binding effect relates 
to the finding of an antitrust infringement. The court can assess the evidential value 
of other competition authority’s findings that are not directly relevant to the finding 
of infringement. Such an approach leaves it open to the parties to prove facts other 
than infringement using evidence in a follow-on action in the court. In practice it 
means that in a follow-on damage action a plaintiff is relieved of the need to prove 
antitrust infringement, e.g. he may rely on the infringement finding to determine the 
unlawful conduct. However he needs to bring additional evidence before the court 
and prove other aspects of the claim, in particular that the infringement caused him 
loss (causation) and the quantum of that loss.361 After all, as a finding of infringement 
does not require proof that loss has been caused to another undertaking, the fact that 
the plaintiff had been unfairly placed at a competitive disadvantage does not auto-
matically mean that he has suffered the claimed losses as a consequence of this disad-
vantage. For instance, in abuse of dominance cases it is not necessary for the regula-
tor to show that competitors actually suffered a loss as a result of the infringement. 
The defendant can always resist the claim by, for example showing that the loss 
claimed did not result from the infringement but for example, was due to the claim-
ant’s own (unrelated) business shortcomings. With regard to a cartel, the nature of 
the infringement implies that losses will be suffered somewhere down the supply 
chain. Even though damages appear to be more straightforward, claimants will still 
                                                        
359  Enron Coal Services Limited (in liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Limited 1 [2011] 
EWCA Civ 2, par. 56. 
360  Justice Jacob in Enron Coal Services Limited (in liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway 
Limited 1.[2011] EWCA Civ 2, par. 148. 
361  T. Woodgate, I. Filippi, The Decision that Binds: Follow-on Actions for Competition Damages after 
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have to prove them. After all, they could have passed on the damage to their custom-
ers and therefore did not suffer any damage.362  
By making a distinction between findings of infringement and other findings 
made by a competition regulator, holding that only the first category is binding on the 
court, the judgement underlined the jurisdictional boundaries of the competition 
authority. Competition authority has jurisdiction over the establishment of antitrust 
infringement but not the jurisdiction to resolve issues of causation and quantum of 
loss. The burden of proving causal link between the effects of the infringement and 
quantum of the damages remains with the complainant for determination by the 
court. Limiting the jurisdiction of the competition authority to the establishment of 
antitrust infringement also creates a parallel with Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003. 
Under EU law where an infringement of the EU competition rules has been found in 
a decision by the EU Commission, a claimant can rely on this decision as binding 
proof of the infringement, while causation and damages have to be established in a 
course of proceeding for damages before national court.  
5.9.2 Limits of the binding effect on national courts  
Following from the Enron case,363 it is clear that section 58A of the UK Competition 
Act (as shaped by the court practice) established a significant, but also limited exten-
sion to the notion of the binding effect of a national administration body’s infringe-
ment decision on courts. On one hand, the defendant cannot argue that he did not 
commit the specific infringement set forth in the regulator’s decision. On the other 
hand, the plaintiff’s entitlement to refer to the regulator’s decision is, in certain as-
pects, limited.  
First, the provision of section 58A CA 98 clearly specifies that decisions regard-
ing an infringement of competition law are binding for the court only for the purpose 
of a subsequent claim for damages or any other sum of money.364 In other words, the 
Act does not provide for a general principle under which findings of national compe-
tition authorities would have a binding effect in other civil proceedings, for example 
cases in which the nullity of a contract arises or when the parties seek a remedy other 
than damages.365 Section 58A is based purely on policy reasons, the aim of which is 
                                                        
362  The possibility of victims at different levels of the distribution chain (direct and indirect purchasers) 
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to facilitate such actions from an evidentiary point of view.366 What Section 58A 
really refers to is follow-on civil actions for damages. Second, non-infringement deci-
sions are not expressly mentioned in section 58A and therefore they are not binding 
on courts. However, this does not mean that such decisions cannot have an evidential 
value in a court that is hearing a damages action based on the same conduct as that 
investigated by the OFT. This contrasts with the EU Commission’s decisions, 
whereby the non-infringement decisions of competition authorities are binding.367 If 
the facts on which a decision is based are exactly the same, national courts will have 
to take into account the EU Commission’s decision in order to comply with the obli-
gations under Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003. Third, as English case law shows, the 
scope of this binding effect is not always clear. There are difficulties in ascertaining 
what exactly are the “nature of the competition authority’s findings and the conse-
quences of those findings”.368 In Enron the court aligned the binding effect of a 
competition authority’s statement in a decision to findings of facts that are ‘clearly 
identifiable’. It remains unclear to what extent the statements are ‘clearly identifi-
able.’369  
Lastly, final infringement decisions made by a NCA of another EU Member State 
have no binding effect on the UK courts. The value of such a decision in proceedings 
before the UK courts will be no more than persuasive. It appears self-evident that the 
decision of a non-UK NCA will not have more persuasive value than the findings of 
fact of the EU Commission in a case between different parties, with respect to a 
different subject matter, as was ruled in Crehan v Inntreprenneur.370 In this case, 
which concerns beer-tie arrangements between a brewery and a public house lease-
holder, the House of Lords was considering the effect that past EU Commission 
decisions had on a civil case in which the facts were similar but not identical. Accord-
ing to the ‘Masterfoods rule,’371 which is now set out in Article 16 of Regulation 
1/2003, national courts cannot take decisions ‘running counter’ to a decision adopted 
by the EU Commission. In Inntrepreneur v Crehan the House of Lords have 
adopted a relatively restrictive interpretation of the obligation of the Masterfoods rule 
and ruled that a EU Commission decision is binding on an English court only when 
the case before the court involves the ‘same agreements, decisions or practices’ be-
tween the same parties as was the subject of the regulatory authority’s decision. If the 
English court is considering a dispute involving different parties the EU Commis-
sion’s decision will not be binding on the court even if the conduct at issue relates to 
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the same product and geographic market. After all, as Advocate General Cosmas 
stated in Masterfoods, there is no conflict between a judgment of the national court 
and a decision of the EU Commission where the proceedings are not ‘completely 
identical’ (par. 16). In Crehan judge Hoffman suggested that the decision of the EU 
Commission is simply ‘evidence’. Being ‘evidence’ implies that its basis can be revis-
ited in the national proceedings and argued between the parties. At the level of prin-
ciple, the House argued that it would be an abdication of the judicial role and a 
breach of the right to fair trial for a court not to make its own findings on the evi-
dence.372 Although the case addressed decisions made by the EU Commission, it is 
likely that a court would follow the same principles not only concerning the decisions 
of the OFT but also other national competition authorities. This has been illustrated 
in Calor Gas Ltd v Express Fuels (Scotland) Ltd.373In that case, which was brought 
before the Court of Session in Scotland, the defendants were accused of breaching 
Calor’s five-year exclusivity clause (whereby they could only purchase and sell Calor 
gas cylinder LPG) and the post termination clause (which prevented them from han-
dling Calor gas cylinders after termination of the contract). The Court found that 
these contractual provisions in Calor Gas Limited’s dealership agreement infringed 
Article 101 TFEU, and therefore Calor’s contractual claims against the defendants 
failed. When deciding on the case the Scottish court took into account a 2005 decla-
ration by the Irish Competition Authority which exempted such clauses on condition 
they did not last longer than 2 years. 
5.9.3 Judicial management of stand-alone claims, prior to NCA’s 
infringement finding 
As established by section 58A CA 98 and illustrated by the Court in Enron Coal 
Services Ltd,374 a party may bring a ‘follow-on action’ in the CAT once there has 
been a relevant infringement finding. In contrast, if there has been no decision (either 
because there is no investigation undertaken or the investigation has not yet been 
concluded), a civil claim for damages may still be brought in the High Court, since it 
is a court of general jurisdiction. In all such cases, the judicial management role of the 
court becomes important, particularly if a competition authority or the EU Commis-
sion has started a parallel action with regard to the same antitrust infringement, as will 
be explained later on. In addition, as the claim is brought without relying upon an 
infringement decision, it will technically be a ‘stand-alone‘ claim. The claimant will 
have the burden of proving the infringement in addition to causation and quantum of 
damages. If during the course of the proceeding the national competition authority 
adopts an infringement decision that has become final, then pursuant to section 58A 
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CA 98, the court will be bound by it.375 The claim that started as a ‘stand-alone’ claim 
will become a ‘follow-on’ claim.376  
It follows from the above that the launching of an investigation by the competi-
tion authorities does not prevent the potential claimants from considering the possi-
bility of seeking redress in the High Court. In contrast to the proceedings in the 
CAT, which cannot be started before the decision of competition authority becomes 
final, the proceedings in the High Court have no specific provision relating to compe-
tition litigation. Usual rules for initiating litigation will apply. The action will com-
mence, but under CPR 31.2(f) the court is entitled to stay proceedings as part of its 
general case management powers. The question that will be dealt with is whether the 
existence of a competition authority’s investigation gives sufficient reasons – in terms 
of expectations that a decision will be adopted in due course, with the potential civil 
consequences that flow from it – to stay the proceeding. As Holmes compared the 
competences of the CAT and the High Court, the first one deals with the question 
“whether to allow the claim to be commenced”, while the second one faces the ques-
tion “when the existing action should be stayed.” 377 That the ‘stay of proceeding’ is 
not a rule but a matter of case management has been demonstrated in Synstar.378 In 
that case it was alleged that that the software maintenance contract system maintained 
by the defendant was in breach of the Chapter I and II Prohibitions. A complaint was 
also filed with the OFT. The court granted a stay of the litigation pending the out-
come of the decisions in order to avoid interfering with the OFT’s ability to decide its 
own procedure. The court made it clear that parallel proceedings between the same 
parties on the same substantial issue were to be discouraged.379 The OFT subse-
quently made a finding that there had been no infringement of the Chapter I and II 
Prohibitions,380 and no appeal was made to the CAT. 
If the court decides to stay the proceeding then an important question that a 
judge has to deal with is at what stage in the development of the proceedings the stay 
should take effect (e.g. after the disclosure of documents and exchange of witness 
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statements had been completed).381 The same question was also dealt with by the 
English court in National Grid v ABB,382 which was discussed earlier with regard to 
the issue of disclosure.383 As said, the litigation arose out of the Gas insulated switch-
gear cartel decision of 2007, when the EU Commission imposed fines of € 750 mil-
lion on Siemens and various other undertakings. National Grid decided to bring a 
damage action when the case was still at appeal to the European Court of First In-
stance. It could not start an action in the CAT as a follow-on claim because the de-
fendant was in the process of appealing (decision is not yet ‘final’).384 However it 
could issue the claim in the High Court where the claimant is not required to ask for 
permission to proceed, and it decided to do so. The defendants (which included 
ABB, the immunity applicant that was not appealing the EU Commission’s decision, 
and other addressees of the decision who were appealing) requested a stay of the civil 
proceeding until the outcome of appeals to the European courts. Section 58A of the 
CA confers binding effect on final decisions by national competition authorities but 
does not say anything about the effect of the EU Commission’s findings of infringe-
ment. Indeed, this matter is dealt with by Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003. Accord-
ing to Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003, national courts cannot take decisions ‘run-
ning counter’ to the decision adopted by the EU Commission and must also ‘avoid 
decisions’ that would conflict with a decision contemplated by the EU Commission. 
Article 16(1) adds that in this situation the national court should consider whether to 
stay its proceedings. The national court’s best practice would be to stay proceeding 
until the EU Commission’s final decision is reached.385 In this way the possibility of 
the court’s decision conflicting with the decision contemplated by the EU Commis-
sion is excluded because once the EU Commission’s decision is reached, the court 
would be bound not to give judgement running counter to that decision. The English 
court however, has followed a variation on this approach. In the National Grid case it 
refused to order a stay of proceedings and ruled that procedural steps to trial, includ-
ing disclosure, should take place before a Masterfoods stay is ordered. In making this 
decision, the High Court compared the position of the parties if a stay were granted 
with the position if it were not, taking into account different situations with regard to 
whether the appeals to the CJEU were successful or not. In the first situation, if Na-
tional Grid had to stay its action for that length of time justice would not be delivered 
expeditiously. In the second situation, the costs of allowing the claim to proceed 
would be wasted, if their appeal to the decision of the EU Commission is successful 
as this would put an end to National Grid’s follow-on claim. In comparing the two 
situations, the court highlighted the tension between the cartelists’ reliance on the 
goal of limiting expense and the claimant’s reference to the aim of ensuring cases are 
dealt with expeditiously and fairly. The court concluded that the desirability of pro-
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gressing with the case, particularly by disclosure of relevant documents to the claim-
ants outweighs the need to avoid potentially wasted expenditure in the event that one 
or more of the ongoing appeals were to be successful.386 
With regard to the above, two important observations have to be made. First, the 
court’s decision not to order the stay at the initial stage of litigation process does not 
contravene the Masterfoods rule.387 If the EU Commission has initiated a procedure, 
national courts are not devoid of their competence to deal with the same facts, since 
their function is different from that of the EU Commission. As said above, when 
there is an envisaged EU Commission decision, the question of whether and when to 
stay the proceedings in a follow-on damage action is at the discretion of the court. In 
National Grid, the High Court decided to allow an action for damages to proceed 
until close of pleadings (including the disclosure of documents), but the trial hearing 
itself was postponed until the EU Commission’s decision is final. In this way disclo-
sure was preserved and the possibility of the court’s decision conflicting with the 
decision contemplated by the EU Commission was excluded. Secondly, the case 
demonstrates the importance of disclosure procedure in the English litigation sys-
tem.388 The Court decided to continue with procedural steps, in particular disclosure 
of documents, even though appeals of the decision underlying the claim were ongo-
ing. It emphasised that staying a procedure before a disclosure can have negative 
consequence for the success of the litigation procedure. In addition to the risk that 
the follow-on action could not be dealt with expeditiously and fairly, an immediate 
stay would also preclude the parties from being on an ‘equal footing’. The claimant 
would not know what the relevant issues are or what documents relevant to those 
issues are available. Once a stay of proceeding is ordered, and as long as the stay 
endures, the relevant court cannot “effectively entertain any further proceedings ex-
cept for the purpose of lifting the stay”. 389 
It follows from the analysis above that although the English application of the 
Masterfoods rule deviates from the usual application it appears to be more acceptable 
in the context of private antitrust enforcement. It still ensures that risk of conflicting 
decisions between the court and the competition authority is avoided. At the same 
time, by allowing the court to not to stay the proceeding until the outcome of appeals 
against the competition authority’s decision, procedural steps up to trial, including 
disclosure, ensure that the follow-on action are dealt with expeditiously and fairly. In 
addition, it minimises the risk that the plaintiff will not be on an ‘equal footing’ with 
the defendant. As the EU Commission often emphasised, access to evidence held by 
the antitrust infringer has to be improved in order to constitute an effective general 
remedy for the consequence of the “information asymmetry” that is normal in com-
petition cases. As such, the English application of the Masterfoods rule could be used 
as a model for future modifications and improvements to the Masterfoods rule. 
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5.9.4 Advantages of initiating a damage claim prior to NCA’s infringement 
finding 
Establishing jurisdiction before a regulator’s decision becomes final might well be 
perceived to reduce delays, as the case of National Grid v ABB390 demonstrated and 
provides a form of legal certainty as illustrated in the Cooper Tire case.391 
The Cooper Tire case was brought as a follow-on action in the English High 
Court after the EU Commission had fined six groups of companies for participation 
in a cartel to fix prices and share consumers for certain types of synthetic rubber. 
After various tyre manufacturers announced their attempt to commence damage 
actions, one of the cartelists, Enichem, commenced proceedings in Italy. It sought to 
declare that there was no cartel and that the EU Commission’s decision had no im-
pact in Italian law because it was contrary to the Italian Constitution. A few months 
later the tyre manufacturers launched a claim for damages in the English High Court 
against 24 cartelists (not including Enichem). A number of cartelists, including Dow, 
that were involved in the damage action subsequently intervened in the Italian pro-
ceedings. Dow challenged the jurisdiction of the English court and, as an alternative, 
applied to stay the English procedure until the Italian proceedings were resolved. The 
case that was brought in Italy was clearly an attempt to delay the English proceedings 
through ‘Italian Torpedo’ tactics,392 on the basis that the Italian courts were the 
courts first seised and the English court must (under Article 27 of the Brussels Regu-
lation)393 or may (under Article 28 of the Brussels Regulation)394 therefore stay pro-
ceedings or decline jurisdiction to avoid conflicting judgments. Even if later the judge 
of first instance dismisses Enichem’s claim (saying that EU takes primacy over Italian 
law), the appeal cannot be decided before certain time. The English Court noted that 
although the English and Italian proceedings were related, the proceedings were not 
between the same parties since Enrichem as claimant in the Italian proceedings was 
not a defendant in the UK proceedings, and a mandatory stay under Article 27 of the 
Brussels Regulation was not required. Instead, in such cases the court had discretion 
to stay under Article 28 of the Brussels Regulation.395 The English Court however, 
decided not to exercise its discretion to stay proceeding but allow the action to go 
ahead. It accepted that the matters relevant to exercising its discretion under Article 
                                                        
390  National Grid v ABB Ltd 2009 EWHC 1326. 
391  Cooper Tire & Rubber Co v Shell Chemicals UK Ltd [2009] EWHC 2609 (upheld on appeal in 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company Europe Ltd & Ors v Dow Deutschland Inc & Ors [2010] EWCA 
Civ 864). 
392  This is a tactic of commencing pre-emptive proceedings in the same matter in another jurisdiction to 
delay proceedings commenced in a court of another state will not always be effective. 
393  Article 27 of the Brussels Regulation provides that when related actions are pending in the courts of 
different EU Member States, a court other than that first seised may stay its proceedings and decline 
jurisdiction. 
394  Article 28 of the Brussels Regulation provides that where related actions are pending in the courts of 
different Member States, any court other than the first court seised has discretion to stay its proceed-
ings and decline jurisdiction. 
395  Cooper Tire & Rubber Co v Shell Chemicals UK Ltd [2009] EWHC 2609, at 104. 
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28 weighed against doing so.396 First of all, it noted that the Italian proceedings had 
been dismissed at the first instance and there was no certainty that the appeal would 
succeed.397 Indeed, although the Italian court held that it had jurisdiction over most 
of the claims the proceedings were inadmissible under Article 16 of Regulation 
1/2003 that prohibits national courts from making decisions. Deciding otherwise 
would be a violation of Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003. Further, the High Court 
acknowledged that the delays in the Italian system meant it was more likely that the 
English court would arrive at a substantive decision before the case was finally de-
cided in Italy. It made a clear point that the declaratory proceedings initiated in Italy 
in anticipation of the action (an ‘Italian torpedo’) should not be allowed to delay the 
proceedings subsequently issued in England against the other cartel members. The 
approach of the High Court was subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal.398  
As the Cooper Tire case illustrates, establishing jurisdiction before a regulator’s 
decision becomes final has some advantages in terms of reducing delays, but also in 
terms of strategy used by the plaintiff. It might be strategically important to file a 
claim form at an early stage, even before a regulatory investigation has been com-
pleted, if there is a threat of a rival claim being filed in a jurisdiction outside of Eng-
land. Since the High Court is the only available avenue for a claimant in this case 
(where there is no infringement decision yet), it may be argued that a risk of forum 
shopping within the UK arises.399 The High Court is likely to become the more 
commonly favoured forum compared to the CAT.400  
Some may argue that the strategy to bring an action to the court before the regu-
lator’s decision becomes final is a risk for the claimants. By bringing a claim before a 
decision has been adopted, the claimants choose to proceed without knowing the 
precise scope of the decision but also the identity of the ultimate addressees of the 
decision. As said, a follow-on action, where the claimant’s burden of proof is allevi-
ated by the existence of a relevant regulatory decision, can be brought in the English 
courts only against addressees of the decision concerned. Nevertheless, the uncer-
tainty and risk in bringing a claim before a decision has been adopted and the choice 
of claimants in proceeding without knowing the identity of the ultimate addressees of 
the decision is diminished by the fact that the claim can be dealt with as combination 
of a ‘stand-alone‘ and a ‘follow-on’ claim. It should also be borne in mind that claim-
ants involved in multi-jurisdictional claims may bring all actions into the same juris-
diction.401 Therefore even if one of the defendants is not an addressee of the eventual 
decision, the claimants can pursue the non-addressees on a stand-alone basis. In 
                                                        
396  L.A. Velasco San Pedro, et al. (eds), Private Enforcement of Competition Law (2011) Valladolid, Lex 
Nova, p. 162 
397  Cooper Tire & Rubber Co v Shell Chemicals UK Ltd [2009] EWHC 2609, at 107. 
398  Cooper Tire & Rubber Company Europe Ltd & Ors v Dow Deutschland Inc & Ors [2010] EWCA 
Civ 864. 
399  See the opinion of E.A. Holmes in Follow-on damage claims: the CAT or the High Court? National 
Grid v ABB Ltd 2009 EWHC 1326 (2010) 31(4) E.C.L.R, pp. 165–167; L.A. Velasco San Pedro et 
al. (eds), Private Enforcement of Competition Law (2011) Lex Nova, Valladolid, p. 162. 
400  B.J. Rodger, Why not court? A study of follow-on actions in the UK (2012) 33(4) Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement, pp. 1–28. 
401  Art 6(1), Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000. 
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other words, the claim that started as a ‘stand-alone’ claim will become a combination 
of a ‘stand-alone’ and ‘follow-on’ claim. It will be a follow-on claim to the extent that 
a claim is made against the addressees of a decision with respect to the conduct cov-
ered by the decision. To the extent that the claimant seeks damages with respect to 
the conduct not covered by the decision, the claimant will have to prove those ele-
ments of his claim on a stand-alone basis. KME Yorkshire v Toshiba Carrier case402 
arose from a 2003 EU Commission decision relating to the copper tubes cartel. In 
2009, Toshiba Carrier UK Limited brought a claim for damages under English law 
against KME Yorkshire, which was not an addressee of the EU Commission’s deci-
sion, but its non-UK parent company was. Actions have also been brought against 
the group companies who are addressees of the EU Commission’s decision but had 
no domicile in UK. If the case against KME Yorkshire was allowed to stand,403 the 
High Court could take jurisdiction over the non-UK companies on the basis of Arti-
cle 6 of the Brussels I Regulation (because the claims are closely connected). The 
defendant argued that the KME Yorkshire’s claim should be struck out. The court 
refused the defendant’s argument. It held that the claimants have sufficiently shown 
that KME Yorkshire (the UK-domiciled subsidiary) had participated in and imple-
mented the cartel arrangements having knowledge of the cartel agreement.404 What is 
important for this research is that the court made it clear that the claim comprised a 
‘follow-on’ claim against the entities fined by the EU Commission and a ‘stand-alone’ 
claim against KME Yorkshire. The UK-domiciled subsidiary (KME Yorkshire) was 
not an addressee named in the EU Commission’s decision and therefore the decision 
had no binding value for its case.405 However, the court held that even if the national 
court is entitled to revisit the evidence to support the existence of a cartel, the EU 
Commission’s decision is “at its lowest evidence properly admissible before the court 
in England”.406 It may be well regarded by the court as highly persuasive, as indeed 
was recognised by the House of Lords in Crehan.407 After all, according to Article 16 
of Regulation 1/2003 national courts must avoid giving decisions ‘running counter’ 
to the decision adopted by the EU Commission when ruling on agreements, deci-
sions or practices under Articles 101 or 102 TFEU that were the subject of a EU 
Commission decision. This applies regardless of the fact that whether the national 
court is dealing with a follow-on or stand-alone action. If the national court is pre-
cluded by Article 16 from reaching a conflicting decision there is no reason to under-
take the task of reinvestigating the same matters. Although in this case the EU Com-
mission’s decision was at issue, it is likely that similar argumentation (avoidance of 
conflicting decisions) would apply when a NCA’s decision is at issue.  
                                                        
402  Toshiba Carrier UK Ltd & Ors v KME Yorkshire Ltd & Ors [2011] EWHC 2665 (Ch). 
403  Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
404  See Provimi v Roche Products Ltd [2003] EWHC 961; Cooper Tire and Rubber Co. v Shell Chemi-
cals UK Ltd [EWHC] 2609. 
405  Toshiba Carrier UK Ltd & Ors v KME Yorkshire Ltd & Ors [2011] EWHC 2665 (Ch), at 38. 
406  Toshiba Carrier UK Ltd & Ors v KME Yorkshire Ltd & Ors [2011] EWHC 2665 (Ch), at 44. 
407  Crehan v Inntreprenneur Pub Co [2006] UKHL 38.  
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5.9.5 Conclusions on binding effect of national competition authorities’ 
decision 
In the White Paper the EU Commission has proposed that decisions of NCAs 
should be considered binding proof of infringement in a competition damages pro-
ceeding filed in any Member State. In England a legal regime that provides for courts 
to be bound by an infringement decision of English NCAs when assessing damages 
in follow-on actions is already in place. Section 58A and confirmation by the court in 
Enron Coal Services Ltd408 clearly show that once there has been an English compe-
tition authority’s decision finding of breach of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU (or the 
domestic equivalents) and the decision becomes final the court is bound by the deci-
sion in private damage actions. As shown above, the binding effect of decisions is 
limited in many aspects. It applies only to damage actions following the decision of 
the regulator and not to other legal disputes in which the establishment of anti-
competitive infringement is relevant. It applies only to final decisions, namely deci-
sions that cannot be brought to appeal either because the respective deadline has 
expired or because they have been confirmed upon appeal. Although these and other 
limitations mentioned above significantly limit the scope of the binding effect of 
NCA’s decisions in courts (and thus jurisdiction of the CAT), they generally reflect 
the EU Commission’s approach to the issue. It has to be kept in mind that as the EU 
Commission’s proposal, Section 58A of the UK Competition Act 1998 has been 
adopted with a view to facilitating follow-on damage claims relating to infringements 
of the competition law. 
However, to be completely consistent with the EU Commission proposal, the 
scope of both section 47(A)409 and section 58 (A) of the Competition Act 1998 
would necessitate expansion so as to include final decisions of foreign competition 
authorities involving infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. As the English 
law stands, English Courts seized with a follow-on claim for damages are not pre-
vented from re-examining the facts relating to the infringement that were already 
investigated and assessed by a foreign NCA. Final decisions of an NCA of another 
Member States have no binding effect on the English courts. In contrast, the White 
Paper suggests that competition authorities’ decisions should be binding not only in 
the NCA’s Member State, but also in the courts in every Member State throughout 
the EU. An exception to the rule would be allowed if a foreign NCA has not re-
spected the rights of defence in adopting its decision.410  
Based on the analysis in the previous sections, it follows that as long as the bind-
ing nature of NCAs’ decision refers only to finding of infringements (as suggested by 
the EU Commission), an introduction of a rule making decisions of NCAs of other 
Member States binding in the UK courts will still be consistent with the fundamental 
                                                        
408  Enron Coal Services Ltd (In Liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd [2009] CAT 36. 
409  Under 47(A) of the Competition Act 1998, a claim may only be brought before the CAT when the 
UK national competition authority (OFT) or the EU Commission has made a decision establishing 
that a competition prohibition has been infringed and any appeal of that decision has been finally 
determined. 
410  See section 4.4.9. 
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principles of English legal system. It would only extend the scope of application of 
sections 47A and 58A of the Competition Act 1998. Under the new rule, not only 
English competition authorities’ decisions will be admitted by civil courts adjudicat-
ing damages actions as ‘irrebbutable proof’ of an infringement of Articles 101 and 
102 – i.e. no contrary evidence could be admitted against their probative force, but 
also infringement decisions of non-UK NCA. Such an extension of the binding force 
of a foreign NCA decision would require changes of law but would not put any pres-
sure on the private law system.  
The risk of a binding rule undermining the English legal system exists, only if the 
binding nature of NCAs’ decision were to extend the scope of follow-on claims to all 
factual findings contained in the NCA’s decision (not only findings of infringement), 
which is not the intention of the EU Commission. Under English law, once the com-
petition authority has found that a defendant has infringed the domestic or EU com-
petition rules (and provided that all appeals have been determined or time limits ex-
pired), then the defendant is not permitted to dispute the finding of infringement in 
any follow-on claim. Since factual findings contained in the regulator’s decision are 
not binding unless they are ‘clearly identifiable’ facts, it appears that any findings of 
fact made during the course of investigation – relevant to the questions of the causa-
tion and the quantum of loss in a follow-on damages case – will have evidential value. 
It is also unlikely that an infringement decision itself will constitute sufficient evi-
dence to support a follow-on claim for damages and a claimant will have to prove 
harm independently before a national court and show that any losses claimed were 
caused by the breach of competition law. In principle therefore, follow-on damages 
claims in England are a question of quantifying the loss and establishing causation. 
After all, in line with the principle of judiciary independence, which is a vital element 
of the judiciary’s activity, competition authority has jurisdiction for the establishment 
of antitrust infringement but not the jurisdiction to resolve issues of causation and 
quantum of loss resulting from an infringement already established. The burden of 
proving causal link, effects of the infringement and quantum of the damages remain 
with the complainant for determination by the court. Extension of the scope of the 
binding effect to any finding of fact made during the course of investigation would 
clearly go against the principle of judiciary independence.  
Another remark can be made regarding the binding effect of the decisions of 
English competition authorities. Once there has been an English competition author-
ity’s decision finding that there has been a breach of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU (or 
the domestic equivalents) and the decision becomes final, only then can an action be 
brought in front of the CAT. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that a civil claim for 
breach of the antitrust rules may be brought in the High Court at any stage. If there 
has been no decision (either because there is no investigation taken, or the investiga-
tion has not been concluded yet), a civil claim for damages may still be brought in the 
High Court. In this case, as the claim is brought without relying upon an infringe-
ment decision; it will be a ‘stand-alone‘ claim. The claimant will have the burden of 
proving the infringement in addition to causation and quantum of damages. If during 
the course of the proceeding the competition authority adopts an infringement deci-
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sion, then the decision will be binding on the parties411 (unless overturned on appeal). 
In such cases, what started as a ‘stand-alone’ claim will then become a ‘follow-on‘ 
claim.412 The possibility of bringing an action in the absence of a regulator’s decision 
is a clear manifestation of the principle of judiciary independence. The jurisdictional 
limitations of the CAT call for more discussion on its weak usefulness of a CAT as a 
specialised court.  
5.10 Damage and reparation for damage 
Remedies play an important role in the system of civil liability. They are ‘the life-
blood of civil justice.’413 At the stage at which remedies are awarded, in the words of 
Jacob, “arises the closest connection between civil procedural law and substantive 
law, since remedies reflect the substantive rights and interests of the parties and, 
conversely, they constitute an essential foundation upon which the rules of substan-
tive law have been and are being fashioned, constructed and enforced.”414 In Eng-
land, as in the majority of other legal systems, remedies in tort are generally intended 
to compensate the injured party for any harm he or she has suffered. Accordingly, the 
compensation nature is inherent in the very structure of a tort suit.  
5.10.1 Head of damage 
English tort law distinguishes between different ‘heads of damage.’415 Under the tort 
law, the primary head of damage recoverable is loss which results from physical injury 
to a person or physical damage to property (‘physical loss‘). ‘Economic loss‘ or finan-
cial loss is recoverable only when it is a consequence of the physical damage,416 i.e., 
when the plaintiff claims economic and physical loss. When economic loss does not 
directly result from personal injury or damage to property (‘pure economic loss‘), the 
English courts have been reluctant to allow a claim.417 The reluctance to award ‘pure 
economic loss’ is a manifestation of the idea that recoverable damages should be 
restricted to loss which is foreseeable. Common law puts strong emphasis on the 
foreseeability of damage.418 It is based on the belief that individuals are incapable of 
                                                        
411  Either pursuant to Regulation 1/2003 (discussed further below) or pursuant to Section 58A of the 
Competition Act 1998. 
412  See Enron Coal Services Limited (in liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Limited [2011] 
EWCA Civ 2, par. 8. 
413  J. Jacob, The Fabric of English Civil Justice (1987) Stevens & Sons, London, p. 169. 
414  J. Jacob, The Fabric of English Civil Justice (1987) Stevens & Sons, London, p. 170. 
415  The expression ‘heads of damage’ refers to categories of loss that a plaintiff in a particular action 
may seek to recover. 
416  ‘Consequential economic loss’ is loss arising as a consequence of the physical damage, and not loss 
arising as a consequence of the event. 
417  Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] 1 QB 27; Cf. Widgery J. in 
Weller & Co v. Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute [1966] 1 QB 569. 
418  On the topic see Foreseeability and the Common Law in S. Balganesh, Foreseeablitiy and Copyright 
Initiatives (2009) 122(6) Harvard Law Review, pp. 1591–1599; A. Kramer, Proximity as principles: Di-
rectness, community norms and the tort of negligence (2003) 11(2) Tort Law Review, pp. 70–103. 
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anticipating all the consequences caused by their actions. Foreseeability therefore, 
works to eliminate from liability events and outcomes that were not capable of form-
ing a part of the individual’s ex ante decision-making process. Putting it differently, 
foreseeability determines the kind of damage for which the defendant will be liable. If 
there is reasonable foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, there will be liability. While 
‘physical loss’ is recognised as reasonably foreseeable damage, economic loss in terms 
of ‘pure economic loss’419 will normally be considered to be too remote and unfore-
seeable.420 The typical case – although not antitrust case – that illustrates this reluc-
tance is Spartan Steel v Martin.421 In that case the defendant negligently damaged the 
cable that supplied electricity to the Spartan works. The claimants were forced to shut 
their factory temporarily. They claimed damages under three heads, damage to the 
metal that was in the furnace at the time of the power cut (physical damage to prop-
erty), loss of the profit that would have been made on the sale of that metal (eco-
nomic loss arising from damage to property), and loss of profit on metal which 
would have been processed during the time the factory was closed due to the power 
cut (pure economic loss). The Court of Appeal held that the first two claims were 
recoverable but not the third.422 It reasoned that the defendants owed the claimants a 
duty not to damage their property and therefore they had to compensate the damage 
and any loss directly arising from such damage. Since there was no duty with regard 
to loss of profit to claimants, they were not responsible for this head of damage.  
In addition to the reason of foreseeability, the courts have been traditionally cau-
tious to compensate pure economic loss for a number of other reasons.423 One of the 
main reasons is a concern that if claims for pure economic loss were allowed it might 
lead to countless claims, some of which may be unmeritorious (‘the floodgates argu-
ment’).424 As indicated by Roger and MacCulloch, if everyone who has suffered eco-
nomic loss could sue, then there would be liability for an indeterminate amount of 
money for an indeterminate period to an indeterminate class of people.425 Or, as 
judge Denning put it, “there would be no end of claims”.426 An objection against 
liability for pure economic loss also points to the fact that the general orientation of 
English law is that pure economic loss is the concern of the law of contract and thus 
is normally not recoverable outside the area of contract. Contract has been seen as 
offering certainty; defendants could only be liable for losses caused by their own 
                                                        
419  ‘Pure economic loss’ is what it is usually meant by ‘financial loss.’ 
420  Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.). 
421  Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] 1 QB 27. 
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failure to fulfil a freely undertaken agreement, and this clearly had benefits in the 
commercial world. Hedley Byrne v Heller427 stands as an exception to the rule of 
non-recovery for pure economic loss outside the area of contract. The House of 
Lords recognised that in certain circumstances negligence could provide reason for 
remedy for pure economic loss caused by things the defendant had said (negligent 
misstatements).428 Essentially, there needs to be a ‘special relationship’ of proximity 
and reliance between the parties which is similar in character to a contract.429 The 
special relationship gives rise to the duty on part of the defendant to ‘take care’. In 
Hedley Byrne v Heller430 the court found that it was reasonable for the defendant to 
have know the claimant would have relied upon the information he was given. That 
would give rise to a ‘special relationship’ and therefore the defendant would have to 
take sufficient care in giving advice to avoid negligence liability.  
It follows that under English law not all loss that is suffered following the dam-
age is recoverable. The test is whether the type of harm is reasonably foreseeable 
(whether the damage is too remote). Economic loss – which is often the loss suffered 
as a result of antitrust infringement – generally does not pass the test and therefore is 
not recoverable. Of course it is always open to the plaintiff to try to bring his case as 
one of the exceptional cases in which compensation for pure economic loss is admis-
sible on the basis that the elements of foreseeibility created by a ‘duty to care’ are 
present. However, this will be difficult in competition cases. Pure economic loss is 
generally perceived to be too remote and uncertain to have been caused by the breach 
of duty. The speculative nature of future losses (foreseeability issue) was also raised 
by the Court of Appeals in the famous Crehan v Inntrepreneur case.431 As said ear-
lier, under English law damages arise from a breach of statutory duty and the plaintiff 
has to prove that the damage he suffered was of a type that the competition rule (in 
this case Article 101 TFEU) was intended to prevent. If the losses are considered to 
be too remote and uncertain to have been caused by the breach of duty, the court will 
not award damages in respect of this. This overlaps with the requirement to prove 
that the breach of statutory duty was the cause of the claimant’s loss. In the Crehan 
case, applying the assessment of causation presented another “inroad of the principle 
of effectiveness in the principle of national procedural autonomy”.432 In order to 
allow for the EU right to damage to be fully effective, the condition of ‘type of loss’ 
had to be set aside. Therefore, following the CJEU’s judgement, the first instance 
court (High Court) found that based on the evidence presented, if Crehan had been 
free of the tie his business would have survived, so the causal link was satisfied433 (the 
Court of Appeal did not interfere with this finding). 
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The plaintiff sought to recover full losses suffered during the period of the two-
year lease, (i) losses actually suffered during the period of the leases, (ii) future profits 
that he would have made between the time he surrendered the leases in 1993 until the 
date of the judgment in 2003 in the absence of the beer tie and (iii) the value of the 
leases on the public houses in 2003, had he wished to sell these on. Although both 
the High Court434 and the Court of Appeal agreed on the heads of damages, their 
approaches to the amount of damages awarded differed. In particular the Court of 
Appeal’s method of calculation of damages was more restricted than the High 
Court’s with respect to ‘future profits’ that the claimant would have made between 
1993 and 2003 (i.e., to the date of the High Court’s judgement). Feeling obliged by 
the EU law requirement that national law should provide effective remedies, the High 
Court calculated the total lost due to the claimant as £1,311,500. It calculated the 
damages on the basis that were it not for the defendant’s conduct the plaintiff would 
have continued in business for the intervening 10 year period. The Court of Appeal 
disagreed with the High Court’s approach to damages, arguing that the measure of 
damages it sought to apply “involves a hypothesis upon a hypothesis: the hypotheti-
cal profits of a hypothetical business” (par. 179). In respect of the ‘future profits’ it 
held that “10 years of trading is a long time, and there must be a real possibility that if 
Creham had remained in the pubs for that period, something unforeseen could have 
gone wrong.” To award damages based on 10 years continuous trading would have 
been unduly speculative. It held that correct dates at which damages should be as-
sessed was 1993 when Crehan went out of business due to the defendant’s anti-
competitive conduct. The Court of Appeal awarded to Crehan damages of 131,336 
GBP, plus interest. The whole difference between the sum calculated by the High 
Court and the sum calculated by the Court of Appeal was made up of the hypotheti-
cal profit the plaintiff would have made between 1993 and 2003 but for the defen-
dant’s infringement. The award was later overturned by the House of Lords who 
found that there had been no infringement; however, they made no criticism of the 
Court of Appeal’s approach to the award of lost profits. The case shows that even if 
reparation for lost profit is recognised by English courts, the level of damages 
awarded will be strongly influenced by the extent to which courts accept foreseeabil-
ity of loss and take into account hypothetical future profits. As such, the English 
approach to loss of profit in terms of remoteness and calculation of future loss, is not 
in line with the EU Commission’s approach to damages. The issue will be dealt with 
in section 7.4.3. 
5.10.2 Full compensation and victim’s behaviour as a factor limiting the 
amount of compensation 
Under the standard measure of tortious damages, in accordance with the principle of 
compensation, the award of damages should make the victim ‘whole’. This rule re-
quires the victim to be put back in the position he would have been if the breach 
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causing loss had not occurred (‘but for’ situation). In Arkin v. Borchard Lines,435 the 
High Court suggested (despite having concluded that there was no breach of compe-
tition law) that any damage should be assessed by comparing a hypothetical scenario 
based on the situation prior to the alleged infringement and then asking what loss (if 
any) the infringement had, as a matter of common sense, caused. This approach, 
referred to as “common sense approach”,436 was also confirmed in the Cardiff Bus 
case.437 The case concerned a ‘follow-on‘ action arising out of the OFT’s decision 
finding that Cardiff Bus had abused a dominant position in the local bus market in 
Cardiff, contrary to UK competition law. As a follow-on action, the CAT was bound 
by the OFT’s findings with regard to the existence of antitrust infringement.438 All 
that the court therefore was concerned with was whether the infringement had 
caused 2 Travel’s loss and, if so what was the quantum of the loss. With regard to 
causation, the CAT applied the standard ‘but for’ test. To do that, it compared the 
position in the ‘real world’ (in which the infringement by Cardiff Bus occurred) with 
the position in the ‘but-for’ world (in which there had been no infringement).439 In 
this case – which is the first and only case in which an award of exemplary damages 
has been made in a competition law context440 – 2 Travel sought both exemplary and 
compensatory damages. It sought compensatory damages under the following five 
heads, (1) loss of profits from the operation of the in-fill service, (2) loss of a capital 
asset (i.e. the business of 2 Travel as a going concern), (3) loss of a commercial op-
portunity (i.e. the opportunity to benefit from the increase in value and development 
potential of the Swansea Depot), (4) wasted time of staff and management prior to 
the liquidation and (5) costs of 2 Travel’s liquidation.441 By application of the ‘but for’ 
causation test the CAT awarded only compensatory damages for loss of profits of 
approximately £34,000 (plus interest). The quantification of the loss was based on a 
finding that the Infringement caused 2T to lose 41,255 passengers.442 In contrast, it 
rejected the remaining four heads of compensatory damages. Its rejection was based 
on the relevant losses suffered by 2 Travel were not the result of the infringement by 
Cardiff Bus. Following a detailed assessment of the evidence the CAT concluded that 
2 Travel was a “badly run company, with enormous financial difficulties, even before 
it commenced the In-Fill services, and providing poor transport services.”443 It would 
have gone into liquidation even without the infringement by Cardiff Bus. Moreover, 
the CAT took the view that the breach did not result in any abnormal waste of staff 
or management time.444 The CAT also noted that although Cardiff Bus had caused 2 
Travel to lose £34,000, it concluded that this “was a drop in the ocean, and would 
                                                        
435  Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2003] EWHC 687.  
436  Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2003] EWHC 687, par. 536. 
437  2 Travel Group plc v Cardiff City Transport Services ltd. [2012] CAT 19, par. 79. 
438  Section 20 EA 02 (which introduced a new Section 58A into CA 98). 
439  It took a situation in which Cardiff Bus did not operate the service at all, rather than a situation 
where it operated the service, but in a different way. 
440  See section 5.10.3. 
441  [2012] CAT19, par. 3. 
442  [2012] CAT19, par. 400. 
443  [2012] CAT19, par. 159. 
444  [2012] CAT19, par. 163. 
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have made absolutely no difference to the decisions the company took”,445 The Car-
diff Bus’s conduct was therefore “causally irrelevant to 2 Travel’s demise”.  
It follows that the principle of full compensation does not automatically mean 
that all the damage suffered by the claimant should be attributed to the defendant and 
therefore recoverable. The determination of damage in tort law is not restricted to 
loss suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the defendant’s illegal conduct, but 
it is also dependent upon the victim’s behaviour. The victim’s behaviour is taken into 
account through principles that limit full adherence to compensation of damages 
such as contributory negligence and duty to mitigate. While the defence of contribu-
tory negligence applies to the question how the harm or loss occurred, mitigation is 
related to the question how the plaintiff copes with the harm or loss after it has oc-
curred. The principle of mitigation, applicable in the law of contracts and tort, en-
compasses the duty which provides that an aggrieved party cannot recover damages 
for loss which could have been avoided by acting reasonably (taking reasonable 
steps). The plaintiff has a duty to do everything possible to keep the damage as lim-
ited as possible, and/or to prevent increase of the damage through his own behav-
iour. As put by judge James in Dunkirk Colliery Co v Lever in the context of breach 
of contract:446 “The person who has broken the contract is not to be exposed to 
additional cost by reason of the plaintiffs not doing what they ought to have done as 
reasonable men, and the plaintiffs not being under any obligation to do anything 
otherwise than in the ordinary course of business.” In this statement, which applies 
equally to tort, the duty to mitigate does not impose an obligation to take steps, 
which a reasonable and prudent man would not ordinarily take in the course of his 
business.447 Accordingly, a plaintiff who fails to do what is reasonable in the circum-
stances to mitigate his damage might have to face a reduction in his damages deemed 
to be caused by his own unreasonableness. The question whether the plaintiff has 
acted reasonably is a question of fact and the answer depends upon the circumstances 
in each case. The burden of proof is therefore on the party who alleges that the vic-
tim had not complied with this duty.448 Mitigation of loss in response to an infringe-
ment actually can be a powerful legal principle that entitles a defendant to argue that 
they are obliged to pay smaller sums in a claim for damages. For example, in foreclo-
sure cases if a competitor is illicitly prevented from entering the market, or growing 
in a market, he might often set up business in another market. Another example is a 
cartel. Since the direct purchaser is genuinely unaware of a cartel between its suppli-
ers, in order to mitigate his losses, he may pass them on to indirect purchasers as far 
as that is possible under given market conditions.  
In line with the principle of full compensation, compensation should only be re-
coverable in respect of losses actually suffered. Accordingly, the defendant could 
argue that a claimant’s loss has been reduced or negated by the claimant having 
                                                        
445  [2012] CAT19, par. 150. 
446  Dunkirk Colliery Company v Lever [1878] 9 Ch D 20, par. 25.  
447  The requirement to take ‘reasonable steps’ is not a high standard. It is after all, the defendant that 
has put the claimant in the position of having to deal with the breach. See Lombard North Central 
Plc v Automobile World (UK) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 20. 
448  Pilkington v Wood [1953] Ch 770. 
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passed on the loss. This suggests that in accordance with the general civil liability 
principles, passing-on defence – as addressed in the White Paper – is available under 
English law. As a matter of fact, exclusion of this possibility could lead to an unjusti-
fied enrichment of the claimant in as much as it has passed on the damage suffered to 
its own customers. This would run counter to the objective that the law of damages is 
geared to ensuring compensation. The applicability of the passing-on defence under 
English law was raised in an interlocutory application for security of costs in Deven-
ish.449 Dealing with the inability of the court to proceed to give restitutionary dam-
ages on the basis of domestic law, the court indirectly addressed the issue of passing-
on. The Court stated that damages should be available to the plaintiff in cartel claims 
only to the extent they were in fact suffered by him. If the claimant has passed the 
overcharge on to indirect purchasers, there would be no reason why the defendants’ 
profits should be transferred to the claimant, without him being obliged to transfer it 
down the line to the indirect purchasers who suffered the actual loss. As judge 
Longmore explained, “neither the law of restitution nor the law of damages is in the 
business of transferring monetary gains from one undeserving recipient to another 
undeserving recipient even if the former has acted illegally while the latter has not.” 
450 Similarly, the Court’s judgment in Emerald Supplies Limited & Anr. v. British 
Airways plc 451 has provided support for the existence of a passing-on defence. In 
particular, the Court of Appeal’s acceptance that the defendant could plead the de-
fence against some members of the class, who had passed on any anti-competitive 
overcharge, might be perceived as implicit recognition of the availability of such a 
defence. Although the court has been aware of the difficulties related to proving and 
quantifying a pass-on,452 it stated that such problems are better dealt with by the 
legislature. It stated that they should not be dealt with by, for example stretching the 
use of representative actions to accommodate cases such as the one at hand. 
5.10.3 Availability of exemplary damages  
Although the idea of punitive damages453 originates from England,454 punitive dam-
ages have always been strictly limited in the English legal system. Far from being 
                                                        
449  Devenish Nutrition Limited v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) & Ors [2008] EWCA Civ 1086 
450  Devenish Nutrition Limited v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) & Ors [2008] EWCA Civ 1086, at 147. 
451  Emerald Supplies Ltd and Another v British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA Civ 1284. 
452  See a research paper by R. Mulheron entitled ‘Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: a 
Perspective of Need’ (February 2008). Mulheron summarised the problem of the ‘passing-on‘ de-
fence as: “one substantive law reason for the difficulty in bringing such actions, […] is the potential 
availability of the passing-on defence. This defence, where available, is a significant substantive law 
barrier to any party in the supply chain from bringing a follow-on action”. 
453  Here the reference is to the modern doctrine of punitive damages. The idea of non-compensatory 
damages itself was already known in ancient legal systems. See M. Rustad and T. Koenig, The His-
torical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers (1993) 42 American 
University Law Review (referring to the Babylonian Hammurabi Code, the Hindu Code of Manu, the 
Old Testament, the New Testament, and Roman Law), p. 1285. 
454  The English Courts first recognised the institution of punitive damages at the end of the eighteenth 
century. One of the earliest reported decisions in England involving punitive damages were Wilkes 
v. Wood (1763), Huckle v Money (1763) and Benson v Frederick (1766). See: J.W. de Gravelles, J.N. 
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encouraged as “an integral part of the common law tradition,”455 they often have 
been regarded as an anomaly of the civil law. As Judge Reid in Broome v Cassell456 
observed, they confuse the function of the civil law, which is to compensate, with the 
function of the criminal law, which is to inflict deterrent and punitive penalties. The 
arguments such as lack of procedural safeguards associated with punishment,457 en-
richment of the plaintiff by the imposition of a civil fine and uncertainty related to 
the fact that awards of exemplary damages are commonly decided by jury have justi-
fied “caution and restraint” in the making such awards.458 Indeed, English courts 
may459 introduce a punitive element in awarding damages but only in exceptional 
cases. In particular, they may award damages of a punitive nature when it is necessary 
to civilly punish the defendant for his outrageous conduct. In Rookes v Barnard,460 
the House of Lords through the speech of judge Devlin laid down three categories of 
cases in which punitive damages are appropriate461 (i) where the claimant has been 
the victim of oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional behaviour by public officers, 
(ii) where the defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for 
himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff and (iii) 
where it is authorised by statute.462 Judge Devlin also listed three considerations that 
should be born in mind by the courts when considering awards of exemplary dam-
ages. First, the plaintiff himself should be the victim of the punishable behaviour. 
Second, the power to award exemplary damages should be used with caution (an 
award of exemplary damages should be the minimum necessary to meet the public 
purpose underlying such damages that is of punishment and deterrence). Third, the 
focus tended to be on the means of the defendant.463  
                                                        
de Gravelles, Louisiana Punitive Damages – A Conflict of Traditions (2010) 70 Lousiana Law Review, 
pp. 579–614. 
455  The expression used by Judge in Barnes v Gorman, 257 F.3d 738, at 745. 
456  Broome v Cassell [1972] AC 1027, at 1089. 
457  Procedural safeguards include the privilege against self-incrimination, the requirement that the 
standard of proof be beyond reasonable doubt. See also Lord Reid in Broome v. Cassel [1972] 1 
E.R. 801. 
458  See: A. Reed, Jurisprudential Support for Exemplary Damages Awards: A Dichotomy Between Eng-
land and other Common Law Jurisdictions (1996) 5 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, pp. 459–
471; J.D. McCamus, Prometheus Bound or Loose Cannon? Punitive Damages for Pure Breach of 
Contract in Canada (2004) 41 San Diego Law Review, p. 1491; V. Wilcox, Punitive Damages in Eng-
land, in H. Koziol, V. Wilcox, B. Askeland, Punitive damages: common law and civil law perspectives (2009) 
Springer, Wien, p. 32 – 39. 
459  Under UK law, awarding punitive damages are in the discretion of the court. 
460  An action was brought for damages based on the tort of intimidation. 
461  In 1993, in AB v South West Water Services Ltd., the Court of Appeal greatly limited the types of 
cases in which punitive damages may be recovered, by holding that a claimant seeking punitive dam-
ages also had to satisfy the cause of action test. This test restricted the availability of punitive dam-
ages to causes of action for which prior to 1964 (i.e. when Rookes v Barnard [1964] All ER 367 was 
decided). In 2001 the AB was overruled by the House of Lords in Kuddus v Chief Constable of 
Leicestershire Constabulary. As a corollary, only the categories test need now be satisfied. 
462  See: V. Wilcox, Punitive Damages in England, in H. Koziol, V. Wilcox, B. Askeland: Punitive damages: 
common law and civil law perspectives (2009) Springer, Wien, pp. 8–10; J. Murphy (ed.), Street on Torts 
(2007) 12th edition, Oxford University Press, p. 638. 
463  Rookes v Barnard [1964] All ER 367, at 411. 
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On the same basis, ‘exemplary damage’, whereby a court imposes a sum over and 
above the compensatory element, is a discretionary remedy in the English legal sys-
tem and available only in exceptional cases. It is seen as a remedy of ‘last resort’.464 It 
has been recognised by the courts that the punitive effect as such is already inherent 
in compensatory damages.465 As the Report on damages says “every award of dam-
ages which is paid out of a defendant’s own pocket”[..] is likely adversely to affect 
him or her,” and continued that “in a loose sense, this effect can be, and often is, 
described as ‘punitive’.”466 Accordingly, an award of exemplary damages is a theoreti-
cal possibility in a case in which compensatory damages that defendants must pay will 
be inadequate to punish them for their conduct.467 As demonstrated in a recent 
case,468 antitrust cases are no different in this regard. The OFT found Cardiff Bus 
guilty of an abuse of dominance in November 2008, but it did not impose fine on it, 
based on the fact that Cardiff Bus’ revenues were relatively low and therefore the 
OFT considered the conduct to be “of minor significance”.469 2T brought a ‘follow-
on‘ claim for damages before the CAT under Section 47A of the Act 1998, alleging 
that it had suffered damage due to the operation of the White Service set up by Car-
diff Bus. It required that damages should be assessed on the basis of standard tortu-
ous ‘compensatory’ damages but also ‘exemplary’ damages. With regard to the exem-
plary damages, the CAT – for the first time in English competition law case470 – ruled 
in favour of the claimant. It awarded exemplary damages on the basis that the defen-
dant’s conduct fell within the Rookes v. Bernard test as being outrageous (first cate-
gory of the test) and was such that a compensatory award was insufficient (second 
category of the test). The CAT emphasised that the standard under the first category 
of the test requires more than a breach of competition law and that a claimant must 
plead that the defendant has acted with “an intentional or reckless disregard of an 
appreciated and unacceptable risk of causing an injurious result or whether it had 
deliberately closed its mind to such a risk”.471 Notwithstanding the high requirements 
for exemplary damages, the CAT found that the requirement for ‘outrageous’ behav-
iour by the defendant had been met. It found that the defendant had introduced its 
service solely to exclude 2T from the relevant market on the basis that they com-
menced at the same time and on the same routes, they intended to operate just before 
2 Travel’s services, the prices were designed to undercut 2T’s prices, they were intro-
duced without any consideration as to their cost or profitability and they were intro-
duced with minimal publicity. As OFT concluded the sole purpose of Cardiff Bus in 
                                                        
464  Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, Law Commission Report No. 247 (1997), p. 64. 
465  V. Wilcox, Punitive Damages in England, in H. Koziol, V. Wilcox, B. Askeland, Punitive damages: 
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operating the ‘White Services’ was to exclude 2 Travel from the market and therefore 
constituted a serious infringement of the Act 1998 Cardiff Bus. In addition, the CAT 
observed that the directors knew that what they were doing was illegal and had delib-
erately failed to take legal advice on the risk of infringement.  
With regard to the second category of the standard, the CAT considered the rele-
vance of fines for competition law infringements. The CAT took the view that since 
Cardiff Bus, as noted, had not been fined, exemplary damages, in principle, could be 
awarded against it. In contrast, if the party being sued had been fined by a competi-
tion law regulator (or would have been fined but benefited from immunity under a 
cartel leniency programme), an award of exemplary damages would not be appropri-
ate, as demonstrated in Devenish Nutrition v Sanofi-Aventis & Others. The case 
arose from a decision by the EU Commission, which found that 13 vitamin manufac-
turers had participated in a cartel, and thus infringed Article 101 TFEU. The EU 
Commission imposed fines.472 Subsequently, damages actions were commenced in 
the English courts against three of the cartel participants, including Aventis, which 
had not been fined as it had been granted leniency by the EU Commission.473 The 
claimants argued that the remedies of exemplary damages, restitutionary damages and 
an account of profits should be available to them in addition to the compensatory 
award. Relying on the case of Attorney General v Blake,474 they stated that compen-
satory damages alone would not be an adequate remedy. The Court concluded that 
the claimants were not entitled to over-compensatory damages, and rejected each of 
the claimed alternative remedies,475 including exemplary damages. An important fac-
tor in the court’s decision was the defendant’s argument that the award of exemplary 
damages would run contrary to the fundamental principle of ‘double jeopardy’ (ne bis 
in idem in EU law), that is, that a person should not be punished twice for the same 
wrongdoing. The court was of the view that a fine imposed by a competition author-
ity for an infringement of competition law served the same punitive and deterrent 
purpose.476 As the defendants had already been fined by the EU Commission for the 
same infringement, it would be in violation of the double jeopardy principle to award 
exemplary damages. They would be punished twice for the same wrong. 
The application of the principle of double jeopardy however, could be seen as 
more controversial when it applies to successful immunity applicants, whose fines 
were partly reduced or even reduced to zero. Certainly, the claimants in Devenish 
argued that the fines imposed by the EU Commission did not punish and deter the 
defendants. Pursuant to the EU Commission’s decision and despite a finding of a 
very serious infringement of the EU antitrust law, Aventis’s fine was reduced to zero 
                                                        
472  A. McDougall and A. Verzariu, Vitamins Litigation: Unavailability of Exemplary Damages, Restitu-
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p. 182. 
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475  See A. McDougall and A. Verzariu, Vitamins Litigation: Unavailability of Exemplary Damages, 
Restitutionary Damages and Account of Profits in Private Competition Law Claims, (2008) 29(3) 
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as a result of the application of the Leniency Notice. Benefiting from immunity, de-
fendants had actually not suffered any sanctions at all for their unlawful conduct. 
However, taking into account the EU considerations (effectiveness of leniency), the 
Court rejected the claimants’ argument. The Court was of the opinion that a reduc-
tion of the fine to zero was not reason enough to subject Aventis to further punish-
ment by an award of exemplary damages against them. As Justice Lewison noted, 
“application of the Leniency Notice serves the important policy aim that it is of even 
more importance to encourage whistleblowers than to punish participants in a car-
tel.”477 An award of exemplary damages against a defendant that had blown the whis-
tle on a cartel would risk undermining the important policy objectives pursued by 
whistleblowing regimes. In addition, the Court held that an award of exemplary dam-
ages would also run counter to a EU Commission decision fining the defendants. 
Since this form of damages also has the same intention as the EU Commission’s 
fines, deterrence and punishment, it follows that the award of exemplary damages 
essentially would be concluding that a fine levied by the EU Commission was inade-
quate and insufficient. This is not permitted. Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003/EC 
precludes national courts from taking decisions that run counter to a EU Commis-
sion decision. 
Returning to domestic considerations, the court in Devenish Nutrition consid-
ered whether exemplary damages could be awarded in the case of multiple claimants. 
In that case, the claimants were not the only persons affected by the unlawful con-
duct. The cartel that the EU Commission found had infringed the EU competition 
rules affected the market in the whole European Union. Therefore there were multi-
ple other claimants affected by the defendant’s conduct which were not before the 
court and this prevented the award of a restitutionary award. While these factors in 
themselves were not a bar to the award of exemplary damages, the court held that 
they pose a problem for the court to calculate them. 
Based on the judgements in 2 Travel Group PLC and Devenish Nutrition, two 
observations have to be made. First, it appears that due to the principle of double 
jeopardy, exemplary damages are unlikely to be available in follow-on actions but 
their availability is not absolutely excluded. When the competition law infringement 
in question is regarded as sufficiently outrageous, and the defendant had not been 
fined by a competition authority, then an award of exemplary damages is possible. 
Nevertheless, when deciding on exemplary damages, the court will consider whether 
there exist EU competition policy reasons as to why exemplary damages could not be 
imposed. As it had been established in Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis, 
such considerations are generally excluded in circumstances where a defendant had 
not been fined by a competition authority, but would have been fined if he had not 
benefited from leniency immunity. It is also clear the competition authority’s decision 
not to impose a fine due to the conduct being of “minor significance” does not con-
stitute a bar to making an award of exemplary damages.478 The judgements, in par-
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ticular the one in the Devenish case, indicate that there are concerns in relation to the 
accumulation of liability in public and private enforcement proceedings. These con-
cerns have been reinforced by the Devenish appeal proceedings,479 as it will be ex-
plained in next section. 
Second, although English law allows for exemplary damages, there is no doubt 
that the principle of full compensation is the rule from which the exceptions of su-
pra-compensatory exemplary damages depart. A finding of infringement by itself will 
not be sufficient to bring a successful action for exemplary damages. In order to 
bring a successful claim for exemplary damages under competition law it would be 
necessary to plead with precision the facts that establish that the competition law 
infringement was executed in either an intentional or reckless manner. In the absence 
of special requirements for an award of exemplary damages the compensation 
awarded must not exceed the loss. In addition, as case law shows, when fixing the 
size of the award of exemplary damages, the tribunal will take into account the com-
pensatory damages. In the 2T case, the CAT declined to use the penalty that might be 
imposed for a breach of the Chapter II prohibition for the basis (as suggested by the 
defendant). Instead, it noted that exemplary damages should have some relation to 
the compensatory damages being awarded (which it acknowledged were low in this 
case). It also took into account the economic size of the defendant (here, a relatively 
small company) and the fact that the defendant was connected with a public authority 
meant that a relatively low award should be sufficient to ensure punishment and de-
terrence.480 On this basis, it made a modest481 award of exemplary damages of 
£60,000. 
5.10.4 Availability of restitutionary damages 
As mentioned before on many occasions, under the English tort law, damages are 
normally assessed on the basis of injuries suffered by the claimant. Like exemplary 
remedies, restitutionary remedies are also awarded only in exceptional circumstances. 
Restitutionary remedies are assessed by reference to the defendant’s gain, and there-
fore they operate differently from ordinary remedies (compensatory damages). When 
the extent of the defendant’s gain reflects exactly what the claimant lost, only then 
the restitutionary remedy will restore to the claimant what he has lost.482 If the de-
fendant’s gain does not correspond to what the plaintiff lost, the effect of the restitu-
tionary remedy will not be the same. In such cases the defendant’s gain might exceed 
the plaintiff’s loss. To the extent that a restitutionary award (based on the defendant’s 
gain) is higher than compensatory award (based on the plaintiff’s loss), it constitutes 
                                                        
imposed by any enforcement body in the future. Thus, there is no risk of double counting or dupli-
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479  Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA [2008] EWCA Civ 1086. 
480  2 Travel Group plc v Cardiff City Transport Services Ltd [2012] CAT19, p. 216. 
481  K. Jones, R. Pike and F. Richmond, Global Guide to Competition Litigation England and Wales (2012), 
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482  G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (2006) second edition, Oxford University Press, p. 4. 
Chapter 5 
198 
 
an ‘unjust enrichment’. The defendant has been unjustly enriched at the claimant’s 
expense.483 In English law, restitutionary remedies can be justified on the ground that 
when the defendant has obtained a benefit at the claimant’s expense, justice demands 
that this should be restored to the claimant.484 Traditionally, they have only been 
available in tort cases where the nature of the tort has a proprietary element.485 If the 
claimant has a proprietary interest in property that has been received by the defen-
dant, the claimant will be able to make a claim to obtain a restitutionary remedy to 
vindicate this proprietary right.486 In particular, they have been granted for proprie-
tary torts, such trespass to goods,487 and trespass to land.488  
In the Devenish Nutrition Ltd case an English court considered (in addition to 
exemplary damages) restitutionary awards in the context of antitrust infringements.489 
The plaintiff relied upon the ruling in Attorney-General v Blake490 where a restitu-
tionary remedy was awarded for breach of contract. Acknowledging that historically 
gain-based remedies had only been available for proprietary torts, judge Nicholas in 
Attorney-General v Blake extended the availability of restitutionary remedies to 
breach of contract cases in exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, he did not ad-
dress whether this principle applied to non-proprietary torts in general or breach of 
statutory duty in particular.491 The reasoning suggested that it might be possible for 
the court to extend restitutionary remedies to the non-proprietary tort of breach of 
statutory duty.492 However, in the case of Devenish the first instance judge concluded 
that by reasoning of his previous decisions in Stoke-on-Trent City Council v W J 
Wass Ltd 493 and Halifax Building Society v Thomas,494 it was not a general law rule 
that a restitutionary award should be available in all tort cases. Feeling bound by its 
previous decisions, it dismissed the claimants’ claims for restitutionary damages.495 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision at the first instance. It reiterated the 
general principle of English law that damages can be claimed for loss suffered as a 
result of the breach of an obligation owed to the claimant. Restitutionary damages 
could be available only in exceptional circumstances when compensatory damages 
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alone would not be an ‘adequate’ remedy for the claimant.496 In the Devenish Nutri-
tion case compensatory damages were an “adequate” remedy497 since there were no 
circumstances that would justify departing from the normal award of compensatory 
damages. The fact that there were evidential difficulties in proving loss, because it 
appeared that Devenish might have passed the defendant’s overcharge to its custom-
ers, did not automatically render damages inadequate. It was also noted that such a 
restitutionary award would give Devenish an unjustified windfall.498 In other words, 
an additional barrier against restitutionary award was the fact that such an award 
might provide Devenish with an additional award as it had passed the overcharge on 
to its purchasers. 
It follows from the Devenish case that the Court saw no legally justified reason 
to treat claimants in antitrust damage cases differently from claimants in other dam-
ages cases. Award of restitutionary damages is not a rule in the English legal system. 
As judge Longmore put it, “cartels are not exceptional in that sense. It is difficult to 
see how one cartel could be more exceptional than another.” 499 He noted that if a 
restitutionary award was permitted in the present case, it would quickly become the 
norm and would be required in all cartel cases. Nevertheless, he did acknowledge the 
policy was aimed at encouraging competition law damages actions, as reflected in the 
EU Commission’s White Paper. Compensatory damages alone do not encourage 
potential claimants. The availability of a restitutionary award could have been a 
change towards giving incentive to more claimants, leading to an increase in damage 
actions. In his concurring ruling, judge Longmore stated, “the only real argument in 
favour of an order for account of profits is the argument of policy that cartels are a 
notorious evil, and the civil courts should in some way provide an incentive for their 
eradication by making such an order”.500 However, he declined the invitation to insti-
tute a new regime of “gains-based damages” for antitrust claims in order to pursue a 
policy objective to encourage private actions. He said that it was not for the courts to 
take this step on their own initiative, especially when there are so many other policy-
makers actively considering reform in this area. Compensatory damages have been 
and still are the normal remedy that apply in civil wrong, including breaches of com-
petition rules. 
5.10.5 Conclusions on damages 
In the White Paper the EU Commission has dropped its initial idea to introduce a 
punitive damages regime. Instead it embraced the principle of compensation and left 
the question on non-compensatory damages to the discretion of the individual Mem-
ber States. In this part, English law and the EU Commission’s policy with regard to 
the issue of damages are similar. Under English law, damages are compensatory in 
nature and therefore the main purpose of awarding damages is to compensate. Puni-
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tive damages are also available, but as argued above, they are within the discretion of 
the Court and awarded only in exceptional circumstances. Due to the punitive char-
acter their availability is even more restricted in the area of antitrust law, in particular 
when the defendant has been already fined by a regulator (follow-on cases). It has 
been held that the imposition of punitive damages in a follow-on action would con-
flict with the double jeopardy principle as in essence it involves two monetary penal-
ties. Another strong point which can be brought against exemplary damages is that 
they contain elements such as punishment and deterrence, and as such they overlap 
criminal law.501 Therefore it appears that generally English Courts will not permit 
recovery of non-compensatory damages. 
With regard to the recoverability of ‘pure economic loss‘, the English traditional 
approach does not reflect the EU approach to the issue. Concerning the scope of 
damages that are recoverable, the EU Commission held that courts in principle must 
compensate the claimant fully for its loss, including awarding damages for loss of 
profits and interest. National legal systems should not exclude the possibility of ob-
taining reparation for pure economic loss. In the Crehan case,502 which was overruled 
by the House of Lords, there was no suggestion that the further losses claimed were 
not recoverable in principle. However, what has to be noted here is that the Court 
emphasised many times that if the case had been decided purely according to English 
law, it would have been decided differently. The general orientation of English law is 
that pure economic loss is the concern of the law of contract and thus it is normally 
not recoverable outside the area of contract. In tort law it is recoverable only in ex-
ceptional circumstances.503 The question of its recovery will depend on the merits of 
the case. Recovery of pure economic loss as a rule would go against the principles 
underlying the English tort law and tort litigation. Firstly, the English tort law recog-
nises physical loss as the primary head of damage. In principle, pure economic loss 
does not fall under this category of loss. There is no legal basis for its recognition. 
Allowing recovery of loss that is not consequential upon any physical damage suf-
fered by a plaintiff therefore would appear to introduce a new ‘head of damage’ in 
English law. Secondly, English law puts a strong emphasis on the foreseeability of the 
damage. As discussed above, the English courts have not objected to recovery of 
pure economic loss because the loss was purely economic: their rejection has often 
been justified by saying that no duty of care is owed, and that the loss is too remote, 
in other words it is not foreseeable. In common law, the test of foreseeability is an 
essential element of tort law. It limits, on one hand, a plaintiff`s entitlement, and on 
the other hand, a defendant’s liability to events and consequences that are objectively 
capable of being anticipated. Limiting liability for antitrust infringement by using 
foreseeability reflects the idea that an individual cannot be responsible for uncertain 
damage. It follows that accepting recoverability of pure economic loss as a rule con-
travenes the English principles and approach to damages. However, as discussed 
above, exclusion of the possibility of obtaining reparation for ‘pure economic loss’ (in 
the form of lost profit) is an obstacle for efficient enforcement of EU competition 
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law, which has also been recognised by the English courts. The issue will be ad-
dressed further in Section 6.3.3. 
5.10.6 Conclusions on passing-on 
Although the passing-on defence is not recognised as such by English law or case 
law, there are grounds for its applicability. First, the primary object of an award of 
damages in the UK courts is to compensate for the injury actually suffered by the 
plaintiff. This stems from the underlying principle that the purpose of private actions 
is to compensate for loss, not to act as a deterrent. Exclusion of the passing-on de-
fence in circumstances in which there remained the possibility of indirect purchaser 
actions would mean that the tortfeasor would be obliged to compensate for the same 
damage several times. This would lead to the introduction of a punitive element in 
UK proceedings.504 Second, the claimant is under an obligation to mitigate his loss if 
he is reasonably able to do so.505 The passing on of damages could be viewed as a 
method of mitigating the amount of damages. Third, based on the grounds that com-
pensation should only be recoverable in respect of losses actually suffered rather than 
the entire amount of overcharge, the claimant is entitled to compensation only to the 
extent that they had suffered loss. Therefore the defendant might be able to claim 
that the claimant in fact did not suffer any loss, as it passed on the effects of the in-
fringement. If the passing-on defence were to be excluded, it would contradict the 
mentioned principles by over-compensating and unjustly enriching the direct pur-
chaser. This would represent a significant exception to the traditional stance of the 
UK courts.  
It is evident that the passing-on defence fits into the English system under the 
general civil liability principles recognised in English law. What is even more impor-
tant is that the legal system itself already provides mechanisms whereby a direct pur-
chaser or indirect purchaser can claim damages to the amount equal to his individual 
loss. To comply with the burden of proof, the plaintiff (direct purchaser or indirect 
purchaser) in a private antitrust damage action has to submit evidence of the damage 
suffered and the causality between the infringement and the damage. In contrast, the 
defendant has the right, but also the burden of proof, to show that the victim has 
successfully passed on (part of) its damage to their customers (indirect purchasers). In 
this respect the defendant has to prove that there is a causal link between the in-
fringement and the passing-on, in particular, that the price increase in the down-
stream market was not caused by other economic factors. If we look at the few anti-
trust cases on the issue, we find that courts actually applied general principles when 
concluding that claimants will not be entitled to damage award with respect to dam-
ages they passed along to their customers.506 
With regard to the EU Commission’s proposition on rebuttable presumption that 
the whole of the illegal overcharge has been passed on, two observations have to be 
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made. Firstly, under English law the similar effect of the rule of shifting the burden 
of proving damages is already achieved by disclosure rules. Under the disclosure rule, 
a party is obliged to disclose to the other side all documents on which it relies and 
which adversely affect the other party’s case, but also all the documents that support 
another party’s case and could adversely affect its own case. A possible lack of plain-
tiff’s evidence – which was the reason for the EU Commission to propose shifts of 
burdens of proof – is remedied by inter-parties disclosure under English law.507 Sec-
ondly, the mechanisms of rebuttable presumptions and legal and evidential burdens 
of proof exist within the English law of evidence. From this point of view, the legal 
presumption of overcharge would not be a new concept in English law. However, it 
can be argued that the fact that the damage in some instances is difficult to prove is a 
reason for introducing presumptions. Under the general rule, the party holding the 
affirmative of the issue must produce the evidence to prove the issue. Since the 
claimant affirmatively asserts the claim, the defendant assumes no burden of proof by 
merely denying the claim. Accordingly, the plaintiff is the one who has to provide 
facts that would form the basis of assessment of the damages to which he would be 
entitled. He is the one who has to prove the existence and the quantum of damages. 
In the event that he subsequently passed on the damages to a subsequent purchaser, 
he would be unable to prove that he has suffered the part of damage that he passed 
on. The plaintiff will not be entitled to this part of damages, regardless whether the 
defendant has invoked the passing-on defence or not. In contrast, if the burden of 
proof is put on the defendant, the defendant will have to prove that the overcharge 
was not passed on, or that it was only partially passed on, even when he has not try-
ing to rely on the passing-on defence against a direct purchaser. This could result in 
an unfair position for the defendant but it might also conflict with the principle of 
full compensation and avoidance of over-compensation. If the defendant is not able 
to prove that the overcharge was not passed on to the indirect purchasers, the plain-
tiff could receive compensation for damage that he has not suffered.  
5.11 Limitation periods 
There are two different limitation periods that apply for bringing an antitrust damage 
action, depending on whether the action is brought before the High Court or before 
the CAT. Claims brought in the High Court are subject to the general limitation rule 
that applies to tort claims, which is generally six years from the time when the cause 
of action occurred. By contrast, damages actions before the CAT must generally be 
brought within two years of the “relevant date”. 
5.11.1 Limitation period for bringing a High Court action  
In England, as in any other jurisdiction, legal proceedings generally must be started 
within a certain period of time. Limitation periods are set mainly by the Limitation 
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Act 1980 (as amended by the Latent Damage Act 1986), which imposes different 
time periods for different types of claims. As the law stands,508 the general rule is that 
actions in tort are subject to a limitation period of six years starting from the date on 
which the cause of action accrued.509 When a cause of action is actionable without 
proof of damage (for example, defamation claims, nuisance and trespass), time clearly 
runs from the date of commission of the wrongful act. In contrast, in tort where 
damage is an essential element of the cause of action – as it is in breach of statutory 
duty – the cause of action accrues when the damage is suffered.510 Since competition 
claims in the High Court are brought on the basis of the tort of breach of statutory 
duty,511 they will be also subject to the limitation rules that apply to this kind of tort. 
Thus, antitrust damage actions (both follow-on and stand-alone actions) accrue when 
the breach has occurred, i.e. when the infringement of the relevant competition pro-
vision has been committed. It is important to note that in these cases that while oc-
currence of damage is generally needed before time begins to run, discoverability of 
the damage is trivial. It is irrelevant if, at the date of accrual of the cause of action, the 
claimant did not know that he had suffered damage.512 Similarly, it is irrelevant if at 
the end of the period the plaintiff still does not know of his cause of action. 
English law provides for an exception to the general rule on limitation period for 
torts. Where the action is based on the fraud of the defendant or where any fact rele-
vant to the claimant’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the 
defendant, the six-year limitation period will be postponed until the claimant discov-
ers such concealment or could with “reasonable diligence” have discovered it.513 For 
the limitation period to be postponed, it is not sufficient that the defendant has 
merely concealed facts that would strengthen the claim: these facts should be central 
to the claimant’s case against the defendant.514 Section 32 (2) of the Limitation Act 
1980 (hereafter ‘LA 80’) also provides some directions on what constitutes “deliber-
ate concealment”, stating that deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circum-
stances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate 
concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty. Following case law,515 if the 
defendant intentionally commits an act or omission which amounts to a breach of 
duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time, the 
claimant can rely on Section 32 LA 80 to postpone the commencement of the period 
                                                        
508  In July 2001, the Law Commission published a report in which it recommended that the current 
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of limitation.516 In contrast, “deliberate concealment” as defined in Section 32 LA 80 
is not satisfied if the defendant did something which later has been found to have 
been a breach of duty but at the time when he did it, he did not realise that it was a 
breach of duty.517  
In the competition context, it would appear that concealed practices such as car-
tels would satisfy the requirement of ‘deliberate concealment’.518 By their nature car-
tels usually involve secret conspiracies among two or more businesses. Cartelists take 
deliberate steps in order to conceal their existence, in particular from customers. 
Subsequently, those who are likely to have been harmed (for example by paying in-
flated prices) are unlikely to know that the cartel exists and that they are suffering 
loss. These facts might not be known to them until years after the cartel activity 
ceased. In this case, the limitation period of 6 years could be postponed under Sec-
tion 32 LA 80. However, other antitrust practices that do not satisfy the requirement 
of ‘deliberate concealment,’ are not in the ambit of Section 32 LA 80. This does not 
pose a problem in cases in which the antitrust infringement is obvious to a potential 
claimant. For example, if a company abuses its dominant position by refusing to deal 
with the plaintiff, the plaintiff is usually aware of the violation from the day on which 
the deal was refused and therefore it will have enough time to file a damage claim 
before the expiry of the relevant 6 year limitation period. The situation is different if a 
company that has a dominant position has been transparent and has not intended to 
abuse its dominance. Its conduct is not prima facie likely to distort competition (‘re-
striction by object’), but in the circumstances given it has led to distortion of compe-
tition (‘restriction by effect’). In this case the time between the occurrence of damage 
and the time of awareness of the wrongful act could be very long.519 Consequently 
the limitation period might expire before the plaintiff can file a claim, even if he has a 
string of evidence supporting his claim. As such, the limitation period would affect 
negatively both deterrence and compensation and in turn run would counter to the 
EU principle of effectiveness. It would deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to 
enforce his EU right to damages before the national court. As the CJEU in the Man-
fredi case held, the duration of the limitation period should not be so short that, 
combined with other factors of the limitation period, it renders the right to damages 
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practically impossible or excessively difficult.520 An analogy can also be drawn from 
Barth v Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Forschung,521 when the CJEU 
ruled that EU law does not preclude a national authority from relying on the expiry 
of a reasonable limitation period unless the existence of a limitation period results in 
totally depriving a person of the opportunity to enforce his rights before the national 
courts. 
Returning to conditions for concealment to be established, having found that 
concealment has taken place, it is then a question as to when a party has discovered 
or could have discovered the concealment with ‘reasonable diligence’. As said above, 
under Section 32(1) LA 80 the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the 
claimant has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake or could have done so 
with “reasonable diligence”. What constitutes “reasonable diligence” will depend on 
the specific context and circumstances of the case in question. Although outside the 
competition context, it has been held that a claimant is not required to do everything 
possible or use all the means at his disposal to discover the fraud: it is only required 
that he do what an ordinarily prudent person would do, having regard to all the cir-
cumstances.522 The burden is on the claimant to show that he had exercised reason-
able diligence.523 In the competition context, in a case in which a final infringement 
decision has been taken by the EU Commission or the OFT (follow-on action),524 a 
defendant might advance a limitation defence, arguing that the existence of the com-
petition authority’s decision prevented the “reasonable diligence” standard being 
fulfilled. Although there is no known case law on the subject, it appears unlikely that 
an English court would dismiss such a defence. Of perhaps greater interest is know-
ing whether the court would uphold the defence in case where a competition author-
ity has started an investigation but no final decision has been taken yet. The question 
remains whether the competition authority’s investigation per se could lead the 
claimant to discover the antitrust conduct with reasonable diligence. 
With regard to the ‘knowledge’ that is required for a limitation period to run, it is 
knowledge of the material facts about the damage and also of the other facts. The 
material facts are described as facts about the damage that would lead a reasonable 
person to consider it sufficiently serious to justify instituting proceedings for dam-
ages.525 The other facts are (a) facts that the damage was attributable in whole or in 
part to the act or omission that is alleged to constitute negligence, (b) the identity of 
the defendant and (c) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person 
other than the defendant, then the identity of that person and the additional facts 
supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant. Therefore time will start 
to run from the date of that knowledge if the court is satisfied that the claimant could 
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reasonably have ascertained the information listed above. As Judge Donaldson of 
Lymington explained in Halford v Brookes526 knowledge “clearly does not mean 
knowing for certain and beyond possibility of contradiction.” However it does mean 
“knowing with sufficient confidence to justify embarking on the preliminaries to the 
issue of a writ, such as submitting a claim to the proposed defendant, taking advice, 
and collecting evidence.” In other words, the claimant must know enough for it to be 
reasonable to begin to investigate further.527 
5.11.2 Limitation period for bringing a CAT’s action 
A special limitation regime applies to follow-on actions brought in the CAT. Section 
47A of the CA 98 provides that a damages action based on a decision of the EU 
Commission or UK regulator may not be brought in the CAT until after that decision 
has established the relevant infringement. Such a claim must be brought within a 
period of two years from (i) the date on which the decision can no longer be ap-
pealed528 or (ii) the date on which a cause of action accrued.529 As summarised by the 
CAT in its ruling,530 claimants relying on a competition authority’s decision to bring a 
claim under section 47A of the CA 98 have a fixed “two year window” within which 
to do so. In the BCL Old Co. Limited case the Court of Appeal has clarified when 
this two year window opens. It held that only appeals to the finding of an infringe-
ment are relevant in this context. Appeals in respect of the level of the fine imposed 
by the regulator do not postpone the opening of the two year window. In other 
words, the suspensive effect of an appeal only applies if liability is challenged – there 
is no suspension in the case of a challenge to penalty alone. In the BCL Old Co. Lim-
ited case the defendant had appealed the level of the fine imposed by the EU Com-
mission531 but not the finding of the existence of a cartel. Based on the facts of that 
case, the two-year period commenced on the day on which the time to appeal against 
the infringement decision had expired (i.e. January 2002). Consequently, the limita-
tion period to bring a damage claim had expired in January 2004, four years before 
the damage claim was brought in 2008. On appeal, the Court of Appeal confirmed 
that the claim was time-barred. 
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The ruling of the Supreme Court in the BCL Old Co. Limited is also important 
because it affirmed the restrictive “two year window” for bringing follow-on claims 
by denying the CAT a power to extend the time limit set out in the CA 98. Once the 
statutory deadline for bringing a follow-on damages claim has expired the CAT has 
no power to extend it. In the Supreme Court the appellant (BCL) argued that the 
operation of the relevant limitation period for bringing follow-on damages claims 
(the difficulty in determining the applicable limitation period and the absence of any 
discretion to extend that time) has created significant legal uncertainty and breached 
the EU principles of effectiveness. According to the last one, national rules may not 
“render practically impossible or excessively difficult” for the claimants to exercise 
their EU law right to seek damages for breach of competition law. In a judgment 
given by Judge Mance, the Supreme Court found that the statutory limitation period 
is sufficiently clear, precise and foreseeable to allow individuals to ascertain and exer-
cise their rights and obligations without excessive difficulty. In the Court’s view, CA 
98 made it sufficiently clear that only infringement decisions are relevant for deter-
mining the limitation period for bringing a follow-on damages claim. Moreover, there 
was no doubt that BASF’s appeal had been on the amount of the fine only and that 
BCL were under no illusions in this regard. For the Court it was clear that follow-on 
claimants could use the Section 47A CA 98 procedure in the way it was intended. In 
this circumstance there had been no breach of EU law. Indeed, there is no violation 
of the EU duty under Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003,532 according to which the 
national courts cannot take decisions that run counter to a decision adopted by the 
EU Commission or give decisions which would conflict with decisions contemplated 
by the EU Commission. If an appeal on the level of the fine imposed by the EU 
Commission has been launched and a claim for damage caused by the anticompeti-
tive conduct (that was the ground for the fine) has been brought before the court, the 
possibility of conflicts between the decision of the EU Commission and the one of 
the court is excluded. On the appeal level, the competent court may reduce the level 
of the fine but may not challenge findings that are relevant to the finding of antitrust 
infringement. Not only that accepting suspension of the limitation period in these 
circumstances does not contravene EU law, it may even undermine its effectiveness. 
The claimant would be prevented from proceeding with an action before the CAT 
until the outcome of an appeal brought on the level of fines, even though the out-
come of the appeal would not have any influence on the finding of the infringement. 
This could significantly delay recovery by the claimant. 
The ruling of the Supreme Court in the BCL Old Co. Limited is also important 
because it affirmed the “two year window” for bringing follow-on claims by denying 
the CAT a power to extend the time limit set out in the CA 98. Once the statutory 
deadline for bringing a follow-on damages claim has expired the CAT has no power 
to extend it.533 In the Supreme Court the appellant (BCL) argued that the operation 
of the relevant limitation period for bringing follow-on damages claims (the difficulty 
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in determining the applicable limitation period and the absence of any discretion to 
extend that time) has created significant legal uncertainty and breached the EU prin-
ciples of effectiveness. According to the last one, national rules may not “render 
practically impossible or excessively difficult” for the claimants to exercise their EU 
law right to seek damages for breach of competition law. In a judgment given by 
Judge Mance, the Supreme Court found that the statutory limitation period is suffi-
ciently clear, precise and foreseeable to allow individuals to ascertain and exercise 
their rights and obligations without excessive difficulty. In the Court’s view, CA 98 
made it sufficiently clear that only infringement decisions are relevant for determining 
the limitation period for bringing a follow-on damages claim. Moreover, there was no 
doubt that BASF’s appeal had been on the amount of the fine only and that BCL 
were under no illusions in this regard. For the Court it was clear that follow-on claim-
ants could use the Section 47A CA 98 procedure in the way it was intended. In this 
circumstance there had been no breach of EU law. Indeed, there is no violation of 
the EU duty under Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003,534 according to which the na-
tional courts cannot take decisions that run counter to a decision adopted by the EU 
Commission or give decisions which would conflict with decisions contemplated by 
the EU Commission. If an appeal on the level of the fine imposed by the EU Com-
mission has been launched and a claim for damage caused by the anticompetitive 
conduct (that was the ground for the fine) has been brought before the court, the 
possibility of conflicts between the decision of the EU Commission and the one of 
the court is excluded. On the appeal level, the competent court may reduce the level 
of the fine but may not challenge findings that are relevant to the finding of antitrust 
infringement. Not only that accepting suspension of the limitation period in these 
circumstances does not contravene EU law, it may even undermine its effectiveness. 
The claimant would be prevented from proceeding with an action before the CAT 
until the outcome of an appeal brought on the level of fines, even though the out-
come of the appeal would not have any influence on the finding of the infringement. 
This could significantly delay recovery by the claimant. 
Another recent judgment of the Court of Appeal (Deutsche Bahn AG & Ors v. 
Morgan Crucible Company Plc & Ors535) added further clarity to the limitation rules. 
Importantly, the limitation period does not begin to run before the proceeding is 
pending at the EU Commission, unless the CAT grants special permission.536 It 
means that, generally speaking, claimants may not bring a claim for damages before 
the infringement decision has become final. The question is, when does the time start 
to run against a defendant who has not appealed an EU Commission infringement 
decision in circumstances in which other addressees of the decision have lodged 
appeals. This is of significant practical importance as many infringement decision 
results in appeals by some (or all of the addressees).  
                                                        
534  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Official Journal L 1, 04.01.2003. 
535  Deutsche Bahn AG & Ors v. Morgan Crucible Company Plc & Ors [2012] EWCA Civ 1055. 
536  Sections 47A(7) and (8) of CA 98 and CAT rule 31(3). 
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The Deutsche Bahn case537 involved a damage claim brought by the plaintiff fol-
lowing on from the EU Commission’s decision in 2003 finding that the defendant 
(Morgan Crucible), together with a number of other undertakings participated in a 
cartel in the carbon and graphite products market. After the EU Commission issued a 
decision on 3 December 2003 appeals to the European courts were made by a num-
ber of the addressees of the EU Commission’s decision. The last appeal was dis-
missed by the Court of Justice on 12 November 2009. One of the addressees, Mor-
gan Crucible, an immunity applicant, had not appealed. In December 2010, Deutsche 
Bahn, alleging that it had suffered loss as a result of Morgan Crucible’s competition 
law infringement, commenced a follow-on action in the CAT. The action has been 
followed by an appeal. There was no dispute that the EU Commission’s decision was 
a “decision” falling within Section 47A(6)(d) CA 98, but the issue of the Morgan 
Crucible case was whether the claim had been brought within the time limits speci-
fied in rule 31 of the CAT Rules. The relevant date was that laid down in rule 
31(2)(a), specifying that the relevant date was the end of “the period during which 
proceedings against the decision or finding may be instituted in the European Court”. 
The defendant argued that the ‘decision’ referred to in section 47A CA 98, deemed to 
be an individual decision addressed to a specific defendant rather than any decision 
addressed to the cartelists as a whole. Accordingly, in this case the two-year limitation 
period would have expired in February 2006 and not in November 2011, as argued by 
the plaintiff. If this was the case, Deutsche Bahn’s claim would be time-barred. The 
Court disagreed with the defendant’s view and held that this approach was irrelevant 
to the meaning of the limitation rules. Endorsing the Emerson I ruling,538 it held that 
the two year limitation period under rule 31 of the CAT Rules does not begin to run 
against any addressee until the time for appealing against the EU Commission’s deci-
sion has expired against all of them.  
This was an important and long-awaited judgment, by which the Court rejected 
the view (which was also the view of the CAT)539 that a decision of the EU Commis-
sion was to be treated as a “bundle of individual decisions” that each addressee had 
committed an infringement. Accordingly, for the purposes of applying the CAT’s 
rules on limitation periods, a “decision” means an overall decision as against a par-
ticular addressee. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Deutsche Bahn AG’s 
damage action was not time-barred and that it could wait until all appeals by any 
addressee had been exhausted before bringing a claim. 
It can be said, that the judgments in BCL Old Co. Limited and Deutsche Bahn540 
considerably contributed to a greater certainty and clarity as to the operation and 
application of the limitation period in follow-on antitrust cases. Since they makes it 
much easier to determine whether a claim in the CAT may be out of time, the tribu-
nal can focus more on the compensation of those parties who are adversely affected 
by anti-competitive behaviour. As an author explained, the Deutsche Bahn judge-
ment reduces the possibilities that antitrust infringers would rely upon technical ar-
                                                        
537  Deutsche Bahn AG & Ors v. Morgan Crucible Company Plc & Ors [2012] EWCA Civ 1055. 
538  Emerson [2007] CAT 28. 
539  Case No: 1173/5/7/10 Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan Crucible Company Plc [2011] CAT 16. 
540  Deutsche Bahn AG & Ors v. Morgan Crucible Company Plc & Ors [2012] EWCA Civ 1055. 
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guments on limitation in an attempt to evade responsibility and therefore deterring 
affected parties from being properly compensated for their losses.541 The Deutsche 
Bahn judgement also gives a claimant more time to prepare and sue an addressee 
antitrust infringer who has not appealed against the competition authority’s finding. 
Of course, in order to benefit from the court’s ruling, as the Deutsche Bahn and BCL 
Old cases demonstrated, when there are appeals the claimant will need to assess the 
nature of the appeals to determine whether any element of the infringement finding 
against any of the addressees of the decision is the subject of the appeal. In this situa-
tion, the claimant will need to follow closely the progress of the appeals through the 
appeal court, including the prospect and progress of any further appeals. 
In addition, it has to be noted that the judgement in the Deutsche Bahn case was 
also in line with the policy of preservation of ‘effectiveness of leniency’. By adopting 
a wide interpretation of the meaning of the ‘decision’ referred to in section 47A(8) 
CA 98, the risk of discouraging potential leniency applicants is avoided. As illustrated 
in Emerson,542 which was a separate private damages action against Morgan Crucible 
and other participants of the carbon and graphite products cartel, the recipients of 
immunity are unlikely to appeal the decision and therefore might become targets for 
damage actions. In this case, Morgan Crucible had not appealed the EU Commis-
sion’s infringement decision since it had benefited from 100 per cent immunity in 
fines under the EU Commission’s leniency policy. The other addressees lodged ap-
peals before the CFI. In the subsequent civil procedure the claimants brought a dam-
ages claim against Morgan Crucible under Section 47A CA 98. The CAT ruled that 
that the time does not start to run until all appeals against an infringement decision 
have been determined.543 The claim in question therefore was premature. This result 
was of particular concern in relation to infringers who have obtained leniency and 
therefore less likely to appeal. Since wrongdoers have joint and several liability to 
claimants, the infringer who has chosen not to appeal might have to bear all the dam-
ages until the appeals have ended and it can seek to recover a share from the other 
wrongdoers. If the CAT had ruled differently it could have encouraged the bringing 
of follow-on claims only against whistleblowers or immunity recipients, who typically 
do not appeal competition authority infringement decisions. This would undermine 
the EU Commission’s leniency programme. However, in the Emerson case the CAT 
decided to exercise its discretion so as to allow the action against Morgan Crucible to 
be brought when the appeals to the CFI were on-going. The decision to grant per-
mission was based on ‘legitimate concerns’ about the preservation and the future 
availability of the documents currently being held by Morgan.  
5.11.3 Length and extension of the limitation period 
An important difference that exists between limitation periods that apply in a High 
Court and the CAT is in terms of their extension. As mentioned earlier, when an 
                                                        
541  L. Craig, T. Bolster, United Kingdom: Deutsche Bahn AG & others v Morgan Crucible (2011) 4(4) 
Global Competition Litigation Review, pp. 45–46.  
542  Emerson Electric Co v Morgan Crucible Company plc [2007] CAT 28. 
543  Emerson Electric Co v Morgan Crucible Company plc [2007] CAT 28. 
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action is brought in the High Court, in principle the expiration of the period is speci-
fied by statue and depends on the cause of action being pursued. In cases of actions 
for breach of contract and tort the limitation period is of six years. Despite the state-
ment in various parts of LA 80 that an action “shall not be brought after the expira-
tion of the […] years,” there is nothing to prevent a claimant to start proceeding 
outside this time. In this case however, the defendant will have a defence that an 
action brought after the relevant limitation period has passed and therefore the claim 
will be time-barred. Since limitation periods are considered as a defence rather than as 
a statutory requirement, the defendant can waive his right to rely on the defence.544 
Accordingly, the parties to litigation or potential litigation can agree to suspend the 
limitation period. To do so, there must be a “clear, unequivocal and unconditional 
promise” 545 by the defendant that he will not raise the limitation defence against the 
plaintiff. 
What is important to note is that Section 33 LA 80 gives the court discretion to 
extend or disregard the statutory time limits if it considers it equitable to do so. The 
Act lists a number of guidelines that the courts will review, including (a) the length of 
and reasons for the delay, (b) any prevarication or lack of cooperation from the de-
fendant, (c) how promptly and reasonably the claimant acted once it was realised 
there was an action; and (d) any disability suffered by the claimant. Although a wide 
discretion is given to the court,546 the discretion is not general. It will not apply to 
actions brought other than for death or personal injury. Therefore in competition 
cases the court does not have discretion to extend the limitation period. 
In contrast, if a claim is brought in the CAT the two year period within which a 
claim must be brought is prescribed by the CAT Rules and cannot be extended by 
agreement between the potential claimant and the intended defendant. As the Su-
preme Court in the BCL Old Co. Limited stated, it is also not in the CAT’s power to 
do so. Once the statutory deadline for bringing a follow-on damages claim has ex-
pired, the action is time-barred. The “two year window” for bringing follow-on dam-
age actions in the CAT is unchangeable.  
5.11.4 Conclusions on limitation periods 
The EU Commission has suggested in the White Paper that the limitation period 
should not start running before the victim can reasonably be expected to have 
knowledge of the infringement and of the harm it caused him. Under English law, the 
basic rule in tort is that time will run for six years from the date when the cause of 
action occurred. Here, the crucial date is the date of damage and not its discovery. In 
principle, the fact that the plaintiff still does not know of his cause of action at the 
end of this period is deemed irrelevant. However, it should be noted that generally 
                                                        
544  In contrast, the two year period within which a claim must be brought in the CAT is prescribed by 
the CAT Rules and cannot be extended by agreement between the potential claimant and the in-
tended defendant. Emerson I (Emerson Electric Co and ors v Morgan Crucible Co Plc [2007] CAT 
28) at par.109. 
545  Seechurn v Ace Insurance SA-NV [2002] EWCA Cir 67. 
546  J. Murphy, Street on Torts (2007) 12th edition, Oxford University Press, pp. 654–655. 
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such a rule does not pose problems when applied to competition cases. The com-
mencement of the limitation period can be delayed if the claimant can establish “de-
liberate concealment” on the side of the defendant and bring the claim under Section 
32 LA 80. Accordingly, if a claimant is unaware that he has a claim and he was put 
into this situation due to deliberate concealment by the defendant of a fact relevant to 
the claimant’s action, the six-year limitation period will be postponed until the claim-
ant discovers such concealment. In other words, such concealment will give rise to an 
estoppel barring the plaintiff from alleging that the action is time-barred.547 The bur-
den of proof rests on the claimant. An important point is that, as the analysis showed, 
appearance of “deliberate concealment” will not automatically apply to all antitrust 
cases. Therefore certain cases might not fall under this rule. 
It follows that, strictly speaking, the English approach to limitation periods for 
tort claims does not reflect the views of the EU Commission on the issue. The ques-
tion arises, what impact the introduction of the rule – according to which the starting 
date of the limitation period is the date of awareness of the violation and correspond-
ing harm – would have on the English system. After all, the implementation of the 
EU Commission’s proposal would lead to set one solution – the date of awareness of 
the violation and corresponding harm – for all types of anticompetitive conduct. 
Under English law, different starting dates of the limitation period apply to different 
types of allegations of anticompetitive conduct. In cases in which the plaintiff is pre-
vented from knowing of the claim, limitation periods do not start to run before 
claimants have suffered damage or know that they have suffered damage. In all other 
cases, when the damage almost invariably arises at the date of the relevant event, it 
may be reasonable to provide that the date of the event will be the commencement 
date of the limitation period. As such, the limitation system is structured to provide 
fairness to both plaintiffs and defendants. It provides for plaintiffs to have sufficient 
time to acknowledge that they have claims, to investigate their claims and to com-
mence proceedings.  
As to follow-on actions, the EU Commission’s proposal that the limitation pe-
riod for follow-on should not start until the infringement decision on which the 
claimant relies has become final, in principle is reflected in the section 47A of the CA 
1998. Section 47A provides that there is the two-year limitation period after that date 
within which proceedings may be brought. As they are applied by the court, they do 
not contravene the EU Commission’s enforcement policy (i.e. leniency programmes). 
However, the two-year limitation period applies only to follow-on actions that are 
brought before the CAT and not to follow-on actions brought before the High 
Court. At the first glance, it would appear that that setting the same limitation period 
in cases brought in civil courts would fit into the English system of limitation period 
for follow-on antitrust damage actions. Based on the analysis taken in previous chap-
ters, the introduction of this rule does not come without risk. The question arises 
how much this change would affect other rules and principles of tort litigation. For 
example, the two-year limitation period is closely connected with the requirement 
that the periods should not start running before the regulator’s decision becomes 
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final. Under current law, a case may proceed even if the NCA’s decision has not be-
come final yet. As UK case law548 illustrates, in principle it is in the general interest 
for proceedings to progress at least as far as disclosure procedure. Under the new 
rule, the court would be prevented from proceeding with the case until all avenues of 
appeal have been exhausted or the time for bringing such appeals has expired. ‘Stay-
ing of procedure’, which is a matter of case management now, would turn into “re-
quirement for an action to proceed”. 
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the High Court is a court of general ju-
risdiction. The CAT was created under the Enterprise Act 2002 as a specialist tribunal 
dealing with competition law matters. It would follow that as long as a plaintiff has 
choice of bringing a follow-on claim to the CAT (where the limitation rules comply 
with the EU Commission’s proposal) there is no reason to introduce the EU Com-
mission’s proposal on limitation periods for follow-on to into the English system of 
limitation period. 
5.12 Costs 
In civil proceedings in English court, the general rule is that ‘costs follow the event‘. 
Whilst there exists certain amount of discretion on the part of the court to adjust the 
balance of payment of costs, this is seen as exception to the general rule. 
5.12.1 Allocation of costs  
The principal rules governing costs between the parties in the civil courts are set out 
in rules 43 to 48 of the CPR and in the ‘Costs Practice Direction’ that supplements 
them. Pursuant to CPR 43.2(1) costs includes fees, charges, disbursements, expenses, 
remuneration, reimbursements allowed to a litigant-in-person under CPR 48.6, any 
additional liability incurred under a funding arrangement and any fee or reward 
charged by a lay representative for acting on behalf of a party in proceedings allocated 
to the small claims track. 
In civil litigation, as the rules stand,549 the general rule is that ‘costs follow the 
event‘, which means that the losing litigant will be ordered to pay the winning liti-
gant’s reasonable costs and will be left to bear his own.550 As Moorhead explained, 
the reasons that justify the rule are the following: “the winner deserves to have the 
costs of successfully claiming or defending; it protects compensation awards made to 
successful claimants; and it deters unmeritorious claims or defences.”551 However, 
                                                        
548  For example National Grid v ABB [2009] EWHC 1326 (Ch). 
549  On 1 April 2013 the UK Government brought in reforms to civil litigation funding and costs in 
England and Wales (‘Jackson reforms’). Although they are claimed to be “the biggest recent over-
haul of civil litigation procedure” (see S. Evans and L. Bylett, United Kingdom: Jackson Reforms On Civil 
Litigation Costs), they preserve the ‘costs follow the event” as general rule.  
550  CPR 44.3(2)(a). 
551  R. Moorhead, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure: Report for England and Wales. Available at 
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~purzel/national_reports/England%20and%20Wales.pdf (last 
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the scope of this principle is limited by CPR 44.3(2)(b), which gives the court the 
discretion to adjust the general rule. So, the court can adjudicate on whether one 
party has to pay the other’s costs, and if so, the court can fix the amount of these 
costs, and decide for which stages of the litigation the costs should be paid. The ‘fol-
lowing the event principle’ is only a starting point from which the court may readily 
depart.552 As Judge Woolf held., the rules “ require courts to be more ready to make 
separate orders which reflect the outcome of different issues […] It is now clear that 
too robust an application of the ‘follow-the-event principle’ encourages litigants to 
increase the costs of litigation, since it discourages litigants from being selective as to 
the points they take. If you recover all your costs as long as you win, you are encour-
aged to leave no stone unturned in your effort to do so.”553 
In deciding what order (if any) to make with regard to costs, the court will take 
into account all the circumstances,554 including the success of the party’s pretensions 
and their conduct during the proceedings. The first issue, the party’s pretensions, 
might appear difficult to assess when there are counterclaims555 and where a claim (or 
counterclaim) is only partially successful.556 The latter issue, ‘conduct’, refers mainly 
to the willingness of the parties to settle before (e.g. pre-action protocols) and during 
the proceedings. Claimants are expected to give the defendant an opportunity to 
settle. Accordingly, the court will pay special attention to any formal offer to settle 
made under Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Such offers are withheld from the 
judge during the trial, but during the assessment of costs the judge will compare them 
with the final damages awarded. A party who refuses to consider whether ADR is 
appropriate or who ignores an ADR Order made by the court is very much at risk of 
costs.557 The risk of costs is complemented by the courts power to encourage parties 
to use ADR methods. In other words, under English law, cost awards are used as a 
way to penalise a party who has refused to accept a reasonable offer of settlement. 
This approach follows the Woolf spirit of putting greater emphasis on access to jus-
tice and to encourage the use of litigation as the last resort of all the available meth-
ods of dispute resolution.558 Accordingly, an effort should be made to achieve a set-
tlement before or during the court proceedings. To that end, a number of procedural 
changes have been introduced by the Civil Procedure Rules of the High Court of 
                                                        
552  Also in follow-on cases, the CAT has full discretion to make any decision regarding costs. 
553  AEI Rediffusion v Phonographic Performance [1999] 1 WLR 1507, 1522-3. 
554  CPR 44.5. 
555  In Medway Oil and Storage Co Ltd v Continental Contractors Ltd [1929] AC 88 the House of Lords 
held that the costs of the counterclaim are only those costs occasioned by reason of their being a 
counterclaim. 
556  See for example Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Cleveland Bridge UK Ltd and another (No 7) 
[2008] EWHC 2280, par. 72.; Mears Ltd v Leeds City Council [2011] EWHC 2694 (TCC). 
557  Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS Trust [2004] EWCA, regarding the unreasonable refusal to participate 
or the mediation process. See also Nigel Witham Ltd v Robert Smith and others (No.2) [2008] 
EWHC 12. 
558  Woolf stated: “My approach to civil justice is that disputes should, whenever possible be resolved 
without litigation,” in Access to Justice, Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in Eng-
land and Wales (1996), p. 107. See also J.A. Jolowicz, Civil litigation: What’s it for? (2008) 67(3) Cam-
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England and Wales.559 It does so through a combination of pre-action protocols and 
active case management by the courts.  
Therefore the parties are obliged to give serious consideration to any available 
form of ADR. It is common under CPR 36 that if a claimant rejects a Part 36 offer 
and judgment obtained by the claimant is equal to or less than the offer made by the 
defendant, the claimant is regarded, for the purpose of costs, as the loser for the latter 
part of the proceedings.560 As the Court of Appeal held that the function of a Part 36 
payment is to place the costs risk on the offeree in circumstances in which he does 
not bear the payment “as a result of the contingencies of litigation”.561 Therefore the 
court will normally order him to pay the defendant’s costs from the date that the 
period for accepting the offer expired and interest on those costs unless the court 
considers that this would be unjust to the claimant.562 It is otherwise if the claimant 
rejects the defendant’s offer to settle and at trial the claimant obtains judgment 
against defendant that is more than the sum the defendant offered, the usual order 
for costs is for the unsuccessful party – defendant – to pay the claimant’s costs on a 
standard basis. As an example, in the case of Dunnett v. Railtrack PLC563 Railtrack 
won their case at appeal on legal grounds, but was not awarded its costs (was penal-
ised on costs) because of its earlier refusal to consider mediation despite the recom-
mendation of the judge. 
In a case when the defendant rejects the claimant’s Part 36 offer and the claimant 
obtains judgment against defendant which is equal to or more advantageous than the 
offer, the defendant faces a cost order on the indemnity basis plus a punitive interest 
rate on those costs. In particular, the plaintiff is entitled to interest on any damages, 
together with indemnity costs (or punitive interest up to 10% above the Bank of 
England base rate) and interest on those costs (i.e. the rule of proportionality of costs 
is displaced). If, following the rejection of the offer, at the trial the plaintiff obtains 
judgment that is less advantageous that the offer made, then costs will be decided in 
the usual way. This normally means that the unsuccessful party (defendant) will be 
ordered to pay the successful party’s costs on the standard basis with interest awarded 
on those costs, although the court may make a different order having regard to all the 
circumstances. 
A new Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is introduc-
ing additional sanctions for defendants who fail to accept a claimant’s reasonable Part 
36 offer to settle.564 In particular, the Act enables the court to order payment of an 
additional amount to be paid by a defendant to a claimant who obtains judgment 
                                                        
559  Research published in the European Competition Law Review shows a number of competition 
claim settlements within recent years (see B.J. Rodger, Private Enforcement of Competition Law, 
the Hidden Story: Competition Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005 (2008) 
29(2) E.C.L.Rev). 
560  J. O’Hare, K. Browne, Civil Litigation (2009) 14th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 471. 
561  Matthews v Metal Improvements Co Inc. [2007] EWCA Civ 215. 
562  Matthews v Metal Improvements Co Inc. [2007] EWCA Civ 215. 
563  Dunnett v. Railtrack PLC [2002] 1 WLR 2434. 
564  The changes being introduced under the Bill also include, removing the restrictions on contingency 
fees or “damages-based agreements” (DBAs) for civil litigation and abolishing the recoverability of 
conditional fee agreement (CFA) success fees and after the event (ATE) insurance premiums. 
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equal to or better than its own offer to settle the claim. This provision will be in addi-
tion to the existing penalties available to the court under Part 36 of the CPR (namely 
the payment of punitive interest on damages and costs, and costs on an indemnity 
rather than a standard basis). The additional amount will be calculated as 10% of 
damages for damages claims. Accordingly, in addition to paying the usual Part 36 
penalties – interest at 10 per cent above base rate on the damages awarded, indemnity 
costs and interest on those costs at 10 per cent above base rate – the defendant will 
also have to pay up to an additional 10 per cent of the damages awarded. This will 
increase incentives for potential claimants to settle their disputes. 
5.12.2 Conclusions on costs 
As noted in Chapter 3, the EU Commission intends to leave it to the Member States 
to determine how best to amend their cost allocation rules to encourage meritorious 
claims. However, in order to assist Member States, it proposes certain non-binding 
measures. 
First, it encourages Member States to design procedural rules fostering settle-
ments. English procedural rules are already designed to encourage settlements.565 The 
"pre-action disclosure" requires parties to take certain steps to exchange information 
about a prospective legal claim, and at least consider mediation or other alternative 
dispute resolution ("ADR") procedures as an option. If parties do not comply with 
the pre-action protocols or refuse to consider forms of alternative dispute resolution, 
they may be penalised by the Court by way of costs orders against them. Further, the 
encouragement of settlement is achieved through the use of costs awards that penal-
ise a party who has refused to accept a reasonable offer of settlement. In particular, if 
a party who refuses a settlement offer that turns out to be higher than the amount of 
damages awarded by the court, might have to pay the other party’s costs (even if the 
other party was unsuccessful overall). It can be said that in England the cost rules are 
designed to encourage settlements. 
Second, the EU Commission encourages the Member States to provide national 
courts with the possibility of issuing costs orders that derogate from the usual cost 
rule. In England, although the general rule is that the unsuccessful party pays a rea-
sonable proportion of the successful party’s costs (the “loser pays” rule), the courts 
enjoy a wide discretion (as does the CAT). The court has to take into account the 
conduct of the parties during the proceedings. As said above, the English civil proce-
dure is very much directed towards settlement within or without court procedure. 
Accordingly, in cases in which the successful party had previously declined an offer 
of settlement and the litigation did not result in a higher award, then in order to en-
courage the settlement of claims the policy and practice is that (i) the successful party 
will not recover its own costs incurred from the last date on which the offer could 
have been accepted and (ii) the losing party will recover its own costs incurred from 
the last date on which the offer could have been accepted (subject again to the over-
riding discretion of the courts). The court’s discretion and encouragement of settle-
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ments reflect the EU Commission’s approach taken with regard to the issue of costs. 
Therefore, it appears that the EU Commission recommendations could arguably be 
found in the current rules. 
5.13 Conclusion – private antitrust enforcement in England 
Based on the analysis carried out in this chapter, there are sufficient grounds for argu-
ing that English law (including the Govt reform proposals) – in relative terms – caters 
to the need for an effective competition litigation enforcement system. Not surpris-
ingly, a number of the EU Commission’s proposed procedural measures are present 
in the English legal system. For example, the final decisions of the UK competition 
authorities, together with those of the EU Commission, are already binding in the 
national courts. There is a two year limitation period for follow-on actions. The bod-
ies officially appointed by the State can bring a collective action only on behalf of 
consumers, although currently they can bring actions on an opt-in basis only. In cer-
tain cases the English legal rules and mechanisms go beyond the proposed enforce-
ment rules, such as the English rules on disclosure, which are more far-reaching than 
the model of disclosure rules proposed by the EU Commission.  
The presence of two parallel regimes for antitrust follow-on actions within the 
English system creates the impetus for effective competition litigation enforcement. 
This is because an action can be brought either in the court of general jurisdiction 
(the High Court) or in a specialist tribunal (CAT), when there is a pre-existing final 
infringement decision of the EU Commission or national competition authority. The 
two tribunals apply different procedural rules when dealing with the cases. This spe-
cial feature of the English competition litigation system allows CAT to operate in a 
manner more amenable to private enforcement of competition law. Accordingly, 
reforms to procedural rules aimed at encouraging effective antitrust damage claims 
can be successfully adopted without affecting the general procedural rules. A good 
example of private-enforcement friendly feature of CAT is the proposed establish-
ment of a new ’opt-out’ collective settlement regime. As such, an “opt-out” collective 
redress model suggested by the UK government will require changes to the proce-
dural rules employed by the CAT without interfering with the civil rules applied in 
the court.  
With regard to substantive rules, English law appears to be less friendly to com-
petition cases.  
For example, a breach of competition rules is characterised as a breach of a statu-
tory duty. Fulfilling the necessary requirements to establish a ‘breach of statutory 
duty‘ is not always easy, particularly in antitrust cases. As a result, antitrust victims 
(indirect purchasers) might find it difficult to bring a claim. Another example is re-
dress for ‘pure economic loss‘ where the English law is very restrictive. An EU inter-
vention into these rules is justified, as long as the intervention significantly contrib-
utes to greater effectiveness of private enforcement. These are the cases where the 
absence of EU intervention will endanger the EU right to damages and the effective-
ness of EU competition law. The issues and the extent of the EU intervention into 
the English legal system are addressed in Chapter 7. Over all, it can be argued that the 
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English system of tort law can serve as an effective means to private antitrust en-
forcement as long as the function of tort law remains compensatory and non-
deterrent.  
The English system can also be held up as a “model to be followed”, when it 
comes to what is usually referred to as the Masterfoods rule.566 According to the 
Masterfoods rule, the national court must always seek to prevent the adoption of a 
conflicting decision by staying the proceedings after the EU Commission has initiated 
the proceedings. The English approach provides an option for the court to proceed 
up to a certain stage of civil procedure, which in a general sense offers no potential 
risk of interfering with the outcome of the competition authority’s decision. In some 
cases this might mean that the court can allow procedure until the disclosure stage. 
The approach aims at ensuring that the follow-on action are dealt with expeditiously 
and fairly, while at the same time it ensures that the risk of conflict decisions between 
the court and the competition authority is avoided. The approach of the English 
courts in this case shows a pragmatic interpretation of the rules befitting the goal of 
effective private enforcement. It can be even used as a model for future moderations 
and improvements to the Masterfoods rule. 
All things considered, the English system can be used as an effective instrument 
of private enforcement. However, some of its unique characteristics make it difficult 
to accommodate all requirements of competition-focused damage actions. 
 
                                                        
566  Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003. See also section 5.9.2. 
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Chapter 6 
Private Enforcement in Slovenia 
6.1 Introduction  
EU competition law and competition policy have had a great impact on the devel-
opment of national competition law in Slovenia. As a key step towards EU integra-
tion Slovenia enacted the Law on protection of Competition in 19931 and entrusted 
the role of central enforcement authority to the Competition Protection Office (here-
after ‘CPO’). Slovenia, which used to be a part of former Yugoslavia, became one of 
the first countries from the Balkan region to enact a modern competition law.2 The 
competition act, which was “partly in conformity with the acquis”,3 became the main 
legal foundation to fight unfair competition in Slovenia. In 1999 a new Act on Pre-
vention of Restriction of Competition4 was introduced that replaced the first compe-
tition act (1993) and fully harmonised Slovenian competition law with the EU legisla-
tion. The process of ‘Europeanisation’ of Slovenian competition law has continued 
with the adoption of the 2008 law on Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act.5 
The act entered into force on April 26, 2008, replacing the 1999 act of the same 
name. 
The EU initiative on private antitrust enforcement was the catalyst for a national-
level discussion and worked towards promoting damage actions. Slovenia has not 
only integrated some of the EU Commission’s proposals into national law but has 
also taken further positive steps in this direction. The Competition Act provides a 
distinct legal basis for the private enforcement of national and EU competition law. 
Although the creation of such a basis does not automatically affect the conditions 
conducive for bringing a successful damages claim (it simply creates a right to dam-
ages and refers to general tort provisions for the conditions of liability), it purports to 
increase awareness of private enforcement in competition matters. The Competition 
Act also introduced special rules that specifically deal with the binding nature of in-
                                                        
1  The rules for the protection of competition find their basis in the Slovenian Constitution by a series 
of constitutional provisions enabling the independence of legal entities, including Article 74, which 
provides that “unfair competition practices and practices which restrict competition in a manner 
contrary to the law are prohibited”. 
2  Croatia (1995), Macedonia (January 2005), Bosnia and Herzegovina (July 2005), Serbia (September 
2005), and Montenegro (January 2006). 
3  Negotiation position of the Republic of Slovenia on Chapter 6 – Competition and State Aids, Inter-
governmental Conference on the Accession of the Republic of Slovenia to the European Union 
(2000), p. 1. Available at http://www.arhiv.svrez.gov.si/fileadmin/svez.gov.si/pageuploads/docs/ 
negotiating_positions/6.doc (last consulted on 8 May 2013). 
4  Prevention of the Restriction of Competition Act (Zakon o preprHÿHYDQMXRPHMHYDQMDNRQNXUHQFH
Official Gazette RS No. 56/1999. 
5  Prevention of the Restriction of Competition Act-1, Official Gazette RS No. 36/2008, as amended. 
See T. Bratina, Kaj prinaša predlog ZPOmK-1 pri postopkih omejevalnih ravnanj? (1. del) (2007) 46 
Pravna praksa; T. Bratina, Kaj prinaša predlog ZPOmK-1 pri postopkih omejevalnih ravnanj? (2. del) 
(2007) 47 Pravna praksa. 
Chapter 6 
220 
 
fringement decisions – taken by national competition authorities – on the civil liti-
gation and the statute of limitations. In order to increase deterrence, antitrust con-
duct has been criminalised. It is important to note that criminalisation extends to all 
competition offences, including abuse of a dominant position, even though to date 
there has been no real conviction or successful enforcement in this regard. 
Although developments in legislation have been undertaken with the intention of 
promoting antitrust damage action, the same trend is not apparent from the court 
decisions. There are hardly any cases on damage actions connected with infringe-
ments of competition law.  
The question is if and to what extent the Slovenian civil substantial and proce-
dural rules are creating barriers for victims of antitrust conduct in Slovenia when 
raising damage actions. It has often been argued that continental civil legal systems 
(in contrast to the English common law system) are less inclined to private enforce-
ment. Mechanisms (components) of effective antitrust litigation aimed at advancing 
effective discovery, allowing for punitive damages and departure from the ‘loser pays‘ 
rule have generally not found place in the Continental European jurisdictions. In 
addition, in Slovenia there is no collective redress mechanism available to antitrust 
victims. The consumers and individuals with low value damages face obstacles to the 
success of their claim. Consumer associations have no legal standing to bring damage 
actions in the interest of the consumer. The legal position of consumers and con-
sumer associations is limited. As a consequence, exercising consumers’ substantive 
rights is hindered. 
Owing to the lack of antitrust damage cases to date, and thus the lack of practical 
examples of private enforcement cases, the analysis in this chapter is based on the 
implications of the Slovenian legal doctrine. 
6.2 Action for antitrust damages in the Slovenian legal system 
Like England, Slovenia, in principle does not govern damages actions for breach of 
competition rules by a special regulation. A lack of special regulation in this field does 
not per se create a barrier for private actions to be taken to enforce the national or EU 
competition provisions. Where there are no special provisions regarding antitrust 
damage actions, such actions are governed by the general rules on civil liability as 
established by the civil law statute. Unlike England, which has in place a system of 
nominate torts,6 Slovenian tort law is defined as a general theory of tort liability. Ac-
cordingly, a general principle was formulated and is applicable to all torts, including 
breaches of competition rules. 
6.2.1 Legal framework of antitrust damage actions  
The Slovenian legal system – just like majority of legal systems in Europe – does not 
govern civil liability for competition violations by a special regulation. The court 
                                                        
6  See section 5.2.2. 
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decides specific questions by applying general rules of damages applicable in tort. It 
comes from the general provision of tort law that “a person who causes damage to 
another is liable for compensating it if he cannot prove that the damage occurred 
without his fault.”7 In addition to the generally applicable rules, Article 62 of the Pre-
vention of the Restriction of Competition Act (hereafter ‘Competition Act’)8 explicit-
ly provides a legal basis for actions for damages with reference to breach of competi-
tion law, whether national or EU. In particular, it states that “anyone violating, either 
deliberately or from of negligence, the provisions of Articles 6 or 9 of this act or 
Articles 101 or 102 TFEU shall be liable for any damages arising from such viola-
tion.” Accordingly, any person who has suffered loss as a result of any conduct pro-
hibited under the Competition Act or the TFEU may claim compensation according 
to the Slovenian rules of the law governing obligations. 
The explicit rule on the right to damages was not a novelty when introduced in 
the Competition Act in 2008. Previous to this, the old competition act9 already re-
ferred to the right to damages in cases of breaches of national competition law. Ac-
cording to the wording of the Article, there was no such explicit reference to the 
infringements of the EU competition rules (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). The dis-
tinction between national and EU law however, is not important in practice. The legal 
basis of the right to claim damages arising from infringements of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU is found in EU law.10 Such actions based on EU law are governed by 
national legal rules that apply to analogous actions brought under national law.11 As 
actions for damages based upon national competition law were (and still are) subject 
to the general tort rules governing obligations, the same rule applies to damage ac-
tions based upon EU competition law. The new provision of Article 62 of the Com-
petition Act referring to national as well as the EU competition law is merely a result 
of the recent discussion on increasing awareness of private enforcement in competi-
tion matters.12 
In addition to specific reference to the EU competition rules, the new Competi-
tion Act, in contrast to the old competition act,13 lays down a number of special rules 
with regard to claims for antitrust damages. Special rules that deviate to a certain 
extent from the general rules applicable to claims for damages on a contractual and 
non-contractual (tort) basis include rules on limitation periods and the binding effect 
of NCA’s decisions on national civil courts, both of which will be discussed later.14 
                                                        
7  Article 131(1) of the Obligations Code (‘Obligacijski zakonik’), Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Slovenia, No. 83/01, as amended. 
8  Prevention of the Restriction of Competition Act (‘=DNRQ R SUHSUHÿHYDQMX RPHMHYDQMD
konkurence’), Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 36/2008, as amended. 
9  Article 44 of the Competition Act. 
10  Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297; joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Man-
fredi [2006] ECR I-6619. 
11  The EU principle of equivalence (‘Rewe/Comet’ doctrine, Case 33/76 Rewe, [1976] ECR 1989, 
Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043). See also section 3.2.1. 
12  See A. Vlahek, =DNRQRSUHSUHÿHYDQMXRPHMHYDQMDNRQNXUHQFHVNRPHQWDUMHP *9=DORæED/MXEOMDQD
p. 494.  
13  Prevention of the Restriction of Competition Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 
56/1999. 
14  See sections 6.11. and 6.9. 
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No specific rules exist regarding the other issues of private antitrust enforcement, 
such as limits on standing, availability of punitive damages, all of which have been 
identified in the White Paper and discussed in Chapter 4.15 As stated above, these 
issues continue to be regulated by the general substantive (and procedural principles) 
established by the Obligations Code (and the Civil Procedure Act)16. 
6.2.2 Slovenian Obligations Code 
Slovenian private law belongs to the circle of European continental legal culture. 
Although in the 20th century both substantive and procedural laws were influenced by 
the laws of various Western European countries, Austrian civil law played an impor-
tant role in the development of the Slovenian civil law (and previously the former 
Yugoslavian civil law). Until 1919 the territory of Slovenia was a part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. While a small territory in the North-East of Slovenia belonged to 
the Hungarian part, most of the Slovenian territory belonged to the Austrian part. 
There from 1811 the Austrian Civil Code17 (hereinafter “ABGB”) applied. It remain-
ed in force in the Slovenian territory also after Slovenian became a part of the King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians in 1918 (renamed in the Kingdom of Yugosla-
via in 1929). This was possible because before World War II the new State did not 
have a unified legal territory and consequently it kept the existing private legislation in 
force. Hence, until 1945 the law of obligations was based on the codified law in force 
in the respective parts of the country18. After the creation of Yugoslavia the Yugo-
slavian authority found no further use for a pre-war legislation that was claimed as 
being incompatible with the new socialist system. Socialist Yugoslavia abolished the 
old pre-war legislation, including the civil codes.19 As the adoption of comprehensive 
new legislation was not expected to rapidly replace the old one, the old legal rules 
were accepted as a provisional solution as long as they did not contravene the rules 
and principles of the new Yugoslavian political and legal order. According to the Law 
on the nullification of legal rules that were enacted before April 6th, 1941 and during 
the enemy occupation (Sl.l., No. 86/1946), the regulations that were in force on April 
6th, 1941 continued to be applied in cases where new provisions had not yet been 
enacted (provided that they were not contrary to the legal rules enacted in the new 
Yugoslavia and to the principles of the new constitutional system).20 This meant that 
for damage actions in general, the rules of the ABGB remained applicable until the 
                                                        
15  See section 4.4. 
16  Civil Procedure Act (‘Zakon o pravdnem postopku’), Official Gazettes No. 26/1999. 
17  Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch of 1811. 
18  Also in Croatia the Austrian Civil Code was applied as a legal source. In Serbia the Serbian Civil 
Code and Montenegro the Montenegrin Civil Code were applied. 
19  Law on Non-validity of Legal Regulations Passed Before 6 April 1941 and During the Hostile Oc-
cupation (‘Zakon o razveljavitvi pravnih predpisov, izdanih pred 6.4.1941 LQPHG VRYUDæQR RNu-
pacijo’), Official Gazette of the FNRJ, no. 86/1946.  
20  To some extend the tort rules enacted before WWII continued to be applicable. On the subject see: 
$)LQæJDU<XJRVODYLDLQ=6]LUPDLHGLaw in Eastern Europe, A series of publications issued by 
the Documentation Office for East European Law University of Leiden, iss. 17, 1970. 
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enactment of the Yugoslavian Obligation Act in 1978,21 although the rules of the 
ABGB in case law were sometimes modified or applied with limitations grounded in 
socialist ideas. For example, damages for non-pecuniary loss were refused for some 
time because they were not in accordance with socialist legal theory. Gradually the 
courts began to give awards for pain and suffering and for mental distress in claims 
for personal injury.22 Especially after the split with the USSR, the Soviet influence 
became marginal and concepts of European legal systems gained acceptance from 
legal scholars and courts. The leading role in the development of the law of obliga-
tions in the years prior to the enactment of the Yugoslavian Obligation Act was 
played by the courts. They applied the old rules creatively, and accepted some mod-
ern trends, including those in tort law. In this way the ‘Europeanisation’ of civil law 
continued even during the socialist era.  
The Obligation Act of 1978, which was adopted as a federal statute to regulate 
the law of obligations, was based upon extensive comparative research. The Austrian 
ABGB still had a strong impact on the code but it was also influenced by Western 
European civil (obligations) codes such as the Swiss Obligationenrecht, the Italian 
Codice Civile, the German BGB and the French Civil Code. It has been observed23 
that the existing private law legislation was generally capable of functioning under the 
changing social and economic circumstances at the beginning of the 1990s.24 
Since the Yugoslav Obligations Act was widely accepted by Slovenian lawyers, it 
continued to be in force for the first ten years after Slovenian independence from 
Yugoslavia in 1991. Moreover, the acceptance of the Yugoslav Obligations Act in 
practice was later also confirmed in the process of adoption of a new code of obliga-
tions in 2001.25 In effect, the new obligation act did not bring major legal changes. 
Apart from the regulation of some contract types that previously were not regulated 
in the Yugoslav Obligations Act and some minor – not conceptual – changes, the 
modifications were not significant.26 The reason for adopting a new Obligations 
Code was more a formal ‘Slovenisation’ of the Law of Obligations and not an actual 
reform of obligation law, as noted by the expert group given the task of preparing the 
reform.27  
The fact that the Slovenian Obligations Code 2002 has a strong resemblance to 
the Obligation Act 1978 makes the interpretation of certain provisions by case law on 
the basis of the Obligation Act 1978 possible. This is especially important because 
Slovenia is a small country with a relatively small system of private law. With the 
achievement of independence it ceased to be a part of a relatively large system of 
                                                        
21  The Act on Obligational Relations (‘Zakon o obligacijskih razmerjih’), Federal OJ 29/1978, 
39/1985, 57/1989. 
22  Supr. Cr. Of Slovenia, Pravnik 1955, 37 Supr. Cr. Of Yugoslavia 25 feb. 1956, Zb.I no. 147. 
23  S. Cigoj, Teorija obligacij – Splošni del obligacijskega prava (2000) Uradni list RS, Ljubljana, SSî13. 
24  After the independence from Yugoslavia, Slovenia went through the transition process from the 
previous socialist system to a market economy. 
25  Obligations Code (‘Obligacijski zakonik’), Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 83/01, 
enacted on 25 October 2001, according to Article 1062, it entered into force on 1 January 2003. It 
applies to obligations arising after 1.01.2002. 
26  '0RæLQD(YURSHL]DFLMDLQPRGHUQL]DFLMDREOLJDFLMVNHJDSUDYDPodjetje in delo. 
27  0,OHäLÿObligacijski zakonik z uvodnimi pojasnili (2003) Ljubljana, p. 28. 
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private law in which the same Obligations Code was used and developed by many 
courts in a much bigger country. Furthermore, since the law of obligations is still the 
same or at least very similar to that of the former Yugoslav republics, the analysis and 
findings conducted in this and chapter 7 could be applied (with certain reservations) 
to the Croatian system of antitrust damage actions. Croatia is set to become the new-
est member of the EU as of July 2013. As a part of the EU it will have to establish 
and develop (if not yet) a private pillar of private enforcement in addition to the pillar 
of public enforcement.  
6.2.3 Fundamental principle of civil law – principle of neminem laedere  
It comes from the general provision of Slovenian tort law28 that “a person who 
causes damage to another is liable to compensate, if he does not prove that the dam-
age occurred without his fault.”29 According to that provision, any intentional or 
negligent fact causing wrongful damage to another person obliges the one who com-
mitted the act to compensate the damage. The provision is based on the principle of 
neminem laedere;30 a principle that dates back to the times of Roman law, and provides 
“to injure no one.”31 Strictly speaking, in Roman law the principle was interpreted 
and applied together with another general rule, namely casum sentit dominus: “every 
person has to bear his loss himself, which is only departed from if there is a legal 
basis for shifting it to another.” Under the Roman legal tradition, the law of liability 
did not offer absolute guarantee to person or patrimony. Since harm to a person and 
other interests are unavoidable in societal life, compensation was not given every time 
damage occurs. It means that although the law of tort offers positive protection to 
the victims, it should not sanction every act or omission which interferes or damages 
the interests of victims. In the words of Wright: “There is no plausible moral argu-
ment for requiring others to compensate every person for every loss no matter how it 
occurred, and neither tort law nor law in general makes attempt to achieve such uni-
versal compensation.”32  
Accordingly, although the rule of neminem laedere is one of the main principles in 
the Slovenian tort system,33 it should be interpreted in a broad sense. It sets out the 
duty to prevent damage but it does not apply directly. It indicates only one tendency 
of the law of liability, though a very important one. It combines the need to behave in 
such a way that no nuisance is visited upon others and attacks on integrity are to be 
avoided, either physical or of their patrimony. In this respect, while damage caused to 
                                                        
28  Terms ‘tort law’, ‘law of obligations’ and ‘delict law’ will be used interchangeabley. 
29  Article 131 (1) of the Obligations Code. 
30  1 3ODYäDN 0 -XKDUW ' -DGHN 3HQVD 9 .UDQMF 3 *ULOF $ 3RODMQDU 3DYÿQLN 0 3DYÿQLN
Obligacijski zakonik s komentarjem (splošni del) (2003) *9=DORæED/MXEOMDQDp. 701.  
31  -.UDQMF=JRGRYLQVNRR]DGMHQDÿHOQRYHJDREOLJDFLMVNHJD]DNRQLNDPodjetje in delo. 
32  R.W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in D.G. Owen (ed.) Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 
(1995) Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press 1, p. 159. 
33  Slovenian tort law traces its historical roots to Roman private law, which it adopted through conti-
nental European civil law, particularly Germanic civil law. Through a process of accretion many of 
Roman features of the tort law were modified by continental European civil law and were subse-
quently incorporated into Slovenian law in adjusted form. 
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others should be avoided so far as possible, not all damage suffered by a potential 
plaintiff generates a duty to compensate on the part of wrongdoer. In legal terms, tort 
law grants a remedy of restoration or compensation if there is a legal basis for that. In 
other words, the victim may ask for compensation from the defendant, if the damage 
can be legally attributed to the defendant. Legal doctrine has developed certain re-
quirements for liability for damages in civil law (unlawfulness of the defendant’s con-
duct, damage, causal link between unlawful conduct and damage and fault of defen-
dant), which will be discussed in section 6.7. Only if these requirements are cumula-
tively fulfilled in an individual case is the victim then entitled to damages. It is con-
ducted as a part of the continental European civil law system; Slovenian private law 
has not adopted a system based on the concept of nominated torts as it is known in 
English common law.34 Instead it developed a coherent system and gave way to the 
notion of a general theory of tort liability, i.e. to the principle of general tort.35  
6.3 Slovenian ‘private enforcement system’ – judicial system 
There are no specialised courts for bringing competition-based actions for damages 
hence the rules on competence for actions for breach of competition law generally do 
not differ in any way from the rules applicable to other damages actions.  
The judicial system of the Republic of Slovenia includes courts of general and 
specialised jurisdiction. Courts of general jurisdiction include 44 district courts (‘okra-
MQDVRGLäÿD’), 11 circuit courts (‘RNURæQDVRGLäÿD’), four higher courts (‘YLäMHVRGLäÿH’), 
and finally the supreme court (‘YUKRYQR VRGLäÿH’) as the highest appellate court of 
third instance, limited to issues of substantive law and to the most severe breaches of 
procedure. 
The district and circuit courts are both courts of first instance. As a rule, district 
courts are competent for claims not exceeding 8,345 EUR. However, when disputes 
concern competition, district courts are competent irrespective of the value of the 
claim.36 The Higher courts (‘YLäMH VRGLäÿH’) are courts of appellate jurisdiction that 
determine appeals against decisions of the first instance courts as well as disputes of 
jurisdiction between County and District courts. The Supreme Court (‘vrhovno so-
GLäÿH LV WKH FRXUW RI WKLUG LQVWDQFH DQG DV VXFK WKH KLJKHVW DSSHOODWH FRXUW LQ WKH
state. In general, it has functions of a court of cassation or Supreme Court in other 
comparable countries. It is the court of the third instance in almost all the cases 
within its jurisdiction. It is a court of appellate jurisdiction in criminal and civil cases, 
in commercial lawsuits, in cases of administrative review and in labour and social 
security disputes. The grounds of appeal to the Supreme Court are limited to issues 
of substantive law and to the most severe breaches of procedure. It is also the court 
of the second instance in cases of administrative review.  
                                                        
34  See sections 5.2.2 and 5.7. 
35  See section 6.7. 
36  Article 32 (2) CPA.  
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6.4 Criminal law statute 
In the Slovenian law, infringement of competition law – in addition to being cate-
gorised as a civil offence – can also qualify as a criminal offence. Not only individuals, 
but also legal persons can be held liable for committing the offence. This is perceived 
to have important implications in terms of deterrence.  
6.4.1 Criminal liability of individuals and legal persons 
Pursuant to Article 225 of the Penal Code,37 persons who, while performing an eco-
nomic activity, violate acts prohibited by the Competition Act (i.e. prohibition on 
restrictive agreements between undertakings, abuse of dominant position or creation 
of a forbidden concentration of undertakings) and in this way prevent, significantly 
impede or distort competition in Slovenia or EU markets will be sentenced to impris-
onment, under the condition that large pecuniary benefits are achieved for the com-
pany concerned or large pecuniary damages are caused to another person.38 Impris-
onment should not be less than six months and not more than five years.39 In ac-
cordance with the latest changes related to the operation of leniency programmes in 
Slovenia,40 successful leniency applicants may be granted immunity in a possible 5-
year prison sentence. 41 This provision has been adopted in order to provide an in-
centive to apply for leniency and makes leniency more attractive. After all, benefits 
from the leniency programmes under the competition act can only be granted in the 
procedures before the NCA and, in principle, the benefits do not apply to criminal 
procedure. Without any reference in the Penal Code there are no guarantees that im-
munity granted in the procedure before the NCA would also be granted in the crimi-
nal procedure. The lack of reference would risk divergent interests in administrative 
procedures and criminal procedures that are pursued by the company and its em-
ployees with regard to the leniency application. As such, the situation could hinder 
the efficient collection of information. Therefore, pursuant to the new provision in 
the Criminal Code, leniency programmes also cover also criminal sanctions. To ob-
tain immunity under the leniency policy, it is first required to provide information 
and submit evidence about antitrust conduct. Conditions to be met for immunity in 
criminal law are similar to the ones required in the NCA’s procedure.42 Only a perpe-
                                                        
37  The Criminal Code of the Republic of Slovenia (‘Kazenski zakonik’), Official Gazettes, no. 55/2008 
of 4 June 2008. 
38  Antitrust infringements have also been designated as criminal offences in accordance with the previ-
ous Criminal Code from 1994. 
39  The Criminal Code provides that a monetary fine may be imposed instead of imprisonment. In 
addition to imprisonment or monetary fine, there are several possible accessory sentences and safety 
measures, the most relevant being a prohibition from performing an occupation for not less than 
one year and not more than five years (Article 3 of the Criminal Code). 
40  Leniency was first introduced by the adoption of an amendment ZPOmK-1 in 2008. The first 
Slovenian leniency programme started functioning on 1 January 2010. 
41  Article 225(2) of the Criminal Code. 
42  Site of the Competition Protection Office: http://www.uvk.gov.si/en/leniency (last consulted on 8 
May 2013). See also T. Bratina, Prizanesljivost Evropske komisije in Urada RS za varstvo 
konkurence (2007) 2 Pravna praksa, pp. 9–12. 
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trator who concludes an anti-competitive agreement and is the first to submit infor-
mation and evidence can have his punishment remitted. Hence, if these requirements 
are met, a perpetrator can be subject to the suspension of criminal sentence.  
In addition to natural persons, undertakings are responsible for the same criminal 
offence under the Liability of Legal Persons for Criminal Offences Act.43 According 
to the Criminal Code, undertakings may be held liable and punished by a fine of be-
tween 10,000 and 1 million euros whenever, while performing a business activity, 
they have “breached antitrust rules banning the conclusion of anti-competitive 
agreements between undertakings, abuse the dominant position, or create a forbidden 
concentration of undertakings, and in this way prevent, materially impede or distort 
competition in the Republic of Slovenia or in the EU market, or materially or in sig-
nificant part affect trade between member states. In addition, the behaviour must 
result in significant proceeds for that undertaking or undertakings, or significant loss 
for another undertaking.”44 With respect to the constitutional prohibition of ne bis in 
idem,45 penal sanctions imposed on the perpetrator following the criminal procedure 
will preclude imposition of penalties provided by the NCA in the course of adminis-
trative procedure. In accordance with Article 12 (1) of the new Act on Misdemean-
ours, proceedings for the misdemeanour shall not be conducted against a perpetrator 
– who was in criminal proceedings and found guilty of a criminal offence, which also 
has elements of a misdemeanour – nor shall sanctions be imposed on him for a mis-
demeanour. This implies that the same act cannot be denoted as a misdemeanour 
after the final judgment of conviction for a criminal offence. A special form of pro-
hibition of ne bis in idem is manifested in a case in which the undertaking has been first 
penalised by NCA for a misdemeanour and then receives additional punishment for a 
criminal offence. Due to stricter preconditions required for established criminal and 
the corresponding procedural safeguards, the Criminal Code46 does not entirely pre-
vent double punishment in such cases, but only provides for a possibility of deduc-
tion of a penalty for a misdemeanour from the penalty for a criminal offence.47 In 
other words, the prohibition of double jeopardy is respected to the extent that the 
first sanction imposed is taken into consideration when the second sanction is deter-
mined respecting the principle of proportionality.48  
With regard to liability of individuals who are in a position of control and are the 
minds and actions of an undertaking, the principle of ne bis in idem does not stand in 
the way of criminal sanctions imposed on an individual for anticompetitive behav-
iour, even if the undertaking in question has already been fined. An individual counts 
as a separate culpable subject for the application of the ne bis in idem rule. This lends 
                                                        
43  The Criminal Liability of Legal Entities Act (“Zakon o odgovornosti pravnih oseb za kazniva de-
janja”), Official Gazettes, no 98/2004 of 9 September 2004; no 65/2008 of 30 June 2008). On the 
subject see V. Jakulin, The Criminal liability of legal persons in the Republic Slovenia, Slovenian Law 
Review, Pravna fakulteta, vol. VI, no. 1-2, 2009, pp. 35–42. 
44  Article 225(1) of the Criminal Code (OJ RS, No 50/2012 of 29 June 2012). 
45  Article 31 of the Slovenian Constitution. 
46  Article 49(3) of the Criminal Code. 
47  On the constitutionality of Article 49(3) of the Criminal Code see judgement no. U-I-24/10. 
48  That is the same interpretation that the CJEU has been applying since its judgement in Walt 
Wilhelm (Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, [1969] E.C.R. 1). 
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support to imposing criminal law sanctions in competition law. In particular, criminal 
liability of individuals is complemented by sanctions applicable to companies. This is 
believed to amplify the deterrent effect in the antitrust enforcement system. In 
contrast to the undertakings, which are subject to the competition law regime under 
national competition law and EU competition law, individuals are not always within 
the reach of those laws. Under the administrative system the ‘perpetrator of the 
crime’ is the undertaking and the sanction in terms of fines is directed at the under-
taking itself. The effectiveness of administrative fines in the EU is limited. Adding 
criminal sanctions against individuals on top of the administrative sanctions to the 
undertaking that is considered the ‘perpetrator of the crime’ increase deterrence.  
6.4.2 System of deterrence 
In Slovenian criminal law there is no distinction between what can be termed ‘hard 
core’ cartel activity and other types of anticompetitive agreements not amounting to 
the ‘hard core’ cartel activity, as it is the case under the English law.49 Such incrimina-
tion, in particular for an abuse of a dominant position is unusual in a competition law 
enforcement context, given the difficulty in proving such an offence ‘beyond reason-
able doubt’, which is a standard of proof that applies in criminal proceedings. Most of 
the countries that criminalise antitrust behaviour limit criminal offence to the most 
severe violations of competition law (such as “hard core cartels”), where the rate of 
detection is inadequately low compared to the harm they cause to consumers and the 
economy. Criminal sanctions including imprisonment therefore, are believed to rem-
edy this situation.  
Criminalisation is believed to be a last resort.50 It should come into play only 
when the lack of adequate administrative fines and individual sanctions make en-
forcement of competition law less than effective. Based on this argument, some of 
the Slovenian legal experts opposed the introduction of criminal law sanctions to 
antitrust cases. According to Batina,51 the current system already provides for pun-
ishment and deterrence against antitrust infringements not only for undertakings but 
also for individuals. Beside the possibility of initiating private damages actions, there 
is also the possibility of imposing individual administrative fines. Individuals respon-
sible for anticompetitive behaviour within legal entities, sole proprietors or self-
employed persons may be fined with a monetary fine under the Competition Act. In 
addition, the Slovenian jurisdiction also provides for other types of liability of indi-
viduals, such as the disqualification of directors. As the legal basis for the liability is 
not the Competition Act but criminal law, disqualification is not possible in the con-
text of a private action. It is imposed in the context of criminal procedures even 
though it results from their company’s participation in a breach of competition law.52 
Finally, according to Batina the introduction of leniency programmes into the Slove-
                                                        
49  See section 5.4. 
50  See: 7%UDWLQD=ORUDEDPRQRSROQHJDSRORæDMDYSUHGORJX.=-1 (2007) 43 Pravna praksa. 
51  See: 7%UDWLQD=ORUDEDPRQRSROQHJDSRORæDMDYSUHGORJX.=-1 (2007) 43 Pravna praksa. 
52  Article 25 of the Responsibility of Legal Entities for Criminal Offences Act (‘Zakon o odgovornosti 
pravnih oseb za kazniva dejanja’), Official Gazettes No. 59/1999 and 12/2000. 
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nian legal system in 2008 and the system of fines themselves provide sufficient deter-
rence for antitrust behaviour.53 Furthermore, the new Competition Act followed 
Regulation 1/2003 and increased the level of fines for deterrence purposes, raising 
them from the scale of the old Competition Act of a maximum of € 375,000 for legal 
entities and € 12,500 for directors in charge to a maximum of 10% of the relevant 
undertaking’s annual turnover. After all, one of the criticisms of the old Competition 
Act was that the maximum fines lacked deterrent effect.54 Without exploring this 
issue in depth as it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it can be said that Slovenia is 
almost unique in criminalising all infringements of competition law. It remains to be 
seen how Article 225 of the Criminal Code will be applied by courts. To date, there is 
no known antitrust case where the criminal provision has been applied. 
Regardless of the different views on the need of criminalisation in antitrust law, 
the question of justified reasons for their availability (in particular, in terms of deter-
rence) is important for the discussion on the introduction of punitive damages into 
the legal system. As will be discussed later, the coexistence of punitive damages and 
administrative and criminal fines raises more questions than it provides solid answers. 
If it has been argued that sufficient deterrence is already provided by the application 
of administrative rules, justification for the introduction of punitive damages is even 
less evident. If the existing administrative regime is not sufficiently deterrent, then 
criminal enforcement should be considered. Private enforcement through availability 
of punitive damages is not the question here.55 
6.5 Role of judge and parties in civil proceedings 
The systematisation of Slovenian civil procedure depends on the point of view. For a 
common lawyer, the Slovenian civil procedure (as civil procedures of many European 
Continental legal systems) is a type of inquisitorial process, which is characterised by 
the court being actively involved in investigating the facts of the case. On the other 
hand, compared to the civil procedure of Socialist countries, the civil legal process of 
Slovenian courts is characterised as being adversarial, where judges act as neutral 
intermediaries and render their decision on the basis of parties’ submissions to the 
court.56 Generally, it can be said that Slovenian procedural law is a mixture of adver-
sarial and inquisitorial systems, with the emphasis on adversarial character. The ele-
ments of both models come into play when assigning the roles of the judge on one 
side and the parties on the other.  
                                                        
53  7%UDWLQD6WURæMHJOREH]DRPHMHYDOQDUDYQDQMDPravna praksa. 
54  See T. Bratina, Kaj prinaša predlog ZPOmK-1 pri postopkih omejevalnih ravnanj? (2. del) (2007) 47 
Pravna Praksa, p. 10. 
55  See section 6.10.5. 
56  See also M. Dolenc, Materialno procesno vodstvo – sredstvo za racionalizacijo postopka ali dodatno 
breme in prelaganje odgovornosti (2008) 7 Podjetje in delo, p. 1569. 
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6.5.1 Principle of ‘substantive conduct of proceedings’ 
Slovenian legal theory distinguishes between ‘substantive’ and ‘formal’ truth. If pro-
ceedings are based on the principle of substantive truth, the judge should reach a 
judgement based on the facts as they had happened in actual practice. In contrast, if 
proceedings are based on the principle of formal truth, then the judge is limited to 
the facts as they are established and presented by the parties.
Under the old Code of Civil Procedure 197757 Slovenian civil procedure was 
governed by the principle of ‘substantive truth’ to a greater extent than it is now. The 
implementation of the principle allowed the Court to resolve the dispute between the 
parties based on a complete ascertainment of the facts in dispute that the parties have 
litigated in court. To do so, the judge was entitled to ascertain ex officio facts and de-
rive evidence not presented by the parties if it were relevant to the case.58 The in-
struments for implementation of ‘substantive truth’ were abolished in favour of the 
principle of ‘formal truth’ in 1999 when the Civil Procedure Act (hereafter ‘CPA’)59 
was adopted. In line with the principle of formal truth, which enhances the principle 
of ‘parties’ autonomy’ and the ‘adversarial nature’ of proceedings, the judge works 
with what he is given and he establishes the basis of his judgments from the materials 
presented by the parties. His task is no longer to ascertain some independent truth. If 
he believes that the facts presented are not true, he has no power to strike out on his 
own in the search for what he thinks might be the real truth. His task is to base his 
judgement on what he believes to be true, taking into consideration the evidence 
placed before him by the parties.  
However, even now, when Slovenian civil procedure is based on the principle of 
‘formal truth’, some indications of existence of the principle of ‘substantive truth’ are 
to be found in the new Procedure Act. In particular, there is a principle of ‘substan-
tive conduct of proceedings,’60 which finds its basis in Article 285 CPA. According to 
this Article, in order to establish the relevant facts of the case, the judge must ask 
questions and in other appropriate ways see that all relevant facts will be stated during 
the hearing, that incomplete statements concerning important facts are supplement-
ed, that evidence relating to the parties’ statements adduced or supplemented, and 
that all necessary explanations given.61 The rule of ‘substantive conduct of proceed-
ings’ is in the public interest, as it promotes a fair trial, the right to make a statement 
during proceedings and equality of means within the procedure.62 As a result, it gives 
a more active role to the judge in civil proceedings. 
The significance of the ‘substantive conduct of proceedings’ and the court’s ac-
tive participation in clarifying the disputed facts is broadened by the establishment of 
                                                        
57  The law of civil procedure was influenced by socialist ideology. Under this ideology the task of the 
judge is to find the actual facts and he may not be satisfied with a limited view of them on the basis 
of the submissions of the parties. 
58  L. Ude, Civilno procesno pravo (2002) Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana, p. 114. 
59  The Civil Procedure Act (‘Zakon o pravdnem postopku’), Official Gazette no. 26/1999 with 
amendments. 
60  ‘Princip materialnega procesnega vodstva’ in Slovenian. 
61 Articles 298, 284, 180 CPA, etc. 
62  M. Dolenc, Od Pasivne k aktivni vlogi sodnika v pravdnem postopku (2007) 13-14 Pravna Praksa. 
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the system of preclusion of evidence under the new CPA,63 which intends to concen-
trate the procedure. Pursuant to Article 286 CPA the parties must submit facts and 
evidence necessary to support their claim or defence at the latest during the first main 
hearing.64 The preclusion for submitting facts and motioning for evidence is justified 
by the demand to ensure judicial protection without undue delay.65 The aim of civil 
procedure is to ensure protection of legal rights, which can be effective only if estab-
lished facts reflect reality as far as possible and if the judgement is correct from the 
point of view of substantive law.66  
6.5.2 Principle of free disposition and powers of the court  
Despite the relatively active role of the judge described above, judicial activism is 
considerably limited when it comes to the commencement, maintenance and termina-
tion of proceedings in civil suits. As in other continental European countries and to 
an even greater extent in England, the prevailing principle in Slovenian civil proce-
dure is the principle of ‘free disposition’, which goes hand in hand with the principle 
of ‘private autonomy’ prevailing in the Slovenian Obligations Code. In accordance 
with these two principles, parties to civil litigation are the main actors of the litigation 
procedure.67 This is reflected in the plaintiff’s power to file a suit outlining the sub-
stance and scope of requested legal protection. In turn, the defendant’s power in-
cludes the right to file legal objections and counter-suits. Moreover, under the princi-
ple of free disposition, it is exclusively up to the parties to identify the facts they think 
will support the claim or defence and to adduce the evidence upon which their claims 
are based. Only then it is up to the court – as part of its active role in civil proceed-
ings – to decide which evidence will be produced for the purpose of establishing the 
relevant facts.68 Properly speaking, only the judge may order the production of docu-
ments from parties or third persons. By virtue of his discretionary power, he decides 
whether to issue such an order. Although the court has the liberty to order the pro-
duction of evidence, the evidence proposed by the parties is also normally taken.69 
Such evidence will be rejected if the proposed evidence is irrelevant to the decision 
and as such does not serve to establish the legally relevant facts. Regarding inadmissi-
ble evidence, in line with the Article 3(3) CPA, the court shall not recognise the ap-
                                                        
63  M. Dolenc, Materialno procesno vodstvo – sredstvo za racionalizacijo postopka ali dodatno breme 
in prelaganje odgovornosti (2007) 7 Podjetje in delo, p. 1568. 
64  The time limit is not absolute. Article 286 CPA allows the parties to submit new facts and motion 
for new evidence even at the subsequent main hearings, if they were not able to submit them at the 
first main hearing without fault on their part. With this provision, the legislature authorised the 
courts to balance in each case which of the two principles (the principle of concentration and accel-
eration of proceedings and the principle of ensuring a correct judgment from the substantive law 
point of view) will prevail (judgement Up-2443/08, at 16).  
65  Judgement Up-2443/08. 
66  M. Dolenc, Materialno procesno vodstvo – sredstvo za racionalizacijo postopka ali dodatno breme 
in prelaganje odgovornosti (2008) 7 Podjetje in delo, p. 1574. 
67  L. Ude, Civilno procesno pravo (2002) Uradni listRepublike Slovenije, Ljubljana, p.108. 
68  Articles 213(2) and 287 CPA. 
69  Normally it is taken at the trial before the judge who will issue the final decision (Article 217(1) 
CPA).  
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plications of parties which are contrary to binding regulations or contrary to moral 
rules and provisions regarding the preclusion of evidence.  
It should be noted that a party may also relay his evidence in a document in the 
possession of the other party. In this case he may ask a judge to order the production 
of a specific document in the statement of claim or statement of defence or at any of 
the further stages of the proceedings. If the court considers the specific document 
relevant to the outcome of the dispute (it might contain information, which can be 
used as evidence in the ongoing case), it orders the production of the document from 
the other party. If a party refuses to cooperate with the court and produce documents 
on a court order, the court will draw adverse inferences against that party; this will be 
discussed in greater detail in section 6.8.5. 
With the regard to principle of disposition, the role of a civil judge can be de-
scribed as a passive one. If the public prosecutor is an expert with a mandate to regu-
late a particular field of endeavour and his decision not to prosecute might be based 
on a decision that it is in the public interest not to prosecute, this is not the case with 
the judge.70 Contrary to the antitrust authority whose authority follows the opportu-
nity principle, the judge has no degree of discretion in the question of whether to 
deliver justice on the case brought to the court. Civil proceedings begin upon the 
request of persons who claim that their rights were infringed or endangered.71 Al-
though sometimes civil proceedings can be started by other entities who are entitled 
to start proceedings on behalf of a specific person,72 civil proceedings may never be 
initiated by the court. It cannot do so, even if there is a decision of the competition 
authorities that found a breach of competition law. The judge is there only to make a 
ruling for a specific case and only the parties – persons who claim their rights were 
infringed or endangered – may initiate civil proceedings.  
Production of evidence plays the most important role in damages actions. There 
are no provisions which would facilitate the taking of evidence in case of breaches of 
competition rules. Under Slovenian law discovery that compels each party to a suit to 
allow the other to have access to its evidence before the trial does not exist as such. 
Strictly speaking disclosure is unknown to the Slovenian procedural system and a 
party is not obliged to disclose evidence that supports the other party’s case or un-
dermines his own case, but only to disclose those documents necessary to prove their 
case. This principle has an exception that applies in the cases of court’s order to dis-
close specific documents. Its application and significance in the context of private 
antitrust enforcement will be discussed in section 6.8.5.  
                                                        
70  K. Roach and M. J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competitions Laws (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall 
Law, p. 486. 
71  L. Ude, Civilno procesno pravo (2002) Uradni listRepublike Slovenije, Ljubljana, p. 108. 
72  In passing, note that Slovenian law does not recognise class action or representative suits when it 
comes to damage actions. See section 6.6. 
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6.6 Access to justice  
The Slovenian legal system does not provide for US-style ‘opt-out‘ class actions in 
which a claim may be brought on behalf of all members of a specified class of plain-
tiffs who do not explicitly ask to be withdrawn from the class.73 Neither is there a 
form of collective action in place for competition damages that would apply to com-
petition law claims. Traditionally, legal disputes involving multiple claimants are dealt 
with by procedural mechanisms that exist under general civil procedural rules, such as 
joint actions (several plaintiffs file a complaint jointly) and test case (where a case 
brought by one or more persons leads to a judgment that forms the basis for other 
cases brought by persons with the same interest against the same defendant). Both 
mechanisms are based on the assumption that civil litigation is dominated by two 
opponents (plaintiff and defendant) and as a result, these mechanisms do not address 
particularities of mass proceeding. Representative actions in which one individual or 
an organisation represents a number of individuals are not available. 
6.6.1 Legal standing and restrictions on standing 
According to Article 61(1) of the Competition Act, anyone who violates, either delib-
erately or out of negligence, the provisions of Articles 6 or 9 of the same act or Arti-
cles 101 or 102 TFEU shall be liable for any damages arising from such a violation. 
By setting out this rule, the Competition Act implicitly determines the class of benefi-
ciaries entitled to bring a damage claim. If a violator of the mentioned rule is liable 
for damages to those who were injured by the violation, it logically follows that the 
ones who were injured by the antitrust violation are the ones (and, in principle, the 
only ones) who have right to address the court, i.e. the right to speak as a party and 
the right to apply for damages. They have so-called locus standi.74 
The provision of Article 61(1) of the Competition Act reflects a general rule that 
requires a claimant’s sufficient connection to the case or the harm resulting from an 
action. Pursuant to the Article 22 of the Constitution, procedural laws (civil, criminal 
and administrative) permit a person to pursue before the court only his rights, duties 
and legal interests.75 Accordingly, the CPA states that an individual shall be a party to 
the proceedings if he is eligible for rights and duties. This means that standing to 
bring a damage claim is given to a person, legal or natural, who has suffered damage 
as a result of illegal conduct (through the violation).76 In addition to natural or legal 
persons, the CPA also provides that the party entitled to claim in civil procedures 
may also be an entity, which does not have the status of a legal person, but the stand-
ing of these entities is governed by special regulations. Although there is an idea that 
sometimes claims can be best pursued by representative bodies rather than the per-
                                                        
73  See section 4.4.2. 
74  ‘Legal standing’ and ‘locus standi‘ are used interchangeably throughout the book. 
75  “Everyone shall be guaranteed equal protection of rights in any proceeding before a court and 
before other state authorities, local community authorities and bearers of public authority that de-
cide on his rights, duties or legal interests” (Article 22 of the Slovenian Constitution). 
76  Article 76(1) CPA.  
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son directly affected, no such special provisions have been adopted in relation to 
competition law issues.  
It follows that when it comes to the antitrust damage right, the plaintiff has locus 
standi to file an action only in so far as he has been has been damaged by the relevant 
antitrust conduct. In this case the person pursuing the claim will also be the one 
whose rights will be affected by the court decision. If the person instituting the cause 
of action has personally suffered no damage, then the future court decision would 
have no effect on his rights and duties. He will be refused legal standing. In practice it 
means that a person or a company who is individually affected by the antitrust breach 
in question may bring an action into the court, while entities which could play an 
important role in antitrust cases but have not suffered damage themselves will not be 
granted legal standing. This includes consumer associations representing general 
consumer interests who would bring an action in the interest of the group at large – 
the consumers. They are incompetent plaintiffs as they lack standing. The issue of 
legal standing of associations representing the interests of a wider group of consum-
ers will be discussed later.77  
6.6.2 System of individual redress proceedings 
Slovenia does not have in place a formal system of collective redress mechanisms that 
would enable groups of people to recover judicially awarded compensation for a 
defendant’s culpable behaviour. The general rules of Slovenian civil procedure are 
based on an ‘individual approach.’78 This does not mean that only an individual type 
of litigation is available and that any kind of group litigation is not possible. “Individ-
ual approach” here describes the framework of the redress mechanism. In particular, 
it indicates that civil claims (in tort law and contract law) are primarily concerned with 
redressing individual wrongs committed against individual parties. Since every legal 
dispute in essence should be treated like a bilateral dispute, the traditional legal prin-
ciple is that res judicata79 normally affects the parties involved in the civil proceedings. 
With the individual approach it is still possible for individual natural persons or legal 
entities, each suffering individual damages, to bundle their individual actions in a 
single trial (‘sosporništvo’). Such a procedure is intended in the first place to reduce 
the costs of litigation and thus make claims economically more attractive to put for-
ward.80 
The mechanism of joining cases is structured so that although all the plaintiffs’ 
claims are joined in a single procedure and treated together (especially discovery), the 
claims remain separate. Individual plaintiffs remain a legally independent party to the 
litigation, so the acts and defences of one party do not necessarily affect (profit or 
harm) the other parties to the proceedings. Each of them acts only on his own 
                                                        
77  See section 6.6.5. 
78  N. Betetto, I. Jeraj, Skupinsko uveljavljanje zahtevkov (2008) 48 Pravna praksa. 
79  Under the ‘res judicata’ doctrine, once a lawsuit is decided, the litigant parties are barred from raising 
the same issue again in the court. 
80  8.HæPDKZakon o pravdnem postopku: s komentarjem in sodno prakso II (2009) Maribor: De Vesta, 
p. 408. 
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behalf. That said, the court will not consider the evidence of one party to the joinder 
in isolation and will consider the evidence of the other parties to the joinder. The 
same applies in a case when the plaintiff/defendant joins the procedure later, but not 
later than the end of the oral hearing.81 He takes over the litigation in the state as it 
stands at the time when he joins the procedure. Further, since the plaintiffs’ claims 
remain separated, the decision on the individual claims may also differ within the 
same judgement. Each of the parties will be awarded damages individually on the 
basis of actual losses incurred.82 The court may find some claims grounded and oth-
ers not. The rule of individual assessment will also apply to legal expenses. All of the 
group who are plaintiffs in the trial have to bear their part of the legal expenses if the 
case is lost.83 
Essential for the bundling in a joint case is that the suit is directed against the 
same defendant and the facts to be decided are common to all individual claims. 
Pursuant to Article CPA, it is possible for several plaintiffs to combine their claims 
into one single claim or for one plaintiff (or more) to file a complaint against several 
defendants,84 if any of the following conditions is met: 
i) if the co-plaintiffs or co-defendants of the action form a legal group, or if their 
rights or obligations are based upon the same factual and legal ground, or if they 
are joint and several debtors or creditors;85  
ii) if the disputed claims or obligations are of the same type and based upon similar 
factual and legal ground, and at the same time the same court has the subject-
matter and territorial jurisdiction over each of the claims and each of the defen-
dants86  
iii) if it is so provided by law.87  
 
Although to date no joint action has been brought in the area of antitrust law, it self-
evident that the second condition will apply to antitrust damage cases. The first con-
dition requiring that the disputed claims are of ‘the same type’ is not difficult to sat-
isfy since the matter of the dispute is the same in all individual claims, i.e. payment of 
compensation.88 The second condition that refers to the ‘similar factual and legal 
ground’ will be satisfied in antitrust cases if the relevant facts are substantially ho-
mogenous to the extent, that a common assessment of evidence with regard to the 
                                                        
81  Article 191(3) CPA. 
82  Article 195 CPA. Case no. VIII Ips 416/2007, case no. II Ips 345/2002, case no. II 456/2002. 
83  See section 6.12. 
84  Under Article 300 CPA, claims can also be joined by the judge owing to the presence of connecting 
factors. 
85  The procedure is named also as ‘substantive litis consortium’ (‘materialno sosporništvo’). The subject-
matter of such cases is joint rights or obligations on which a court cannot rule separately.  
86  Such law suits are defined as co-litigation or ‘formal litisconsortium’ in terms of Roman law (‘formalno 
sosporništvo’ in Slovenian law). 
87  An example of legal joint liability is a form of joint liability provided by Article 194 CPA. The Article 
states that the main debtor and the surety may be jointly sued if such joinder is not incongruous with 
the contract on surety-ship. 
88  Case no. II Cp 2669/2009. 
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co-litigants will be possible.89 An obvious example would be the case in which all the 
claimants before the court are at the same level of supply. They would all argue that 
the price increase resulting from anticompetitive behaviour of the defendant has 
caused them a loss. 
The joining of cases differs from collective redress mechanisms such as class ac-
tions in that that the joining of the cases in one lawsuit is purely a procedural matter. 
It is based on a simple accumulation of numerous individual claims. As individual 
claims are at the basis of a joinder party, autonomy of parties,90 which is a basic rule 
of civil litigation, is still preserved. Only those parties who filed individual claims that 
are then combined into a joint action or who then join the action after the joinder 
procedure has been established will be bound by the outcome of the case. The deci-
sion will not have any effect on other victims of the illegal behaviour who did not file 
individual claims. 
A joinder of actions is appropriate in legal proceedings in which issues at stake 
are common to all plaintiffs. If each of multiple injured plaintiffs could only bring his 
case separately based on grounds that are common to other cases, against the same 
defendant, the defendant will have to go to trial a number of times, each time proving 
the same facts in each case. At the same time each of the plaintiffs would have to 
provide evidence on issues that are common to all plaintiffs, such as evidence of an 
infringement of competition law. A disadvantage of a joinder becomes clear if an 
action is brought forward by hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs, which can be the 
case in antitrust litigation. In that situation a joinder of all members becomes difficult. 
Under the rules of traditional joinder, all parties are still treated individually and each 
party’s claim has to be examined on its own. Hence, such proceedings can easily 
become so complex that they cannot be handled within a reasonable time. If the 
application of the mechanism of joint proceedings is inappropriate to a case that 
involves a very numerous individuals, it becomes of little use in situations in which 
infringement might not only cause damage to a multitude of individuals but their 
individual damage might be of low-value, as often is the case of antitrust infringe-
ment. In this case bringing a joint action will not only be unattractive, but it will also 
make no sense economically as the expected recovery is too small to justify the costs 
of litigation. The traditional procedural technique of joinder of parties is of very little 
use for collective litigation purposes. This has also been obvious when in 2008 the 
CPO found that five Slovenian electricity distributors breached antitrust law by si-
multaneous price rise of retail electricity for householders.91 Given that the damage 
suffered by individual householder amounted only to between 30 EUR to 300 EUR, 
the harm caused to each individual was too small to justify separate damage actions 
(even having the possibility of being joint in the same procedure). As the mechanism 
is structured, it does not allow one claimant to bring a single aggregated claim. As 
already said, the victim of a legally defined wrong, and only the victim, is empowered 
by tort law to seek a remedy from the wrongdoer. In that case, which will be dis-
                                                        
89  J. Zobec, /8GH1%HWHWWR$*DOLÿ95LMDYHF':HGDP/XNLÿ-=REHF-.UDPEHUJHUãNHUO
M. Damjan, Pravdni postopek, zakon s komentarjem, 2. knjiga *9=DORæED/MXEOMDQD, p. 240. 
90  See section 6.5.2. 
91  Judgement U 2/2008, from 30 June 2009. 
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cussed into greater detail later,92 a solution was offered by an ad-hoc interested group 
that was created with the aim of acquiring the claims by customers and bring a bun-
dled claim in their name. Without civil incentive consumers would probably remain 
uncompensated, but also their access to justice would be impaired. Of course under 
the general procedural rules the consumers (the potential plaintiffs) could always 
transfer their claims to any other individual or an association, which could then 
claim those rights. Nevertheless, the expected recovery did not exceed the 
anticipated costs of initiation of the claim, but also the cost related to the 
transfer of the rights to other entity. The case is a good illustration that the 
traditional civil procedure mechanism of joinder does not provide for effec-
tive access to justice in competition cases involving low, scattered damages. 
6.6.3 Model procedure 
A model case (or ‘test case’) is another mechanism put in place to enable the court to 
deal with a multiplicity of claims. Pursuant to Article 279.b CPA-D, when a large 
number of plaintiffs bring an individual tort claim against a single defendant, the 
court may pick one of those claims as model case, and temporarily suspend all oth-
ers.93 The model proceeding has been introduced in the civil procedure by amend-
ment to CPA in 2008, but this form of procedure is not totally new in the Slovenian 
legal system. In administrative dispute proceedings it was already possible to bring a 
model case. The Administrative Disputes Act provides that if lawsuits against more 
than twenty administrative acts in which the rights or obligations are based on the 
same or similar factual and legal grounds have been filed with the court, the court 
may, after receiving an answer, carry out a model procedure and suspend other pro-
cedures.94 Similarly, the CPA provides for this possibility without limiting it to the 
number of lawsuits. It refers to “a large number of claims.”  
Unlike the US class action,95 the Slovenia model procedure is not aimed at adju-
dicating claims that would not have been brought otherwise. A model case is estab-
lished by the court explicitly for the purpose of eliciting from the court a decision 
that will resolve not only the model case but also all the other cases with which it 
shares common features.96 It permits issues of fact or law common to multiple indi-
vidual claims to be decided upon in a single trial and thus to avoid duplication of 
work and costs, such as expert evidence. A major benefit of this mechanism is that it 
is performed as a normal process between two parties. The way it is structured, it 
ensures that legal traditions and fundamental principles of procedural law are re-
spected. All the parties concerned by the test case should have individual interest in 
                                                        
92  See section 6.6.5. 
93  The parties have an opportunity to make a statement about suspension of the proceedings and 
realisation of the model proceeding. No objection is possible against a decision on suspension of the 
proceedings and performance of the model proceedings.  
94  Article 43 of Administrative Disputes Act (‘Zakon o upravnem postopku’), Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Slovenia, no. 105/06. 
95  See section 4.4.2. 
96  P. Cane, The anatomy of Tort law (1997) Oxford, Hart, p. 16. 
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the case concerned. Before the establishment of a model case, they must file an indi-
vidual claim. In an antitrust case this would mean that all individuals who suffer dam-
ages as a result of the same antitrust infringement must bring a claim into the court. 
In addition, the requirement that all the parties concerned in a model case are in-
formed about the court decision that the model procedure will be carried out ensures, 
that all claimants are involved and have the possibility, at least to a certain extent, to 
join and influence the test case.97 Having the possibility to have an active role in the 
proceeding also complies with the right to be heard. 98 According to that right, all 
plaintiffs and not just the model claimant are entitled to present their opinion on the 
model questions to the court. It would interfere with the right to a hearing if the 
court based its judgment on the facts on which the parties have been denied the op-
portunity to be heard. Therefore, also the model judgment will bind only victims who 
filed an individual lawsuit and who were in a position to influence the outcome of the 
model proceedings. 
Once the common questions have been decided (e.g. the establishment of a 
competition law infringement) and the court has adopted a decision in a ‘model pro-
ceeding,’ it decides on the suspended proceedings. In these individual proceedings, it 
decides upon the issues not common to all claims, such as the amount of individual 
damages and causation. In practice, it means that although all plaintiffs in the test 
procedure are bound by the decision on common issues, damages sued for are indi-
vidualised damages and their assessment has to be carried out individually for each 
claim that is asserted.99 Even if the common questions have been determined in the 
claimants’ favour in the test proceeding, the individual actions might not succeed due 
to other reasons. As it is structured, the model preceding takes into account that the 
assessment of the existence of claims for damages cannot be detached from the cir-
cumstances of the individual case.  
Model procedure offers some of the efficiencies of US class action, while it does 
not offer the same incentives in mass antitrust cases. The use of model cases is based 
on the presumption that one model case creates a pattern for other similar cases that 
derive from the same infringement and are filed against the same defendant. As with 
joinder procedure, here the problem with model procedure is that it still requires 
standing for all parties and that the case already has to be taken to the court. A 
judgement handed down in the model proceeding has no binding authority on per-
sons who do not bring an individual action. In addition, the procedure can only be 
initiated by the court on its own motion. It is not a mechanism in the hands of the 
parties. It follows that such a mechanism might reduce the amount of costs of evi-
dence taken, but it does not facilitate access to justice for individuals with low value 
claims100 that are often not worth pursuing individually. Since competition cases are 
likely to involve a large number of victims, model procedure appears not to be an 
effective mechanism in competition law. This is also demonstrated by the fact that to 
                                                        
97  I. 5REQLN9]RUÿQLSRVWRSHNPravosodni bilten, pp. 111113. 
98  Article 5 CPA. 
99  ,5REQLN9]RUÿQLSRVWRSHNPravosodni bilten, p. 111. 
100  See also N. Betteto, I. Jeraj, Skupinsko uvljavljnje zahtevkov, (2008) Pravna praksa – priloga, p. VI.  
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date, there has been no case where the mechanism of model procedure has been used 
in the area of competition law. 
6.6.4 Representative actions in the general interest 
As already discussed earlier, pursuant to the general rule of locus standi, an action can-
not be brought by a person without having been individually affected by the breach 
in question.101 Suits by representative bodies on behalf of numerous individuals who 
are not parties to the joint litigation are generally not possible. Representative actions 
are recognised only in exactly determined cases, in particular, when the law has em-
powered specific associations to represent a particular aspect of public interest. Based 
on the Protection of Consumers against Unfair Commercial Practices Act,102 con-
sumer organisations that satisfy certain criteria can start a legal action and declare null 
and void certain contracts concluded between the defendant and consumers, individ-
ual provisions in these contracts or general terms and conditions of business incorpo-
rated in these contracts.103 In this case consumer organisations104 are entitled to liti-
gate on behalf of the whole class of damaged consumers. They themselves act as a 
litigating party on behalf of individual claimants. In case of a positive outcome, the 
judgment concerned has a general effect (erga omnes), so that every consumer affected 
by the contract at issue may refer to it. In case of a negative outcome, the judgement 
binds only the parties of the contract (effect inter parties), and shall not prevent the 
instituting of a new action with respect to the same claim, either by another Con-
sumer protection organisation or by persons who have legal standing.105 This results 
from a general rule that a negative outcome cannot be to the detriment of the indi-
vidual who had no opportunity to participate in the action or could not assert his 
wish not to be bound by the outcome of the litigation in which he cannot partici-
pate.106 
The application of Article 76 however, is limited to declaratory claims. Although 
as the requesting party is an interested organisation, it is not possible to claim dam-
ages in this way.107 Damages in the tradition of civil law perception exist primarily to 
compensate the individual victim, while the general interest is primarily carried out in 
the context of regulation and control and thus focuses on deterrence and punish-
ment. Since these two are considerably different objectives, claims for damages 
                                                        
101  See section 6.6.1. 
102  Article 13 of the Protection of Consumers against Unfair Commercial Practices Act in conjunction 
with paragraph 1 of Article 76 Consumer Protection Act (Official Gazette RS, no. 78/11). 
103  Besides the claims for declaratory relief, the Consumer protection organisations have standing in 
court to file claims for injunctive relief (Articles 74 and 75 of the Consumer Protection Act). Injunc-
tive relief obtained by a consumer organisation, however, by no means guarantees voluntary compli-
ance with the court decision. 
104  Here ‘consumer protection organisations’ includes organisations established for protection of con-
sumer rights that have been in operation for at least one year. 
105  Article 76 (2 and 3) of the Consumer Protection Act. 
106  $*DOLÿ6NXSLQVNHWRæEHQDSRGURÿMXSRWURäQLäNHJDSUDYDPravni letopis, p. 222. 
107  Consultation on Collective Redress, Public consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach 
to Collective Redress, Slovenian Consumer Association (‘Zveza potrošnikov Slovenije’), 2011, 
available on: http://ec.europa.eu. 
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brought in the public interest are incompatible with the traditional concept of civil 
liability. Therefore, if an individual wants to receive compensation, he will have to 
initiate an individual damage claim.108 Nevertheless, in this case a final decision re-
garding the question on nullity of the act issued in the previous collective proceeding 
under Article 76 can be used in the subsequent individual procedures.109 
Furthermore, the individual plaintiffs can still authorise the consumer association 
to bring an action for compensatory damages, by transferring their claims under the 
general procedural rules. To a certain extent, the procedure resembles a collective 
damages action,110 although it still has to be carried out in the name of all individual 
plaintiffs and not in the name of the group as such. The issue will be discus in next 
section. 
 6.6.5 (Im)possibility of consumer association to bring tort actions 
In accordance with the doctrine of locus standi, the procedural rules deny standing to 
some categories of entities relevant to antitrust cases, i.e. consumer associations. 
Consumer associations are entitled to initiate a civil procedure under the same pre-
conditions as all other individuals: if their rights or interests are directly at stake. It 
means that they can bring forward a claim for damages only if they can provide that 
they themselves have suffered damage or injury. If the damage has not been caused 
to them, their interest in bringing an action is not justified by the legal consequences 
of the judgement and thus they cannot pursue a private action.111  
Lack of standing for consumer associations to bring tort actions however, does 
not impede consumers’ associations encouraging the victims to bring individual but 
coordinated claims. For example, in 2008 the Slovenain Consumers’ Association 
(Zveza potrošnikov Slovenije – ‘ZPS’) assisted to the victims of the so-called Modro 
YDUÿHYDQMH VDYLQJV VFKHPH WR EULQJ WKHLU FODLPV ,Q WKLV FDVH WKe largest Slovenian 
bank (NLB) infringed the law and its contracts by lowering interest rates in long term 
savings products instead of increasing them – as agreed in the contract. As no collec-
tive redress procedure existed, ZPS has offered legal help to the victims and sug-
gested that they be represented by the same attorney. In this way 160 lawsuits have 
been filed112 and the majority of the cases have been settled. According to informa-
tion of ZPS, during the proceedings and under public pressure, the bank reimbursed 
consumers who did not file a damage claim an additional €13 million.113 It has to be 
                                                        
108  In this case the recovery of damages an individual action is facilitated if the representative organisa-
tion obtains a favourable judgement because the issue of existence of an infringement will have al-
ready been decided. 
109  $*DOLÿ6NXSLQVNHWRæEHQDSRGURÿMXSRWURäQLäNHJDSUDYDPravni letopis, pp. 222–223. 
110  See section 4.4.2. 
111  See section 6.6.1. 
112  7KHHVWLPDWHGQXPEHURIYLFWLPVZDV9UKRYQRVRGLäÿHJOHGHPRGUHJDYDUÿHYDQMDYEDQNL
NLB pritrdilo Zvezi potrošnikov, Dnevnik, at http://www.dnevnik.si/poslovni-dnevnik/poslov-
ni/novice/1042387413). Last consulted on 7 May 2013. 
113  Slovenain consumers’ association (‘Zveza potrošnikov Slovenije’), at: http://www.zps.si/osebne-
finance/varcevanja/uspesen-zakljucek-akcije-modro-varcevanje.html?Itemid=671. Last consulted on 
7 May 2013. 
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stressed that in this case the victims acted as individual parties in the procedure and 
also the risk of losing the case was borne by each of the victims. The actions of ZPS 
were limited to non-litigation actions. ZPS, as a consumers’ association, is not al-
lowed to initiate a civil procedure on behalf of the interested parties. 
The case of the “savings scheme” is not isolated. In 2007 the Competition Pro-
tection Office found that five Slovenian energy distribution companies (Elektro Pri-
morska, Elektro Maribor, Elektro Ljubljana, Elektro Gorenjska and Elektro Celje) 
had breached the competition rules114 with a simultaneous increase of electricity 
prices for households. The CPO decision115 was upheld by a ruling of the Supreme 
Court in June 2009.116 According to the estimations of R. Pezdir, a Slovenian econo-
mist, the overpaid sums were about € 15 million; the damage suffered by individual 
households was amounted approximately € 30 to € 300.117 If this estimation was 
correct, pursuing individual damage claims made no sense economically. Since collec-
tive actions are not available under Slovenian law and other multi-party procedural 
mechanisms were economically unjustified, the victims of the antitrust violation 
would therefore remain uncompensated. When everybody thought that the story of 
energy distribution companies was finished, a solution was offered by a group of 
LQGLYLGXDOVZKRHVWDEOLVKHG´'UXäWYR]DYUDÿLORSUHSODÿDQHHOHNWULÿQHHQHUJLMHµ118 a 
civil association (a non-profit legal entity) with the aim of reclaiming the damages. By 
using mass media the association collected a mandate from nearly 75,000 victims for 
refund claims. The association asked energy distribution companies to compensate 
for the damages. The distributors first rejected the request but later agreed on volun-
tary compensation. Consumers who were deemed to be victims of antitrust behav-
iour received credit notes corresponding to the overcharge that each household had 
paid. If the outstanding sums were not returned within certain time the association, 
supported by a law firm which agreed to bear the costs of litigation, would file law-
suits on behalf of the householders.  
In contrast to the representative actions analysed in the previous section, here it 
was not the public or group interest that entitled the association to act. The entitle-
ment of association to act rested upon an agreement between the victims and the 
representative (i.e. civil law institute of mandate) and therefore did not need a legal 
base in special legislation. Based on this agreement, the association would represent 
the members in a potential legal proceeding. It would be entitled to bring a damage 
action even though it is its members who have suffered the damage. Here, rights of 
individuals presented by the same association were collected for the purpose of 
economy. The use of a voluntary pooling device does not change the nature of the 
individual claims. If damages are awarded, they are conceived as compensation for 
specific losses. This is in line with the idea of an individual assessment of claims. 
                                                        
114  Article 6 of the Competition Act and Article 101 TFEU.  
115  Decision No. 306-168/2007-57 (6.8.2008), available at web site of CPO: http://www.uvk.gov.si/ 
fileadmin/uvk.gov.si (last consulted on 7 May 2013). 
116  Judgement U 2/2008, from 30. June 2009.  
117  'UXäWYR ]D SUDYQR GUæDYR DW http://www.dzp.si/domov/novice-projekti-aktualno/articleid/4/ 
cbmoduleid/388.aspx). Last consulted on 7 May 2013. 
118  The association has been established by economist Rado Pezdir. 
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That the number of victims can be high and damage suffered is low in antitrust 
cases is illustrated in another case. In 2006 the Competition Protection Office estab-
lished that four Slovenian banks (NLB, NKBM, Abanka Vipa and Banka Celje) 
breached antitrust rules by introducing the fee of the same amount (33 cents) on the 
same day in 2006. After the ruling became final in 2010, the Consumer Association 
urged the banks to refund the fee illegally charged to their clients. The additional 
pressure came from the association that a year earlier forced the electricity distribu-
tors to give their clients refunds for an anticompetitive price rise; now under the 
QDPH RI 7KH $VVRFLDWLRQ IRU WKH 5XOH RI /DZ 'UXäWYR ]D SUDYQR GUæDYR )LUVW
NLB, Abanka Vipa and Banka Celje decided to refund the fee, while NKBM, Slove-
nia’s second biggest bank, said it had filed a petition for a revision of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling that upheld the decision of the Competition Protection Office. None-
theless, NKBM later decided to reimburse their clients for the anticompetitive with-
drawal fees charges. According to the Association for the Rule of Law, the average 
amount of refunded sums was € 5.28, and the number of bank clients damaged was € 
728,512.119 
An important observation that has to be made is that the absence of collective 
actions does not stand in the way of joining individual antitrust damage claims in 
proceedings by using the existing legal mechanisms. In the above mentioned case, an 
ad-hoc interest group was created with aim of acquiring the claims of customers and 
bringing a bundled claim in their name. Nevertheless, the case illustrates some major 
problems with regard to non-existence of specific instrument of collective redress. 
First, the drawback of ad-hoc interest group is that its effectiveness is limited by fi-
nancial restraints. A civil society faces the problem of limited financial resources. 
According to the Association Act,120 which regulates formulation of a civil society, a 
‘civil society’ is a legal entity that may be established only for non-profit purposes. 
Article 3 of the Association Act explicitly states that establishment of a “civil society” 
with the purpose of gaining a profit is forbidden. Accordingly, the organisation could 
not keep any possible gains from the action. If a case succeeds, the benefits of the 
judgment must be distributed to the represented group members: and if a case fails a 
civil society has to pay litigation costs. As a consequence, the incentives for bringing 
an action are too small and the risk too high. Second, as there is no designated body 
entitled to bring actions in the interest of consumers, consumers whose right has 
been harmed by antitrust infringements, but their individual loss is small, will be de-
prived of an effective redress mechanism. In other words, they will find their EU 
right to damages excessively difficult or even impossible to be exercised in practice. 
The ‘full effectiveness’ of EU law is therefore undermined. 
                                                        
119  The Association for the Rule of Law, Društvo za pravno dræDYR ]RSHU EDQÿQL NDUWHO 
(http://www.dzp.si/domov/novice-projekti-aktualno/articleid/19/cbmoduleid/439.aspx). Last 
consulted on 7 May 2013. 
120  Association Act (‘Zakon o društvih’), Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 64/2011. 
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6..6.6 Conclusions on indirect purchaser’s standing 
EU law does not distinguish between different groups of victims (protected groups 
and non-protected groups). Any individual who has suffered harm caused by an anti-
trust infringement (including indirect purchasers) must be allowed to claim dam-
ages.121 Also in the White Paper the EU Commission did not suggest any limitation 
on standing of anyone who can show a causal link between his harm and an in-
fringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Similarly, under Slovenian law, the main limitation of the right to claim damages 
is the basic procedural requirement of a legal standing. Someone who has not per-
sonally suffered damages has no ‘legal interest’ in the outcome of the decision and 
therefore cannot file a lawsuit. There is no further a priori limitation on the standing, 
such as the class of protected persons or the kind of damage as known in English law 
with regard to antitrust damage cases.122 All damaged persons are granted the right to 
claim damage. This norm should be interpreted as allowing standing not only for the 
direct purchasers or competing undertakings in the market, but also consumers and 
indirect purchasers. Denying the standing of these groups in the first place would go 
against the purposes sought by effective private enforcement of competition law, but 
also against the general principle of legal standing in Slovenian law. 
In this part it should be added that although indirect purchasers are not a priori 
excluded from legal standing, hurdles that might hinder their claims arise from the 
difficulty of proving causation.123 The question of coverage for indirect purchasers 
will be treated as an ordinary question of causation. As in any other damage case, the 
plaintiff has to convince the court that there is a causal link between the unlawful 
breach of competition law and the damage sustained. In particular, in order to dem-
onstrate loss caused by anti-competitive behaviour of the undertakings involved, the 
plaintiff must establish that the direct purchaser (and any other indirect purchasers in 
the distribution chain above) has passed the damage on to him, as there exists no 
presumption under the general provisions of Slovenian tort law that the higher prices 
have been passed-on. If the plaintiff is not able to prove that he suffered damages, 
the court will not award compensation. Also the EU Commission acknowledged that 
under the EU regime, antitrust claims are always subject to causation and that the 
success of a claim will be dependent on whether the plaintiff is actually able to prove 
causation.  
It follows that Slovenian law does not impose restrictions with regard to legal 
standing that would make antitrust litigation harder to pursue. From the Slovenian 
law perspective, there is also no reason why the law would a priori exclude indirect 
purchasers to bring a damage claim. On this point, the Slovenian law is in line with 
the private antitrust enforcement policy and reflects the same spirit as the EU Com-
mission’s proposal in the White Paper. The law works well in competition damage 
cases and therefore an EU intervention is not needed. 
                                                        
121  Manfredi, [2006] ECR I-6619. 
122  See section 5.7.3. 
123  6HH DOVR /9DUQHOOL2GäNRGQLQVNL YLGLNL ]ORUDEH SUHYODGXMRÿHJD SRORæDMD  Podjetje in delo, 
p. 224. 
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6.6.7 Conclusions on collective redress 
Under Slovenian law, all damaged persons have the right to bring a damage action for 
infringement of national or EU law. However, as far as the consumers and individu-
als who have suffered scattered and relatively low value damages are concerned, prac-
tical and procedural challenges deter them from exercising this right. 
In Slovenia there are two principal mechanisms available to courts when dealing 
with multi-party actions, joinder actions and test cases. Both mechanisms have devel-
oped in the realm of general civil procedural legislation, which presupposes that ac-
tions for damages require individual assessment of claims. As the analysis carried out 
in this chapter shows, the mechanisms are limited and to a certain extent impractical 
for competition damage cases, particularly in cases where individual claims are too 
low to be individually claimed. Individuals here lack the necessary incentive to file 
suits.  
Unlike the EU Commission’s proposals on damage actions in the White Paper, 
the Slovenian civil procedural law regulating multi-party litigation is less concerned 
with empowering victims of illegal behaviour in their pursuit for damages. It does not 
provide for US style class action or any other collective mechanism whereby victims 
of an illegal practice would either ‘opt-in‘ or ‘opt-out‘ of the action taken by a group 
in pursuit of their members’ interest. The law’s primary concern is to deal efficiently 
with claims already filed. Accordingly, the mechanisms of multi-party litigation are 
structured as a means to achieve the legislator’s objective of speeding up the proce-
dure but not as a means to improve the access to justice of individual plaintiffs with 
small claims and dispersed claims. As the analysis conducted so far in this chapter 
highlights, that multi-party actions are not sufficient to provide effective access to 
justice in scattered and low value antitrust damage claims. The effective access to 
justice, which is not only a fundamental principle of civil law, but also of fundamental 
importance for victims seeking redress for violation of EU law, therefore is under-
mined. The victims remain uncompensated and effective enforcement of EU compe-
tition law is endangered. It is evident that mechanisms allowing aggregation of the 
individual claims of antitrust victims therefore are needed. 
The current system of dealing with multi-party litigation in Slovenia does not 
only lack effectiveness with regard to access to justice, but it is also not in line with 
the EU Commission’s proposal on collective redress mechanisms. In order to im-
prove access to justice and thus enhance effectiveness of EU competition law, the 
EU Commission proposed to introduce a model of opt-in group actions and allow 
representative actions. Since there is an ‘access to justice’ gap in the Slovenian legal 
system, it appears that the EU Commission’s proposed system can bridge the gap. 
Indeed, a system of effective collective mechanism should be designed and imple-
mented. However, such a system should not be at the expense of undermining the 
structure of the Slovenia legal system since not all forms of the EU Commission’s 
proposed collective redress mechanisms fit easily into the Slovenian legal system. The 
difficulties in tailoring the EU Commission’s proposals to fit the Slovenian legal sys-
tem are discussed below. 
With regard to group actions, the EU Commission gives preference to the model 
based on the opt-in principle, where claimants expressly decide to combine their 
Private Enforcement in Slovenia 
245
 
individual claims in the group action (where claimants are identified), and not for the 
model based on the opt-out principle. Although opt-in mechanisms are more com-
plex124 than opt-out mechanisms, without doubt they are closer to the Slovenian civil 
legal culture. Opt-in mechanisms require the identification of the claimants and the 
identification and demonstration of the damage suffered by each plaintiff. In this way 
they preserve a constitutionally guaranteed liberty of an individual to choose whether 
to bring the action or not.125 The opt-in mechanism is also in line with the classical 
concept of civil litigation that is defined by the fact of existence of two parties in 
dispute. In addition, the opt-in model, to a certain extent, has some resemblance to 
the existing model procedure. In the model procedure, which is designed on an indi-
vidual basis, only the victims who have also filed an individual lawsuit will be bound 
by the outcome of the test case. The victims of illegal conduct who did not file their 
claims individually will not be bound by the judgement.126 Also a representative joint 
action is based on an opt-in principle, since only those who expressly joined the 
group are considered group members and the final judgements is only binding on 
group members. As long as a collective model is structured in such a way that it re-
quires claimants to come forward to affirm their right, it is not a problem and does 
not put Slovenian legal system under undue pressure the. It might require a change of 
law, but not a change of system.  
The EU Commission’s other proposal concerns representative actions. Based on 
the above analysis, this form of collective redress mechanism can play an important 
role in addressing shortcomings of traditional procedures of private law and provide 
consumers with access to remedies, in cases where they would not have an incentive 
to act individually.127 The mechanism can be particularly useful and even necessary 
when large numbers of consumers have each suffered small losses. It would allow the 
action to be brought to the court by a representative, who acts as a litigating party on 
behalf of the individual claimants. However, with the availability of representative 
actions brought on behalf of ‘identifiable’ victims, the EU Commission’s recommen-
dation raises concerns with regard to its compatibility with the Slovenian legal system. 
As far as identifiable victims are defined as specific individuals, there is an overlap 
between representative actions and the civil law institution of joint representative 
action. The consumer association would act on behalf of a group of consumers, all of 
whom have suffered individual harm as a result of the same illegal action. If identifi-
able victims are very loosely defined, the same problems as in opt-out actions might 
arise.128 In particular, if the group is not precisely defined at the beginning of the 
procedure, then there is a risk that persons represented in the action are not known 
to the representative parties. If the represented parties are not known, then it would 
                                                        
124  See section 4.4.2. 
125  Article 3 CPA. 
126  See section 6.6.3. 
127  See section 6.6.5. 
128  That this is the risk is also evident from the Draft Damage Directive, which was subsequently with-
drawn. According to the Draft, the representative organisations will not have to individually identify 
the injured parties that belong to the group although it would still have to inform all those injured 
parties belonging to the group of the representative action (Draft Damages Directive, Article 6 
(2)(3)). See section 4.4.2. 
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be difficult in practice for the representative (who itself has no injury) to give notice 
to the individuals purportedly represented, and who actually have a claim. Notice, as 
such, it is essential to protect the rights of the individual, who has a claim.  
Based on the analysis in the previous sections, such a collective redress mecha-
nism would not fit into the Slovenian legal system. The general rule of civil law is that 
the individual whose interest has been violated is the holder of the claim and he has 
the exclusive right to pursue a claim in the court. 129 Even in the case of representa-
tion in joint action only those individuals who have allowed the association to repre-
sent them are affected by the lawsuit.130 All other individuals injured who did not 
express a desire to be presented in the representative action will be bound by the 
result of the case. Allowing a representative to initiate a civil procedure (pooling of 
individual claims) without any kind of prior consent of the interested parties would in 
fact lead every single member of the group being deprived of the guaranteed right of 
free party disposition131 because once a collective action has been initiated the possi-
bility of individual actions of individuals presented in the collective action will be 
ruled out. Based on this consideration, Slovenian procedural law requires that a claim 
can be brought on behalf of a defined group and damages be awarded to that group 
if all the individual claimants are identified at the beginning of the action.  
Accordingly, a model of representative action should be structured in a way that 
only parties who fall within the defined group would be bound by the result of the 
case. This model offers two options with regard to the identification of claimants. 
The first option implies that a representative action is brought on behalf of named 
consumers. In order to assert a wish to participate in the proceeding each individual 
potentially represented would have to be informed of the proceeding. Such a model 
could be easily introduced into the Slovenian legal system without contradicting other 
rules of civil procedure.  
A second option involves a model providing that a representative action may be 
brought on behalf of consumers at large. The procedure would incorporate a flexible 
notice procedure, requiring a notice to be published or broadcast to class members, 
but specifically does not require individual notice. Class members must then be given 
the opportunity to opt out of the class. By doing so, they will not be bound by the 
decision issued in the case. If those individuals wish to proceed with their own litiga-
tion they are entitled to do so. It would be based on an opt-out model, which is not 
known to the Slovenian legal system. This would require a more radical change in the 
law than the first option. As each plaintiff is required to demonstrate an interest in 
bringing damage claim proceedings and, in principle, there is no possibility under 
Slovenian law to file a representative action on behalf of other persons. However, it 
could be argued that the model can be explained in the light of civil legal litigation, as 
long as individuals have the possibility to assert their wish not to be bound by the 
outcome of the litigation. To achieve that, they would have to be properly informed, 
otherwise they cannot exercise their right not to be presented in the action. 
                                                        
129  See section 6.6.1. 
130  See section 6.6.5. 
131  Aricle 3 CPA. See alsosection 6.5.2. 
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Finally, ‘representative action without a represented victim’ sharply contradicts 
the classical concept of civil litigation and the ‘philosophy of compensation.’ As dam-
ages cannot be distributed to unknown individuals there is the risk of double-
compensation. This renders any payment strictly punitive. For all the reasons men-
tioned, it seems that a representative action on behalf of identified victims is closer to 
‘joint representative actions‘, and therefore more easily compatible with traditional 
principles of representation and procedural autonomy. The consumer association 
would act on behalf of a group of consumers who each has suffered individual harm 
as a result of the same illegal action. 
6.7 Substantive conditions for claims for damages 
Tort law limits cases for which compensation can be received. The starting point is 
that every person has to bear his loss himself (casum sentit dominus) unless there is a 
legal basis for shifting it to another.132 The damage is inflicted on another person (the 
wrongdoer) if certain requirements (the so-called liability factors) are established. 
According to the general rule of civil liability,133 they are four, unlawfulness (unac-
ceptability) of the defendant’s conduct,134 damage, a causal link between the defen-
dant’s unlawful act and the damage and fault of defendant. Thus if – and only if – all 
the mentioned conditions are cumulatively met is there a delict and the defendant will 
be found liable for damages.135 The same rule will apply to antitrust cases. There 
exists an explicit statutory basis for bringing an action for antitrust damages,136 but in 
the end, since there are no specific provisions on the subject, conditions for liability 
will be governed by general rules as laid down in the Obligations Code. 
The first condition is the illegality of the defendant’s conduct. Such illegality will 
be established by a breach the national or EU competition rules. As in other EU 
Member States, there are two competition law systems in force in Slovenia, i.e. EU 
competition law and Slovenian national competition law. The breach of EU competi-
tion rules will exist if an agreement or abuse might appreciably affect trade among the 
Member States. If not, national competition rules will apply. Nevertheless, there are 
no considerable differences between Slovenian and EU competition laws. Accession 
to the EU acted as considerable political and economic initiative for Slovenia to 
adopt a competition law system similar to the rules laid down in Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. Therefore Article 6 of the Competition Act – aligned with the Article 101 
TFEU – defines prohibition of restrictive agreements as “agreements between under-
                                                        
132  13ODYäDN0-XKDUW'-DGHN3HQVD9.UDQMF3*ULOF$3RODMQDU3DYÿQLN03DYÿQLNObli-
gacijski zakonik s komentarjem (splošni del) *9=DORæED/MXEOMDQDp. 665. 
133  In Slovenia, as in the majority of other continental European countries, a systematic and rationalistic 
approach to damages actions has been accepted. In contrast to common law systems in which exists 
an enumeration of different types of breaches for which one could be recovered, the Slovenian tort 
law has a unified concept of tort. 
134  ‘Unlawfulness’ or ‘wrongfulness’ are also used in this context. 
135  13ODYäDN0-XKDUW'-DGHN3HQVD9.UDQMF3*ULOF$3RODMQDU3DYÿQLN03DYÿQLNObli-
gacijski zakonik s komentarjem (splošni del) *9=DORæED/MXEOMDQDp. 689. 
136  Article 62(1) of the Competition Act. See also section 6.2.1. 
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takings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices of under-
takings […] whose object or effect is the prevention, restriction or distortion of com-
petition in the Republic of Slovenia.” Such agreements, according to the above-
mentioned provision, shall be prohibited and shall be null and void. This prohibition 
applies in particular to agreements which “directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling 
prices, or other trading conditions; limit or control production, markets, technical 
progress or investment; apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; make the 
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obli-
gations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of their contracts; share a market or sources of supply.”137 The sec-
ond competition law provision, the violation of which justifies a claim for damages, is 
the prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position. According to Article 9 of the 
Competition Act – that mirrors Article 102 TFEU – “an undertaking or several un-
dertakings shall be deemed to have a dominant position when they can, to a signifi-
cant degree, act independently of competitors, clients or consumers”138. In determin-
ing the dominant position, the following factors should be taken into consideration, 
market share, financing options, legal or actual entry barriers, access to suppliers or 
the market and existing or potential competition for the market share, funding op-
tions, legal or actual entry barriers, access to suppliers or the market and existing or 
potential competition.139 An undertaking is deemed to be in a dominant position if its 
share in the Slovenian market is higher than 40 percent (higher than 60 percent in the 
case of several companies).140  
The damage is the second necessary condition for the victim to be entitled to 
compensation. Since the Competition Act does not contain special provisions on the 
various types of damages in case of an antitrust infringement, the general rules of the 
law of damages apply. Under the Obligations Act, the claimant has the right to com-
pensation for three types of damages,141 ordinary damage (decrease in property – 
damnum emergens), lost profit (prevention of the increase of the property – lucrum ces-
sans) and non-material damage.142 Article 168(3) defines lost profit as “the profit 
which could have been justifiably expected in the normal course of events or taking 
into account special circumstances, but which was not achieved because of the act of 
the person who caused the damage”. A plaintiff is also entitled to claim non-
monetary damages, but only for expressly enumerated injuries, the infliction of physi-
cal or mental distress or fear on another person and encroachment upon the reputa-
tion of a legal person. In case of infringement of the competition rules, the poten-
tially relevant form of non-material damages would be damages resulting from harm 
to reputation. 
                                                        
137  Article 6(2) of the Competition Act. 
138  Article 9(2) of the Competition Act. 
139  Article 9(3) of the Competition Act. 
140  Articles 9(5) and 9(6) of the Competition Act. 
141  Article 132 of the Obligations Code. 
142  The characterisation of the type of damage is regarded as a substantive issue, a possibly error in 
specification of the type of the damage suggested by the party does not influence the decision of the 
court. 
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The third condition of liability is a causal link between the unlawful damaging act 
and the damage. Only if there is a connection between the person and the damage 
suffered, is that person called upon to render compensation. Slovenian law of delict, 
like most other continental legal systems, does not define, regulate or provide rules 
on causation (causality, causal connection, causal link, etc.) explicitly in the Civil Ob-
ligation Act. It only states that causality is one of the essential elements of tortuous 
liability.143 Not every action or omission that leads to damage is the cause of the 
damage and not all consequences of an infringement will be considered to be caused 
by the infringement. Cigoj distinguished between causation as a philosophical ques-
tion and causation as legal question. While the philosophical approach is limited to 
the question of “whether a fact cause another fact – the damage?”, the legal approach 
focuses on “whether one is responsible for the fact that caused the damage.” The role 
of tort law is to deal with the legal question of causality. There is no single theory of 
causation that would be accepted in legal theory. The Slovenian courts have accepted 
several theories, 144 although some of them have been eventually abandoned, such as 
the theory of conditio sine qua non (also known as theory of natural causality or equiva-
lence theory). On the basis of this theory, a causal link between an infringement and 
damage exists if the damage, without the infringement, would not have occurred as it 
did in fact occur. The theory was criticised because it does not distinguish between 
more and less important causes and that it is too broad, and that in some cases termi-
nates and consequently does not lead to reasonable and fair solutions. In practice, the 
court usually applies one of the two following theories: the theory of adequate causal-
ity and the theory of ratio legis causality.145 According to the theory of ratio legis 
causality, the court should only take into consideration the causes which simultane-
ously represent violations of a legal norm and which the legal norm itself considers as 
causes (which depends on the intention of such a legal norm). The problem arises 
when the legal norm itself does not give any indication as to the causation, so that 
other theories should be also considered, in particular, the theory of adequate causal-
ity. According to the theory of adequate causality, only the causes that lead to a result 
in the normal course of affairs should be considered the causes of such a result. Un-
der this theory the party causing the damage shall have to make good the damage 
caused by any unlawful act, upon which the basis of the normal course of events is 
considered to be capable of producing this effect. According to that theory, all ab-
normal, distant and unusual effects are excluded. 
The fourth element necessary for the tortuous liability of one’s own acts is fault. 
The Prevention of the Restriction of Competition Act 146 explicitly provides for liabil-
ity for damages resulting from either intent of negligence.147 Even before, when fault 
was not referred to in the competition act, it was required according to general prin-
                                                        
143  Article 131 of the Civil Obligation Act. 
144  S. Cigoj, Teorija obligacij – Splošni del obligacijskega prava (2000) Uradni list RS, Ljubljana, pp. 222–225. 
145  6HH/9DUDQHOOL2GäNRGQLQVNLYLGLNL]ORUDEHSUHYODGXMRÿHJDSRORæDMDPodjetje in delo. 
146  Article 62(1) of the Competition Act. 
147  The definitions of ‘intent’ and ‘negligence’ are not addressed in Obligations Code. They are estab-
lished by legal standards developed by case law. See II Ips 600/98, judgement of the Supreme Court 
of 9 September 1999. 
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ciples governing liability for damages. When adopting the competition act, the legisla-
tor decided to make an explicit reference to fault in order to avoid any confusion as 
to whether fault is required as an essential element of anticompetitive liability for 
damages.148 After all, the CJEU has not referred to any requirement of fault over and 
above the proof of the infringement.149 Therefore some could argue that not address-
ing fault as a requirement for the right to arise is a clear indication that the EU right 
for damages is based on strict liability rather than on fault.150 With an explicit refer-
ence to fault the potential confusion is removed. 
With regard to the fault requirement, an important remark has to be made, which 
will be further discussed in next chapter. In line with the general principles governing 
liability for damages, in antitrust cases (as well as in non-antitrust cases) fault is rebut-
tably presumed as soon as the infringement is established. It would be wrong to con-
clude that since fault is presumed, the fault requirement is an irrelevant element of 
tort liability. Presumption of fault ‘only’ means that it falls to the defendant to prove 
the absence of fault in order to escape his liability. The plaintiff does not bear the 
burden of proof in this case. That fault is still a basic element of tort liability is also 
evident from an explicit reference to the ‘intent’ and ‘negligence’ in the Competition 
Act, as mentioned earlier.151 
6.8 Evidence 
Collection and presentation of evidence is an important part of the litigation process 
and crucial for the decision on a competition case. Obtaining relevant documents or 
at least being aware of their existence creates an obstacle to private antitrust enforce-
ment, especially when there is no prior decision of competition authorities.152 Under 
Slovenian law no provision that would facilitate taking evidence in a case of in-
fringement of competition rules has been put in place. When it comes to evidence, 
the general rules on evidence for civil law cases will be applicable.  
The basic principle is that the parties carry out the discovery of the facts of the 
case and of the supporting evidence. Although broad discovery rules, under which 
parties are obliged to disclose relevant documents, and which the EU Commission 
favours with regard to antitrust damage actions, do not exist; the institution of ‘dis-
closure of documents’ is not completely unknown in the Slovenian legal system. 
Based on the general procedural rules the judge may – although in limited cases – 
order the disclosure of documents in the possession either of the parties or of a third 
party when one of the parties to the proceedings has referred to that document. After 
                                                        
148  A. Vlahek, =DNRQ R SUHSUHÿHYDQMX RPHMHYDQMD NRQNXUHQFH V NRPHQWDUMHP  *9 =DORæED /MXEOMDQD, 
p. 500. 
149  Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, judgment of 13 July 2006. 
150  For example, A.P. Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement, Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts (2008) Hart Publishing, p. 195 (see section 3.4.4). 
151  According to Article 61(1) of the Competition Act, anyone who violates, either deliberately or out of 
negligence, the provisions of Articles 6 or 9 of the same act or Articles 101 or 102 TFEU shall be li-
able for any damages arising from such a violation. See section 6.6.1. 
152  See section 4.4.3. 
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the revision of the Civil Procedure Act in 2008153 the institution of ‘disclosure of 
documents’ has even gained relevance by the introduction of a rule according to 
which the failure to comply with the court order of disclosure of documents means 
that the requested documents are deemed to be proven. 
Before focusing on the rules of evidence and access to evidence it is important to 
briefly present standard of proof and burden of proof as applicable to antitrust dam-
age cases. After all, the chance of the success of the claim depends on who bears the 
burden of proof and what standard of proof is necessary to discharge that burden of 
proof. 
6.8.1 Standard of proof 
Although the court – in line with the principle of ‘free evaluation of evidence’154 – 
decides which facts are deemed to be proven on the basis of the evidence presented, 
its decision is not trivial. Before granting a claim for damages the court must be con-
vinced that the claim is well-founded. In order to be able to make a well-founded 
ruling, the judge needs to have a certain degree of certainty that particular events 
occurred.  
In actions for antitrust damages, the assessments of both the alleged violations of 
the competition rules (where there is no a prior infringement decision of national 
competition authority)155 and of the damages in question are decided on the basis of 
the standard of proof that is applicable in civil proceedings. In contrast to criminal 
proceedings where it is required that there is no ‘reasonable doubt’ about the guilt of 
the defendant, the standard of proof applied in civil cases is lower.  
Pursuant to Article 215 CPA, the Slovenian judge must be convinced with a de-
gree of ‘certainty’ about the facts on the basis of the evidence presented. What is 
important to note is that although the level of ‘certainty’ is lower than the level of 
‘reasonable doubt’ required in criminal law, it is still higher than the level of proba-
bility usually required in other civil law systems.156 A lower degree of conviction – 
‘preponderance of the evidence’157 – is only sufficient, if expressly provided by law, in 
particular to a certain intermediate procedural decisions that do not bring the pro-
ceedings to an end and by which the court settles intermediate procedural ques-
tions.158 
Some may argue that if the standard of proof is too high it will be difficult to 
reach it in practice. This will be the case if the available evidence is not complete due 
to information asymmetry, which often happens in antitrust damage actions. There 
was even a discussion in the Green Paper to lower the standard of proof for antitrust 
                                                        
153  The Civil Procedure Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 45/2008). 
154  Article 8 CPA. See also 6.8.3. 
155  Infringement decision of the national competition authorities or the EU Commission is binding on 
courts (see sections 6.9.1. and 6.9.2). 
156  6HH $ *DOLÿ 5D]NULWMH GRND]RY PHG SULYLOHJLMHP ]RSHU VDPRREWRæER LQ YVHELQVNR SUDYLÿQRVWMR
(2011) 6-7 Podjetje in delo, p. 1463. 
157  ‘Preponderance of the evidence’ means whether it is more likely or not. 
158  See, for example, Article 270 of the Enforcement and Security Act (‘Zakon o izvršbi in 
zavarovanju’), Official Gazettes , no. 51/1998, 89/1999, 75/2002, 87/2002, and 16/2004. 
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cases as a possible means to remedy such a situation,159 but the option was later 
dropped. Adoption of a lower standard of proof than is normally required by a court 
in tort proceedings would require changes to the national law when applied to anti-
trust actions. However, it would not always provide adequate results. It might reduce 
the complexity of the proceeding and give the plaintiff some degree of certainty, but 
it would not address the difficulties a plaintiff (who is charged with the burden of 
proof) faces, such as access to evidence. 
6.8.2 Burden of Proof  
The CPO provides that when the court cannot establish a fact with a degree of cer-
tainty on the basis of the evidence presented, it decides on the basis of the rules on 
the burden of proof.160 This provision requires a further explanation. On one hand, 
based on the principle of party control over the proceedings161 and the principle of 
‘formal truth’,162 the judge generally is prohibited from investigating the truth of the 
parties’ allegations. It remains only for the parties of the case to convince the judge 
that they have genuine claims by proving their allegations. On the other hand, the 
judge is not allowed to refrain from adjudicating the case before him simply because 
the facts that need to be proven could not be proven (“non-liquet” situation).163 The 
burden of proof rule therefore, provides a mechanism to overcome a non-liquet situa-
tion. It gives a specified party an obligation to come up with evidence supporting his 
position. If the party cannot convince the judge by the given evidence, he will not be 
entitled to a favourable decision on a particular issue. In other words, the party that 
bears the burden of proof, and that burden has not been met, will risk the case being 
decided to his detriment.164  
The question of which party bears the burden of proof in establishing a claim 
therefore, is one of the most important issues in evidence and procedure. Behind the 
allocation of the burden of proof is the decision on who should bear the risk of los-
ing the case. Here it should be stressed that allocation of the burden of proof only 
affects the likely outcomes of particular classes of cases by making cases harder or 
easier to prove. It does not mean that only the party who bears the burden should 
produce evidence, but it is also up to the opposite party to show otherwise.165 Ac-
cording to a common rule applicable in tort law, each party involved must generally 
plead facts in their favour and prove them if required unless the law provides other-
wise. It means that, in tort law, if the legal action is brought because of an act based 
                                                        
159  Option 9 of the Green Paper COM (2005) 67 final. 
160  Article 215 of the Obligations Code. 
161  See section 6.5.2. 
162  See section 6.5.1. 
163  ‘Non liquet’ is a Latin phrase which means ‘it is not clear.’ See E. Karner, The Function of the 
Burden of Proof in Tort law, in H. Koziol and B.C. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2008, Tort 
and Insurance Law (2009) Vienna/New York: Springer, p. 69. 
164  On the nature of the burden of proof see M. Kazazi, Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A Study on 
Evidence Before International tribunals (1996) The Hague/London/Boston,p p. 27–30. 
165  M.M. Collins, The Burden and Standard of Proof in Competition Litigation and Problems of Judicial Evaluation 
(2004) ERA-Forum 66, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 68. 
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on fault, the victim has to prove an illegal act, damage, causation and fault of the 
defendant. The tortfeasor, on the other hand, must prove everything which exoner-
ates him.  
The ‘burden of proof’ is, therefore, a starting point in the civil litigation. The 
party that brings an action before a court has to state the facts and prove the evi-
dence upon which his claim is based.166 However, as indicated in section 6.7, accord-
ing to established principles of tort or civil liability, the plaintiff is required to prove 
the existence of all the conditions for the establishment of the wrongdoer’s liability 
but not the actual fault of the tortfeasor. Pursuant to Article 131 of the Obligations 
Code, the fault element is automatically fulfilled unless proven otherwise.167 This 
contrasts with civil legal systems in which the plaintiff had the obligation to establish 
each of the four essential elements for finding a defendant liable, and the defendant 
needed to prove those facts that constitute the basis of its affirmative defence. If the 
plaintiff does not succeed in convincing the court of the existence of every single 
element necessary to found the claim, his claim is refused. Slovenian Obligations 
Code with the ‘reversal of the burden of proof’ regarding the fault is therefore in 
favour of the applicant. It falls to the defendant to prove that his conduct did not 
imply fault in order to escape liability.  
In legal literature it has been emphasised that proving non-fault might be notably 
difficult in competition cases. According to Vlahek, it is difficult to imagine a case 
where an undertaking would make a cartel agreement or abuse its dominant position 
without acting negligently, if not intentionally.168 As she explained, cartels and certain 
abuses of dominant position usually imply fault, as the defendants cannot be excusa-
bly unaware of the restrictive nature of their conduct. Indeed, competition law in-
fringements themselves involve some elements of intent or negligence. In the event 
of so-called ‘hardcore cartels’,169 the requirement of fault is easy to fulfil. Restrictive 
agreements or concerted practices under Article 6 of the Competition Act (or Article 
101 TFEU) imply an intentional element. Also in other cases in which the objective 
of the infringement is to restrict competition and eliminate competitors (for example 
in case of exclusive pricing), cases are usually based on evidence of an abusive strat-
egy by the dominant company. If the plaintiff is able to prove the existence of such 
an infringement proving fault would not be a hurdle. A situation in which fault is of 
practical relevance is when an anti-competitive practice did not have an intention 
directly aimed at altering the competition, but it produced such effects (infringements 
by effect). For example, the defendant (dominant firm) could argue that he did not 
                                                        
166  Article 212 of the Obligations Code. 
167  Slovenian tort law also regulates situations in which a person is responsible for damages irrespective 
of fault, most notably concerning damages deriving from subjects or activities that are the source of 
increased danger for the surroundings. However, such situations would normally not arise in actions 
for damages arising from breach of competition law. 
168  A. Vlahek, =DNRQ R SUHSUHÿHYDQMX RPHMHYDQMD NRQNXUHQFH V NRPHQWDUMHP  *9 =DORæED /MXEOMDQD
p. 500. 
169  ‘Hard core cartels’ are the most egregious violations of competition law. They injure consumers in 
many countries by raising prices and restricting supply, thus making goods and services completely 
unavailable to some purchasers and unnecessarily expensive for others (see the definition provided 
by OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/). 
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know and could not reasonably have known that its practice was anticompetitive. In 
this case the defendant will have to prove that he did not know or could not have 
known of the anti-competitive effects of what he was doing. In other words, he will 
have to establish that he met all the required standards of conduct and that conse-
quently he acted within the required duty of care.170 This could be particularly diffi-
cult in competition cases. The defendant owes to a plaintiff a ‘duty of care’ which is 
higher than ‘standard duty of care’ (the ‘reasonable man’ test) that would apply in 
normal cases. The reason for higher level of ‘duty of care’ comes from the fact that 
the defendant is likely to be a company or another economic entity carrying out eco-
nomic activities in the market and therefore it is expected to perform to the standards 
of an expert.171 In addition, the requirement of fault will only be relevant in cases in 
which there is no prior infringement decision of a national competition authority. If 
an infringement is found by an NPO’s decision, the court will bound by it with re-
gard to the existence of the antitrust infringement172 (no fault will be required in 
order to establish the infringement in the case before the court). 
With the EU Commission the principle of reversed burden of proof – that has 
been also part of the established Slovenian legal system – is considered as a way of 
facilitating a claimant’s proof obligations and consequently encouraging private ac-
tions. It believes that the fault requirement could be an obstacle to private antitrust in 
Member States, where the claimant actually needs to prove fault.173 To remedy the 
situation, the EU Commission even proposed that in these cases, Member States 
should consider lowering of the standard of proof or even a reversal of the burden of 
proof. Although there is no data available on the practical relevance that the institu-
tion of reversal of burden of proof has for the level of development of antitrust dam-
age actions in Slovenia, based on the arguments above, it is difficult to believe that it 
represents a tangible benefit for claimants. It is difficult to believe that few antitrust 
cases that came before the Slovenian court would not have been brought if the bur-
den to prove fault was put on the claimant. As explained above, in practice once the 
claimant established an infringement then fault most likely cannot be denied. 
6.8.3 Evaluation of evidence by the court  
Having made clear that the plaintiff (the party claiming antitrust damages) bears the 
burden of proof that the alleged anticompetitive conduct has caused him damage and 
that the standard of proof is relatively high, the next issue that has to be addressed is 
how that burden is to be satisfied. The complainant cannot satisfy the burden without 
evidence. 
                                                        
170  While negligence exists, when a defendant does not apply the required duty of care, intent is pre-
sumed if the person is aware of the illegality of his action and of the consequences, and he wants to 
achieve them. 
171  L. Varnelli, Odškodninski vidiki zlorabe prevODGXMRÿHJDSRORæDMDPodjetje in delo, p. 243. 
172  See section 6.9.2. 
173  Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, 
comparative report, Ashust (August 2004), p. 11. 
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There is no particular form of evidence required. The CPA lists 5, inspections (of 
places, persons, objects), documents, hearing of witnesses, hearing of expert wit-
nesses and hearing of the parties. The list is not exhaustive and other forms of evi-
dence are also permissible.174 As there is no limitation on the type of evidence the 
party may adduce required, there is generally no rule with regard to the relative weight 
to be accorded to different forms of evidence. In line with the general rules of civil 
procedure, it is up to the judge to evaluate the statements and other material pre-
sented in the course of the proceeding and to decide which facts are deemed to have 
been proven and which remain unproven, and to decide the case on that basis. The 
evidential value of material presented is assessed therefore, at the judge’s own discre-
tion. This will be done on the basis of an honest and careful evaluation of a given 
piece of evidence and in conformity with his own conscience. 175 Such an evaluation, 
however, must always be based on examination of all of the evidentiary material that 
has been presented during the evidentiary procedure. 
An exception to rule of court’s discretion with regard to the evaluation of evi-
dence applies to public documents. According to the Article 224(1) CPA, a public 
document176 issued in the prescribed form by a competent authority is evidence of 
the veracity of its content, unless established otherwise. The CPA makes the assump-
tion that the facts contained in public documents are true. A party may still prove 
that facts are inaccurately recorded in a public document or that a public document 
has been incorrectly drawn up.177 Concerning foreign public documents that are 
authenticated under the relevant Slovenian law, CPA provides that they have the 
same evidential value in judicial proceedings as the domestic documents, provided 
that reciprocity arrangements are applied and unless otherwise provided by interna-
tional treaty.178 The only requirement is that such documents must be accompanied 
by certified translations thereof. With the mentioned exception to public documents, 
other forms of evidence do not have any determined probative value or a ranking. 
6.8.4 Expert evidence in competition law enforcement 
A form of evidence that requires further elaboration is ‘expert evidence’. In competi-
tion law related cases there is a close relationship between economics and competi-
tion law. Competition law not only applies law to economics, but it also incorporates 
economic concepts into law. It issues prohibitions with reference to economic con-
cepts; for example, it prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. The importance of 
economists and economic thinking is also evident in the context of competition law 
litigation. In particular, the judge cannot rule in a dispute between private parties in 
                                                        
174  The court may admit as evidence photographs, plans, drawings, devices recording or transmitting 
pictures or sounds, etc. 
175  Article 8 CPA. 
176  ‘Public documents’ are documents issued in a prescribed form by a state institution acting within its 
sphere of responsibility or documents issued in such a form by a local authority, an association or 
other organisation or an individual in the exercise of public authority entrusted to them by law. 
177  Article 224(3) CPA. 
178  Article 225 CPA. 
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competition cases if he does not understand the economic context of the dispute. 
Contrary to judges of a specialised court for competition-based damage claims, as in 
England,179 ordinary judges usually have no specialised knowledge of competition law 
matters. 
When faced with the complexities of competition law litigation, courts have the 
authority to call upon an economics expert or group of experts180 in order to acquire 
the technical information on the economic aspects of the case and the market under 
consideration. This is in line with Article 243 CPA, which provides that the court 
shall appoint a court expert (or two or more in complicated cases) when expert 
knowledge is required for purposes of determination or clarification of a certain fact 
in dispute. In doing so, expert evidence may be used to prove several aspects of pri-
vate claims, such as relevant markets and market shares, the overcharges or amount 
of damages including lost profits and, crucially, whether the defendant’s conduct 
lessened competition and thus caused antitrust injury pursuant to Articles 6 and 9 of 
the Competition Act or Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. An important remark that has to 
be made is that court experts are appointed by the court on its own discretion. Even 
if expert evidence is proposed by the parties, the expert is selected by the court, 
which may (and in practice usually does) consult the parties before the selection is 
made.181 In such a case, the court is in no way bound by the parties’ opinions and 
suggestions. Even if an expert is appointed on suggestion of the party/parties, he has 
to remain neutral and independent of the parties. He provides the court with a writ-
ten opinion, but the judges and the parties may also question him or her in an oral 
hearing.  
It is usual for a court expert to be appointed in competition matters. Experts are 
regarded as an assistant of the court. They do not provide the court with any inter-
pretation on the law or give value judgment expertise. This is – according to the rule 
of free evaluation182 – a task of the judge. Rather they provide insights that help the 
judge to understand market facts relevant for the decision in their right dimension. If 
the judge has knowledge of the legal framework, the economic expert has specialised 
knowledge that is necessary for the coherent application of the legal rule. Brewer 
describes this as:183 “by deciding to call or listen to an economic ‘expert’ judges ad-
mits limitations to their knowledge for the purposes of legal decision-making, which 
is an essential dimension of their legitimacy and authority.” It is the court that in-
structs the expert as to his duties and supervises his activities. The Court gives direc-
tions and explanations, shows the object to be examined and allows the expert to 
inspect files. It also specifies a time period in which the expert opinion must be pro-
duced. As soon as the expert opinion has been delivered, the parties are entitled to 
comment on it. Accordingly, the role of the judge is not to conform to the expert’s 
opinion but to evaluate the economic theories invoked and the conclusions made by 
                                                        
179  See section 5.3.1. 
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the experts. The court becomes involved in evaluating the standing and credibility of 
the economists. Experts are usually asked to evaluate economic evidence not merely 
in order to ascertain the truth of contested facts, but also for the purpose of the reli-
ability of the economic theories they referred to, and the correctness with which they 
have applied those economic theories to the facts in question that have given rise to 
the litigation.184 Although the Court is not bound by the expert opinion, in practice it 
tends to rely very much on expert opinions, especially in complicated commercial 
disputes.  
Expert evidence is indispensable and substantial for antitrust cases, especially if 
there is no prior NCA’s or EU Commission’s infringement decision on which the 
plaintiff could rely. The use of expert evidence will be reflected in increased costs.185 
The more complex the case is, the greater the costs are for legal experts. As such, 
these costs form part of litigation costs,186 and can contribute significantly to overall 
costs of litigation. They will be recovered in accordance with the principle applicable 
to costs.187  
6.8.5 Access to evidence in the sphere of the opposing party 
In contrast to the English legal system,188 in the Slovenian procedural system there is 
no obligation on the parties to an action to deposit with the court or disclose to the 
other party every document that is in their possession and is relevant to the issue in 
question. The basic principle laid down in Article 212 CPA is that a party is obliged 
to provide only evidence upon which his claim or objection is based. It means that 
the claimant must submit to the judge all relevant evidence it possesses in order to 
prove its claims, while the defendant must provide statements made in its defence. 
Normally, the civil procedure stage of discovery is limited to such document produc-
tion (and the hearing of witnesses). If a party fails to submit the relevant evidence on 
its own behalf, he risks his claims being not proven to the judge’s satisfaction. In 
contrast, under the general rule of presenting the facts and producing the evidence 
nobody is obliged to contribute to the production of evidence against his own case. 
However, there are two exceptions to this rule.  
First, if the parties intend to dispose their claims in violation of mandatory legal 
rules or morals, the court may order production of documents ex officio.189 Second, 
Article 227, which is of great relevance for antitrust cases, provides that a court may 
order a party to present documents in his possession if one of the parties has referred 
to these documents. This implies that the production of the evidence will be to the 
disadvantage of the party who possesses the relevant document. The application of 
                                                        
184  M.M. Collins, The Burden and Standard of Proof in Competition Litigation and Problems of Judicial Evaluation, 
ERA-Forum 66, vol. 5, no. 1, 2004, p. 71. 
185  Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, 
comparative report (Ashust August) 2004, p. 11. 
186  Article 151 CPA 
187  This is generally the ‘loser pays’ principle. See section 6.12. 
188  See section 5.8.3. 
189  Article 7 CPA. 
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Article 227 however, is limited. The party requesting a disclosure order must define 
exactly the specific document to be disclosed, as well as its relevance for the case.190 
Indeterminate requests involving generic classes of documents are not allowed. The 
requirement of specification of documents is based on the principle whereby the 
collection of relevant evidence is mainly left to the parties. Under this principle the 
judge cannot supplement the parties’ requests for documentary evidence191 and ac-
cordingly, the burden of specification borne by the requesting party should remain 
high. After all, the purpose of the disclosure rule provided by Article 227 is to help 
the parties to prove certain facts relevant for the case and not to provide them with 
information held by the other party of litigation. As a consequence, the rule of speci-
fication is of no help if a party is unsure about the relevant documents. In order to 
fulfil the requirement of specification the plaintiff often needs to gather a consider-
able initial amount of information. This might be a problem, in particular in competi-
tion cases in which there is an asymmetric distribution of the available information 
between damage claimants and defendants (information asymmetry).192 The claimant 
often does not know about the existence of certain relevant documents, which are 
mostly held by the defendant. An additional limitation to the document disclosure is 
that disclosure is limited to documents that were subjected to the court’s order of 
disclosure. In particular, the court will only order production of evidence if it decides 
to examine it.193 To do so the court will consider each document individually in de-
termining whether it was appropriate to order disclosure. Such a decision will be 
reached in the course of proceedings when both parties are present and may be 
heard.194 
Despite of the concerns about the limited application of Article 227 when it 
comes to antitrust damage cases, the effectiveness of the provision is significant. If 
the court orders production of the documents, the party is obliged to follow the or-
der. Following the changes brought by the amendment to the CPA in 2008,195 if a 
party who has possession of the relevant document refuses to comply with an order 
to disclose it, the facts intended to be substantiated by the requested document are 
deemed to be proven.196 The availability of procedural sanctions as such is seen as an 
important means to ensure maintenance of legal order, as well as efficient and fair 
conduct of the proceeding and adjudication of issues.197 To avoid this sanction, the 
litigant will obey court orders and decisions. Even before the 2008 amendment en-
tered into force, a failure to comply with orders concerning evidence was subject to 
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191  See section 6.5.2. 
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sanction and the court could conclude that the fact that would be substantiated by 
such a document, was deemed to be proven. The difference is that under the old rule, 
the court was not obliged to do so. Although often the refusal to produce a relevant 
document was an indication that the content of the document was unfavourable for 
the possessor,198 the court had a certain degree of discretion concerning both the 
importance of the non-compliance and the kind and measure of the sanction that 
would be imposed.  
Obviously, the new rule has generally been seen as controversial.199 The court is 
obliged to take the assertions intended (to be sustained by the requested document) 
as proven, even though the requested document is not the only evidence of the rele-
vant fact. In other words, if the requested document was disclosed and it contained 
the information to which the party referred, under the principle of free evaluation of 
evidence, the court could still conclude that the facts intended to be established by 
the requested document are not proven. There might be other documents that could 
prove the contrary. Nevertheless, if the rule on refusal to produce requested docu-
ments is seen as being controversial, its application is desirable in the area of antitrust 
damage actions. It could increase effectiveness of the disclosure rule, the application 
of which is very limited in its current form when compared to common law coun-
tries. Knowing that failure to comply can amount to contempt of court and could 
have serious consequences, the antitrust violator – who most likely has in possession 
the relevant documents – will be encouraged to comply with the disclosure orders. 
Moreover, the rule on refusal to produce the requested documents improves the 
position of the victims who might be discouraged by a high standard of proof re-
quired in civil litigation.200 
In addition, it is important to note that under Slovenian law, tampering with evi-
dence is perceived as a form of obstruction of justice that could prevent an injured 
person from even seeking redress in court. As such, it can be a ground for further 
legal action against the offending party under criminal law. According to the Slovene 
Penal Code201 as amended, Article 285 states that whoever, with the intention of 
preventing or hindering the production of evidence, conceals, destroys or damages a 
document or other object intended to serve as evidence, or renders it wholly or partly 
useless, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for up to three years. Since this is a gen-
eral provision, it will also apply to antitrust cases. Due to the ‘information asymme-
try‘, which in these cases typically exists in favour of the defendant, spoliation of 
evidence by the defendant can be particularly devastating for the plaintiff. In these 
cases it is therefore of particular importance that sufficiently deterrent sanctions are 
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available.202 As tampering with evidence is subjected to criminal law, antitrust evi-
dence and its preservation will enjoy the highest level of protection under Slovenian 
law. 
6.8.6 Privileges 
Since the parties generally do not have to disclose documents, the need for privilege 
mostly arises in cases of third parties being requested to testify as a witness or to 
produce documents. Accordingly, the CPA’s rules on privilege mostly concern the 
testimony of witnesses. When a privilege is invoked by a party to the civil proceeding, 
the court will consider whether the refusal to present the document requested is 
grounded by referring to these same provisions that govern witness’ refusal to testify. 
In particular, pursuant to the CPA, a person may not be heard as witnesses if he has a 
duty to keep an official or a military secret.203 A witness may refuse to testify relying 
on the attorney-client privilege, the privilege not to disclose what the party or other 
person has confessed to him as their confessor, and the professional privilege, which 
applies to various persons who, by virtue of their profession, are entrusted with con-
fidential information.204  
Protection of business secrets205 is considered important in competition damage 
cases but this is not explicitly mentioned in the CPA as grounds for refusal of disclo-
sure. Protection of business secrets will be possible as long as they fall within the 
categories of protected information, in particular those of professional secrets. Since 
professional secrecy is a wider term than business secrets, the overlap generally will 
not cause a problem.206 A greater problem will be to satisfy the requirements neces-
sary for the protection to be allowed. According to Article 232 CPA, refusal of testi-
mony will be allowed on the grounds of protection of a business secret only if non-
disclosure outweighs the benefits of disclosure. Therefore, in antitrust cases a party 
will not be entitled to refuse to disclose a business secret if the disclosure is in the 
public interest and this interest is more important than the keeping of business secret 
itself. There is no evidence available how this is to be applied to competition cases in 
practice.  
                                                        
202  See also White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, 
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203  Article 230 CPA. 
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Another possibility is that business secrets are protected under Article 233 CPA. 
This provision entitles witnesses (and parties) to refuse to answer individual questions 
if answering these questions would, inter alia, cause considerable material loss or 
financial disadvantage to a party, spouse or close relatives. The question remains to 
what extent the application of this Article would be appropriate in relation to the 
refusal of documents in competition cases. According to the legal experts, Article 233 
CPA is generally used in the context of the privilege of self-incrimination,207 in cases 
where the credibility of a person could be put at risk. Knowing that answering the 
question could have undesirable consequences for him or his family, a person might 
not give an honest answer. Accordingly, Article 233 will apply mostly in the context 
of refusal of production of a document on the part of witness and a party to this 
dispute.  
In addition to the wide-ranging privileges, CPA provides for the possibility of 
protection of business secrets in the context of the hearing.208 Civil proceedings are 
generally public. This includes the hearing and the announcement of the judgement. 
As an exception, Article 294 provides that in cases where it is so required by the in-
terest of official, business or personal secrets or for moral considerations, the judge 
may exclude the public from the entire hearing or a part of the hearing. Regardless of 
a broad provision, exclusion of the public does not apply to the parties, their statu-
tory representatives, attorneys and interveners. Business secrets therefore will not be 
protected from the other party in the litigation. In antitrust cases normally these are 
the ones from who the business secrets must be protected. 
Here an important observation has to be made. Despite of the fact that business 
secrets are not explicitly protected by the Procedure Act, this does not present an 
obstacle to bringing damage claims in competition cases. After all, according to the 
general rules on evidence, companies do not have to disclose confidential informa-
tion to their opponent. Not having extensive litigation discovery (as in the US and to 
certain extent in England), it prevents the exposure of trade secrets and other confi-
dential information. As a positive side-effect, the Slovenian system cannot be 
(ab)used to obtain confidential information from a competitor by commencing pro-
ceedings based on a claim without merit. 
6.8.7 Access to the administrative file  
The access to public information is a right guaranteed by Article 39 of the Constitu-
tion. According to the Access to Public Information Act, legal entities or natural 
persons have free access to public information held by inter alia state bodies and also 
the right to reuse it. According to Article 4 of this act, public information is “infor-
mation originating from the field of work of the bodies and occurring in the form of 
a document, a case, a file, a register, a record or other documentary material drawn up 
by the body in cooperation with other body, or acquired from other persons”. The 
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applicant has the right to require information from the public body. He needs to 
indicate the information and to define how he would like to be informed (in the form 
of an electronic record, a copy, a transcript). Therefore he is not obliged to substanti-
ate his request. It means that he is obliged neither to disclose his legal interest, or any 
other interest, nor is he obliged to indicate the purpose for which the information 
requested as this is irrelevant for the rights to require public information. 
However, the Competition Act has special provisions that interfere with the Ac-
cess to Public Information Act. Article 13.b (4) of the Competition Act enables the 
Competition Protection Office to reject the applicants’ request for information relat-
ing to the secrecy of the source and to information constituting a business secret of 
undertakings. Pursuant to the Government Decree on the procedure for granting 
immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, which came into force on 
1 January 2010, a leniency application is deemed to represent a business secret of the 
undertaking209. The Competition Protection Office can reveal the information and 
the evidence from the application only on the undertaking that is party to the pro-
ceedings and after a statement of objections has been issued in accordance with para-
graph 7 Article 18 of the Competition Act. The leniency application may also be 
transmitted to other national competition authorities in other EU Member States 
pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003, provided that the offender consents to 
the transmission of information or an offender has also submitted an application for 
immunity from reduction of a fine for the same infringement to the competition 
authority of the Member State that has requested information (…), and the level of 
protection against disclosure afforded by the receiving Member State is equal to that 
conferred by the Republic of Slovenia.210 
6.8.8 Conclusions on disclosure 
In the White Paper the EU Commission noted that obtaining access to evidence in 
the possession of defendants is essential in order to alleviate the information asym-
metry between victims and defendants in antitrust cases, and therefore, increase the 
effectiveness of private enforcement system.211 For that reason it proposed an EU-
wide minimum level of disclosure of evidence between the parties. 
In the context of the consistency of the EU Commission’s proposal on disclo-
sure with the Slovenian legal rules three observations can be made.  
First, the inter parties disclosure is not completely unknown in Slovenian legal 
order (certain mechanisms allowing for mandatory disclosure already exist). Based on 
the general procedural rules, the judge may – in limited cases – order the disclosure of 
a document in the possession of either of the parties or of a third party if one of the 
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parties to the proceedings has requested a disclosure of the document.212 Although 
the application of the “disclosure rule” is limited, its effectiveness is significant when 
it comes to antitrust damage cases. Non-compliance with disclosure requirements has 
serious consequences. If the party does not disclose the document, the content of the 
document is deemed to be proven. This could even lead to a situation where the 
party will lose the case because of the refusal. Such a severe sanction is a strong in-
centive for the parties to comply with the court orders and it may be seen as a useful 
instrument in cases involving ‘information asymmetry‘ between the parties, which is 
likely to be the case in antitrust litigation. The disclosure provision in the Slovenian 
legal system comes with the preservation of evidence, which enjoys the highest level 
of protection under the Slovenian law. Tampering with evidence constitutes a crimi-
nal offence subjected to criminal sanctions.213 It follows that the rule of disclosure 
and sanction in case of non-compliance provides an effective private antitrust en-
forcement mechanism. In this way, Slovenian law endorses ‘sufficiently deterrent 
sanctions’ in cases of non-compliance by means of court orders as proposed by the 
EU Commission.  
Second, the Slovenian civil procedural rules guarantee the right of the applicant 
to seek disclosure of documents in a manner compliant with the system of disclosure 
proposed by the EU Commission, as long as disclosure is not automatic. The EU 
Commission suggests that access to the evidence can be granted only on the basis of 
factual argumentation (‘fact-pleading’), subject to judicial control. Similarly, under the 
existing rules of Slovenian civil procedure, relevant evidence held by the other party 
becomes available to the litigants during trial as long as the parties, allowed by the 
judge, are required to disclose it. Furthermore, the EU Commission suggests that the 
access to the documents held by the other party should be obtained through a court 
order. This is in line with the Slovenian legal tradition that relies on the central func-
tion of the court seised with an action for damages. The collection of evidence in 
private litigation normally takes place during the proceeding under the direct supervi-
sion of the judge. Under the principle of free disposition of parties, it is for the par-
ties to identify the facts that, in their opinion, will support the claim or defence. Sub-
sequently, it is up to the court to decide which evidence will be produced for the 
purpose of establishing the relevant facts.214 The judge may also issue an order re-
questing the opponent or a third party to disclose a specific document in cases in 
which the requesting party does not hold that document (although the conditions to 
be fulfilled to obtain a disclosure order are strict). The judge is the only one in the 
position to require the disclosure of a document in the trial. Whether or not to allow 
such a request will generally depend on the judges’ discretionary evaluation of the 
relevance of the document.  
Third, the civil procedure rules in Slovenia are not well suited for the option sug-
gested by the EU Commission with regard to the level of ‘specification’ of docu-
ments to be disclosed. Under the Slovenian civil procedure rules, the applicants have 
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to specify precisely which documents they desire. The courts can oblige a party to 
present documents or other objects that are thought to be in its possession and are 
essential for the proceedings if the other party specifies the item (and not only the 
category of evidence). This is based on the rule that the collection of the relevant 
evidence is mainly left to the parties. Civil procedure presupposes that it is the parties’ 
responsibility to provide the court with all the evidence. Therefore the party request-
ing an order to produce evidence is required to name the exact document he is re-
questing. Indeterminate requests, involving generic classes of documents are not 
allowed.215 As a consequence, court disclosure orders, when allowed, fall on very spe-
cific documents. In contrast, the EU Commission suggests that national courts 
should have the power to order disclosure of ‘precise categories’ of relevant evidence 
rather than specific documents. This gives the courts increased powers to order dis-
closure even when the plaintiff has not fully substantiated his claim with the required 
evidence. The requesting party would still have to collect some initial information, 
but the burden of specification is much lighter than if he had to specify the individual 
documents. As a consequence, the function of the disclosure rules would not only be 
to provide the party with the documents that he is looking for in relation to certain 
facts relevant for the case but would also be a tool for gathering information held by 
the other party. Therefore, for Slovenia this proposal would require radical amend-
ments to well-established civil procedural rules on evidence. The obligation to pre-
sent ‘categories of documents’ not only puts the principle according to which each 
party is obliged to substantiate the evidence to be presented under pressure, it also 
contradicts a principle that information is generally secret unless the party decides to 
reveal it (because of the intention to use it in the process) or the court orders its ex-
hibition. If the minimum requirement can be satisfied in the case of English disclo-
sure rules,216 the same cannot be argued under the Slovenian law.  
Even though there is no rule requiring that ‘categories of documents’ are dis-
closed for the benefit of the applicant, the mere fact that the documents named by 
the applicant are allowed to be disclosed – in some cases – could go some way to-
wards alleviating the information asymmetry. 
6.9 Binding effect of decision adopted by national competition authorities 
In order to ensure consistency between administrative decisions and those of the 
Slovenian courts, a specific provision was introduced into the Slovenian Competition 
Act that imposes a binding effect of final infringement decisions of the CPO on Slo-
venian courts. This rule applies only to final decisions taken by the Slovenian NCA 
and not to decisions of any other NCA within the EU. In cases in which there is no 
decision of a competition authority (yet), a general procedural rule will apply, accord-
ing to which the court is encouraged to stay the proceeding and wait for the competi-
tion authority’s decision.  
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6.9.1 Slovenian reference to EU Commission’s decisions 
Following the trend within the EU competition policy aimed at encouraging and 
facilitating follow-on claims, the Competition Act established an extension to the 
notion of the binding effect of an infringement administrative decision on national 
courts.217 In particular, Article 62(2) of the Competition Act has introduced the rule 
according to which a decision taken by the CPO or by the EU Commission establish-
ing an infringement of Articles 6 or 9 of this Act or Articles 101 or 102 TFEU is 
binding upon Slovenian civil courts with regard to the question of whether infringe-
ment has occurred.218 It means that pursuant to the Article, decisions made by Slove-
nian competition authorities and also the EU Commission have a binding effect on 
subsequent damage actions.  
It should be emphasised that the reference to decisions of the EU Commission 
in the Slovenian Competition Act (Article 62) is not required, and it only creates 
confusion to the anti-trust system of follow-on damage actions. Even without an 
explicit reference to the EU Commission’s decisions, the national courts are still 
bound by the EU Commission’s decisions under the European Regulation 1/2003. It 
goes without saying that according to Article 16 of the Regulation 1/2003, national 
courts are not allowed to rule against decisions of the EU Commission when assess-
ing the legality of agreements or practices with respect to Article 101 or 102 TFEU. 
The reference to the EU Commission’s decisions in the Slovenian Competition Act is 
supposed to provide clarity on the binding effect of antitrust decisions (of the EU 
and national competition law enforcer) on civil courts. In reality, it does exactly the 
opposite. The reference to the EU Commission in Article 62 of the Slovenian Com-
petition Act creates confusion rather than clarifying the system of the binding force 
of antitrust decisions. One might think that only ‘final’ decisions of the EU Commis-
sion have a binding effect. Final here implies those decisions that have been accepted 
by their addressees or were confirmed on appeal by the competent review court.219 
However, according to Regulation 1/2003 the binding effect of the EU Commission 
decisions exists, irrespective of whether they are final or not. References made within 
the Slovenian Competition law are only to final decisions by the EU Commission so 
Article 62 can be taken to mean that decision that are not yet final have no binding 
effect on the courts, and this is clearly incompatible with EU law. If the EU Commis-
sion’s decisions are at stake, by virtue of the principle of supremacy of EU law, na-
tional courts must not apply Article 62 of the Competition Act.220 Further, while the 
Member States have the obligation not to apply rules that contravene EU law, trans-
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position of an EU Regulations into the domestic legal orders is not allowed.221 Ac-
cording to Article 228(2) TFEU, a regulation “shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable”. EU regulations are part of Slovenian law without any further 
need of implementation. 
6.9.2 National rules governing the interplay between CPO and national 
courts 
Concerning the Competition Protection Office’s decisions, Article 62 of the Compe-
tition Act will continue to apply. Indeed, Regulation 1/2003 deals only with the bind-
ing value of EU Commission’s decisions in private damages actions before the courts, 
while the relationship between NCAs and national courts is governed by national 
rules. In this respect, as said earlier, any reference to the binding effect of the CPO’s 
decision in Article 62 of the Competition Act will presuppose that that decision is 
final. Since there is no reference to the decisions of foreign NCAs in the Article, 
decisions of foreign NCAs are treated as “facts” that do not have a binding effect in 
Slovenian courts.222  
As explained earlier, the term ‘final’ refers to decisions that can no longer be ap-
pealed either because the time limit has expired or the decision has been confirmed 
upon appeal by the competent review court. Pursuant to the Competition Act, a 
decision becomes final if a request for judicial protection has not been filed within 30 
days from the issue of the decision.223 This implies that the CPO decision can be 
challenged in a judicial proceeding before it becomes binding on courts in a civil 
procedure. This is an important rule that subscribes to the principle of the separation 
of powers, which is also guaranteed by the Constitution.224 Pursuant to the Constitu-
tion, a court having jurisdiction to review administrative acts decides the legality of 
final individual acts, by which state authorities and local communities can determine 
the rights or obligations and legal entitlements of individuals and organisations if 
other legal protection is not provided by law for a particular matter. In line with this 
provision, while the CPO can carry out the investigation and impose penalties for 
infringements, the authority to supervise the legality of individual acts of administra-
tive authority is given to a court. In competition proceedings, the relevant appeal 
body for NCA decisions is the Supreme Court, although it has been often argued that 
the role of judicial review should be entrusted to a specialised tribunal whose speciali-
sation would combine experience of procedural issues of the judicial review of ad-
ministration with the problems of competition in the market place.225 There is only 
one stage in proceedings and no complaints for revision can be made against the 
decision of Supreme Court. Its decision is “final”. This aspect of the principle of 
separation of powers is further elaborated in the right to judicial protection, which is 
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also considered as a fundamental right ensured by the Constitution. Based on Article 
23 of the Slovenian Constitution, everyone has the right to have any decision on his 
rights, duties and any charges brought against him made without undue delay by an 
independent and impartial court constituted by law.226 Accordingly, there is an impar-
tial tribunal above the competition authority and any defects with regard to the right 
to a fair trial can be rectified by judicial review.  
Nevertheless, the requirement that a decision is final before having a binding 
force on civil courts does not prevent a person who has suffered damages due to an 
antitrust infringement from filing a damage claim before the decision has become 
final.227 Indeed, the provision of Article 62 was introduced into the Competition Act 
with an aim of facilitating antitrust damage claims. It does not entail a duty for courts 
to await the adoption of a contemplated competition authority’s infringement deci-
sion or its finality. The relationship between civil court and national competition 
authority is not one of hierarchy. The civil court has the power to hear damage claims 
and rule on compensation in relation to the same infringement that can be subject of 
competition authority’s investigations. Accordingly, private claims are independent of 
administrative claims and can be brought separately or even as follow-on cases after 
the decision of the domestic authority. However, it is clear that there are practical 
problems connected with independent private litigation, especially because proving 
antitrust conduct might be difficult and expensive. 
In addition, it would also not be in the spirit of private antitrust enforcement pol-
icy228 to have the right to antitrust damages restricted to cases in which an infringe-
ment decision of a competition authority already exists. It is clear that claims brought 
on a stand-alone basis (i.e. claims brought prior to or without any government inves-
tigation) have a greater value compared to follow-on cases in terms of effective public 
antitrust enforcement. Only successful stand-alone cases contribute to the detection 
of antitrust violations. By contrast, follow-on cases are cases filed after the CPO or 
the EU Commission have detected and investigated the violation. Hence they do not 
contribute anything to the detection of antitrust violations. The value of the stand-
alone actions becomes even more significant by the application of Article 63(6) of the 
Slovenian Competition Act. Article 63(6) requires the court to submit a copy of any 
decisions involving the application of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU to the CPO and the 
EU Commission. Although the reference to the EU Commission is not appropriate 
(under Article 15(2) of the Regulation 1/2003 national courts are already obliged to 
submit to the EU Commission a copy of all judgments in which Article 101 or Article 
102 TFEU has been applied), the provision is important as it serves as a helpful 
mechanism for the development of an effective competition law system.229 
                                                        
226  See also Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), signed in Rome on 4 
November 1950. 
227  0 6HYHU 9H]DQRVW QDFLRQDOQHJD VRGLäÿD QD RGORÿEH NRPLVLMH LQ 8UDGD ]D YDUVWYR NRQNXUHQFH
(2009) Pravni letopis, p. 271. 
228  Stand-alone antitrust damages contribute to the achievement of the goal to supplement public 
enforcement (see section 2.2.4.).  
229  0.DYÿLÿ-DYQRSUDYQRLQ]DVHEQRSUDYQRYDUVWYRNRQNXUHQFHREUDPEDLQDNWLYQDUDYQDQMDVWUDQN
po ZPOmK-1 (2008) 7 Podjetje in delo, p. 1466. 
Chapter 6 
268 
 
The non-existence of a final competition authority’s decision is not a legal bar per 
se when bringing a damage action, and this can be illustrated by a recent case. In 2004, 
the CPO issued a decision in which it found abuse of a dominant position by Tele-
kom Slovenije.230 Telekom Slovenije, which held a legal monopoly in the market of 
fixed voice telephony started to offer services of ISDN technology in the forum of 
the ISDN 3000 package. ISDN 3000 consisted of public monopoly services as well as 
services of a commercial nature (internet access services). ABM put forward an offer 
for business cooperation, asking Telekom Slovenije for inclusion of an ABM CD 
with a program for internet access in the ISDN 3000 package. Telekom Slovenije 
rejected the offer of ABM. The CPO decided that the rejection by Telekom Slovenije 
was without justifiable reason. In the view of the CPO, Telekom Slovenije abused its 
dominant position in the market of fixed voice telephony in Slovenia by discrimina-
tion against ABM. After the rejection of an appeal by the Supreme Court in 2008,231 
the decision became final. Meanwhile, in 2002 ABM filed a lawsuit against Telecom 
Slovenije for payment of damages arising from the breach of competition rules. To 
avoid legal uncertainty (that the competition authority would come to a different 
conclusions with regard the same alleged antitrust conduct) the District Court de-
cided to stay the proceeding before it and wait for the decision of the Slovenian CPO 
to decide about the breach. Finally, in 2012 the District Court (court of first instance) 
rendered a decision ruling that Telekom Slovenije is obliged to pay the plaintiff dam-
ages to the amount of € 2,306,285.75 plus legally prescribed default interest (with the 
statutory interest on late payment) due to the refusal to include the plaintiff’s CD 
ROM in the defendant’s ISDN 3000 internet access package. The decision however, 
is not yet final as Telekom Slovenije has appealed to the Supreme Court.232 
With regard to the CPO’s decisions,233 the wording of the Article 62 of the 
Competition Act has been read as indicating that civil courts are only bound by a 
positive finding of an infringement.234 The court will not be bound by an act of the 
competition authority that decided to terminate the proceeding because special cir-
cumstances indicate that the proceedings would not be reasonable (for example due 
to lack of sufficient evidence).235 The party concerned nevertheless, may prove the 
existence of an infringement as a requirement for his claim. Similarly, in case of a 
negative decision, when the competition authority in the course of the proceedings 
finds no antitrust violation, the civil court is not bound by such a decision. According 
to Slovenian commentators,236 a claimant may still attempt to prove the existence of 
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an infringement within the context of a civil claim – despite the fact that in practice it 
will be difficult to establish the existence of anticompetitive infringement if the com-
petition authority after the hearing of evidence has found no anticompetitive in-
fringement. To the extent this interpretation is correct, the provision is in line with 
the rule proposed by the EU Commission in the White Paper.237 
Furthermore, in accordance with principles of judiciary independence and separa-
tion of powers, binding effect relates solely to the finding of an antitrust infringe-
ment. All other questions associated with a damages claim for breach of antitrust 
rules, such as questions concerning fault, damage and causality between the infringe-
ment and the damage will continue to be handled by civil courts, guided by principles 
of party disposition and free evaluation of evidence by court.238 Before the national 
court the claimant will still have to prove damage and to show that any losses claimed 
were caused by the breach of competition law. Accordingly, national competition 
authority’s statements – with exception of an ‘infringement statement’ – will not be 
formally binding. They may ‘only’ be used as evidence in a civil proceeding. Follow-
ing the principle of free evaluation of evidence,239 the court decides according to its 
free conviction formed from the overall result of the proceedings. The court may 
make its own findings on the evidence, even though the evidence consists of EU 
Commission’s findings. 
6.9.3 Expected and envisaged Competition Protection Office’s decision 
If the Slovenian CPO has not (yet) decided whether there is a breach, the issue of 
infringement of national and/or EU competition law will be regarded as a prelimi-
nary question in the civil proceedings. Article 13 of the Civil Procedure Act240 pro-
vides a general rule stating that if the court’s decision depends on whether there exists 
a certain right or legal relationship, and such a preliminary question has not yet been 
decided by a competent body, the court is entitled to solve such a preliminary ques-
tion itself, assuming it is not otherwise provided in the applicable legislation.  
Notwithstanding the above mentioned ‘independence of the judiciary’, the court 
may also decide not to solve such a preliminary question itself. In such a case, the 
court will stay proceedings to wait for the final decision of a competent body. In 
competition cases this means that the court will either decide itself on the issue of an 
antitrust infringement or order the plaintiff to initiate proceedings before the compe-
tition authority. In the first case, the civil court will have to deal with all circum-
stances related to reviewing the behaviour. Such a decision would only be applicable 
for the lawsuit in question241 and the competition authority would still be entitled to 
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take a decision on the issue. As said before, the court may decide instead not to solve 
such a preliminary question itself. A certain degree of discretion is available for the 
court to decide whether to solve the question or to wait for the competent body’s 
decision. According to the court’s practice, its discretion will be limited to what is 
‘reasonable and convenient’ in the case at hand.242 In competition cases it would 
appear ‘reasonable and convenient’ to stay the proceeding until a decision has been 
reached by the Competition Protection Office that has already initiated proceedings 
on the same matter. This conclusion can be drawn from the court’s practice. In con-
trast to the civil courts the competition authority is an expert in field of competition 
law and therefore familiar with the competition issues and this could bring benefits 
not only in terms of expertise but also in terms of time. In addition, if the court de-
cides to solve the preliminary question itself, it might come to a conclusion different 
to that of the CPO on the question whether or not any particular conduct qualifies as 
an infringement of antitrust rules. In doing so, it faces a risk of reopening a proceed-
ing. According to the Article 394 CPA, proceedings can be reopened upon request by 
a party to the dispute in case of enumerated reasons of which the most often used is 
the possibility of a party to bring new evidence (under specified conditions). The 
NCA’s decision that has become final after the civil court decision with regard to 
damages could be a reason for reopening the proceeding. Thus, in cases in which the 
NCA’s process is still on-going or an appeal against NCA decision is pending, civil 
courts seised with damage actions are encouraged to stay their proceedings, or at least 
consider staying proceeding. Moreover, a decision to stay proceeding and wait for the 
competition authority’s decision would be in line with the rationale of Article 62(2) of 
the Competition Act. Article 62(2) aims to facilitate the task of the civil court when 
ruling on agreements, decisions or practices pursuant to Article 101 TFEU and Arti-
cle 102 of the TFEU or their Slovenian equivalents.  
In contrast, it would not seem ‘reasonable and convenient’ to stay the proceeding 
if the proceeding before the competition authority has not yet been initiated. It is 
difficult to come to any other conclusion. If the court stays the proceeding it cannot 
be sure that the competition authority will start the investigation. Unlike some other 
administrative proceedings, competition authorities are free to decide whether to start 
a proceeding or not. They may start investigations after receiving a complaint – in 
this case made by a party to the civil proceeding – but there is no obligation to do so.  
It appears that the Slovenian emphasis on CPO’s decisions in civil courts bears a 
certain resemblance to the EU approach to the status of the EU Commission’s deci-
sions in civil courts. At EU level, according to the Masterfoods rule,243 the national 
court ‘cannot take’ decisions that run counter to a decision adopted by the EU 
Commission, but it must also ‘avoid giving decisions’ that would conflict with the EU 
Commission’s decision. If the EU Commission has initiated proceedings concerning 
the agreement or conduct in question there is a risk of conflicting decisions. For 
instance, the EU Commission could rule that an agreement is caught by Article 
101(1) TFEU even though a national court has previously held a contrary view. The 
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national court may, for the purpose of legal certainty, consider the option of staying 
the proceeding until the EU Commission has delivered its decision. If the court takes 
this step, the possibility of conflicts between the EU Commission and itself is ex-
cluded. Once the EU Commission reaches its decision that had been pending during 
the suspension period, the national court would be bound not to give judgment run-
ning counter it. Thus it is for the national court to act cautiously and, if necessary, to 
await the EU Commission’s decision. Nonetheless, when national judges do not have 
reasonable doubts with respect to the decision that the EU Commission might adopt 
or when the EU Commission has already adopted a decision in a similar case, na-
tional judges may resolve the matter in question in accordance with the decision that 
the EU Commission is likely to have adopted, without waiting for the EU Commis-
sion’s decision.244 A similar version of Masterfoods’ approach is followed by Slove-
nian courts in relation to Slovenian competition authorities. In contrast to the EU 
approach, where the Masterfoods rule finds its basis in the principles of legal cer-
tainty and the necessity for the coherent and uniform application of the EU competi-
tion rules, on the national level the provision of Article 13 CPA has been associated 
with the principle of procedural efficiency. If the CPO has initiated a procedure re-
lated to the same matter as those filed before civil court (or whether it is probable 
that a decision is to be adopted in the matter), the national judge should consider the 
option of staying the proceedings until the CPO has delivered its decision. Although 
the court is not obliged to stay the proceeding, it is the court’s practice to do so. It 
will be guided by reasons of reduction of the cost and the time, as explained above. 
6.9.4 Conclusions on binding effect of NCAs’ decisions 
The EU Commission proposed to extend the binding effect of NCA decisions to 
national courts in civil matters throughout the EU, whenever infringements of EU 
antitrust law are in question. 
Generally speaking, Slovenia already complies with the above-mentioned EU 
Commission’s proposal. As shown earlier, if the Slovenian CPO made a decision that 
there is a breach of competition rules, then the court is bound by such a decision. 
The binding effect of CPO’s decision presupposes that this decision is final. This is 
also a legitimate qualification proposed by the EU Commission. Only NCA’s deci-
sion that “either has been accepted by their addressees, or which were confirmed 
upon appeal by the competent review courts” are binding. In such cases the court is 
not permitted to re-investigate the facts that led to the finding of infringement. The 
national courts are not bound to final infringement decisions when an appeal against 
an NCA decision is still pending on grounds relating to the finding of the infringe-
ment or if time-limits for appeal have not yet expired. The EU Commission’s pro-
posal does not entail a duty on the civil courts to stay proceedings and await the 
adoption of a competition authority’s infringement decision or the decision to be-
come final. The wording of the proposal is clear as to the fact that administrative 
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proceedings leading to fines have no priority over concurrent civil proceedings. Thus, 
when there has been no final infringement decision the court has the power to adju-
dicate on the merits of the case since it enjoys parallel competence with the competi-
tion authority to deal with an action for damages based on the same competition law 
violation. Nevertheless, the EU Commission encourages national courts seised with a 
damage action to consider whether it would be appropriate to stay their proceedings 
and wait for the decision of NCA. This is already an established court practice in 
Slovenia for civil cases. 
The EU Commission’s proposal envisages that NCAs’ decisions should be bind-
ing not only in the NCA’s Member State, but also on the courts in every Member 
State throughout the EU. With regard to decisions of foreign NCAs, there is no pro-
vision imposing a binding force on such decisions under Slovenian law. The choice 
of awarding binding effect to final decisions adopted by competition authorities is 
limited to Slovenian authorities. If a foreign NCA establishes an infringement, in 
theory, the decision will be treated as a ‘fact’ without imposing on the court a formal 
obligation to grant binding force to such decisions. Since the foreign decision may 
‘only’ be used as evidence of the infringement, its legal status can be compared to the 
status of the national NCA’s decisions that are yet to become final. The court will not 
be obliged to accept the content of the evidence. In contrast, it will be allowed to 
reinvestigate the facts that led to the finding of infringement. Nevertheless, it is 
should be recalled that an exception to the rule of the court’s discretion with regard 
to evaluation of evidence applies to public documents.245 A public document issued 
in the prescribed form by a competent authority is evidence of the veracity of its 
content, unless established otherwise. Pursuant to Article 225 CPA, a foreign public 
document which is properly legalised has the same validity as national public docu-
ments under condition of reciprocity. Accordingly, it will be assumed that the facts 
contained in foreign public documents are true, but a party may still prove that facts 
are inaccurately recorded in a public document or that a public document has been 
incorrectly drawn up.246 There is no reason not to apply the same rule to decisions of 
foreign NCAs. 
It follows from the analysis above that an obligation upon the courts to accept 
the legal consequences of a foreign NCA decision would require a new national or 
EU legislation (Council Regulation or Directive) based on a system of mutual recog-
nition. From a legal point of view, in principle, this should not be give problems247 
since the automatic recognition by a civil court of the binding effect of Slovenian 
NCA’s decision is already operational. It would not risk undermining the Slovenian 
legal system as long as such decisions have the same binding force in the country of 
origin and have been issued following the procedure in which the right to appeal is 
ensured. In addition, the binding force of foreign decisions, as proposed by the EU 
Commission, would not contravene the principles of separation of powers and inde-
pendence of the judiciary, which are important principles on which Slovenian legal 
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system is based and are also guaranteed by the Constitution. In particular, in line with 
the principles, in order to bring a follow-on action, a claimant will still be required to 
bring evidence before court for the purposes of causation and quantum of damages.  
6.10 Damage and reparation for damage 
Before national courts, action for damages for violations of competition rules do not 
have a special status in the sense that the law would allow for special remedies. Gen-
eral tort rules will apply in the case of such actions.  
According to the general tort rules, the main objective of damage actions (includ-
ing antitrust damage actions) will be to provide compensation for those who suffered 
damages as a result of illegal conduct and not to punish the tortfeasors.248 When it 
comes to the assessment of damages the focus will be on the victim and the compen-
sation of the loss he suffered249 
6.10.1 Available forms of reparation  
In cases in which liability for a wrongful act is established the person responsible is 
obliged to repair damage. Damage will generally be repaired following the principle of 
restitution in integrum, which requires the restoration of the injured party to the position 
he was in before being harmed. In accordance with the principle, damages are re-
paired by one of the following forms, restitution in kind (‘in natura restitution’) or by 
the equivalent (‘monetary compensation’). While the first one requires the replace-
ment of harmed components with equivalent components, the second requires repa-
ration of damages through payment of a sum of money corresponding to the value 
that a restitution in kind would bear. 
The Slovenian Obligations Act affords restitution in kind priority over monetary 
compensation. Accordingly, the injured party is generally afforded the right to restitu-
tion in kind. Monetary compensation is permitted alongside or in place of restitution 
in kind whenever the facts of the case so require. In particular, if restitution in kind 
does not remedy the damages entirely, then the responsible person is obliged to pay 
monetary compensation for the non-remedied part in addition to such restitution. 
According to Article 164 of the Obligations Act monetary compensation alone shall 
come into consideration in three situations, (i) if restitution in kind is not possible, or 
(ii) the court considers it inappropriate for the responsible person to perform restitu-
tion in kind or (iii) the plaintiff requests monetary compensation With regard to the 
last case, the court will award monetary compensation unless it is of the opinion that 
the circumstances of the case require restitution to the previous condition. Despite 
the fact that the wording of the Obligations Act suggests that restitution in kind has 
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priority over monetary compensation, according to the legal theory,250 it is up to the 
plaintiff to choose the form of compensation. He has the right to choose whether to 
require restitution to the previous condition or monetary compensation. In the 
court’s practice, restitution to the previous condition is a rare exception. Compensa-
tion is almost exclusively claimed and awarded by way of monetary payment.251 
Giving priority either to restitution in kind or monetary compensation in the case 
of antitrust damage, restitution in kind will not be possible. Antitrust damage can 
result from different forms of antitrust violation, such as price-fixing, market-dividing 
cartel agreements, excessive pricing by a dominant firm, but in all cases only mone-
tary compensation will constitute the appropriate form of reparation. For example, 
increased costs due to cartel prices will be translated into reduced profits.252 The 
damage suffered by the plaintiff in the form of reduced profits cannot be compen-
sated if it is not possible that the compensation takes monetary form.  
6.10.2 Principle of full compensation and reduction of damages 
The principle of full compensation, known in legal literature as compensatio lucri cum 
damno, is often considered as one of the fundamentals of the tort law.253 It seeks to 
put the victim in the position he was in before the tort occurred. In accordance with 
the principle of full compensation, an award of damages should present the compen-
sation necessary to bring plaintiff’s financial situation in line with the situation in 
which the infringement had not happened.254 Damages awarded to an injured party 
cannot exceed the amount of loss incurred and compensation cannot enrich the in-
jured party.255 
In tort law the principle of full compensation is applied together with another ba-
sic principle on which Slovenian civil law is based, the principle that the victim has to 
bear the loss himself to the extent to which damage cannot be imputed to the oth-
ers.256 If the victim had in any way contributed to the occurrence or the sum of dam-
age, then the quantum of damages that would have been granted otherwise will be 
reduced. In line with this principle, the Slovenian law provides for a reduction of 
damages when the plaintiff acted in the interest of the defendant.257 If the plaintiff 
has financially or otherwise benefited from the infringement of the law, the award 
should be proportionally reduced. Only the net damage should be compensated. 
Otherwise the plaintiff will be unjustly enriched. Another justification for reduction 
of a damage award is when the defendant contributed to the occurrence of damage or 
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its increase.258 In this case the damage award shall be reduced in proportion to the 
victim’s contribution.259 In the competition context, this will be the case where over-
charging resulting from a cartel or abuse of a dominant position is passed-on with 
profit by the injured party to another entity on the market. Similarly, the fact that the 
defendant did not mitigate losses – but could have done so – would also lead to a 
reduction in the amount of damages.260 A plaintiff who suffers damage as a result of 
either a breach of contract or a tort is under the obligation to take appropriate steps 
to restrict those damages insofar as it is reasonable to expect him to do. If he has 
failed to mitigate the losses, the court can reduce the amount of damages awarded by 
a percentage that represents the extent of the injury that could have been avoided 
through reasonable care. A standard of behaviour applied in this case is the “reason-
able person standard” or what a reasonable person would do under similar circum-
stances.261  
The principle of full compensation, however, does not exclude the possibility of 
reduction of the amount of compensation payable to the victim.262 It only indicates 
that the tort procedure starts with the assessment of the full damage incurred by the 
victim, which can be reduced later (or even refused by the Court if there is no legal 
basis for compensation). Therefore, the Code of the Obligation has established that 
the damages awarded to the plaintiff may be reduced in cases where the defendant is 
in a weak financial position and the payment of damages could cause distress to the 
defendant and the damages were not caused intentionally or by gross negligence and 
at the same time, the plaintiff finds himself in a relatively stronger financial position 
compared to the defendant.263 This provision, based on social justice, in principle is 
not of importance for competition cases. 
6.10.3 Definition of damage and assessment (calculation) of damages 
According to the Obligations Act, damage includes (1) the reduction of asset in a 
person’s patrimony (actual loss or damnum emergens), and (2) deprivation of increase of 
asset in a person’s patrimony that would otherwise have occurred (loss of profit or 
lucrum cessans).264  
The concept of damage is also reflected in the calculation (assessment) of dam-
ages. When monetary damages are concerned the court will take into account the 
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circumstances arising after the damages were caused. According to the general rule 
laid down in Article 168, the plaintiff is not only entitled to ‘ordinary damages’ (i.e. 
monetary compensation for destroyed goods, costs of repair, costs arising from the 
fact that the plaintiff has temporarily not been able to use a certain product etc.), but 
also to the ‘lost profit’ at the time of the trial.265 In addition to monetary damages, the 
plaintiff is also entitled to non-monetary damages, but only for expressly enumerated 
injuries. Concerning damages arising as a result of anti-competitive conduct, the only 
potentially applicable type of damage would be damages to the reputation or goodwill 
of a legal entity. Non-monetary damages might be an important component of the 
total damage, especially when a competitor has been forced to leave a market in 
which it had established a reputation. In these cases the court shall award a fair mate-
rial damage to the legal person irrespective of the compensation of material damage, 
and even in case of no material damage, if it is justified by the circumstances of the 
case.266  
With regard to lost profit further explanation is necessary. Loss of profit is a legal 
term defined in the Obligations Code as profit that could have been justifiably ex-
pected in the normal course of events, and which was not achieved due to the wrong-
ful act of the defendant.267 It is the profit that has not been gained due to the injuri-
ous incident.268 Accordingly, calculation of lost profit is guided by the principle of 
establishing a hypothetical scenario that would have prevailed in the market in the 
absence of infringement. This hypothetical outcome is used as a reference to which 
the actual market outcome is compared. There is no exact calculation procedure and 
criteria for assessment are not clearly specified. Neither is there a settled model on 
damage calculation in court practice. Decisions are made on a case-by-case basis. 
With regard to antitrust cases, it is widely accepted269 that the courts should assess 
the damage by way of applying one of the existing economic models (the ‘price pre-
diction’ approach, the ‘yardstick’ approach, the ‘before and after’ approach, the ‘cost-
based’ approach, the ‘theoretical modelling (simulation)’ approach).270 There is no 
court practice that would either confirm or alter this approach or further elaborate on 
how the models are to be applied in practice.  
Irrespective of the discretion of the courts with regard to the method or combi-
nation of the methods ultimately used to determine the loss of profit, an estimation 
of a hypothetical market crucially depends on the availability of suitable data to the 
plaintiffs. Under Slovenian procedural law the claimant has to provide evidence of a 
hypothetical scenario and the link between the unlawful conduct and the alleged lost 
profit. Namely, it has to provide the court with evidence of the economic situation he 
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would have been in if the infringement had not taken place. On that basis, the court 
will proceed to its estimate of loss of profit. It has often been argued that in the field 
of antitrust law fulfilling this requirement frequently is not an easy task and often 
amounts to a probatio diabolica (impossible proof).271 The plaintiff will have to provide 
evidence of the complex factual and economic background (e.g. purchase and market 
data).  
Taking into account the difficulties with regard to gathering evidence and the 
complexity of calculation of antitrust damages, one might ask to what extent the 
court is entitled to assess damages using its discretion. After all, Article 216 CPA 
provides that in cases in which the court establishes that a party is entitled to mone-
tary compensation for loss but the exact amount of such loss will be difficult to de-
fine, the court may decide on the amount of damages at its own discretion. Reading 
the Article, it would be wrong to conclude that the provision could be generally ap-
plied in antitrust cases. Under the general rule, when calculating the damage the court 
should use all information available to compare the actual financial state of the in-
jured party with the hypothetical state that would have existed if such damage had 
not occurred. Since Slovenian law entitles the court to decide on the amount of dam-
ages at its own discretion in exceptional cases, Article 216 CPA is interpreted nar-
rowly by the courts. According to case law, Article 216 CPA should not be applied in 
a way to relieve a party of its obligation to produce evidence.272 It should also not be 
applied when it is possible to quantify the amount of damages based on expert evi-
dence.273 This is in line with the rule that the determination of damages must be sup-
ported by evidence of actual damage suffered by the plaintiff. In principle, the plain-
tiff will have to provide the court with evidence that is sufficiently representative in 
order to serve as a sound basis for the estimation of the ‘hypothetical comparative 
price’ of the product or service in question. It is not enough to provide the court with 
documents based on mere speculations.274 Therefore the argument that quantifica-
tion and calculation of damages in antitrust cases can be complex is not enough to 
justify application of Article 216 CPA. Due to the nature of loss of profit, calculating 
such losses is often difficult and the exact amount of the harm suffered cannot always 
be precisely calculated. It follows naturally the idea of the exact amount of the harm 
suffered cannot be, and also is not, strictly applied with regard to the calculation of 
lost profit. However, it seems there are no objections to its application where insuffi-
cient evidence is available, as long as the court’s discretion to calculate the damages is 
within the limits of reason. 
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6.10.4 (Absence of) punitive damages  
Punitive damages, in principle are not available in the Slovenian legal system. Dam-
ages are awarded to compensate, and therefore are limited to compensation of actual 
damages suffered by the claimant, including the loss of profit (plus interest). In ac-
cordance with principles of restitution in integrum (restitution to the previous condition) 
and compensation lucri com damno, the injured party may not benefit from the damages. It 
is further accepted that claims going beyond the compensatory damages are not in 
line with the principle of full compensation discussed above.275 An award of damages 
must put the victim into position as close as possible to that in which he would have 
been if the damage had not occurred. According to one author,276 the principle con-
sists of three propositions, (1) all the damage, (2) nothing but the damage, and (3) the 
only thing that matters is the position of the victim. If punitive damages are awarded, 
the victim might be compensated for more than the actual measurable damages done. 
As an exception, Slovenian legal system provides for the award of damages that 
are more than compensatory, and this resembles the punitive damages approach. In 
particular, Article 168 of the Copyright Act provides for copyright infringement that 
was committed intentionally or with gross negligence, damages may amount up to 
200% of the ‘usual honoraria’ regardless of damage suffered.277 The wording of the 
article might suggest that punitive damages are available under the Copyright Act. 
Pursuant to the article, damages are not conditional upon the presence of damage 
suffered. They might be awarded even if the right holder has suffered no monetary 
damage. Besides, while in traditional tort law compensation of damages is independ-
ent of the infringer’s culpability, when assessing punitive damages for copyright in-
fringement, the infringer’s awareness of wrongfulness of its action might influence 
the amount of damages. The Copyright Act explicitly states that when deciding on 
the claim for the award of punitive damages and setting of their amount, the court 
shall take into account all circumstances of the case and in particular the degree of 
culpability of the infringer, the amount of agreed or customary remuneration and the 
achievement of a general preventive purpose sought by the award of punitive dam-
ages.278 Based on these considerations, one might think that punitive damages are 
recognised under the Copyright act and therefore form part of Slovenian legal sys-
tem. However, in the strict definition of punitive damages known in the U.S. the 
damages awarded under the Copyright Act may not be considered ‘punitive’ because 
of the following reasons. 
First, punitive damages in the U.S. are calculated in addition to actual damages. 
They aim to set an example and to teach the wrongdoer not to reoffend. The amount 
of damages awarded will depend on the damages suffered by the plaintiff. Damages 
under the Copyright Act are different in that the basis for determining the amount of 
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civil penalties is not the amount of actual damages. The amount is calculated accord-
ing to a specific standard set out in the Act. According to that standard, damages are 
calculated on the basis of the ‘usual honoraria’ (applicable license fee). This has been 
also underlined by the Slovenia Constitutional Court on occasion.279 
Second, while punitive damages in U.S. antitrust law are intended to punish the 
defendant for conduct found to be outrageous, damages under the Slovenian Copy-
right Act are designed to facilitate the calculation of damages for copyright infringe-
ments that would otherwise be very difficult to calculate. Although the damages 
awarded under Article 168 of the Copyright Act go beyond pure compensation and 
have a preventive effect, the system, part of which the Article Copyright Act utilises, 
is based on the general principle of full compensation and the idea that damages in 
tort law are in the first place compensatory. Accordingly, the Act refers to general 
rules on compensation for damage. It also provides the right of the right holder to 
claim the difference to full actual damages when the actual damage (non-punitive 
damage) is higher than the amount of damages calculated under Article 168 of the 
Copyright Act. This also implies that the system of compensation for copyrights 
damages does not allow for additional liability on top of the coverage of the damage 
that actually occurred. It follows from the above that the concept of punitive dam-
ages as such does not exist in Slovenia and therefore it is not available as a remedy. 
Third, having a preventive effect is not considered to be inconsistent per se with 
tort law.280 It follows directly and logically from the general prohibition of causing 
damage, as it follows from Article 10 of the Obligations Code. If the Obligations 
Code prohibits certain behaviour that results in damages, it is only reasonable and 
logical that a specific statutory provision contains the spirit of this prohibition. Due 
to negative economic consequences that are imposed upon the infringer, it would 
also be impossible for the civil damages not to have a neutral effect. Beside the com-
pensation function, they also produce a prevention effect. Therefore, taking this into 
account Article 168 of the Copyright Act is no different to any other civil law liability 
provision. 
To sum up, the ‘more than compensatory’ damage award that exists in Slovenia is 
far from being punitive. Furthermore, ‘more than compensatory’ damages are limited 
to Slovenian copyright laws and do not extend to competition law infringement.  
6.10.5 (In)compatibility of punitive damages with the legal order 
As seen from the above analysis, the concept of punitive damages does not exist in 
Slovenia. It is also clear that they do not fit into the legal system.281 An argument 
supporting this statement can be found in the Constitutional Court’s decision282 on 
constitutionality of the provision of Article 109 CPP that authorises the court to 
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punish a person who insults the court, a party or other participant during the pro-
ceedings. The petitioners asserted, inter alia, the inconsistency of the challenged pro-
vision with the right to judicial protection in Article 23 of the Constitution. They 
argued that the punishment provided by CPP should be asserted in the course of 
criminal procedure, where all due procedural guarantees applying to the criminal 
cases are carried out. The Court ruled that the provision of Article 109 of CPP is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution. Although the subject of the decision was Article 
109 CPP (which is not the topic of this analysis) the decision provides reasoning 
relevant for the discussion on punitive damage. From the reasoning, it follows that 
punishment in itself is not inconsistent with the Constitution as long as sanctions 
resemble administrative sanctions more than criminal sanctions.283 The argument of 
administrative sanctions holds as long as sanctions provided in civil procedure are not 
‘excessively high’. In other words, when sanctions can go beyond the degree of being 
‘excessively high’, sanctions can be imposed on individuals only in procedures, where 
all due constitutional guarantees apply, in particular the guarantees provided in the 
criminal procedure code.284 It would appear that constitutional guarantees must also 
exist on the imposition of those sanctions, which are not provided as punishment in 
the formal sense of punishment but which can be regarded as punishments in a mate-
rial sense. Accordingly, punitive damages would not fit into the legal system, since by 
definition their main aim is to punish and deter. Thus, it cannot be seen how punitive 
damages would not be materially considered by the Constitutional Court as punish-
ment. 
In addition to their incompatibility with the main principles of tort law, concerns 
coming from constitutional perspective, the institution of punitive damages raises a 
problem of ‘double jeopardy’ (the so-called ne bis in idem) principle. Pursuant to Arti-
cle 31 of the Constitution, no one can be punished again for an act for which he has 
been acquitted or convicted by final judgement of the proceeding that has been fi-
nally dismissed or for which the charge has been finally rejected. This fundamental 
right constitutes an elementary guarantee for individuals’ juridical security by restrict-
ing the possibility of opening of a new process on the same matter when there is an 
identity of the act and an identical basis for sanction. Although authors mostly con-
sider the principle of double jeopardy as a principle of criminal law, nevertheless this 
principle would also have an impact on the substantive civil law, in that one allows an 
award of an additional punitive damage. In the case of an individual being first pun-
ished pursuant to criminal procedure and then subjected to punitive damages based 
on the same conduct, the question might arise whether the punitive damage is actu-
ally a second punishment in the meaning of Article 31 of the Constitution. Putting it 
differently, the question must be asked whether means of private enforcement in the 
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form of punitive damages should be treated as a punishment. Following the decision 
presented earlier, it is likely that Slovenian Constitutional Court would take the posi-
tion that the possibility of applying punitive damages is essentially a side punishment 
in the meaning of penal power, and the application of punitive damages might create 
a conflict with Article 31 of the Constitution.285 In order to ensure that there is no 
double jeopardy, it would be necessary to adopt a similar provision as the one that 
applies to situations in which someone is convicted of a criminal offence and for a 
misdemeanour. Pursuant to that rule, if criminal offence has elements of a misde-
meanour, proceedings for the misdemeanour shall not be conducted, neither shall any 
sanctions be imposed for a misdemeanour against a perpetrator who in criminal pro-
ceedings was found guilty of criminal offence.286 That means that the same act can-
not be denoted as a misdemeanour after the final judgment of conviction for a crimi-
nal offence. But if the perpetrator is first punished by the imposition of punitive 
damages, analogous to Article 49 of Criminal Code, additional punishment for a 
criminal offence would be allowed. In this case deduction for the penalty that was 
paid in the form of punitive damages should be allowed.287 The question remains 
whether the legal theory would agree with such regulation of the relationship between 
civil and criminal offences.  
6.10.6 Conclusions on damages 
There are two broad comments that can be made about the proposed damages 
model: the first concerns the rejection of punitive damages and the second concerns 
the scope of damages. 
With regard to the rejection of punitive damages, Slovenian rules applying to 
damages are in line with the EU Commission’s model based on compensation 
through ‘single damages’ for the harm suffered and the principle of ‘full compensa-
tion’. However the same could not be said of the proposal for the introduction of a 
system of punitive damages that was put forward in the Green Paper.288  
European scholars often point out that the continental civil law systems disap-
prove of punitive damages.289 The primary purpose of an award of damages is to 
compensate the claimant for the harm that has been done to him, and not to punish 
the perpetrator. Similarly, the Slovenian Obligations Code accepts the notion that 
damages are awarded to compensate the victim – to redress the injuries that he has 
actually suffered. Since compensation is primarily limited to the restoration of the 
victim’s original condition, the concept of full compensation as well as restitution in 
integrum appears to be a basic principle under the Slovenian law. There is one excep-
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tion in the Slovenian legislation when damages that exceed compensation are avail-
able. Under the Copyright Act, punitive damages may be awarded in special circum-
stance on the wrongdoer’s side (aggravated circumstances). But, even in this case, it is 
emphasised that – as a general rule – damages are compensatory in nature.290 Based 
on the analysis presented above, the concept of punitive damages does not exist in 
Slovenia, and it would not fit into the legal system. If civil punitive sanctions were to 
be added to the existing compensation damages a major change of the legal system 
would be required. An argument supporting this statement can be upheld by the 
decision of the Constitutional Court, which held that punitive damages would not fit 
into the legal system since, by definition, their main aim is to punish and deter.291 An 
additional argument against punitive damages comes from the risk of ‘double jeop-
ardy’ (the so-called ne bis in idem) principle.292  
Thus from a Slovenian perspective, the rejection of the concept of punitive dam-
ages by the EU Commission in the White Paper has been seen as positive. Punitive 
damages do not fit into the legal system. Furthermore, they would appear to be un-
necessary. First, the competition law already provides for sanctions in terms of impo-
sition of administrative sanctions. Second, as analysed earlier,293 the current Slovenian 
law has provisions to come to an essentially similar result in terms of deterrence as 
could be done by means of punitive damages. In particular, besides administrative 
and civil liability, criminal acts provide for criminal liability. It is true that the effect of 
the criminalisation of anti-competition conduct so far has had less than stellar rate of 
convictions. In fact, no person has been sanctioned by imprisonment, neither is there 
any information about an undertaking being convicted under Article 225 of the Penal 
Code. Regardless of these considerations, it has been argued by legal experts that the 
existing administrative system already provides sufficient deterrence.294 Third, the 
award of punitive damages interferes unduly with public enforcement. Introduction 
of punitive damages in addition to administrative and criminal sanctions would risk 
‘overdeterrence’. 
Similarly, the EU Commission’s position on the scope of damages recoverable in 
antitrust damage actions does not contravene the Slovenian law. The EU Commis-
sion stated that antitrust victims must be able to seek compensation not only for the 
actual loss (damnum emergens), but also for the loss of profit (lucrum cessans) plus 
interest. It follows that to be in line with the EU Commission’s proposal, national 
legal systems cannot exclude the possibility of obtaining reparation for pure eco-
nomic loss (in the form of lost profit). Under Slovenian tort law pure economic loss 
is not treated differently than any other loss. The tort law rests on a unitary general 
clause found in article 131(1) of the Obligations Code, which provides that any per-
son that inflicts damage on another shall be obliged to reimburse him, unless it is 
proved that the damage was incurred without the culpability of the former. Further, 
Article 132 of the Obligations Code states that damage comprises the diminution of 
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property (ordinary damage), the prevention of the appreciation of property (lost prof-
its), the infliction of physical or mental distress or fear with respect to another per-
son, and encroachment upon the reputation of a legal person. This general clause 
approach in principle enables loss of any type be recoverable, regardless of the nature 
of the infringed right or interest. Thus, pure economic loss is included in the defini-
tion of recoverable loss and therefore it can also be compensated in claims for dam-
ages for breach of competition law.  
In conclusion, the rules of Slovenian civil law that apply to antitrust damage ac-
tions comply with the proposals from the White Paper. As such, it is believed that 
they promote effective enforcement of antitrust damage actions.  
6.10.7 Conclusions on passing-on 
Although there are no maximum limits to damages that may be awarded, according 
to the general rule of tort law, the compensation awarded may not exceed the dam-
ages actually suffered.295 The court, through this provision, can estimate the damage 
and prevent the injured party from being unjustifiably enriched.296 If the injured party 
received any gain from the damage sustained (loss and benefits are the consequences 
of the same event), then the court will deduct it from the amount of compensation.  
Strictly speaking, the ‘passing on’ defence has a similar effect of defining the 
amount of damages payable as the principle of compensation lucri cum damno under 
Article 169 OC. It prevents an unjust enrichment of the injured party. Prohibition of 
the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff in damage actions is likely to require the courts 
to contemplate the defence of passing-on when assessing damages. The overcharges, 
which were attributed to anticompetitive behaviour and were passed-on to a subse-
quent purchaser, are not the source of any damage actually suffered by the plaintiff 
himself. So to the extent that the price increase has been passed on to subsequent 
purchasers, direct purchasers will not be able to prove occurrence of damage on their 
side. The court will normally conclude that there was no personal damage sustained 
by the claimant and accordingly that the claimant is not entitled to recover from the 
defendant the amount passed on. If the inflated cost has been fully passed on, then 
the court may even dismiss the claim for damages due to lack of evidence of the 
damage effectively suffered. Therefore, although the term passing-on defence is not 
explicitly provided for by Slovenian law, it will be examined by a court in the context 
of proof of damage. 
However, if the passing-on is contemplated then, by application of general rules, 
it can be stated that there is no presumption that higher prices have been passed-on 
and the burden of proof that the damage has been carried by a subsequent purchaser 
                                                        
295  Article 169 of the Obligations Code. 
296  Under Slovenian law claims antitrust infringements may also give rise to unjust enrichment. In case 
when the defendant has received an unjust benefit at the claimant’s expense, he can waive the tort 
claim and sue based upon unjust enrichment. Basis for claiming antitrust damages is not so much of 
relevance from the point of view of the existence of the right than from the point of view of the 
rules that apply in the case of each of them. See A. Vlahek in =DNRQ R SUHSUHÿHYDQMX RPHMHYDQMD
konkurence s komentarjem *9=DORæED/MXEOMDQDp. 496. 
Chapter 6 
284 
 
lies on the defendant. This is in line with the basic procedural rule that the burden of 
proof lies with the party that alleges a fact and wishes to obtain a benefit based on the 
existence of that fact (Article 7 CPA). In other words, the plaintiff has to prove the 
damage that he has suffered and the defendant has to prove that the plaintiff has 
passed the loss on. In any case, according to the general tort rule of full compensa-
tion, the claimant will only receive indemnification for the damage he has actually 
suffered. If the claimant suffered a smaller amount of damage as a result of passing-
on, then the plaintiff`s claim with respect to the damage that he had not suffered will 
not be compensated by the court. In other words, damages will be awarded by the 
courts as compensation for damage suffered by a claimant, provided that the amount 
of that damage was duly evidenced during the proceedings. 
In the White Paper, the EU Commission has proposed to give indirect purchas-
ers the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that the illegal overcharge was passed on 
to them in its entirety. This presumption implies that the defendant will bear the 
burden of proof. In other words, it reverses the burden of proof from the claimant to 
the defendant. This might be the case even where the defendant has not tried to rely 
on the passing-on defence against direct purchasers. It should be noted that the con-
cept of reversal of the burden of proof is not unknown to Slovenian legal order.297 
As discussed above, the main theory of tort liability is fault based on a reversed bur-
den of proof.298 In this system, the fault of the wrongdoer is presumed unless proven 
otherwise. Even though the presumption exists regarding the fault, no such presump-
tion exists with respect to damages. Under the general rules, it is up to the claimant 
(direct purchaser) to prove its case and it has to prove, inter alia, the damages and the 
amount of damages. Since it is up to him to prove the amount of damage, in the 
event that he subsequently passed on the illegal overcharges to a subsequent pur-
chaser, he would be unable to prove that he suffered the amount of damages that he 
had passed on. Overcharge will be taken into account even if the defendant has not 
invoked the passing-on defence. Thus, any existence of indirect loss would not affect 
the right to full compensation for the real value of the damage. A rebuttable pre-
sumption suggested by the EU Commission would create a considerable risk of un-
justified compensation for non-suffered injury.  
6.11 Limitation periods 
A limitation period is defined as a period of time during which an individual can 
bring a claim. Once the limitation period has ended there will be a complete defence 
available to the defendant against claims by the claimant, given that the claim has 
been brought outside the period of limitation. Since the Competition Act does not 
provide for limitation periods for antitrust cases, the limitation period for tort liability 
applies.  
                                                        
297  Under the Slovenian law, reversal of the burden exists in relation to the proof of the injurer’s fault. 
298  See section 6.8.2. 
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6.11.1 Statute of limitation periods 
According to Obligations Code, a claim for damages should be raised within three 
years after the injured party became aware of the damages and the identity of the 
wrongdoer, and in any case within five years from the date of the occurrence of the 
damage.299 Based on this, the Slovenian law adopted a concept of ‘double limitation 
periods.’300 On one hand, there is a rather short subjective period, which refers to the 
moment when the injured party notices the damage and knows who caused it. For 
the period to start running, it is necessary that the claimant is subjectively aware of 
the damages and the identity of liable person. On the other hand, there is a longer 
objective period, which is defined as an overall absolute period within which action 
against an alleged offender can be brought. After the expiry of that time, no plaintiff 
is able to bring damages action against the defendant.  
The way the system is structured, it provides for corrective justice without un-
dermining legal certainty and the protection of the interests of the defendants. On 
one hand, it encourages victims who know about an infringement to bring a claim 
within a reasonable time period (3 years) and, at the same time, preclude lawsuits 
from being instituted a long time after the occurrence of the damage (5 years). Ab-
sence of an absolute limitation in time for exercising the right of damages would lead 
to a risk of an increase of legal errors due to difficulties related to evidence gathering 
and, most importantly, owing to the creation of undesirable and excessive uncertainty 
for potential defendants. On the other hand, inclusion of the subjective limitation 
period into the system certainly has a positive impact on corrective justice, as it gives 
a realistic possibility for victims to exercise their right to damages. This subjective 
limitation period is of particular importance for antitrust cases in which evidence of 
anti-competitive conduct is not always directly observable. Potential private plaintiffs 
might often be unaware of the existence of the violation, corresponding harm and the 
infringer.301 This was evident in a case of 2007 when five Slovenian electricity dis-
tributors breached antitrust law by simultaneously announcing an increase in retail 
electricity prices for householders.302 Many victims were not aware of the damage 
caused before the case became public and a CPO’s infringement decision was pub-
lished. If the starting date of the limitation period was the date in which the conduct 
occurred (therefore, before the infringement has not yet been discovered), then the 
number of victims aware of the occurrence of the damage before the expiry of the 
limitation period would have been lower. Damage claims would become time-barred 
before the claim was noticed by the victim. 
The case above is also a good example of the fact that in the absence of a formal 
decision, potential claimants do not have knowledge of the infringement. In Slovenia 
the time when the injured party came to know of the damages is also the time when 
the injured party has collected, or could and should have collected (according to the 
                                                        
299  Article 352 of the Obligations Code. 
300  See Kranjc, in 13ODYäDN0-XKDUW'-DGHN3HQVD9.UDQMF3*ULOF$3RODMQDU3DYÿQLN0
3DYÿQLNObligacijski zakonik s komentarjem (splošni del) *9=DORæED/MXEOMDQD, pp. 477–481. 
301  See section 4.4.4. 
302  Decision n. 306-168/2007-57 (6.8.2008). See also section 5.6.5. 
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circumstances of the case and the required level of care), all elements necessary for it 
to determine the amount of the claim – i.e. only after damages are stabilised and only 
after the injured party is able to ascertain the amount of damages, either itself or, if 
necessary, with the help of an expert.303 Although there is no case law on the issue 
with regard to antitrust infringement, it is believed that the requirements will be ful-
filled when the CPO issues an infringement decision.304 Furthermore, even if poten-
tial claimants are aware of the antitrust behaviour and damage caused before the 
decision is issued, they would seek to rely on the CPO’s infringement decision as 
proof of the breach. The limitation period applicable to the CPO to start a proceed-
ing and impose fine is 5 years from the day on which the violation was committed.305 
This applies that the limitation period for imposition of penalties is longer than the 
one for bringing a damage claim. Depending on the circumstances of the case, it is 
therefore possible that the limitation period will run out before the competition au-
thority has decided that there has been a breach of antitrust rules. For example, if an 
infringement occurred in 2006, the CPO starts a proceeding in 2010 and adopts a 
decision finding an infringement in 2013. A plaintiff having realised the occurrence of 
the damage in 2010 when the CPO started the proceeding could end up being unable 
to file lawsuit after 2011. To avoid this situation, the Competition Act provides that 
the applicable limitation periods do not run in the period after the commencement of 
proceeding before the CPO. They start running again after a court of last instance has 
decided on the issue of infringement.306 The same also holds true whenever the EU 
Commission launches investigations for alleged breaches of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. It follows that the proceedings of the competition authority carry a suspen-
sive effect. This provision aims to ensure that antitrust victims can make use of the 
binding effect without fearing that their limitation period will be time-barred. After 
the proceedings of the competition authority have been concluded, the victims still 
have the remaining limitation time to prepare the damage action. A period that has 
already lapsed before the start of the judicial proceedings will be deducted from the 
applicable period and the remaining period commences at the end of the judicial 
procedure. However, the question is whether the remaining limitation time is long 
enough to prepare and commence a civil proceeding. If the limitation period was 
suspended shortly before the expiration of the time period, then the remaining time 
for bringing a claim would be insufficient. This could be an obstacle to damage 
claims. Furthermore, another practical obstacle that antitrust claimants (and defen-
dants) face is related to the lack of knowledge about the time period when the pro-
ceeding is before the CPO. They will sometimes find it difficult to calculate the re-
maining period precisely, given that the opening and closure of proceedings by com-
petition authorities may not be known publicly. While decisions of the opening of 
                                                        
303  6HH.UDQMF9LQ13ODYäDN0-XKDUW'-DGHN3HQVD9.UDQMF3*ULOF$3RODMQDU3DYÿQLN0
3DYÿQLNObligacijski zakonik s komentarjem (splošni del) *9=DORæED/MXEOMDQDpp. 478–479. 
304  3*ULOF7%UDWLQD$*DOLÿ(.HUäHYDQ0.RFPXW.3RGREQLN$9ODKHN%=DEHOZakon o 
SUHSUHÿHYDQMXRPHMHYDQMDNRQNXUHQFH=32P.-1): s komentarjem (2009) GV ZDORæED/MXEOMDQDp. 512. 
305  The limitation period applicable to the European Commission in starting a proceeding under EU 
competition rules is subject to a limitation period of five year. 
306  3*ULOF7%UDWLQD$*DOLÿ(.HUäHYDQ0.RFPXW.3RGRbnik, A. Vlahek, B. Zabel, Zakon o 
SUHSUHÿHYDQMXRPHMHYDQMDNRQNXUHQFH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proceedings are published on the CPO website, there is no information publicly 
available about whether an appeal against the CPO decision has been filed and if so, 
how it was decided. 
6.11.2 Conclusions on limitation periods 
An important feature of limitation periods is the date from which the time limit starts 
to run. If the limitation period is set to run from the date on which the infringement 
occurs, then the time period in which antitrust practices are recognised would proba-
bly be shorter than the time period of antitrust practices. According to the EU 
Commission, it would not be compatible with EU law if a national limitation period 
starts to run before the victim of the infringement can reasonably be expected to 
have knowledge of the infringement and the damage caused.307 If the EU Commis-
sion’s wording is understood merely as a subjective limitation, then the Slovenian 
approach to limitation periods is in line with the EU Commission approach only to a 
certain extent. As noted in section 6.11, limitation periods are a combination of sub-
jective and objective statutes of limitation. They are defined not only by the date 
when the claimant came to know of the damages and identify of the wrongdoer, but 
also by the time when the damage occurs. In relation to antitrust claims a subjective 
limitation period of 3 years, coupled with a 5-year objective limitation period will 
apply. If the possibility of an objective limitation period were to be excluded, despite 
the deprivation of the parties from the benefits of an ‘objective’ limitation period (see 
above), the system of mere subjective limitation period would also not fit into the 
Slovenian legal system. There is a concern that mere subjective limitation period 
would have the same effects as limitation period that is ‘too long.’ It imposes an 
unduly onerous record keeping obligation on the market participant and 
therefore unduly prolongs legal uncertainty.  
With regard to follow-on damage actions, the EU Commission suggested that, a 
new limitation period should start once the competition authority’s decision – on 
which a follow-on claimant relies – has become final. Claimants would otherwise be 
deprived of their fundamental right to effective compensation. Similarly, Slovenian 
law provides for a measure aimed at avoiding the expiration of the limitation period 
while public enforcement is still ongoing. However, in contrast to the EU Commis-
sion preference for the option of a new limitation period rather than the suspension 
of the limitation period during the public proceedings, the Slovenian law opts for the 
latter.308 The Competition Act stipulates that the limitation period does not run when 
a competition authority institutes a proceeding that is relevant for that same damage 
action, and resumes again when the proceeding is closed. The suspension allows for 
potential plaintiffs to await the outcome of public investigations without fearing that 
their limitation period will be time-barred, but it does not ensure sufficient time to 
effectively bring a claim. This could deprive claimants of their fundamental right to 
effective compensation. Therefore a change in Slovenian law would appear necessary 
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in order to comply with the EU Commission recommendations. Since Slovenian law 
already recognises temporary termination of the limitation period for damages claims 
from the date proceedings are instituted by the EU Commission or national competi-
tion authorities, this change would not go against the existing system of limitation 
periods. Overall, the institution of suspension and the creation of a ‘new limitation 
period’ share the same objective – to avoid the expiration of the limitation period 
while public enforcement is still ongoing. 
Introduction of a new limitation period instead of institution of suspension 
would also avoid situations where claimants (and defendants) would not have enough 
time left to prepare a claim (as in case when a suspension were to commence at a very 
late stage of the limitation period). However, establishing a new limitation period 
would not remedy the problem of knowing about the closure of proceedings by 
competition authorities and therefore the time when the new period starts running. 
This is a problem that will have to be addressed at national level. 
6.12 Costs  
Under Slovenian law costs are distributed according to the ‘loser pays‘ rule, however 
its application is not absolute. The Civil procedure Act empowers the court to deviate 
from it in several situations 
6.12.1 Allocation of costs 
Preliminarily each party bears its own costs incurred during the proceedings.309 Al-
though the Procedure Act does not provide for a list of types of costs, court practice 
has established that costs cover all expenses incurred during or due to the court pro-
cedure,310 such as court fees,311 costs of parties (travelling expenses, translation 
costs), etc.312 The only category of costs to which the Procedure Act refers is fees for 
the work of lawyers and of other persons whose entitlement is recognised by law (e.g. 
legal experts and witnesses).  
At the end of the proceeding when it comes to ex post allocation of litigation 
costs the ‘loser pays rule’ will normally apply.313 At this stage it is not important who 
paid the ex ante costs. It is also irrelevant what type of litigation cost is in question. 
There is no difference in the treatment of attorneys’ fees and court fees or any other 
                                                        
309  Civil Procedure Act 73/07, 13.8. 2007, Article 152. 
310  Article 151(1) CPA. 
311  Court fees are usually paid at the beginning of the proceeding when the application has been filed. In 
some cases the fees are paid when the court hands down a decision (e.g. social matter disputes be-
fore first instance courts, land register proceedings, proceedings concerning first instance decisions 
on indemnities). 
312  6HH-ãLQNRYHFand B. Tratar, Veliki komentar Zakona o pravdnem postopku s sodno prakso =DORæED
Oziris, p. 319. 
313  See also: B, Grosman, Pogled odvetnika na prakso priznanja pravdnih stroškov (2001) 22(3) Pra-
vosodni bilten, pp. 165171; J. 9ODM3RJOHGVRGQLNDQDRGORÿEHRVWURäNLKSUDYGHQJDSRVWRSND
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litigation costs. The basic idea of the loser pays rule is that the party that wins the 
case shall bear no cost. The principal justification for the rule is the judgment only 
gives the party that to which he is entitled under substantive law. As one author put 
it, “the winner deserves to recover” the costs of successfully claiming a right or de-
fending against this claim.314 If the defendant is the winner it is justified to burden the 
plaintiff with the litigation costs because under the substantive law ultimately there is 
no basis for the plaintiff to bring a suit. Conversely, if the plaintiff is the winner it is 
justified to burden the defendant with the litigation costs since he is entitled to the 
recovery under the substantive rules. Accordingly, under Article 154 CPA the unsuc-
cessful party in the action refunds the costs of the proceedings to the opposing party 
and its representative. Considering the success of the party, and therefore the enti-
tlement to reimbursement of costs and fees, only the final success is taken into ac-
count. This means that if an appeal court renders a judgment in favour of the appel-
lant, annulling the judgement of the lower court, such a party will have to bear the 
costs of the winning party if later the court in retrial dismissed his claim. Based on the 
loser pays principle, if both parties are partially successful in the litigation, parties are 
entitled to a proportional part of the costs with respect to the outcome of litigation. 
In such a case the court may also order each party to bear its own costs.315 If one of 
the parties failed to succeed only in respect of a relatively small part of his claim, and 
there were no extra expenses related to such part of his claim, the court may also 
decide that such a party has a right to recover his entire costs incurred from the op-
posing party.316 Concerning the calculation of the proportion of success, usually the 
proportion between the amount sought and the amount granted is taken into ac-
count. 
Although the principle of success is the normal rule applicable to allocation of le-
gal costs, CPA empowers the court to deviate from it in several situations.317 First, 
irrespective of the outcome of the litigation, each party is allowed to recover costs 
incurred due to a fault of the other party or due to coincidence on its side (‘the guilty 
pays rule’).318 The rule protects parties from needless increase in the cost of litigation 
due to the malicious behaviour of the opponent. Second, special rules apply for cer-
tain specific procedural situations. If a plaintiff withdraws the claim, he must refund 
the defendant’s costs unless the withdrawal of the claim followed immediately after 
the defendant has satisfied the claim.319 Third, when deciding on the recovery of 
costs the court is allowed to exclude the costs thought to be excessive or unnecessary 
                                                        
314 N. Betetto, Cost and Fee Allocation in Slovenia – From Major pr partial Shifting?, in Mathias 
Reimann (Ed.), Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil procedure (2012) Springer, p. 254, 
315  Article 154(2) CPA. 
316  Article 154(3) CPA. See also for example, case VSL sklep I Cp 1394/2010. One-fourth of the total 
relief sought is not perceived as a ‘relatively small part’ (case VSC Cp 613/99).  
317  For more see: B. Grosman, Pogled odvetnika na prakso priznanja pravdnih stroškov, pp. 165–171; J. Vlaj, 
3RJOHGVRGQLNDQDRGORÿEHRVWURäNLKSUDYGHQJa postopka, pp.173–182. 
318  Article 156 CPA (see, for example, case VSL sklep II Cp 6606/2006; case VSC sklep Cp 1004/ 
2004). 
319  Article 158 CPA..  
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for the litigation.320 This will be a case for example, when it comes to the question 
what costs could a winning party reimburse from the opponent. The CPA explicitly 
states that if a tariff provides for consideration of the lawyer’s fees or other expenses, 
such fees and expenses shall be refunded according to the tariff.321 Accordingly, the 
court will calculate the amount of the attorney fees on the basis of the applicable 
Attorneys’ Tariff. This is an important provision. Under Slovenian law the amount of 
the attorney fees depends on the amount agreed between an attorney and a client. 
Instead of applying the Attorneys’ Tariff they can agree on the use of other criteria 
for the payment. They can also agree on contingency fees as long as they are con-
cluded in writing and do not exceed 15% of the amount awarded to the client.322 In 
the absence of the rule on the amount of reimbursement of lawyer’s fees the party 
who is ordered to pay the costs would be exposed to unnecessary unpredictability. 
Therefore, irrespective of the actual agreement between the winning party and the 
attorney, the losing party will be ordered to reimburse only the amount that corre-
sponds to the fee as prescribed by the Attorneys’ Tariff. 
Finally, financially weak parties can apply for legal aid.323 According to the Con-
stitutional Court, the right of access to court can be violated if financial burdens of 
litigation constitute an insurmountable obstacle for the access to court for a poor 
party.324 Such legal aid is available if it is requested and conditions pursuant to the 
Free Legal Aid Act met.325 It includes exemptions from payment of the attorney fees 
and all other costs of procedure, except for the costs and fees that might need to be 
reimbursed to the opposite party.326 Legal aid may also be granted for a part of such 
costs.  
6.12.2 Conclusions on costs 
As said above, although the EU Commission has acknowledged that the ‘loser pays‘ 
rule is a significant disincentive to bringing a damage claim, it does not propose the 
adoption of a specific framework of costs rules in antitrust damages cases. Instead it 
simply recommends that the national courts should be given discretion to depart 
from the ‘loser pays’ rule. Here, two observations have to be made. First, as far as this 
                                                        
320  Article 155(1) CPA. For example, costs for an attorney are considered to be necessary, even though 
the attorney has no legal knowledge (Bilten 1960/1 and 2, p. 36). 
321  Articla 155(2) CPA.  
322  Article 17(3) of the Attorneys Act (‘Zakon o odvetništvu’), Official Gazettes No. 18/1993, 24/1996 
and 24/2001 and Article 4 of the Tariff of Attorney Fees (“Odvetniška tarifa”), Official Gazettes 
No. 67/2008. Amendment of the Attorneys’ Act, Official Gazette RS, no. 35/09. 
323  Pursuant to the amendment of the Free Legal Aid Act in 2004 (Official Gazette RS, No. 50/04) 
residents of other EU Member States are guaranteed the dame level of access to free legal aid as 
Slovenian residents. 
324  Constitutional Court, Up-40/97 (7. 3. 1997), available at http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/usrs/us-
odl.nsf/o/D8898AF7CA20A152C1257172002A2822 (last consulted on 8 May 2013). 
325  Free Legal Aid Act (¶=DNRQ R EUH]SODÿQL SUDYQL SRPRÿL·), Official Gazettes No. 48/2001 and 
50/2004. Some provisions concerning free legal aid are also contained in the CPA, but after the 
adoption of the Free Legal Aid Act there is no further need to retain a parallel system in the Civil 
Procedure Act. 
326  Case VSC sklep Cp 635/2008. 
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proposal is concerned, Slovenian law reflects the EU Commission’s policy. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 6, there are already rules in place which give power to the court to 
depart from the ‘loser pays principle’. Irrespective of the outcome of litigation, the 
party has to bear the costs by himself/herself if he protracted proceedings mali-
ciously. This will also be the case if the cost recoverability would be unreasonable or 
in the case of withdrawal of the claim. In principle, these rules also apply to antitrust 
cases.  
Secondly, although according to the loser pays rule, litigation costs are repaid to 
the successful party, its application is not absolute. It applies as long as it does not 
contravene equity. For instance, irrespective of the outcome of the litigation, each 
party is allowed to recover any costs incurred due to coincidence on the other party’s 
side. It can be said that generally the losing party will have to reimburse the winning 
party’s costs and fees, as long as these costs were reasonable, necessary and also pre-
dictable for claimants. Only the legally prescribed fees of the representative of the 
winning party must be reimbursed and not fees that have been agreed upon between 
an attorney and a client. This leads to another important remark. Even if it could be 
argued that the loser pays rule has a deterrent effect (especially for the plaintiff), it 
should not be regarded in isolation from the whole system of allocation of litigation 
costs. On one hand, the principle is an effective deterrent against unrealistic and 
uneconomic claims. On the other hand, the way that the system is structured pre-
vents strict and absolute application of the ‘loser pays’ principle. It entitles a party to 
get what he is entitled to under substantive law without going against equity. 
6.13 Conclusion – private antitrust enforcement in Slovenia 
In Slovenia, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU or the domestic equivalents, are enforced by 
both public law (administrative and criminal rules) and the civil law. Although the 
public pillar of antitrust enforcement (due to administrative enforcement) is relatively 
strong, owing to its establishment at both EU and national levels, the private pillar of 
antitrust enforcement continues to be less effective. The fact that private enforce-
ment of competition law is not only available under Slovenian law but also carries 
equal importance to public enforcement is yet to be reflected in practise. Except for a 
single case, there is no publicly available information on successful antitrust damages 
claims. Recently members of two cartels voluntarily compensated individuals who 
were damaged by their antitrust activities. As it appears, the compensation was most 
likely due to the establishment of civil initiatives and media pressure following the 
finding of the antitrust infringements.  
Despite the lack of judgments with regard to civil damages claims, the analysis 
carried out in this chapter showed that the legal framework of private enforcement of 
antitrust law provides for several of the enforcement elements (put forward in the 
White Paper) to deal consistently with private suits. In order to facilitate antitrust 
damage actions (initiated by the EU) certain specific procedural mechanism had been 
already put in place in Slovenia. This includes the binding effect of national competi-
tion authorities’ decisions and limitation rules for follow-on actions.  
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The analysis carried out in this chapter also showed that the existing Slovenian 
civil law and civil procedure rules in principle do not present a serious hurdle to pri-
vate enforcement in Slovenia. First, all damaged persons have the right to bring anti-
trust damage action, even though an action for bringing competition-based damages 
is no different from any other action for damages. Nevertheless, as far as the con-
sumers are concerned, practical and procedural challenges deter them from exercising 
this right. In order to facilitate a wider use of private remedies, a first step could be 
the adoption of representative actions, allowing a consumer association to bring 
damage actions in court against anti-competitive behaviour. Under the current proce-
dural law regime, the plaintiff must have suffered a ‘direct’ injury as a consequence of 
the antitrust violation and the consumer associations lack standing. The introduction 
of representative actions (on an opt-in basis) in Slovenia would promote private liti-
gation and convince even plaintiffs of minor claims to opt-in for large and already 
structured actions, rather than pursuing their own independent cases. 
Second, the Slovenian rules of evidence – with a narrow disclosure rule – do lend 
themselves to application in antitrust damage actions. Proving infringement is also a 
difficult issue. In most of cases proof depends largely on the documents (evidence) 
belonging to the defendant. The Slovenian rules on evidence can be applied, if the 
plaintiff is aware of the existence of such documents. In this case, he might ask the 
court to order the disclosure. If the disclosure is ordered, the defendant must disclose 
them or face severe sanctions. Considering the importance of these documents, ob-
taining them – or at least being aware of their existence – creates an obstacle to pri-
vate enforcement, especially when there is no prior decision of competition authori-
ties. As for Slovenian law, the best way for plaintiffs is to lodge complaints to compe-
tition authorities before bringing action, since competition authorities enjoy broad 
authority to investigate infringements. Decisions of the competition authorities de-
claring that the law has been breached strengthen the plaintiffs’ position before the 
courts. As said earlier, the courts are bound by such decisions. 
Third, in cases in which there is no decision of a competition authority (yet), un-
der a general procedural rule, the court is encouraged to stay the proceeding and wait 
for the competition authority’s decision. Although, the aim of the rule is to provide 
procedural efficiency, it indirectly facilitates private enforcement of antitrust damage 
actions. The Slovenian approach towards placing great onus on CPO’s decisions in 
civil courts is comparable to EU approach to the status of the EU Commission’s 
decisions in civil courts. 
The question remains whether the Slovenian framework of private enforcement 
of antitrust law can be improved. It is evident from the analysis conducted in this 
chapter that, it is likely that the introduction of provisions regulating collective re-
dress will improve access to justice for antitrust victims and therefore accelerate ap-
plication of damage actions for breach of competition law in Slovenia. Besides, the 
cost rules that apply to civil actions (‘the loser pays rule’) are not considered as effec-
tive when applicable to antitrust cases. Also the rules of evidence could be improved 
in order to increase effective enforcement of competition rules. In all these cases, the 
implementation of the EU Commission’s proposals as suggested in the White Paper 
might appear necessary. However, the question is, if the implementation would be 
justified. Implementation of some of the EU Commission’s proposals would require 
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significant changes in substantial and procedural law and might even risk undermin-
ing the Slovenian legal system. This is likely to happen if the disclosure proposal, as 
presented in the White Paper, were to be implemented. In this case an EU harmoni-
sation could only be justified if the proposal significantly contributed to more effec-
tive enforcement within the EU. Strong arguments have to be made that, without EU 
intervention, the effectiveness of the system of the EU right to damages and effec-
tiveness of EU competition law would be endangered. Arguments for EU interven-
tion are not persuasive when principles of effectiveness and equivalence are capable 
of overcoming the obstacles of the national legal systems. The question of whether 
the arguments for EU intervention in Slovenian (and English) law are persuasive 
enough, thereby necessitating such intervention in order to ensure effectiveness of 
EU competition law will be answered in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 
Enforcement-oriented Issues in European Competition 
Law and Private Law 
7.1 Introduction 
The current status of the private enforcement of EU competition law can be de-
scribed as ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘needing further development’, if the EU Commis-
sion’s study on antitrust damage actions1 was to be taken as a reference. The EU 
Commission has presented – first in the Green Paper and later in the White Paper – a 
number of policy choices and specific measures aimed at encouraging damage ac-
tions. It was anticipated at the time that the White Paper would be followed by the 
publication of the EU Commission’s draft Directive on damages for breach of EU 
competition law. The first draft was withdrawn at the beginning of October 2009, 
just before its expected publication. The EU Commission Work Programme 20122 
foresaw a legislative proposal on actions for damages in case of breaches of antitrust 
law but until recently no further developments had happened in this regard. For a 
long time it was uncertain whether the draft Directive would ever be issued. The only 
noteworthy initiatives on antitrust damage actions were published in 2011, and they 
focused specifically on the quantification of harm3 and collective civil redress;4 with 
regard to the later one, the EU Commission’s action was focused on a general EU-
level approach and is not directly aimed at competition law. Only recently, on June 
11th 2013, after the research for this thesis had been completed, the EU Commission 
issued a belated draft Directive on private antitrust damage actions in which it pro-
posed a non-binding recommendation on collective redress mechanisms. It remains 
to be seen whether any or all of the new proposals will be implemented. As stated 
previously, the EU Commission has voiced the intention of submitting a proposal on 
antitrust damages actions several times before, although it has never gone as far as it 
has this time. The reason can be attributed to the controversy associated with some 
of the policy issues put forward by the EU Commission. For this reason, it is impor-
tant to emphasise that before the draft Directive becomes law, it has to be considered 
and passed by the European Parliament and Council of the EU. 
 
                                                        
1  See the EU Commission’s website (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/ 
study.html). Last consulted on 25 June 2013. 
2  The EU Commission Working Programme 2012 is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/ 
cwp2012_annex_en.pdf. 
3  European Commission Draft Guidance Paper on Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based 
on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (June 
2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_actions_damages/draft_ 
guidance_paper_en.pdf. 
4  Commission Staff Working Document Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European. Ap-
proach to Collective Redress (February 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/con-
sulting_public/0054/ConsultationpaperCollectiveredress4February2011.pdf. 
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In the EU Commission’s opinion, the main reason for the current state of (un-
der)development of private enforcement of EU competition law is the reluctance of 
the Member States to introduce the EU Commission’s proposed measures into na-
tional law. It should be recalled that the leading idea of the EU Commission is that, 
given the specific area of EU competition law, the procedural autonomy of Member 
States should be limited and certain rules of private law should be harmonised in 
order to create an effective competition law-enforcement system.5 The harmonisation 
would encompass national rules of tort and procedure law, and would make excep-
tions that would apply only to damages resulting from infringements of competition 
law. Even though the proposals are claimed to be “balanced measures that are rooted 
in European legal culture and traditions,”6 they do not appear to have been easily 
accepted by Member States. While it is true that EU Commission had to scale back 
its original intentions with regards to harmonisation due to the reluctance of member 
states, the question still remains as to how far the Commission’s proposals need to be 
scaled back.  
The aim of this research – as stated in the Introduction – is to identify barriers to 
antitrust damages claims in England and Slovenia and determine if private law can be 
used for effective enforcement of EU competition law. Based on the analysis of Eng-
lish and Slovenian legal systems, it is clear that implementation of certain measures 
proposed by the EU Commission would go against the core features of national pri-
vate law systems and would require significant changes in the substantial and proce-
dural laws of the Member States.7 The White Paper’s proposals – labelled by the EU 
Commission as the minimum necessary to achieve effective damages actions8 – have 
to be reconsideered. Only justifiable and well balanced measures should be upheld. 
After all, the private law consequences of competition law infringements fall within 
the competence of the Member States in accordance with the principle of subsidiar-
ity.9 Therefore it is the responsibility of the Member States to provide for remedies to 
effectuate damages actions. The EU should act only if the objectives of the proposed 
measures cannot be achieved by the Member Stats or if they can be better achieved at 
EU level. Hence, the question remains whether the proposed measures are necessary 
in order to increase effectiveness of private enforcement.  
As the analysis of the English and Slovenian legal systems showed national sys-
tems might already have mechanisms in place to deal with the issues that the meas-
ures proposed by the Commission are supposed to address. If the Member States do 
not have mechanisms to deal with the issues, then the question arises whether the 
proposed measures are based on principles that are compatible with the national tort 
laws, litigation systems and traditions. If the answer is affirmative, then further action 
should be taken with regard to a particular measure. If the answer is negative, then 
                                                        
5  See section 4.1. 
6  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 3. See 
also section 4.3. 
7  See, for example, section 6.8.8. 
8  See, for example, White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM 
(2008) 165, p. 2. 
9  Article 5 (3) TEU. See also section 3.2. 
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the intervention into the Member States’ civil and procedural law should be chal-
lenged. When evaluating the proposed measures, it has to be reconsidered whether 
the introduction of certain statutes and specific rules (for the antitrust sector) is re-
quired. In order to arrive at an answer, it is necessary to balance effectiveness with 
the interests of private law. On one hand, in a legal system where national courts 
directly apply EU law, action at EU level is sometimes not only welcome but also 
necessary. For instance, the failure to introduce necessary changes into the national 
law of obligations and the rules of civil procedure can endanger the effectiveness of 
EU antitrust law. On the other hand, changes could adversely impact the core ele-
ments of civil systems. The introduction or removal of an institution, which is closely 
linked to other procedural or particular substantive rules, could even undermine the 
entire national legal system. Therefore only those legal issues in which the balance 
prevails in favour of the EU antitrust enforcement policy should be subject to 
changes. These are the issues that should take an important place in terms of priority 
in the EU Commission’s agenda in the coming years. The discussion on EU propos-
als in this chapter is based exclusively on the analysis of Slovenian and English legal 
systems. 
Based on the research findings we propose to sub-divide the EU Commission’s 
measures (as were set out in the White Paper) into three distinct groups. The first 
group is the easiest to define and comprises of proposed measures (section 7.1.) that 
are consistent with private law but their introduction into national law appears to be 
redundant. This is because national legal systems already have mechanisms in place 
that achieve results very similar to those the proposed measures are supposed to 
achieve. In other words, the proposed measures are already in effect present in the 
national legal systems, although in a different form and under a different legal in-
strument. The proposed measures classified within the first group therefore, would 
render no additional value to the existing EU legal regime. In addition, integrating 
these proposals into the national systems might not only create needless costs but 
also would not contribute in any way to the establishment of an effective system of 
antitrust damages actions. With regard to the issues relevant to this group of propos-
als, it can be argued that private law can be used effectively in enforcing EU competi-
tion law in the Member States, in particular England and Slovenia. However, further 
research is needed to definitively declare whether this is true for the rest of the Mem-
ber States within the EU. 
In contrast to the first group, the decision to include a proposed measure into 
one of the remaining two groups is not always straightforward. Although the logical 
basis for classifying measures under the remaining two groups differs substantially, 
the question arises as to which of these two groups can better accommodate a given 
measure. The decision normally depends on the assessment of how a measure’s im-
pact on the principles of civil law and civil procedure would be counterbalanced by 
the benefits gained in terms of the effectiveness of EU law. Following the above-
mentioned line of reasoning the remaining proposed measures are categorised as 
explained below. 
The second group (section 7.2.) includes measures that are neither desirable nor 
appropriate (‘no go area’). They are considered to be inconsistent with the basic prin-
ciples of private law or national procedural rules, and accordingly are not fit to form a 
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part of the law of obligations or of the system of civil procedure in the Member 
States. At the same time, from the subsidiarity perspective,10 the intervention in na-
tional law of the Member States at EU-wide level is not justified. There are not 
enough arguments to support an EU approach or, as is often the case, these argu-
ments are not strong enough to prevail over founded civil law concerns, as high-
lighted by the analyses in previous chapters. Arguments supporting an EU approach 
must be especially strong when an implementation of EU measure risks bringing 
about a serious break with general and traditional principles and practices of national 
tort law. In these cases changes in the national rules could produce adverse effects for 
litigation concerning the nature of private law claims and the system of civil proce-
dural law. In addition, as the civil rules in question tend to be closely linked to other 
procedural or substantive rules of the national legal systems, the adoption of the 
proposed rules could have a serious impact on the complete national legal system 
with unforeseen consequences. Based on these arguments, if the proposed changes 
are not indispensable for the effectiveness of private anti-trust enforcement, then 
interference in the legal systems of the Member States is not justified. The introduc-
tion of new standards would be an unacceptable intervention in national autonomy 
and would conflict with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Instead of 
an EU-wide approach an appropriate approach to be followed for obstacles falling 
within this group would be one that corresponds to the CJEU’s view taken in the 
Manfredi case. There it has been held that “it is for the domestic legal system of each 
Member State […] to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for 
safeguarding rights which individuals derive directly from Unity law”.11 After all, it 
should be borne in mind that principles of effectiveness and equivalence might be 
powerful tools for imposing EU standards on national law regimes. If a national rule 
makes it practically impossible or excessively difficult to succeed in an action for 
antitrust damages, then it will have to be set aside. With regards to the measures that 
fall into this group of the EU Commission’s proposals, it is argued that private law is 
not an appropriate instrument for enforcing EU competition law. 
The third group (section 7.3.) consists of measures that might be inconsistent 
with the rules of private law, but there are justifiable reasons to interfere with these 
principles. This is the case when in the absence of an EU action the effectiveness of 
EU law would be jeopardised. In other words, isolated initiatives by Member States in 
conjunction with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence (Rewe test) are not 
capable of overcoming the barriers to private antitrust enforcement within national 
legal systems. National systems might not always provide for sufficient procedural 
and remedial rules. The EU Commission’s intervention in these cases is justifiable if 
it would add demonstrable value to the effectiveness of the system of the EU right to 
damages and effectiveness of EU competition law. More precisely, further action at 
EU level would be required by the principle of subsidiarity of Article 5 (3) TEU. 
Interference with coherent legal systems of the Member States is necessary and im-
plementation of the EU Commission’s proposed measures would be indispensable. 
                                                        
10  Article 5 (3) TEU. 
11  Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, 13 July 2006. 
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Consequently, harmonisation of national rules governing antitrust damage actions 
with respect to the proposed measures seems justified. In addition, with regard to the 
issues that fall into this group of EU Commission’s proposals, it can be argued that 
private law and civil procedural laws are suited for the task of enforcement of EU 
competition law. 
7.2 Group 1: Recommendations consistent with private law, but action at 
EU level is unnecessary 
The first group of recommendations consists of proposals that introduce certain 
measures that are consistent with private law, but their introduction into the law 
appears to be unnecessary. It includes recommendation on passing-on, limitation 
periods for stand-alone actions and costs. 
7.2.1 Recommendation on passing-on  
An issue that antitrust enforcement systems have to deal with in when managing 
claims by indirect purchasers is passing-on. ‘Passing-on’ as such is not addressed in 
civil law, neither as a complete defence to an action for damages, nor as a way of 
reducing the amount of damages payable. As ‘indirect purchaser’, passing-on is a term 
used in the context of competition law enforcement, in particular when the law for-
bids the passing-on defence. Indeed, from the point of view of competition enforce-
ment, the passing-on defence might have a negative effect on the effectiveness of 
antitrust damage actions,12 and therefore should not be allowed.  
The impact that passing-on has on effectiveness of antitrust enforcement would 
suggest that the issue should be regulated at EU level. This would be probably true if 
the EU Commission decided to focus on the deterrent effect of damage actions and 
therefore disallow the passing-on defence. However, as observed earlier, in the White 
Paper the EU did not take the ‘competition enforcement’ approach.13 Following the 
civil law tradition of the majority of Member States, it suggested that infringers 
should be allowed to invoke the possibility that the overcharge might have been 
passed on.14 Indeed, in respect of the general principles of compensation, payments 
for damages should provide for equitable restitution and unjust enrichment of the 
plaintiff in damage actions should be prohibited.15 Pursuant to these principles, only 
the damage actually suffered will be compensated, whereas any gain received by the 
plaintiff as a result of the damage shall be deducted from the amount of compensa-
                                                        
12  The incentive for such actions is essentially driven by the aim of direct purchasers to recover signifi-
cant damage amounts, but also the avoidance of risk related to difficulties to prove passing-on with 
any acceptable degree of certainty (see section 4.4.8.) However, it has to be noted that this problem 
can be also addressed by the use of other mechanisms to incentivise injured parties to sue, such as 
collective actions and representative actions. 
13  See section 4.3. 
14  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 7. 
15  See sections 5.10.2 and 6.10.2. 
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tion. When the plaintiff suffers a smaller amount of damage as a result of passing on 
higher prices to his customers, and has thereby limited his loss, then his claim in 
respect to the damage that was not suffered will not be compensated by the court. If 
the passing-on defence was not permitted, it would result in significant distortions in 
the redress system, which would fail to achieve its main goal of allowing all victims to 
obtain full compensation and nothing more. Any other conclusion would lead to the 
imposition of what can be conceptualised as punitive damages. In that case, the ar-
guments against punitive damages which will be discussed in Section 7.3.1 and the 
strict adherence to the compensatory nature of awards in private damages actions are 
not justifiable. 
As observed, the passing-on defence – as proposed in the White Paper – is con-
structed in accordance with the general principle of civil liability and therefore theo-
retically possible under the existing rules. From the perspective of general tort law, at 
least in Slovenia and England, one could ask whether the incentive of allowing the 
passing-on defence is necessary. Questions of passing-on defence and the law of 
unjust enrichment deal with essentially similar issues. Both focus their attention on 
changes in the status of the claimant after the defendant’s enrichment, although they 
rest on different rationales. On the one hand, the passing-on defence stems from the 
‘effectiveness’ consideration and brings into question whether an individual should be 
entitled to claim damages he has not actually incurred. On the other hand, unjust 
enrichment is based on the ‘fairness’ consideration and puts into question whether an 
individual should be entitled to claim damages under conditions which do not fully 
justify the damage award. That difference aside, the court’s position would not be 
much different in the matter of passing-on defence than its position in the matter of 
unjust enrichment. Therefore, the legal systems already provide mechanisms whereby 
both the direct purchaser and the indirect purchaser can claim damages to the 
amount equal to their losses. An intervention from the EU Commission in the area 
of damages’ evaluation would overlap with existing – and well-functioning – national 
rules that have been developed in civil law. Therefore, as long as the focus rests on 
the ‘compensation approach’ to antitrust damage actions, regulation with regard to 
passing-on is not needed at the EU level.  
Nevertheless, in the recently published draft Directive,16 the EU Commission 
explicitly recognises the ‘passing-on‘ defence, but not in all cases. In particular, it 
recognises the possibility for the defendant to rely on the passing-on defence in cir-
cumstances in which it is legally possible for the end-user (i.e. the customer to whom 
the cost was passed on) to claim compensation. It appears that by taking this ap-
proach in the draft Directive the EU Commission was aiming at preventing cases in 
which the defendant (the party to the anti-competitive practice) would be ‘enriched’ 
by his illegal act as it is not legally possible for the end-user to claim compensation. 
Here, it does not matter if the claimant who has passed-on its additional cost is the 
one who may be unjustly enriched by this litigation. With this proposal, the EU 
Commission clearly departs from the ‘compensation approach’, when dealing with 
                                                        
16  Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 (11 June 2013). 
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the issue of ‘passing-on’. The status of this (as any other draft Directive’s proposal) is 
unclear and it remains to be seen if it will be implemented. This is a highly controver-
sial proposal. If the objective of the system of EU antitrust damage actions rests on 
‘compensation’, then the draft Directive’s proposal on passing-on goes too far. The 
focus of the Commission in the draft Directive should remain on providing compen-
sation for end-purchasers and not on ‘punishment’ of defendants. If this is the case, 
then based on the analysis carried out in Chapters 5 and 6 (as English and Slovenian 
law stand), the passing-on measure should not be regulated on EU level.  
7.2.2 Recommendation on limitation periods for stand-alone actions 
No legal rule aimed at encouraging private antitrust damages actions can be effective 
if it is coupled with an inefficient limitation period. A limitation period can only be 
considered as efficient if set in a way that it provides the plaintiff with a sufficient pe-
riod of time for identification of a potential claim, collection of evidence and prepara-
tion for proceeding in court: if not, it fails to accomplish its role of providing legal 
certainty. Much depends not only on the duration of relevant limitation periods, but 
also the moment they begin to run.  
In antitrust cases victims are often not aware of the existence of infringements or 
become aware of it after the duration of the limitation period.17 If the limitation pe-
riod is set to run from the date on which the infringement occurs the time limit to 
enforce the claim would probably be shorter or even non-existent compared to the 
situation where the time limit commences at the moment when the plaintiff becomes 
aware of the infringement and the loss. Such regulation of limitation periods creates a 
risk of the plaintiff not having an opportunity to discover and enforce the claim dur-
ing the limitation period and therefore deprives him of the claim and possible com-
pensation. This would not be in line with the EU Commission’s goal to establish an 
efficient private enforcement system.18 There can be no question of the establish-
ment of efficient system thereby, if the plaintiff – due to the limitation regime – were 
to be deprived of an opportunity to file a justified claim. To avoid this situation the 
EU Commission rightly proposed that the limitation period should not commence 
before the victim becomes aware – or should have become aware – of the violation 
and corresponding harm.19 So-called subjective limitation periods therefore seem to 
be best suited for anticompetitive conduct and accordingly more in line with the 
principle of effectiveness.  
All national legal systems have applicable limitation periods for civil actions. 
Based on the analysis presented in Chapters 5 and 6, it would appear that there is no 
reason for introducing different rules applicable to damages actions for competition 
law infringements as long as national law provides for ‘subjective’ limitation periods. 
This is the case in Slovenia where limitation periods combine subjective and objective 
                                                        
17  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 16, 72. 
18  See section 4.3. 
19  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 8. 
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statutes of limitation.20 A limitation period for damage actions is defined not only by 
the date when the damage occured, but also by the date when the claimant became 
aware of the damages and the identity of the wrongdoer. England is a case apart, 
where further explanation is needed. Strictly speaking, England does not fall into the 
group of the Member States that take into account the ‘subjective knowledge’ of the 
plaintiff when setting the limitation period.21 Generally, the commencement date for 
limitation period is the date of damage.22 ‘Subjective knowledge’ of the claimant will 
come into play in exceptional cases as a way of preventing the defendant from alleg-
ing that the action is time-barred. These will be cases when the plaintiff’s right of 
action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant. As argued earlier, 
in antitrust cases, the rule applied in ‘deliberate concealment’ would not automatically 
apply to all cases. This would not pose a problem per se. It can be argued that a ‘sub-
jective’ limitation period is not needed as long as the existing civil limitation system 
provides plaintiffs with sufficient time to prepare and enforce their claims (this is also 
the objective that the EU Commission is trying to achieve with the proposal on limi-
tation periods). As the analysis of the English legal system shows, existing limitation 
rules that do not include ‘subjective’ limitations are not necessarily inefficient when 
applied to antitrust cases. The general limitation rule based on the ‘date of damage’ 
does not pose a problem in cases in which the antitrust infringement is obvious to a 
potential claimant. Nor it does pose a problem where the antitrust practice would 
satisfy the requirement of ‘deliberate concealment’. Here, the commencement of the 
limitation period will be postponed to the date when the concealment was or should 
have been apparent to the claimant. Thus, the rule ensures that sufficient time is 
available for the claimant to prepare his claim. This is not the case when the conduct 
of defendant is not prima facie likely to distort competition (‘abuse by object’), but in 
the circumstances given it has led to distortion of competition (‘abuse by effect’). The 
limitation period might expire before the plaintiff is able to file a claim if the plaintiff 
was not aware of the damage in due time. In this case the limitation period would 
negatively affect both deterrence and compensation, and in turn would run counter 
to the principle of effectiveness. The potential plaintiffs would not be able to exercise 
their EU rights in due time. Based on this reasoning, it would follow that the limita-
tion period is a measure that necessitates further EU action. This might be the most 
logical conclusion to be made, but not necessarily correct one, as it will be explained 
later on.  
Based on the of English and Slovenian rules on limitation periods, the only pos-
sible reason one might be inclined to adopt the EU proposal is the fact that the Eng-
lish rules appear to be inefficient when applying to ‘certain’ antitrust cases. As said 
above, the English rules (but not Slovenian rules) appear to lack efficiency in situa-
tion in which the conduct of the defendant is not prima facie likely to distort competi-
tion, but in the circumstances given, it has led to distortion of competition. In all 
other antitrust situations, the English rules work well. As stated earlier,23 harmonisa-
                                                        
20  See section 6.11.1. 
21  See section 5.11.4. 
22  See section 5.11.1. 
23  See section 7.1. 
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tion of national rules is an acceptable intervention in national autonomy if it is in line 
with the principle of subsidiarity.24 It is justified when the principle of national pro-
cedural autonomy (subject to Rewe test)25 is not sufficient on its own to produce an 
effective tool in terms of enforcement of EU law. With regard to rules on limitation 
periods, it is difficult to reconcile the EU Commission’s proposal with the require-
ment of subsidiarity. The same effect (the effectiveness of the limitation rules) in this 
specific case can be achieved without the proposed harmonisation. After all, in line 
with the Manfredi judgement,26 the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are 
powerful tools in evaluating national rules and imposing EU standards on national 
law regimes. In particular, in applying the principles of effectiveness, the English 
court will be obliged to set aside national limitation rules if it appears that the rules 
would make it practically impossible or excessively difficult for parties to exercise 
rights derived from EU law. Following the Mafredi ruling, this would be the case if 
the statute of limitation periods, combined with other factors of the limitation period, 
is so short that it renders the right to damages practically impossible or excessively 
difficult.27 If the national rule is not set aside, the potential plaintiff will be deprived 
of the claim since he would not have had the opportunity to discover the claim dur-
ing the limitation period and thus was unable to enforce it. In practice, non-
application of the English rule on limitation periods for the above mentioned reason 
will be necessary only in a limited number of cases. In other cases the objectives of 
the proposed EU action (effective redress) would be already achieved by application 
of the national rules. Therefore, it appears clear that the EU Commission’s proposal 
on limitation periods is not justified under the EU principle of subsidiarity. 
It follows from the above that, as far as the English and Slovenian legal systems 
are concerned, there are no grounds for laying down a limitation period based on EU 
law.28 The systems, in principle, provide the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to 
enforce his claim. In addition, the EU Commission’s proposal also raises another 
concern. If the White Paper is understood correctly, the proposal on regulation of 
limitation periods excludes application of an ‘objective’ limitation period, which 
would set an absolute time bar for bringing antitrust damage claims. If this is the 
intention, the EU Commission’s proposal would contravene with the legal certainty 
that is recognised as a general principle of civil procedure. Potential defendants would 
face years of uncertainty not knowing whether or not they will be sued. A claim could 
never lapse if there has been no knowledge of it. Such a regulation of the limitation 
period also makes it difficult for a market participant to conduct a meaningful inves-
tigation and defence (rendering it more difficult to defend oneself against the claim 
efficiently). While the proposal in the White Paper might be necessary in terms of 
effective private enforcement of antitrust rules,29 setting the start of the limitation 
                                                        
24  Article 5 (3) TEU. 
25  See section 3.2.1. 
26  See section 3.4.4. 
27  Joined Cases C-î0DQIUHGL>@(&5,-6619, par. 82. 
28  See sections 5.11.4 and 6.11.2. 
29  Subjective limitation period therefore seems more in line with the principle of effectiveness (see 
section 4.4.). 
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period after the victim becomes aware of the infringement and of the harm caused, in 
some cases could equate to an action with no time limit at all. Based on these consid-
erations, there is no reason to believe that objective periods would present a genuine 
obstacle for claimants, especially if they are long enough. Moreover, to preserve legal 
certainty, objective periods should not be ruled out. 
To summarise, the proposal on limitation periods, in principle, is consistent with 
the core features of national private law systems but its introduction into Slovenian 
and English law appears to be an unnecessary intervention in national law. It follows 
that according to a proposal in the recently published draft Directive30 a claimant 
should have at least five years to bring a claim starting from the moment when it 
became possible for the claimant to discover that he had suffered harm. The EU 
Commission took a step too far in going down this path. Although it is unclear if the 
proposal will be accepted by the EU Parliament and the Council of EU, based on the 
arguments of the analysis carried out in the previous chapters the acceptance of a 
harmonised pan-European limitation period should not be upheld. 
7.2.3 Recommendation on costs 
The EU Commission believes that one of the biggest barriers faced by victims of 
competition law infringements when bringing damages actions is the cost of those 
actions.31 Competition cases often tend to require economic evidence and involve 
experts in addition to the lawyers. As a consequence the costs of these cases tend to 
be substantial. Even when the EU Commission or a NCA has adopted a decision 
imposing cease orders and fines on cartel members (and that decision has been up-
held in the final courts of appeal or left unopposed), the burden of proving the dam-
age and the extent of the damages caused to the plaintiffs is essential for the plaintiff 
to succeed in his claim. However the costs can be very high while the damages 
awarded32 in majority of EU countries are often low and aim only to compensate the 
loss suffered. The EU Commission voiced concern because most EU Member States 
apply the ‘loser pays‘ principle. Combined with the requirement of upfront payment 
of costs, the ‘loser pays’ principle is likely to deter many plaintiffs from bringing civil 
actions before the national courts as they might have to pay the defendant’s litigation 
costs in addition to their own costs. The likelihood of the plaintiff being deterred due 
to the ‘loser pays’ principle increases with the economic imbalance between the par-
ties, especially between consumers and companies. For parties in such cases, the costs 
are a barrier to filing a lawsuit: the risk of bringing an action outweighs the potential 
benefits. Nevertheless, in the White Paper the EU Commission did not propose 
binding rules regarding cost, but simply encouraged Member States, where the ‘loser 
                                                        
30  Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 (11. june 2013). 
31  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, at p. 74. 
32  Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, 
comparative report, Ashurst, August 2004, p. 115. 
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pays’ principle is a normal cost rule to give national courts the possibility of issuing 
cost orders derogating from the mentioned principle. Taking into account that rules 
on cost recovery play an important role as incentive or disincentive for bringing an 
action, the question arises whether the EU Commission should propose binding rules 
regarding cost and the possibility for derogation from the ‘loser pays’ principle, or go 
even further and abolish the principle of ‘loser pays.’ To answer this some observa-
tions have to be made.  
Most Member States already provide for adjustments to the principle of ‘loser 
pays‘ for specific cases and give the court power to decrease the amount to be paid. 
As showed in Chapters 5 and 6, in the English and the Slovenian legal systems the 
‘loser pays’ principle is the main rule applicable to the allocation of the costs in civil 
proceedings but, as the analyses in these chapters showed, courts may depart from 
the ‘loser pays’.33 The courts’ discretion is especially broad in English law. There it 
has been underlined that the “loser pays” (so called the ‘following the event princi-
ple’) is only a starting point from which the court may readily depart. Even more, 
there is a rule that the ‘loser pays’ will not apply in cases when a party declined a rea-
sonable offer to settle.34 Also in Slovenia the ‘loser pays’ principle is not strictly ap-
plied.35 Generally the losing party has to reimburse all the winning party’s costs and 
fees, as long as these costs were necessary and also reasonable. If the litigation be-
comes more costly because the party maliciously protracted proceedings, he will have 
to bear the costs by himself. Accordingly, in England and in Slovenia, the court will 
take into account all the circumstances in deciding what order (if any) to make about 
the costs.  
Based on the above, it appears that there is no need for the EU Commission to 
issue a non-binding rule on costs. Based on the analysis of Slovenian and English law, 
the Member States already provide for deviation from the “loser pays” principle. The 
recommended EU rules would therefore add no additional value to the existing legal 
regime. The existing procedural rules work well with regard to antitrust cases. It 
would follow that the EU Commission’s proposal on costs falls into the first group, 
where EU action is unnecessary.36 However, if the goal is to reduce the financial risk 
of bringing an action in order for claimants to be willing to take the risk of losing the 
action, then it should be considered whether adoption of binding and stricter rules 
regarding cost appears to be justified. In other words, the question is whether the 
interference with coherent legal systems of the Member States appears to be neces-
sary and indispensable in order to render effective the EU right to damages and thus 
preserve the effectiveness of EU competition law. After all, as said above, costs tend 
to be substantial in competition cases. 
On one hand, lowering the risk of having to bear those costs would have a strong 
incentive for plaintiffs and can be seen as improving access to justice. On the other 
hand the ‘loser pays‘ principle is the main rule, but also an essential one applicable to 
                                                        
33  See sections 6.12.1 and 6.12.1. 
34  See section 5.11.1  
35  It is not strictly applied in cases of ‘the guilty pays rule’, when the requirement that the cost recover-
ability should be reasonable and when the claim is withdrawn. 
36  See section 7.1 
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the allocation of the costs in civil proceedings in the majority of legal systems 
throughout Europe. It is an important check against filing of unmeritorious (careless) 
actions. It implies that a potential plaintiff must consider the possibility of bearing the 
costs of the defendant in case of an unsuccessful action. During litigation it encour-
ages parties to focus their discovery in an effort to minimise costs and therefore it 
discourages the creation of unnecessary costs. Further, the risk of losing and paying 
the costs of the dispute is seen as an effective instrument to discourage speculative 
litigations and thus to prevent abuse of the legal system. Particularly in countries 
where there are high discovery costs, as in England, cost rules might already be used 
as a means of putting pressure on the defendant who is unwilling to settle.37 If on top 
of that claimants would enjoy cost privileges, then legal abuses would be even more 
likely to happen.  
Moreover, in the system as whole the introduction of new measures departing 
from the ‘loser pays‘ principle would be likely to risk bringing about a serious break 
with other important principles and practices of national tort law, and this could ad-
versely impact the complete civil legal system. First, the basic idea of the loser pays 
rule is that the party that wins the case shall bear no cost. The principal justification 
for the rule is the judgment only gives the party what he is entitled to under substan-
tive law. Second, the ‘loser pays’ principle should be regarded as being part of the 
system of costs. It applies as long as the costs are reasonable, necessary and also pre-
dictable for claimants.  
Besides the arguments above, the ‘loser pays‘ principle does not pose any real ob-
stacle to potential plaintiffs who have a strong case. Thus, an action at EU level 
would not add demonstrable value to the system of the EU right to damages, but 
rather it risks having negative impact on it. It is important that cost rules in antitrust 
cases should be such that claimants with a strong damages case would be less hesitant 
to start an action, while unmeritorious claimants are not encouraged. This is ensured 
by national cost rules. They preserve the ‘loser pays’ principle, but at the same time 
they provide for discretionary power of the court in order that the claimant will not 
necessarily be exposed to all cost recovery, even if the action were to be unsuccessful. 
Therefore an EU-wide action appears to be unjustified. This was also clear to the EU 
Commission when drafting the recently proposed Directive.38 The question of costs 
is not an issue that is dealt with in the new proposed Directive.  
7.3 Group 2: Theoretically undesirable recommendations (“no go area”) 
The second group of EU Commission’s propositions consists of measures that are 
inconsistent with the basic principles of private law or national procedural rules. This 
group contains propositions on punitive (double) damages, presumption of passing-
on and disclosure. 
                                                        
37  See section 5.12. 
38  Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 
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7.3.1 Recommendation on punitive (double) damages 
An important issue that has risen in the context of private enforcement is the avail-
ability of US style of punitive (multiple) damages. It has often been argued that puni-
tive damages do not fit into civil law system of the majority of Member States.39 
Even though punitive damages are no longer required in the context of EU antitrust 
damages, they are still considered as a possible (or even desirable) addition to the tort 
rules when applying to EU antitrust damage actions. Undoubtedly, by increasing a 
potential plaintiff’s possible award, punitive damages appear to constitute an incen-
tive for victims to bring claims for damages.40 The question arises therefore, whether 
the strong opposition of Member States to introduce punitive damages has been 
justified. Putting it differently, considering their nature and purpose, are punitive 
damages fit to form a part of tort law? This question is relevant for legal systems that 
do not have the concept of punitive damages (Slovenia),41 as well as for legal systems 
which are familiar with punitive damages, but their availability is considerably re-
stricted (England).42 
Punitive damages are a type of damages developed in the common law legal sys-
tem.43 They are defined as damages awarded in addition to the actual damages and 
aimed at punishing the defendant and deterring him and other potential violators 
from any violations of the law in future. This is an important difference from civil 
doctrine of European countries, according to which the obligation to repair damages 
in private law primarily fulfill a compensation function. The purpose of a damage 
award is to bring an injured party to the position it would have been in if the tort had 
not taken place.44 Some may argue that legal orders in which punitive damages are 
not a settled principle allow for awards that give a victim more than the actual dam-
age suffered, at least in some areas of law. For example, as it has been noted earlier, 
under Slovenian copyright law damages may be awarded over and above the actual 
damage sustained.45 This seems to suggest that the concept of punitive damages is 
known to Slovenian law, or at least that the introduction of punitive damages for 
antitrust cases would not contravene the established legal system. However, this is 
not the case. As it has been observed in Chapter 6, even though the damages under 
the Copyright Act – if awarded – entitle the plaintiff to receive more than the com-
pensation for the damage suffered, they are not considered ‘punitive damages’ in the 
U.S. sense of the word.46 It has to be emphasised that they are not aimed at punish-
ing the infringer, as U.S. punitive damages do. Even if designed to facilitate the claims 
made by plaintiffs, their focus rests on compensation. This is true even in England 
                                                        
39  See section 4.4.6. 
40  Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios, 
final report for the European Commission, COMP/2006/A3/012, p. 192 (available at  http:// 
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf. 
41  See sections 6.10.4 and 6.10.5. 
42  See section 5.10.3. 
43  See section 5.10.3. 
44  See sections 5.10.3. and 6.10.3. 
45  See section 5.10.4. 
46  See section 4.4.6. 
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where the law allows for punitive damages.47 Even there, there is no doubt that the 
principle of full compensation of the claimant for the harm suffered is the rule. 
Hence only in certain limited circumstances may the UK judge award punitive dam-
ages and punish the defendant for his conduct in inflicting the harm. It should be 
borne in mind that civil and criminal laws are two separate entities of law with sepa-
rate sets of functions. As noted on many occasions by UK judges,48 punitive dam-
ages, as such, create a risk of distortion of the boundaries established between private 
and penal law and transfer penal law functions to civil law.49 The private legal system 
is designed with compensation awards in mind and as a result, lacks the rigorous 
procedural safeguards necessary to ensure due process in such a regime. A similar 
conflict arose also in Slovenian law when the Constitutional Court indicated that a 
situation in which penalties can be inflicted without due constitutional guarantees – in 
particular, the guarantees provided in the criminal procedure code – was in conflict 
with the principle of rule of law.50  
All the above mentioned arguments lead to an important observation. If there is 
an action for which it is believed that the defendant has to be punished, then the 
obvious answer is to recognise the conduct in question as an administrative offence 
or even crime. After all, based on Article 5 of Regulation No. 1/2003, in addition to 
administrative and civil enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, Member States 
can provide for criminal enforcement.51 Moreover, it follows from the principle of 
equivalence – a general principle of EU law developed in the case law of the CJEU – 
that criminalisation of national competition law cannot be done in isolation from the 
enforcement of EU competition rules. If a Member State provides for imprisonment 
sanctions to enforce an anticompetitive prohibition under national law, it automati-
cally provides for such sanctions to enforce the EU anticompetitive prohibition con-
tained in TFEU. Accordingly, as seen, Section 188 of English Enterprise Act 2002 
and Article 225 of Slovenian Penal Code do not distinguish in any way between anti-
trust prohibitions52 that do not affect trade between Member States (and thus only 
fall under the national competition acts) and antitrust conduct which might affect 
trade between Member States (and thus falls under Articles 101 or 102 TFEU).53 In 
addition, the statement that where arguments exist for punishment or deterrence then 
public law (and not private law) is appropriate, is supported (ironically) by the argu-
ments against criminalisation of competition law in Slovenia.54 It must be questioned 
whether the current system based on administrative fines is sufficiently deterrent and 
punitive enough to assure compliance with the legal rules. After all the current com-
petition enforcement system, both at EU and at national level is predominantly ad-
ministrative. If the existing administrative regime is not sufficiently deterrent, then 
                                                        
47  See section 5.10.3. 
48  See, for example, Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Ors. Oct 08. [2008] EWCA Civ 1086.  
49  See section 5.10.3. 
50  See section 6.10.5. 
51  Criminal law was considered to fall within the ambit of exclusive national sovereignty. See also 
section 2.2.1. 
52  In England criminalisation of antitrust behaviour is limited to cartel prohibition. 
53  See sections 5.4 and 6.4. 
54  See section 6.4. 
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criminal enforcement has to be considered. Private enforcement through availability 
of punitive damages is not the question here. Slovenian law does not conceive the 
idea of private damages pursuing a punitive role concurrent to the punitive role of 
administrative or criminal fines. When there is the intent to enhance deterrence and 
punishment, then administrative and criminal measures will be considered.  
Another argument against introduction of punitive damages is that where a legal 
system provides for criminal enforcement – as do Slovenian and English legal sys-
tems – the award of punitive damages raises a question of double jeopardy (the so-
called ne bis in idem).55 More generally, if punitive damages ought to fall under the 
category of criminal sanctions as understood by the European Convention and the 
European Court of Human Rights,56 then the imposition of criminal sanctions would 
preclude an award of punitive damages as both serve the purpose of punishment and 
deterrence. This is an important point that has also been raised during consultations 
with regard to relations between administrative fines and punitive damages.57 As for 
that, it also appears from English case law that there are good reasons for this oppo-
sition.58 Double jeopardy should apply to all punitive procedures and penal sanctions. 
If national courts reject the application of punitive damages in cases in which the 
defendant has already been fined by the relevant competition authority, there is no 
reason not to do the same in the case of imposition of a criminal sanction owing to ne 
bis in idem principle. It follows that if punitive damages are generally available in civil 
proceedings for conduct that is also a crime, it would be necessary to ensure that 
there is no double punishment or violation of a fundamental (constitutional) principle 
of double jeopardy(ne bis in idem ). Or, to avoid double jeopardy and double punish-
ment, any further preventative measures or actions should be left to the appropriate 
public enforcement authority. 
Last but not least, it not only appears that the institution of punitive damages 
contradicts the compensatory function of private law, raises a risk of double jeopardy 
and gives rise to the need for procedural safeguards but it does not enhance the effec-
tiveness of EU antitrust law to any considerable extent. Based on the approach intro-
duced in this chapter, when the introduction of a certain measure would have an 
impact on core elements of civil systems it is necessary to balance the effectiveness of 
the measure with interests of private law. It is difficult to see how the balance would 
prevail in favour of EU policy considerations. It should be borne in mind that with 
regard to the issue of punitive damages, the EU Commission has stepped down con-
                                                        
55  The principle of ne bis in idem is a general principle of EU law, inspired by the ECHR and enshrined 
in Article 50 EU Charter. 
56  According to the ECtHR, the term ‘criminal sanctions’ can include administrative fines, insofar as 
their aim is to punish and deter unlawful conduct. It is difficult to argue then that the Commission’s 
or NCA’s contentious procedures are criminal for the purposes of the Convention. See also opinion 
of Advocate General Sharpston 10 February 2011, in the case C-272/09 P KME Germany AG, 
KME France SAS, KME Italy SpA v Commission, where he stated that “little difficulty in conclud-
ing that the procedure whereby a fine is imposed for breach of the prohibition on price-fixing and 
market sharing agreements in Article [101(1) TFUE] falls under the ‘criminal head’ of Article 6 
ECHR as progressively defined by the European Court of Human Rights” (para 64). 
57  See section 4.4.6. 
58  See section 5.10.3. 
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siderably. In the Green Paper it proposed the introduction of punitive damages into 
national legal systems, but soon after receiving negative feedback, this idea was 
shelved. Instead the EU Commission put forward alternative ways of strengthening 
private enforcement. The question of punitive damages (at least not explicitely) is also 
not a subject of the draft Directive.59 This would seem to suggest that even the EU 
Commission itself does not see punitive damages as an indispensable and necessary 
instrument to ensure the effectiveness of EU competition law. 
7.3.2 Recommendation on presumption of passing-on  
The second recommendation that appears to be inappropriate from the point of view 
of private law and merits further consideration is the presumption of passing-on in 
favour of indirect purchasers. Based on the overall political impetus to strengthen the 
standing of end-consumers (indirect purchasers) in damage proceedings, the White 
Paper suggested easing the burden of proof for indirect purchasers by enabling them 
to rely on the presumption that overcharges imposed illegally by the defendant (on 
the direct purchaser) have been passed on in their entirety down to their market 
level.60 
Substantially, the EU Commission’s proposal leads to a reversal of the burden of 
proof from the claimant to the defendant. The presumption would consider passing-
on as a defence for which the defendant bears the burden of proof. When facing an 
indirect purchaser (plaintiff), the defendant will have to prove that the damage (the 
overcharge) that the plaintiff is claiming was not passed on to him, even when the 
passing-on has not been invoked by the plaintiff. This might be in line with private 
antitrust enforcement policy, but the proposal undoubtedly contravenes the general 
principles of tort law, according to which those claiming compensation should show 
with a degree of certainty61 both the damage and the causal link between the in-
fringement and the damage.62 The rule of burden of proof is important and contrib-
utes towards full compensation (which is a basic principle of the English and Slove-
nian tort law).63 Injured parties have the right to be compensated for damages that 
they had suffered on the condition that they can prove the existence of the damage. 
In principle, nobody can be compensated for loss that he did not suffer. In the event 
that the victim (direct purchaser) mitigated the damages (imposed on him by the de-
fendant’s antitrust conduct) by reselling the products or services at increased prices to 
a subsequent purchaser, he would be unable to prove that he has suffered the part of 
damage that he subsequently mitigated. Where the mitigation of damages equals re-
funding the claimant for his loss, awarding the entire damages would appear unjusti-
fied. Based on the principle of full compensation, the plaintiff will be compensated 
for the injury he has suffered (zero damages in this case). Thus, the overcharge will 
                                                        
59  See section 7.2.1. 
60  See section 4.4.8. 
61  In Slovenia, the applicable standard of proof is ‘certainty’ (see section 6.8.1.), while in England it is 
‘balance of probabilities’ (see section 5.8.1.). 
62  See sections 5.8.2. and 6.8.2. 
63  See sections 5.10.2. and 6.10.2. 
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be taken into account, even if the defendant has not invoked the passing-on defence. 
Of course, the defendant – when facing a direct purchaser – has always the right to 
provide evidence that the victim has successfully mitigated (part of) the damage by 
passing on the excess price to downstream buyers. It follows that, in tort law – at 
least in Slovenia and England – the passing-on defence is an issue of loss. It is unreal-
istic to assume that national courts would not take into account the fact that over-
charges were passed-on. If no loss has been suffered, then the claimant should have 
no claim. Passing-on (but not its presumption) is therefore already part of the English 
and Slovenian law. 
The passing-on defence is consistent with tort law; however the presumption of 
passing-on is not. In particular, the introduction of the presumption of passing-on 
risks contravening the general principles applicable to damages actions, such as the 
principle of full compensation and avoidance of over-compensation. If the defendant 
is not able to prove that the overcharge was not passed on to the indirect purchasers, 
the plaintiff could receive compensation for damages he has not suffered. After all, in 
a number of cases the rebuttable presumption is unlikely to reflect reality.64 Whether 
passing-on took place and to what extent depends, among others, on the elasticity of 
demand65 and the structure of the market. For example, this is the case with a small 
enterprise without significant market power that has paid the artificially inflated prices 
but is not in a position to pass-on illegal overcharges to their customers. Besides, it 
will not always be easy for the defendant to rebut the presumption that the illegal 
charge had been passed on.  
In addition, the use of presumption entails a serious risk of double recovery in 
cases where both the direct and indirect purchasers claim damages for the same part 
of the damages, which is not the intention of the EU Commission.66 The EU Com-
mission encourages national courts to use mechanisms available to them under na-
tional, EU or international law to avoid the risk, but it will not be possible to com-
pletely avoid it. If a direct purchaser brings a damage claim and proves damages (and 
the defendant is unable to establish that the overcharge has been passed on), the 
direct purchaser will be awarded full damages for the overcharge. If an indirect pur-
chaser subsequently brings a damage claim and it has been presumed that the over-
charge had been passed-on, the fact that the defendant in a previous case had been 
unable to prove passing-on would have no effect on the second case. The legal pre-
sumption that the overcharge had been passed-on will still apply. This could result in 
the payment of multiple damages by the defendant, and unjust enrichment of one of 
                                                        
64  See also opinion of Oxera, contribution to the consultation on the EU Commission’s White Paper 
on Damages Actions for breach of EC Antitrust rules, p. 8. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/oxera_en.pdf (last consulted on 18 May 
2013). 
65  The more elastic is supply, the more the firms will tend to pass on a large part of the price over-
charge because their reduced output remains equally costly to produce. Conversely, if supply is ine-
lastic, firms tend to pass on only a small part because their reduced output becomes cheaper to pro-
duce. See T. van Dijk and F. Verboven, Implementing the Passing-on Defence in Cartel Damages 
Actions, Global Competition Litigation Review (2010), p. 6. 
66  See White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, par. 
2.6, at 8. 
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the claimants. The judgements issued in the two proceedings would not contravene 
the rule of law. Looking at cases individually, each case would have been decided 
according to the applicable rules on the burden of proof. Moreover, when a plaintiff 
is an indirect purchaser and also a seller the presumption would give him the benefit 
of a presumption that the entire overcharge was passed on to him. At the same time 
it would not be presumed that he passed on the overcharge to his customer (since the 
passing-on defence is the defendant’s burden).67 
Based on the above arguments, the White Paper’s proposals are difficult to rec-
oncile with the principle of procedural autonomy as recognised in Rewe and the in-
tervention into the national law of the Member States does not seem to be justified 
for a number of reasons. First, the presumption of passing-on is obviously at odds 
with the compensatory principle, the main principle of tort law. Only strong reasons 
could justify their interference. In this case, it does not appear that they exist. The 
arguments presented by the EU Commission seem to be far from convincing. As 
mentioned earlier, the presumption that the overcharge has been passed on does not 
reflect reality. The information necessary for the counter-evidence that the illegal 
charges were not passed on by the plaintiff (indirect purchaser) is not within the 
sphere of the defendant but is in the hand of third parties (direct purchasers) who are 
not involved in the civil proceeding (and may have a legitimate interest in keeping 
information as part of ‘business secret’). In this situation presumption of passing-on 
is not justified. As the European Parliament commented on the proposal, “a defen-
dant cannot be required to provide evidence for the plaintiff. While it cannot be de-
nied that there is an information asymmetry between plaintiff and defendant, this is 
nevertheless entirely typical in procedural law relationships.”68 In other words, ‘the 
fact that the damage is in some instances difficult to prove is neither unusual nor a 
reason for introducing presumptions.’69This leads to the second reason against the 
presumption of passing-on. The introduction of presumption of passing-on implies a 
number of legal but also practical problems that would hinder full compensation of 
the ‘real victims’ and therefore the effectiveness of the private enforcement system. 
Finally, despite the EU Commission’s intention to strengthen the standing of end-
consumers in damage proceedings, the presumption seems inappropriate as it does 
                                                        
67  See White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, par. 
2.6, at 8. It is unclear what weight would be given to this presumption. In other words, if it is in-
tended to be a strong presumption, then the issue of possible over-compensation for harm caused 
would appear to be more problematic. 
68  European Parliament on the White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 
(2008/2154(INI)) Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Rapporteur: Klaus-Heiner Le-
hne. 9 Mar. 2009.  
69  European Banking Federation, EBF contribution to the consultation on the EU Commission’s 
White Paper on Damages Actions for breach of EC Antitrust rules, p. 6. Available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/ebf_en.pdf (last con-
sulted on 18 May 2013). See also Response of the Law Society of England and Wales to the White 
Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, p. 9 They stated that, “since it would 
normally be the purchaser, rather than the defendant in the claim, that would hold the evidence that 
could demonstrate the passing on, we do not see the justification for placing the defendant in this 
disadvantageous position’’ Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/ 
white_paper_comments/lawsoc_en.pdf (last consulted on 18 May 2013). 
Enforcement-oriented Issues 
313
 
not address the practical problems that indirect purchasers face before filing a claim. 
In particular, the presumption of passing-on would not remedy the problem of very 
low and scattered damage at the end-consumer level. If the EU Commission’s aim 
has been to reduce the disincentive for indirect purchasers to start litigation, then it 
appears that this goal would be better achieved through the establishment of collec-
tive redress mechanisms and not through burden of proof (see below).70 
To sum up, as the analyses of English and Slovenian law showed, the ‘presump-
tion of passing-on‘ is not reconcilable with private law principle that in order to claim 
damages a claimant must prove the existence of harm or loss, rather than it being 
presumed. For this reason there are justified objections to the EU Commission’s 
proposal in the draft Directive,71 wherein the EU Commission suggests that in the 
case of a cartel there will be a rebuttable presumption that the infringement caused 
harm. Since the draft Directive is not a final document and changes are possible, it is 
uncertain whether the proposal of ‘presumption of passing-on’ will be upheld at all. 
7.3.3 Recommendation on disclosure  
One of the most groundbreaking changes advocated in the White Paper is the provi-
sion for a ‘minimum level of disclosure’ between parties, under which national courts 
will have the power to order the disclosure of precise categories of relevant evidence. 
Although, the White Paper presents the proposals as part of the continental tradition 
of ‘fact pleading‘ system,72 the reference to ‘precise categories of relevant evidence’ 
constitutes the introduction of elements of the common law ‘notice pleading‘ system 
into civil legal systems.73  
The EU Commission noted that due to ‘information asymmetry‘, which is typical 
in competition cases,74 in the absence of discovery rules it is very difficult for a pri-
vate party to bring a successful competition case. Both the cost and difficulties in 
obtaining all the relevant evidence are likely to deter a potential claimant, who bears 
the burden of proving the infringement as well as causation and quantum, from 
bringing a claim. This is likely to be a particular issue in stand-alone actions when 
there is no pre-existing infringement decision of the relevant competition authority. 
The EU Commission stressed that some kind of disclosure rules would appear to be 
necessary in order to alleviate the information asymmetry between victims and de-
fendant as well as improve victims’ access to relevant evidence. However, it would be 
wrong to conclude that the issue of disclosure should be placed in the third group of 
the EU Commission’s proposals, for which the adoption of a proposed measure is 
necessary in order to ensure effectiveness of private antitrust enforcement. The EU 
                                                        
70  See section 7.4.2. 
71  Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 (11. june 2013). 
72  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p. 5. 
73  See section 4.4.3. 
74  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 23. 
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Commission suggested giving national courts power to order disclosure of ‘precise 
categories’ of relevant evidence. In common law jurisdictions such as England where 
extensive disclosure rules exist, the EU Commission’s proposal would not affect the 
rationale of the existing rules. The adoption of the rule would rather be a step back-
ward for the UK. The antitrust victims would find themselves being in a less benefi-
cial position than victims of other infringements where general rules of discovery 
apply. Instead of encouraging the antitrust victims to bring damages actions, it would 
discourage them. As discussed in Chapter 5, this could create a problem on its own.75 
If the above mentioned problem is disregarded and it is accepted that the mini-
mum requirement can be satisfied in the case of English disclosure rules, the same 
cannot be said for Slovenia. It is true that the concept of disclosure is not new for the 
Slovenian legal system.76 However, the adoption of the measure as proposed by the 
EU Commission would require radical amendments to well-established civil proce-
dural rules on access to evidence and the burden of proof. As it has been pointed out, 
in civil law countries, at least in Slovenia, the collection of relevant evidence is left 
mainly to the parties. They are not under any obligation to produce relevant informa-
tion. Information is generally secret,77 unless the party decides to reveal it (because he 
intends to use it in the process), or the court orders its disclosure. Even if in the cases 
in which the court has the power to order the disclosure of documents, its power is 
limited to situations in which the other party to the proceedings has referred to that 
document, as well as specified the document as precisely as can be reasonably ex-
pected. The burden of specification is thus on the party seeking evidence. Requests 
that involve indeterminate classes of documents are not allowed. From the Slovenian 
perspective, the reference in the White Paper to ‘categories of relevant evidence’ is 
too vague to determine in a precise way which documents have to be disclosed.78 The 
proposal gives the courts increased powers to order disclosure, even when the plain-
tiff has not fully substantiated his claim with the required evidence. Even though the 
requesting party would still have to collect some initial information, the burden of 
specification is much lighter than if he had to specify the individual documents. As a 
consequence, in addition to providing the party with the documents that he is looking 
for with regard to certain facts relevant to the case, disclosure rules would risk be-
coming a tool for gathering information held by the opposing party. The rights of the 
defendant would be diminished and the discovery system would be turned into a 
mechanism to promote the actions for damages.  
Based on these observations, on one hand, adoption of the EU Commission’s 
proposal would encourage, at least to certain extent, antitrust damage claims. On the 
other hand, it would conflict with well-established civil procedural rules on evidence. 
As stated previously, in jurisdictions such as Slovenia the level of disclosure proposed 
by the EU Commission constitutes not only a major departure from existing rules, 
but the obligation to present ‘categories of documents’ also risks putting the principle 
– by which each party is obliged to substantiate the evidence to be presented – at 
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77  See section 6.8.6. 
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stake. Applying the distinction between the three categories as presented above, the 
proposal (on disclosure) falls into the second category, which includes propositions 
where an EU interference with the existing legal rules of Member States is not justi-
fied. It is hard to see that in the absence of the EU measure on disclosure, the EU 
damage right would be endangered to the extent that EU action would be required. 
In England there already exist extended rules on disclosure. Even in Slovenia under 
certain conditions the judge may consider on a case-by-case basis whether the disclo-
sure of documentary evidence is appropriate. It is true that while the application of 
the ‘disclosure rule’ is greatly limited compared to the English disclosure system, its 
effectiveness is significant when it comes to antitrust damage cases. As presented in 
chapter 6, severe sanctions that are envisaged for non-compliance with disclosure 
requirements are a strong incentive for the parties to comply with the court orders 
and it may be seen as a useful instrument towards alleviating the ‘information asym-
metry‘ between the parties. The information asymmetry is the barrier that the EU 
Commission is also trying to overcome with its proposal on disclosure. However, the 
advantages or benefits of minimizing information asymmetry are out-weighed by the 
adverse effects on the national legal systems. As such, the EU Commission’s proposal 
on disclosure would not add great value to the private antitrust system.  
In addition, building on the fact that private antitrust cases are particularly fact-
intensive, the EU Commission’s proposal aims at creating a common knowledge of 
the case between the parties. In EU most antitrust claims are brought as follow-on 
actions. In these cases, the investigation carried on by the EU or the NCAs can al-
ready present an important source of information. This is even truer in jurisdictions 
such as England and Slovenia, where one of the most problematic issues – the in-
fringement of antitrust law79 – is proven by the antitrust authorities in follow-on 
actions. Whenever the NCA or the EU Commission finds a breach of competition 
law, victims of the infringement can rely on a decision from such bodies as binding 
proof of antitrust liability in subsequent civil proceedings for damages. This method 
prevents unduly extension of trials, but also strengthens the plaintiffs’ position before 
the courts. 
Based on this analysis, it is clear that the EU Commission’s proposal in the re-
cently published draft Directive80 (and following the policy option set out in the 
White Paper with regard to disclosure) is not justified. The EU Commission allows 
the court to order disclosure of evidence by other parties or third parties where the 
requesting party specifies either ‘pieces’ of the evidence or ‘categories’ of evidence. 
As said above, with regard to ‘category’ of documents, the EU Commission’s pro-
posal is superfluous. As Slovenian and English law stand, the legal systems already 
provide for disclosure of specified ‘pieces’ of the evidence. When it comes to ‘catego-
ries’ of evidence the reasons for objection are no less strong. Although the proposal 
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80  Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
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limits the principle of disclosure to evidence that is defined as precisely and narrowly 
as it can be “on the basis of reasonably available facts”, such a proposal introduces 
elements of discovery (know in common law) into civil procedures and breaks with 
civil procedural rules of the Member States such as Slovenia. 
7.4 Group 3: Recommendations where action on EU level is necessary 
The third group consists of measures that may be inconsistent with the private law 
rules but EU interference in that area appears necessary and beneficial in order to 
preserve the effectiveness of EU law. The group consists of recommendations on 
legal standing, collective redress mechanisms, pure economic loss and limitation peri-
ods for follow-on actions. 
7.4.1 Recommendation on legal standing  
As observed earlier,81 one of the main areas that antitrust enforcement entails is the 
management of claims by parties other than direct purchasers. A specific issue that 
has to be dealt with is indirect purchaser’s redress, in particular whether indirect pur-
chasers should have legal standing to bring damage claims. An almost obvious answer 
to the question would seem to be a simple affirmative response as long as the loss 
suffered and causation can be proved (as required under tort law). However, the 
question is more complicated than that. Deterrence, which is normally perceived as 
the ultimate goal of enforcement policy,82 speaks in favour of exclusion of indirect 
purchasers from standing.  
The EU Commission however, has opposed the deterrence-based approach to 
standing in the White Paper.83 Rather than limiting the liability to direct purchasers, it 
acknowledged a broader rule of standing, allowing indirect purchasers to claim dam-
ages. The EU Commission’s approach to the issue of legal standing is not a surprise 
since the White Paper gives preference to compensation over deterrence when refer-
ring to the main object of the system of antitrust damages.84 A broader rule of stand-
ing is also consistent with the CJEU’s recognition that ‘every individual’ should have 
the right to damages.85 As it explained, “the full effectiveness of EU competition law 
would be jeopardized if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss 
caused to him.” In addition, a denial of the indirect purchaser’s standing would un-
dermine the EU system of private rights. As noted in Chapter 3, the EU right to 
antitrust damages has been established in order to ensure participation of EU citizens 
in the enforcement of EU law, and thereby, increasing the full effectiveness of EU 
                                                        
81  See section 4.4.1. 
82  See sections 2.2.2. and 4.2. 
83  White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165, p.4.  
84  See section 4.3. 
85  Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297, and Joined Cases C-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rules.86 Exclusion from standing of a large group of indirect purchasers who often are 
ultimately the true victims of unfair competition would go against the principles of 
EU law.  
To ensure the right to claim damage to indirect purchasers the EU Commission 
has suggested the creation of a specific legal basis for indirect purchasers to bring 
damage claims. Although the formulation of a specific rule that would allow indirect 
purchasers to bring damage claims is indispensable in terms of effectiveness of EU 
law, it does not appear to be needed in all cases. In Slovenia for example, indirect 
purchasers are not a priori excluded from bringing claims.87 In accordance with a 
general tort principle, any injured party that can prove the existence of the damage, 
the causality link between the defendant’s behaviour and the damage suffered, has the 
right to be compensated. The issue whether a claimant is entitled to compensation 
instead will be addressed by courts when deciding if there is a causal relationship 
between the injury of the claimant and the infringement of competition law in each 
individual case. Here it should be remembered that EU law does not object to na-
tional provisions that lead to the prevention of indirect purchasers from bringing 
damage claims for reasons of causation. Under the doctrine of causation, a plaintiff, 
who can show damage caused by an infringement (according to rules of causation 
that apply in a particular Member State), has a private right of action. Accordingly, 
the EU Commission in the White Paper also clearly indicates that it does not intend 
to interfere with these fundamental rules of tort law.  
Based on the above, introducing a rule allowing indirect purchaser’s standing for 
competition cases into Slovenian law would not contravene with the established legal 
system, but this action would amount to unnecessary intervention in the general rules 
of tort law. Slovenian law already performs well in allowing indirect purchasers to 
bring damage claims.88 It follows from this, those legal systems that already provide 
mechanisms whereby both the retailer (the direct purchaser) and the final consumer 
(the indirect purchaser) can claim damages, do not need a special rule allowing the 
indirect purchaser to claim damages in court. Any further action taken towards inte-
gration of the EU Commission’s proposal into legal systems of these Member States 
would create needless costs. However, the same is not true for Member States where 
different legal or statutory provisions that directly impede indirect purchasers’ claims 
exist. In England for example, the law restricts standing to claimants who fall within 
the class of persons for whose benefit the antitrust rule was passed. As the analysis 
showed,89 the requirement of ‘class of persons’, which generally limits the circle of 
potential claimants, ‘renders practically impossible’ the exercise of the EU right to 
damages, and therefore cannot apply when a breach of EU antitrust law is in ques-
tion. It is true that, by applying the Rewe test90 the English rule could be simply set 
aside. Nevertheless, if the national judiciary is obliged to apply the EU law test (Rewe 
test), a national court will be called upon to undertake an analysis and decide whether 
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a particular national rule might have a limiting effect on the realisation of EU rights 
in each case at hand (when EU competition law is put in question). The EU Commis-
sion’s aim in the White Paper is to provide for effective means to exercise the right to 
compensation of harm suffered as a result of an antitrust infringement. To make it 
possible, first of all it is necessary to ensure – without any uncertainty – that in all 
Member States it is open to ‘any individual’ to claim damages for loss caused to him 
by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition91. Taking the 
English example, in order to ensure that there is no legal or statutory provision that 
directly impedes claims to be brought and, thereby jeopardises the ‘effectiveness’ of 
EU antitrust rules, it would be necessary to shift the entitlement to bring damages 
actions from ‘protected’ to ‘affected’ parties. A positive EU regulation would appear 
to be indispensable in order to ensure their full and undistorted application of the EU 
right to antitrust damages in the Member States. Applying the van Gerven theory, 
which distinguishes between ‘constitutive’, ‘executive’ and ‘procedural’ conditions of 
the EU right to antitrust damages,92 the issue of standing for indirect purchasers 
represents a constitutive element of the EU right and therefore must be governed by 
EU law.  
That idea that the issue of standing must be regulated at EU level has also been 
recognised by the EU Commission in the recently published draft Directive.93 By 
confirming the established EU law principle that “anyone who has suffered harm 
caused by an infringement” is entitled to bring an action for damages, it explicitly 
extends this principle to include indirect purchasers who have suffered harm because 
an overcharge to the direct purchaser has been passed on to them. The fact that indi-
rect purchasers are recognised with regard to standing is also clear from the provision 
on passing-on.94 The provision clearly states that normally indirect purchasers shall 
have the burden of proving that an overcharge was passed on to them. However, as 
explained above, standing is an important element of the EU right to antitrust dam-
ages. To avoid any potential misunderstanding, the EU Commission should state 
explicitly that claims may be brought by both direct and indirect purchasers, instead 
of referring to “anyone”.  
7.4.2 Recommendation on collective redress  
The following observation can be made based on the comparison between the nature 
of antitrust damage claims and the civil procedure rules that are applied to multi-party 
litigation. Some form of collective action exists in the majority of the Member States 
but the analysis of different types of multi-party mechanisms in place in Slovenia and 
the UK shows their limitations when applied in the context of antitrust cases.95 To 
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conduct a further analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between the two different 
situations. The first situation includes cases in which the individual damage is high 
enough to file an action, but the court is paralysed due to the large number of dam-
ages suffered by many individual parties. This problem is usually addressed by na-
tional law, in particular within rules of civil procedure. The second situation refers to 
the phenomena of minor damages, which is typical in antitrust law, and involves 
cases in which the individual claims are too small to be individually enforced. Who is 
going to sue, for example, a supermarket chain because of selling shoes for a price 
that exceeded a competitive level? Civil procedure rules often do not deal with this 
situation (Slovenia),96 or if they do, only to limited extent (England).97 Putting it dif-
ferently, the existing English and, most of all, Slovenian procedural mechanisms that 
deal with multi-party litigations might aid the judge when managing multi-party litiga-
tions, but they do not provide sufficient or effective access to justice for large groups 
of individual consumers or small businesses who have suffered minor and dispersed 
damage arising from the same wrongful conduct. The result could be that in circum-
stances in which the individual loss is not sufficiently large to justify the costs and 
risks of bringing an individual claim, individual consumers or small businesses have 
no real possibility of obtaining compensation for their loss. This raises serious con-
cerns that access to justice is being unduly restricted. After all, it should not be for-
gotten that the right of effective access to justice is considered as a fundamental right 
that is guaranteed both under Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Article 6(1) ECHR.98  
From the above observations, it follows that in order to improve access to justice 
and thus the efficiency of civil litigation it is crucial to establish a new or improved 
collective redress mechanism. In addition to improving civil litigation, the establish-
ment of collective redress mechanisms is required from the EU point of view. In this 
way, victims of antitrust violations would have a more effective redress mechanism to 
enforce their EU law right to antitrust damages.99 Private enforcement is the only 
way for victims to obtain compensation for the loss that they have suffered, as public 
enforcement of antitrust rules can only put an end to the infringement and impose 
sanctions on the infringer.100 In the absence of an effective collective redress mecha-
nism when the individual loss is not sufficiently large to justify the costs of bringing 
an individual claim those who have been harmed will not be compensated and the 
perpetrator will not be held liable for the loss it caused. The effective enforcement of 
EU competition law by which individuals have a right to damages for infringements 
of art.101 or 102 TFEU is impaired. Availability of collective redress mechanisms is 
therefore required under the principle of effectiveness. 
The need for introducing new mechanisms however, should not justify claims 
that contravene established principles of civil litigation. In order to create effective 
access to justice for citizens who would not otherwise have any or any effective ac-
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cess to justice, the EU Commission has suggested introduction of a collective redress 
mechanisms based on opt-in basis.101 The EU Commission believed that an opt-in 
model would be easier to implement at national level.102 Indeed, as it has been shown 
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the opt-in system is closer to traditional litigation than an 
opt-out action. In England for example, where some forms of collective redress 
mechanisms are already available, they all operate on an opt-in basis.103 Also in Slo-
venia, where there are no collective redress mechanisms, the opt-in model, to a cer-
tain extent, has some resemblance to the existing model procedure.104 
The other proposal that has been made by the EU Commission concerns repre-
sentative action mechanisms.105 Representative action is characterised by the fact that 
the claimant himself is not the one that has suffered harm. The claimant is a con-
sumer association that represents those who have suffered the damage and who will 
benefit from such an action.106 As demonstrated by the form of representative action 
known in the English system, representative action is a type of collective redress 
mechanism that can be successfully used to address shortcomings of the traditional 
approach to civil litigation.107 It purports to enhance access to justice for injured 
individuals in situations in which they would not have an incentive to act individually, 
in particular when large numbers of consumers have each suffered small losses. 
However, as it is evident from the analysis carried out in Chapters 5 and 6, not every 
form of representative action would fit into the legal system of Member States. To 
determine to what extent the proposal on representative actions – as put forward by 
the EU Commission in the White Paper – is justified, further considerations should 
be taken into account. Following the analysis of Slovenian and English legal systems, 
it appears that the EU Commission’s suggestion to introduce in certain – although 
restricted – cases representative actions brought by qualified entities on behalf of 
‘identifiable’ (i.e. non-identified) victims,108 shifts away from the established princi-
ples of civil litigation and a traditional voluntary method of instituting litigation in a 
few aspects. 
First, the EU Commission’s suggestion contravenes the traditional private litiga-
tion rule that each plaintiff is required to demonstrate an interest in bringing damage 
claim proceedings.109 An individual whose interest has been violated by antitrust 
infringement is the holder of the claim. He has an exclusive right to take the action in 
the court. Accordingly, he becomes a plaintiff only by having actually manifested his 
intention to bring a claim (the principle of free party disposition). As it has been seen, 
generally nobody can bring a claim on behalf of a group of persons without requiring 
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any prior mandate under Slovenian law.110 In line with the principle of res judicata, 
claim preclusion will bar later related action by those victims who joined the multi-
party litigation. Accordingly, multi-party action cannot impede those victims who did 
not agree to be presented in the action from bringing claims individually. Also in 
England, where a specific law expressly allows representative actions in case of anti-
trust infringement, the action can only be brought on an opt-in basis.111 The EU 
Commission’s proposition in this part is similar to ‘opt-out‘ class actions (an option 
that the EU Commission no longer pursues).112 It allows a representative to initiate a 
civil procedure without requiring any prior mandate or similar form of consent of the 
interested parties. This in fact would lead every single member of the group to be 
deprived of the guaranteed principle of free party disposition.113  
Even if it would be accepted that res judicata extends to the individuals who did 
not give a prior authorisation to the association to represent their interest, the EU 
Commission’s proposition risks being incompatible with the rule according to which, 
individuals who are represented in the action should be aware of the existence of a 
representative action. Individuals cannot be bound by a decision without knowing 
about the procedure in which this decision was rendered. The problem with an ‘opt-
out‘ mechanism is that it is not enough to give those represented in the action the 
right to opt-out if they did not know about the action brought by associations de-
fending their interests. If they do not know about the action, they cannot exercise 
their right to opt-out. Consequently they will be bound against their wishes by the 
outcome of the action. Some may argue that the condition of ‘knowing about the 
action’ is satisfied as long as a representative action proposal includes adequate provi-
sions for giving a notice to the individuals who will be represented by the association. 
In this way, individuals will be informed about the action and have the possibility to 
decide whether they want to be part of it or not. Notice would ensure the protection 
to the rights of the individuals (who actually have the claim). The problem does not 
arise if representative actions are limited to actions for identified victims. The prob-
lem arises when representative action involves those who are difficult or impossible 
to identify (the situation which was in the English Emerald case.114 By not knowing 
the identity of the victims, the organisation would be precluded from giving a notice 
to the individuals with claims. This would create the risk of ‘individuals with claims’ 
being unaware of an action being brought in their name. If the ‘opt-out’ approach 
addresses the problem of gathering those who were affected by antitrust practices 
and therefore providing for an expeditious closure of the issue (which is in the gen-
eral interest), in itself it does not address the question of notification of such action. 
By contrast, notification is an essential part of ‘opt-in‘ based mechanism. 
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Returning to the requirement of prior authorisation to the association to repre-
sent a claimant’s interest, the requirement implies that each such consumer should be 
individually identified at the beginning of the action. This refers to the second argu-
ment against the introduction of representative actions for identified victims. The 
identity of all individuals involved in a lawsuit should be known. Civil claims are pri-
marily concerned with redressing individual wrongs committed against individual 
parties. Questions concerning causation or the amount of compensation are assessed 
individually for each claim that is asserted, as the analysis presented in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 demonstrated.115 Accordingly, the defendant might argue for example, that 
some of the represented individuals did not suffer damages because they passed them 
on. If he succeeds in the defence, causation for those individuals will be established. 
Representative actions as suggested by the EU Commission risk individuals who are 
damaged by the antitrust act will be largely irrelevant to the action. The EU Commis-
sion’s proposal permits the court to assess damages in an aggregate amount, without 
reference to the individual class members’ losses. This would create a potential risk of 
depriving people of an individualised determination of their dispute. 
In addition to the fact that the individual perspective of damage claims is an im-
portant and elementary characteristic of legal systems, it is also in accordance with the 
idea of compensation. If the purpose of damages is compensation, deterrence is a 
mere by-product. Damages must be distributed to the individual injured parties and 
also limited to the real value of the loss suffered.116 The idea of compensation pre-
supposes that the number of injured parties and the injury suffered by each individual 
party can be precisely determined. When the individuals are not, or cannot, be identi-
fied, the court cannot determine if the unidentified individuals have suffered loss, and 
to an even lesser extent the amount of the loss suffered. The damage will be awarded 
on a group-wide basis. In this case, the rule – that the purpose of damages is com-
pensation, deterrence is a by-product – changes (or might change) if the defendant is 
ordered to pay more by way of damages than he would have to had to pay if no such 
procedure was available. Representative actions thus have the potential to punish, 
even though no punitive damages have been awarded by the judge. To create a model 
of collective redress therefore, attention should be given to the issue of ‘individual 
concern.’ If standing is recognised for representative associations, then the principle 
of compensation requires a very careful drafting of the legislation regarding who will 
be the beneficiaries of the damages awarded. Claims for compensation may only be 
sought by way of multi-party litigation; if sums sued by individual group members are 
unified otherwise the EU model would not sit comfortably with the fundamental 
principles of civil law and civil procedure.  
One may argue that a shift away from the traditional voluntary method of insti-
tuting litigation through the introduction of an opt-in redress mechanism is justified 
because the opt-out approach has considerable advantages in terms of increased 
effectiveness as compared to opt-in mechanisms. Indeed, there is no doubt that the 
creation of a system based on the ‘opt-out’ procedure ensures that certain cases that 
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otherwise would have remained unheard (by the court) will be dealt with. While large 
companies usually do not hesitate to apply to the court and claim damages, the opt-
out collective redress mechanism is ideal for the consumers and small businesses that 
are unlikely to go to the court if “their losses do not justify the costs of litigation and 
the uncertainty of the outcome.”117 In this way, opting out also ensures that defen-
dants are held liable for the damages they have caused rather than escaping (fully or 
partially) their obligation to compensate, simply because a number of group members 
did not opt-in. The right to damages acts as a deterrent from engaging in anti-com-
petitive conduct. 
However, the above mentioned reasons are not adequate to justify a shift away 
from the traditional voluntary method of instituting litigation. The issue of redress 
mechanisms should be addressed from the perspective of whether the unavailability 
of an opt-out mechanism implies that the judicial protection of the claimant’s right is 
not safeguarded. The principle of full effectiveness requires that Member States must 
provide an effective redress mechanism that ensures that the right to damages of 
those who have been harmed by antitrust infringements is effective, including cases 
in which a large number of individual claims are unlikely to be brought in practice. 
The full effectiveness therefore is not affected as long as there is no obstacle that 
makes the exercise of the right to damages impossible or excessively difficult in prac-
tice. Where an opt-in regime is adopted, there will be no real obstacle to individuals 
with low-value claims to join the group provided that required prerequisites are met. 
Individuals will be able to join the group and benefit from the collective action. On 
this basis, the debate on an opt-in or an opt-out system has less to do with access to 
justice and more with questions of notification and effective gathering of individual 
claims. In other words, the principle of effective enforcement of EU competition law 
does not appear to require that a particular procedure be available to the claimants in 
certain circumstances. Accordingly, the decision on the opt-in or opt-out regime has 
to be left to the individual Member State. For example, in England there has been a 
debate on introducing an opt-out system. There, an introduction of the opt-out 
mechanism is perceived as an important tool to iron out the difficulties of communi-
cating the commencement of the group action to those affected. Thus, an opt-out 
system rather than opt-in system serves general policy interest. In contrast, in Slove-
nia the communication of the commencement of the group action has not been 
raised. It is a difficult point to raise, taking into account the pooling of potential liti-
gants is relatively small in this jurisdiction. In short, the demographic size of Slove-
nia118 does not provide a strong reason for the opt-out system. 
To summarise, in order to improve access to justice and thus efficiency of civil 
litigation, it is crucial to establish some new or improved collective redress mecha-
nism. The new mechanisms should be designed to render effective the right that 
stems directly from Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. However, it should be ensured that 
the mechanism does not contravene established principles of civil litigation, in par-
                                                        
117  Speech by J. Almunia, European Commissioner responsible for competition policy, of 15 October 
2010 (speech 10/554), p. 4. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-
554_en.htm (last consulted on 15 may 2013). 
118  Slovenia has a population of 2 million. 
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ticular the requirements of having knowledge and having an interest in bringing a 
case. If this is not ensured, the system of collective redress mechanisms would bring 
about a serious break with the fundamental principles of civil procedure. Such aggres-
sive intervention in national legal systems cannot be qualified as being necessary in 
terms of effectiveness of private antitrust enforcement. In particular, while the opt-in 
form of redress mechanism is consistent with the traditional concept of litigation, the 
opt-out form requires a dramatic shift from the traditional method of instituting 
litigation. The decision on an opt-in or an opt-out regime has to be left to an individ-
ual Member State. A similar approach has been taken by the EU Commission when it 
recently issued a package of proposals in form of a draft Directive designed to facili-
tate antitrust damage actions. 119 The proposed Directive does not require Member 
States to introduce a system of collective redress related to competition law infringe-
ments. Instead of including the question of collective redress into the proposed Di-
rective, the Commission published a recommendation on a series of non-binding 
principles for collective redress mechanisms in the Member States across all areas of 
EU law. In the Recommendation the EU Commission (for some surprisingly, for 
others expectedly) gives preference to an ‘opt-in’ model rather ‘opt-out’ class actions. 
The EU Commission suggests that the Member States may operate opt-out regimes if 
justified by the “sound administration of justice.” This approach clearly mirrors the 
findings set out in this thesis’ research. 
7.4.3 Recommendation on pure economic loss 
As seen from the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6, national systems take different ap-
proaches to the recoverability of pure economic loss, depending on whether tort law 
limits protection on legally acknowledged interest or it purports to offer compensa-
tion for wrongs of a broader kind. On one hand, if a given tort system automatically 
imputes certain acts as tortuous violation and provides compensation for damages 
following from the breach (as it is under Slovenian law), then pure economic loss in 
general is not excluded from the recovery. All types of loss are equally protected.120 
On the other hand, if tort law protects only a limited number of interests, then pure 
economic interests generally enjoy less protection than, for example personal or 
property rights. Under English law such economic loss is recoverable only to the 
extent that it is consequential upon physical injury to the plaintiff or damage to his 
property.121 Such a restrictive attitude of tort law would be a serious handicap for 
claims brought for antitrust infringement.122 As emphasised by the EU Commission, 
competition law violations generally result in pure economic loss as their main effects 
are increases in prices and/or loss of business opportunities for the competitors.123 
                                                        
119  Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 (11. june 2013). 
120  See section 6.10.1. 
121  See section 5.10.1. 
122  See section 5.10.5. 
123  See section 4.4.6. 
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Depriving victims of anticompetitive conduct from recoverability of such losses 
would mean depriving them of adequate compensation. Consequently, the effective-
ness of the EU law would be undermined if national legal provisions do not provide 
compensation for economic loss.  
Pure economic loss is one of the issues where the civil law approach to the con-
cept of recoverable damages might have a serious impact on the effectiveness of EU 
antitrust law. Accordingly, the EU Commission’s recommendation to introduce a rule 
of recoverability of pure economic loss in legal systems where pure economic loss is 
treated differently to any other loss is justified. Infringements of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU should in all legal systems normally be capable of giving rise to compensation 
for pure economic loss. 
As said above, in Slovenia, this is already possible. The law does not differentiate 
between damage to property and loss that is not accompanied by injury to the person 
or property. Pursuant to the Obligations Code, all types of loss are equally protected, 
including pure economic loss.124 In contrast, English law is not in line with the EU 
Commission proposal. It has been argued that introducing the rule into the English 
system would go against the principles underlying the English tort law and tort litiga-
tion. Based on these principles, the major objections against liability for pure eco-
nomic loss are that such harm is often unforeseeable125 and the associated anxiety 
about opening the floodgates of litigation. However, these considerations should not 
lead to the conclusion that the protection of pure economic loss is not allowed in all 
cases. It only implies that the objection is to overall protection. English tort law per-
mits exceptions to recoverability for pure economic loss when it can be justified. For 
example, in tort of negligence an award for pure economic loss is possible, based on 
the fact that there is a ‘special relationship’ between the parties, which is characterised 
as being ‘equivalent to contract’. As noted above, liability for pure economic loss is 
generally accepted under contract law. The main reasons for its acceptance are that 
firstly, contract law only incorporates duties owed by one party to another, and sec-
ondly, the floodgates argument has no relevance here. Applying the same justifica-
tion, recoverability for pure economic loss as general rule could not be introduced 
into English law. However, a different argument can be made in favour of such an 
exception when it comes to competition law.126 In antitrust cases financial loss is 
typically very important to the victims, in particular to competitors, whose ability to 
compete and make profits is harmed as the result of the antitrust breach. Depriving 
them of recovering of such losses would mean depriving them of compensation. 
Therefore EU interference in private law is necessary in order to ensure the effec-
tiveness of EU competition law; a position which has been also taken by the EU 
Commission when drafting the proposal of Directive. It clearly states that full com-
pensation should include compensation for actual loss and for lost profits.127 
                                                        
124  See section 6.10.1. 
125  See section 5.7.2. 
126  See section 4.4.6. 
127  Article 2 of the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404. 
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7.4.4 Recommendation on limitation periods for follow-on actions 
As said earlier, the regulation of limitation periods must ensure that the plaintiff has a 
reasonable opportunity to enforce his claim.128 While there are arguments in favour 
of the application of national rules in the case of stand-alone claims, with regard to 
follow-on claims there are obvious grounds for laying down a limitation period based 
on EU law. Follow-on actions by definition are limited to antitrust cases. They refer 
to cases in which civil action is brought after a competition authority has discovered a 
competition law infringement. Unlike stand-alone actions, where ‘detection’ of dam-
age is important for the determination of limitation rules (irrespective of antitrust or 
any other law infringements), detection is not relevant in follow-on actions. In this 
case, the problem is that the victims of antitrust infringement might have no reason-
able opportunity to bring a damage claim after a public authority has established an 
antitrust infringement. The time limit in which damages actions have to be brought 
might expire while the EU Commission’s or NCA’s investigation is still ongoing.129 
This results in the deprivation of claimants of their fundamental right to effective 
compensation.  
As recognised in the White Paper, with an exception such as England,130 in most 
Member States victims currently have no guarantee of being able to bring damages 
actions after a NCA has established an infringement of competition law. Limitation 
rules applied in civil damage actions are general rules and therefore they do not ad-
dress this specific problem related to competition law. Slovenia is a case apart. The 
Competition Act is aimed at avoiding the expiry of the limitation period while public 
enforcement is still ongoing. However, such provision does not address all the prob-
lems related to ensuring sufficient time for a claimant to prepare his claim. In particu-
lar, it does not deal with the question of whether the remaining limitation time is long 
enough to prepare and commence a civil proceeding.131 If the limitation period is 
suspended shortly before the expiration of the time period, then the remaining time 
for bringing a claim would be insufficient. This could be an obstacle to damage 
claims. Therefore, the introduction of a new rule with regard to competition cases is 
necessary. In particular, in order to preserve the possibility of a follow-on action and 
therefore ensure legal certainty and the effectiveness of EU antitrust rules, a new rule 
should be established preventing the limitation period expiring while public proceed-
ings are still ongoing.132  
The EU Commission has suggested adopting a new limitation period running for 
at least two years after an infringement decision by the EU Commission or NCA has 
become final and all appeal avenues are either exhausted or waived. This proposal is 
broadly133 consistent with the position in England. As it has been seen, such a regime 
                                                        
128  See section 7.2.2. 
129  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 70. 
130  See section 5.11.4. 
131  See section 6.11.1. 
132  See section 6.11.2. 
133  ‘Broadly’, because of the existence of two parallel limitation regimes for follow-on actions in Eng-
land (see section 5.11.3). 
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clarifies when an action can be brought and eliminates uncertainties as to whether a 
claim is time-barred. Although the English regime demonstrates some difficulties 
with regard to claims that are brought before the appeals of the relevant decision 
have expired, 134 the English regime could be used as a model when it comes to en-
suring that the limitation periods for each EU Member State meet the requirements 
of the principle of effectiveness. Importantly, a similar approach to limitation periods 
has been taken by the EU Commission in the draft Directive.135 It suggests that the 
limitation period shall be suspended when a relevant competition authority begins an 
investigation and the suspension will not end until at least one year after an infringe-
ment decision has become final. 
7.4.5 Binding effect of the national competition authorities’ decisions 
The EU Commission (in the White Paper) has proposed that a final infringement 
decision of an NCA (irrespective of its national jurisdiction) is binding in a follow-on 
action for damages in the courts of all EU Member States.136 ‘Final’ here refers to 
decisions which either have been accepted by their addressees or confirmed upon 
appeal by the competent review courts.137 In that case, for example the English com-
petition authority might adopt a decision finding that an undertaking has been in-
volved in a cartel that has an effect on the market in Slovenia. The Slovenian courts 
would be obliged to follow the decision as far as it relates to the same practices and 
undertakings covered by the English NCA’s decision. The EU Commission’s sugges-
tion, if adopted, would improve the possibilities of redress for plaintiffs in follow-on 
actions, as it considerably alleviates plaintiffs’ burden of proof. Plaintiffs would no 
longer have to provide proof of an infringement when an infringement decision of a 
relevant competition authority exists. As a consequence, the time and cost of re-
establishing the existence of the infringement is not required and legal certainity is 
ensured. In this respect, the binding rule would certainly help to make EU competi-
tion law enforcement more effective.  
With regard to the EU Commission’s proposal on binding effect of the NCAs’ 
decisions three important sets of observations have to be made. 
First, the binding effect of the national competition authorities’ decisions is an 
inevitable consequence of a system where public and private enforcement are de-
signed to be complementary, as is the case in the system of EU antitrust enforce-
ment. In general terms, the competition authorities are responsible for pursuing al-
leged violations while courts are in charge of deciding on compensation for damage 
                                                        
134  It forces claimants to wait until the appeal process has run its course, during which time the memo-
ries of the involved individuals will start to fade.  
135  Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 (11. june 2013). 
136  See section 4.4.9. 
137  Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404, p. 46. See also section 4.4.9. 
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resulting from the violations, as it has been emphasised by the English court.138 In 
this way, the EU Commission’s suggestion on binding effect will increase judicial 
economy and improve the quality of decisions. As presented earlier in sections 2.3. 
and 2.4., in Europe enforcement of competition law by public authorities is the tradi-
tion. Accordingly, competition authorities often have greater knowledge in the field 
of competition law. They have considerably more expertise than the courts of general 
jurisdiction and therefore are better able to handle the competition issues, such as the 
state of the market in question. At the same time, courts can be seen as lacking spe-
cialised expertise in competition questions. It is noteworthy that in the majority of 
Member States there are no specialised courts dealing with competition damage 
cases139. England is an exception in this. The Chancery Division had been created 
with a view to strengthen the expertise among judges who deal with competition 
cases (in addition to creation of specialised competition tribunal ‘CAT’).140 In Slove-
nia,141 courts of general jurisdiction are empowered to hear antitrust damage cases. 
The rise of the expert judge and/or establishment of specialised courts would defi-
nitely weaken the argument in favour of endowing NCA’s decisions with binding 
effects for civil courts.142  
Second, while infringement decisions of English and Slovenian NCAs already 
have a binding effect on their respective national courts in civil matters, decisions of 
foreign NCAs are not binding. Based on the analysis conducted in chapters 5 and 6, 
English and Slovenian legal system would not be undermined if already existing rules 
of binding effect of NCA’s were to extend to foreign decisions.143 This would en-
hance legal certainty and assist in further promotion of private actions. The proposed 
measure would enable a Slovenian claimant to file for damanges in Slovenia relying 
on an infringement decision handed over by a foreign NCA for a multijurisdictional 
antitrust violation, thereby placing him on an equal footing with another Slovenian 
claimant who is affected by an infringement that falls within the Slovenian NCA 
jurisdiction and plans to file a claim before a Slovenian court. However the issue of 
binding effect is more complex in the Member States that do not have a rule on the 
binding effect of NCA’s decisions on national civil courts. In this case it can be ar-
gued that if the binding rule is adopted courts would find themselves unduly con-
strained by decisions taken by a NCA on the application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. This argument might be put forward in countries where constitutional princi-
ples enshrine the principle of separation between the administrative and judiciary 
powers. As seen from the analysis in Chapter 6, this is not an issue in Slovenia, even 
though the principle of separation of powers is part of the Slovenian legal system.144 
                                                        
138  See for example, Enron Coal Services Limited (in liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway 
Limited 1.[2011] EWCA Civ 2 (section 5.9.1.) 
139  Ashurst, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, published 
in August 2004, p. 1 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/study. 
html). 
140  See section 5.3.1. 
141  See section 6.3. 
142  See section 6.9.3. 
143  See sections 5.9.5. and 6.9.4. 
144  See section 6.9.2. 
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Under general law, if the Slovenian NCA has already established a violation, the court 
is bound by such a decision. The principle of separation of powers is not violated 
since the binding nature concerns only the decision that the defendant has infringed 
antitrust law. Even in that case courts maintain the jurisdiction to decide whether the 
defendant has acted in a tortuous manner. In addition, the requirement that a deci-
sion is final before having a binding force on civil courts does not prevent a person 
who has suffered antitrust damages from filing a damage claim before the decision 
has become final. Civil courts enjoy parallel competence with competition authorities 
concerning competition law violations. Civil courts have the power to hear damage 
claims and rule on the merits in relation to the same infringement that may already be 
a subject of competition authority’s’ investigations. Also in England, where a strong 
emphasis is placed on the principle of separation, the courts are bound by decisions 
of the UK NCAs (even though to limited extent).145 It would follow that in order to 
encourage antitrust damage actions the binding effect of NCA decisions should be 
made operational in Member States where it is currently not the case.  
Third, there exists an issue of consistency of decisions between the courts and 
the competition authority. Even if the binding effect is recognised, this leaves open 
the extent to which courts will follow the conclusions of public authorities, as indeed 
English case law shows. In Crehan v. Inntrepreneur the House of Lords followed a 
narrower concept of conflict between decisions of the EU Commission and national 
courts. The House of Lords held that there was no conflict between the EU Com-
mission’s decision finding infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU and the High Court’s 
finding to the contrary.146 Accordingly, the EU Commission’s decision ultimately was 
only part of the admissible evidence that the court took into account. If a similar – 
narrower – approach were to be followed by national courts in relation to competi-
tion authorities, then the question could arise whether the increased effectiveness of 
EU law enforcement would justify the introduction of the binding rule into national 
legal systems. In other words, the extent to which the binding rule would increase the 
effectiveness of EU antitrust law would have to be analysed. After all, it should not 
be forgotten that, according to the EU Commission’s study, all Member States at 
least recognise that decisions by a national competition authority, a national court or 
an authority from another Member State can be submitted as evidence in damages 
proceedings.147 Although, such a decision does not normally acquire the status of 
binding authority, it can be a persuasive authority. Therefore, it might appear that the 
level of effectiveness that the binding rule, if adopted, would achieve will not be 
much greater compared to the situation in the absence of the rule. 
In conclusion, in England and Slovenia decisions of NCAs already have a bind-
ing effect on national courts in civil matters. Based on the analyses conducted in 
chapters 5 and 6, English and Slovenian legal system would not be undermined if 
already existing rules of the binding effect of NCAs’ decisions were to extend to 
foreign decisions, as it was also proposed in the EU Commission’s proposed Direc-
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146  See section 5.9.2. 
147  Ashurst, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, published 
in August 2004, p. 69. 
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tive.148 Nevertheless, the question arises whether EU action in this regard is neces-
sary. Decisions of foreign national competition authorities are generally viewed as 
having high evidential value. By strengthening the role of the European Competition 
Network in ensuring consistency of antitrust decisions, the evidential value of NCAs’ 
decisions of foreign Member States is likely to increase. 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
Taking into account observations made in chapters 1, 2 and 3, from an EU perspec-
tive it is clear that greater importance should be given to private enforcement and it 
should be treated as complementary to public enforcement of EU competition rules. 
By addressing the key issues relevant for damages actions in the Green Paper and the 
White Paper, the EU Commission’s initiative to encourage and facilitate private en-
forcement of EU competition law across the EU is undeniably a step in the right 
direction. However, as the results of the research show, the EU Commission’s strat-
egy to create a “European legal framework” for antitrust damages actions goes a step 
too far. Harmonisation of certain national standards would be a disproportionate and 
unacceptable intervention into national procedural autonomy and would conflict with 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. At times the EU Commission has 
shown a tendency not to fully appreciate that EU-wide action is not always justified 
and national procedural autonomy is sufficient on its own to produce an effective 
enforcement system. From the analyses that were conducted in chapters 5 and 6, this 
is obviously the case for passing-on, limitation periods for stand-alone actions and 
costs. The introduction of the proposed measures into national legal systems is not 
only unjustified in terms of ‘achieving greater EU effectiveness’, but it would also 
involve unnecessary costs.  
It is necessary to conduct an in-depth examination of the existing legal structure 
under which antitrust damage actions operate before the introduction of a new meas-
ure. Only measures that are either consistent with the core features of national private 
law systems or provide a balance between the interests of the European law and the 
interests of private law can be used towards effective enforcement of EU competi-
tion law. Other measures might be seen as being effective from the point of view of 
private antitrust enforcement but the implementation of these measures is not justi-
fied. Private law is unsuitable for the task of private antitrust enforcement with re-
spect to the issues that such a group of measures aims to regulate. It should be 
stressed that any changes to national rules have to be made carefully, taking into ac-
count all the relevant issues. Otherwise the adoption of new legal rules and institu-
tions risks having a serious impact on all aspects of the national legal system. In some 
cases it is likely that EU harmonisation of one aspect of the law opens a ‘Pandora’s 
Box’ from a legal point of view. The civil rules in question tend to be closely linked to 
                                                        
148  Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
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other procedural or substantive rules of the national legal systems and cannot be 
applied in isolation.  
The English and Slovenian legal systems have been analysed in the context of the 
considerations described so far. The analyses drew attention to the private substan-
tive and procedural rules that were relevant to the issues addressed by the EU Com-
mission’s policy choices presented in the White Paper. These issues were considered 
as important starting points for addressing the current ineffectiveness of antitrust 
damages actions in the EU. The findings of chapters 5 and 6 were then taken into ac-
count when evaluating if private law can be used effectively in enforcing EU compe-
tition law. As it has been contested and upheld by arguments, EU action is certainly 
necessary with regard to certain issues in order to preserve the effectiveness of the 
system of the EU right to damages and effectiveness of EU law or it would add de-
monstrable value to the effectiveness of the system. 
With regard to the role of private law within a private antitrust enforcement sys-
tem, the EU Commission’s policy choices were divided into three main groups. The 
first group of the proposed measures – which involves actions that are consistent 
with private law, but their introduction into national law appears to be unnecessary – 
consists of punitive damages, presumption of passing-on and disclosure rules. In the 
second group – which refers to measures that are neither desirable nor appropriate – 
are passing-on, limitation periods for stand-alone actions and cost rules. Any attempt 
of the EU to harmonise national rules in this respect would be a far-reaching inter-
vention into the Member States’ national procedural autonomy, and would not ac-
cord with the principle of subsidiarity. With regards to this, no further action should 
be taken by the EU Commission. Finally, the third group consists of measures that 
might be inconsistent with the rules of national private law, but there are valid rea-
sons to interfere with these rules in order to establish an effective system of damage 
actions based on infringement of EU competition law. The group includes issues of 
legal standing, collective redress, pure economic loss, limitation periods for follow-on 
actions and the binding effect of the national competition authorities’ decisions. 
There exist good arguments to take these issues seriously. Here again it has to be 
stressed that the issues are included into this group based on the analyses of English 
and Slovenian legal systems. 
The conclusions outlined in this chapter therefore, can serve as a blueprint for 
the introduction of a system of antitrust damage actions on the basis of minimum 
harmonisation. On June 11, 2013 the Commission published a long-awaited draft Di-
rective on actions for damages,149 in which it put forward a series of proposals de-
signed to advance private antitrust damage and collective actions in Europe. The 
status of the proposed Directive is unclear. The proposed Directive will be discussed 
by the European Parliament and the EU Council. Although the consultation phase 
(following the White Paper) has already been long and extensive, given the contro-
versy and the impact that the proposed measures could have on national private law 
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and civil litigation rules, it is likely that the extensive discussions will continue for 
some time in both institutions. If the EU Commission wants to avoid a long ‘period 
of uncertainty’ and justify effective enforcement of antitrust damage actions, while at 
the same time looking for a balance with the established principles of tort and civil 
procedural law, then it should pay attention to the categories of subjects listed in 
section 7.4. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
In the last two decades there has been an increasing interest from policy makers in 
encouraging private enforcement of antitrust law within the European Union. The 
public enforcement system in which the EU Commission and national competition 
authorities have considerable investigative powers over potential infringements of 
antitrust law does not provide for compensation of losses incurred by victims. The 
redress of such losses falls within the domain of tort law, and the only possibility for 
individuals and companies to obtain compensation is to bring an action for damages 
before national civil courts where the national law of the Member States is applicable. 
According to the EU Commission, a better system of antitrust damages actions (pri-
vate antitrust enforcement) would not only be beneficial for potential claimants, but 
would also lead to a higher level of compliance with the competition rules. To en-
hance the effectiveness of the right of the victims to claim damages, the EU Com-
mission presented, first in the Green Paper and later in the White Paper, a number of 
policy suggestions and specific measures aimed at encouraging damage actions. It is 
expected that the introduction of these measures into the national legal systems of 
the Member States would reduce the differences that exist between the Member 
States in the sense of national rules governing actions for damages. 
The thesis seeks to analyse and understand the applications of the policy sugges-
tions and contributes to the research on encouragement of private antitrust enforce-
ment within the EU. It aims to provide the analysis by taking into account the private 
law aspects of antitrust damage actions in England and Slovenia and carrying out an 
in-depth examination of the existing legal structure under which antitrust damage 
actions can be brought. Adoption of measures aimed at enforcing antitrust provisions 
in national legal systems is closely linked to civil procedural or particular substantive 
rules of legal systems. The introduction or removal of a particular institution risks 
going against the core features of national private law systems.  
The research on the question whether the EU Commission’s measures presented 
in the White Paper should be upheld does not wholly support an affirmative answer. 
When it comes to the issues of passing-on, limitation periods for stand-alone actions 
and cost rules, the national legal systems already have mechanisms in place to deal 
with the issues that the measures proposed by the EU Commission are supposed to 
address. In cases of punitive damages, presumption of passing-on and disclosure 
rules, the intervention in the Member States’ civil and procedural law is not justified 
as the interests of EU law do not balance the interests of private law. Only measures 
that are either consistent with the core features of national private law systems or 
those which provide a balance between the interests of the European law and the 
interests of private law can be used to obtain effective enforcement of EU competi-
tion law. These are measures on legal standing, collective redress, pure economic loss, 
limitation periods for follow-on actions and the binding effect of national competi-
tion authorities’ decisions. In these cases it has been found that private law is unsuit-
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able for the task of private antitrust enforcement with respect to the issues that such 
a group of measures aims to regulate.  
The subject of the thesis is divided into two parts. The first part (Chapters 2, 3 
and 4) provides the background for the rest of the thesis and builds the case for an 
effective system of private enforcement of EU competition law. The second part of 
the thesis (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) is dedicated to the examination of the national legal 
rules that are applicable to antitrust damage actions.  
Chapter 2 represents the theoretical basis for the private enforcement of EU 
competition law and supports the belief that action by competition authorities and 
damages claims should complement each other. The benefits of private enforcement 
correspond to the weaknesses of public enforcement, and the advantages of public 
enforcement correspond to the weaknesses of private enforcement of EU antitrust 
law. In addition, Chapter 2 contains an analysis of the developments that have taken 
place at the EU level in this regard. For a long time enforcement of the EU competi-
tion rules was seen as the responsibility of the EU Commission (and national compe-
tition authorities). More than fifty years after the Treaty of Rome this conviction 
changed both at EU and the national level of the Member States. With the adoption 
of Regulation 1/2003 damage actions became an important pillar of the enforcement 
system of EU competition law. They compensate those who have been harmed by 
anticompetitive behaviour but they also contribute to the overall level of deterrence 
generated by the competition regime.  
In order to get a complete overview of the private enforcement system of EU 
competition law, Chapter 3 is concerned with an exploration of the basic rules and 
doctrines governing the relationship between EU and national law in the sphere of 
claims brought to protect EU rights, such as the principle of national procedural 
autonomy and its limitations in regard to the principle of effectiveness and equiva-
lence, the principle of direct effect and the right to compensation as a means of law 
enforcement. Special attention is given to the developments of the most important 
case law of the CJEU in the area of private antitrust enforcement, in particular the 
well-known cases of Courage and Manfredi, in which the CJEU irrefutably laid down 
the principle of EU law-based right to damages for violations of Articles 101 or 102 
TFEU. Also the CJEU’s subsequent judgements in Pfleiderer and Otis reveal a clear 
EU policy in favour of private antitrust enforcement and damages actions specifically. 
The analysis conducted in Chapter 3 leads to the conclusion that from the EU point 
of view it is clear that greater importance should be given to private enforcement and 
it should be treated as being complementary to public enforcement of the EU com-
petition rules. The CJEU’s rulings provided the EU Commission with an incentive to 
promote damage actions for breach of EU antitrust rules. Against this background, 
the EU Commission published the Green Paper, followed by the White Paper in 
which it identified fundamental issues that are likely to facilitate or discourage private 
antitrust litigation and therefore are critical to the success of effective private en-
forcement systems in Europe.  
Chapter 4 is an analysis of the policy suggestions and specific measures presented 
by the EU Commission in the White Paper. It starts with specific competition law-
connected issue of indirect purchasers’ standing and discussion on collective redress 
mechanisms. It continues with presentation of measures on the access to evidence 
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through inter parties disclosure, modifications of limitation periods, costs of damages 
actions, the definition of damages and a fault requirement. Furthermore, the policy 
choices in relation to specific competition law-connected issues, such as standing for 
indirect purchasers, availability of the passing-on defence, the issues relating to the 
interaction between leniency programmes and damages actions, are addressed. From 
the EU perspective, the suggested measures would contribute towards overcoming 
the limitations of the existing antitrust enforcement system.  
Following chapters 2, 3 and 4, in which the discussion centres on the European 
point of view, the focus in chapters 5, 6 and 7 moves to a national perspective. In 
particular, the English legal provisions that apply to EU antitrust damage actions are 
presented in Chapter 5. Here the discussion in Chapter 4 provides the point of depar-
ture, as the issues presented in the Chapter 4 are considered as being relevant in the 
context of competition litigation based on EU law. It is also demonstrated in Chapter 
5 that a number of the EU Commission’s proposed procedural measures are already 
present in the English legal system, including the binding force of final decisions of 
the UK competition authorities, a two year limitation period for follow-on actions 
and a system of collective redress mechanisms. Although England is considered to be 
at the forefront of developments in private enforcement of competition law in 
Europe, issues exist in the English system in the context of private enforcement. 
Characterisation of right to EU antitrust damages as ‘breach of statutory duty’, re-
strictive rules that apply to redress of ‘pure economic might make it difficult for cer-
tain antitrust victims to bring a claim. As a consequence, the effectiveness of EU 
competition law is endangered in these cases. 
The measures discussed in the Chapter 4 also play a key role throughout Chapter 
6 and form the basis for addressing the state of private enforcement in Slovenia and 
the scope for its further development by changing the national tort and civil proce-
dural rules. Although the enforcement system of EU antitrust rules to some extent is 
based on EU provisions, the private pillar of antitrust enforcement in Slovenia has 
not been well developed (as yet) as there are hardly any cases on issues connected 
with infringements of competition law. Despite the lack of judgments with regard to 
civil damages claims, the analysis has shown that the legal framework of private en-
forcement of antitrust law provides for several of the enforcement elements to deal 
consistently with private suits. First, in order to facilitate antitrust damage actions 
(initiated by the EU) certain specific procedural mechanism had been already put in 
place in Slovenia. This includes the binding effect of national competition authorities’ 
decisions and limitation rules for follow-on actions. Second, the existing Slovenian 
civil law and civil procedure rules, in principle, do not present a serious hurdle to 
private enforcement in Slovenia when it comes to standing rules, rules of evidence 
and binding effect of competition authorities’ decisions. The area where the Slove-
nian civil law rules present an obstacle to the development of a system of private 
competition litigation is that of collective redress. The existing mechanisms that are 
available to courts when dealing with multi-party actions have developed in the realm 
of general civil procedural legislation and are limited and to a certain extent impracti-
cal for competition damage cases (as the analysis carried out in the chapter shows). 
Finally, Chapter 7 is a concluding discussion of the findings from Chapters 5 and 
6, in addition to the final conclusions of the research. A list of recommendations that 
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should be addressed by the EU is given. The list of recommendations is arrived at by 
classifying the measures proposed by the EU Commission in the White Paper into 
three groups, and analysing each of the issues in a group. The first group of the pro-
posed measures involves actions that are consistent with private law, but their intro-
duction into national law is unnecessary. Included in this group are recommendations 
on passing-on, limitation periods for stand-alone actions and costs. The second group 
includes measures that are neither desirable nor appropriate (‘no go area’). This group 
contains propositions on punitive (double) damages, presumption of passing-on and 
disclosure. The third group consists of measures that might be inconsistent with the 
rules of national private law, but there are well-founded reasons to interfere with 
these rules – the recommendations on legal standing, collective redress mechanisms, 
pure economic loss and limitation periods for follow-on actions. When it comes to 
indirect purchaser’s standing the action at the EU level is indispensable, even though 
some Member States (Slovenia) already provide mechanisms whereby both the direct 
purchaser the indirect purchaser can claim damages. The problem exists in the Mem-
ber States, in particular in England,1 where legal provisions that directly impede indi-
rect purchasers’ claims are in place. From the analysis provided in the thesis it 
emerges that the principles of effectiveness and equivalence (Rewe test) are not suffi-
cient on their own to produce an effective tool in terms of enforcement of EU law. 
The EU Commission’s aim in the White Paper is to provide for effective means to 
exercise the right to compensation of harm suffered as a result of an antitrust in-
fringement. To make it possible, first of all it is necessary to ensure – without any 
uncertainty – that in all Member States it is open to ‘any individual’ to claim damages 
for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort compe-
tition. 
In order to improve access to justice and thus the efficiency of civil litigation it is 
crucial to establish a new or improved collective redress mechanism for cases in 
which the individual claims are too small to be individually enforced. However, the 
analysis in Chapter 7 suggests that the need for collective redress mechanisms does 
not justify an introduction of the legal rules that would contravene established princi-
ples of civil litigation. Moreover, the debate on an opt-in or an opt-out system of 
collective redress has less to do with access to justice and more with questions of 
notification and effective gathering of individual claims. Therefore, the decision on an 
opt-in or an opt-out regime has to be left to an individual Member State. 
Pure economic loss is another issue where the civil law approach to the concept 
of recoverable damages risks having a serious impact on the effectiveness of EU 
antitrust law. Exclusion of the possibility of obtaining reparation for ‘pure economic 
loss’ (in the form of lost profit) is a serious handicap for claims brought for antitrust 
infringement, since competition law violations generally result in pure economic loss. 
Therefore an action at the EU level is necessary when it comes to pure economic 
loss. 
Another issue that needs to be regulated at the EU level is limitation periods for 
follow-on actions. Limitation rules applied in civil damage actions are general rules 
                                                        
1  Properly speaking, it is the UK that is a Member State of the EU. England is only part of the UK.  
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and therefore they do not address this specific problem related to competition law. In 
order to preserve the possibility of a follow-on action and therefore ensure legal cer-
tainty and the effectiveness of EU antitrust rules, a new rule should be established 
preventing the expiry of limitation period while public proceedings are ongoing.  
The conclusions outlined in Chapter 7 therefore can serve as a blueprint for the 
introduction of a system of antitrust damage actions on the basis of minimum har-
monisation. It was anticipated at the time of publication of the White Paper that it 
would be followed by the publication of the EU Commission’s draft Directive on 
damages for breach of EU competition law. Only recently, on June 11th 2013, after 
the research for this thesis had been completed, the EU Commission issued a belated 
draft Directive on private antitrust damage actions in which it proposed a non-
binding recommendation on collective redress mechanisms. The main reason for the 
EU Commission’s belated response regarding the development of the system of pri-
vate antitrust enforcement is the reluctance of the Member States to introduce the 
EU Commission’s proposed measures into national rules of tort and procedure law. 
In order to avoid long and arduous discussions in the European Parliament and the 
EU Council, and therefore a long ‘period of uncertainty’, attention should be paid to 
the categories of subjects listed in Chapter 7. In this way the effective enforcement of 
antitrust damage actions would be justified, while at the same time the balance with 
the established principles of tort and civil procedural law would be maintained. 
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Gedurende de afgelopen twintig jaar is de aandacht van beleidsmakers in toenemende 
mate uitgegaan naar het aanmoedigen van de privaatrechtelijke handhaving van de 
mededingingswetgeving binnen de Europese Unie. Het publiekrechtelijke handha-
vingssysteem, waarbinnen de Europese Commissie en de nationale mededingingsau-
toriteiten aanzienlijke onderzoeksmacht hebben met betrekking tot mogelijke over-
tredingen van de mededingingswetgeving, voorziet onvoldoende in de mogelijkheid 
tot vergoeding van de door benadelden geleden schade. De beantwoording van de 
vraag naar de vergoedbaarheid van dergelijke schade moet worden beantwoord aan 
de hand van het onrechtmatige daadsrecht (‘Tort Law’). De enige mogelijkheid voor 
particulieren (individuen en bedrijven) om schadevergoeding te krijgen, is het starten 
van een daarop gerichte procedure bij de nationale burgerlijke rechter. Op deze vor-
dering is grotendeels nationaal recht van toepassing Volgens de Europese Commissie 
zou een beter systeem voor mededingingprocedures (privaatrechtelijke handhaving 
van mededingingsrecht) ten goede komen van potentiële schuldeisers, en bovendien 
zou een dergelijk systeem leiden tot een hoger niveau van naleving van de mededin-
gingsregels.  
Om de effectiviteit van het recht op vergoeding van schade te vergroten, heeft de 
Europese Commissie eerst in het Groenboek en later in het Witboek een aantal be-
leidsvoorstellen en specifieke maatregelen voorgesteld welke gericht zijn op de aan-
moediging van het vorderen van schadevergoeding. Naar verwachting zal de intro-
ductie van deze maatregelen in de nationale systemen van de Lidstaten leiden tot een 
afname van de tussen de Lidstaten bestaande verschillen in de op de schadevergoe-
dingsvordering van toepassing zijnde regels. 
In dit onderzoek worden de beleidsvoorstellen geanalyseerd. Gepoogd wordt een 
bijdrage te leveren aan het onderzoek naar de stimulering van de privaatrechtelijke 
handhaving van het mededingingsrecht binnen de Europese Unie. Rechtsvergelijkend 
onderzoek is gedaan naar de privaatrechtelijke aspecten van schadevorderingen met 
betrekking tot mededingingsrecht in Engeland en Slovenië. De aanpassing van de 
maatregelen die gericht zijn op de handhaving van de mededingingsbepalingen in 
nationale wetsystemen is nauw verbonden met burgerlijkprocesrechtelijke en speci-
fieke materiële regels van de nationale rechtsstelsels. De introductie of het schrappen 
van een specifieke regel houdt het risico in dat men ingaat tegen de kernelementen 
van nationale privaatrechtelijke rechtssystemen.  
De vraag of de maatregelen van de Europese Commissie zoals aangegeven in het 
Witboek gehandhaafd dienen te worden, kan op grond van dit onderzoek niet slechts 
positief beantwoord worden. Wanneer het gaat om zaken als doorberekening, verja-
ringsperioden voor ‘stand-alone actions’ en kostenregels, zijn de onderzochte natio-
nale wetsystemen al voorzien van mechanismen voor het omgaan met zaken zoals 
bedoeld door de Europese Commissie. In gevallen van ‘punitive damages’ (bestraf-
fende schadevergoeding), vermoeden van ‘passing-on’ (doorbereking), en regels voor 
openbaarmaking, is het ingrijpen in het civiele en procedurele recht van de beide 
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onderzochte Lidstaten niet gerechtvaardigd aangezien de belangen van het recht van 
de Europese Unie niet in evenwicht zijn met de belangen van het daar geldende bur-
gerlijk recht. Alleen maatregelen die ofwel in overeenstemming zijn met de kernele-
menten van de desbetreffende nationale burgerrechtelijke systemen ofwel rechtssys-
temen welke voorzien in een evenwicht tussen de belangen van de Unierechtelijke 
maatregel en de belangen van burgerlijk recht kunnen gebruikt worden voor de effec-
tieve handhaving van Europees mededingingsrecht. Dit betreft maatregelen op een 
juridische basis, collectief schadeverhaal, zuivere vermogensschade, verjaringsperio-
des voor ‘follow-on actions’ en het bindende effect van besluiten van de landelijke 
mededingingsautoriteiten. In deze gevallen is gebleken dat de beide onderzochte stel-
sels van burgerlijk recht ongeschikt zijn voor de taak van privaatrechtelijke mededin-
gingshandhaving.  
Dit onderzoek bestaat uit twee delen. Ten behoeve van het in het tweede deel 
van dit werk verrichte onderzoek, beschrijft het eerste deel (hoofdstuk 2, 3 en 4) de 
achtergronden van het onderwerp. Het bevat een opzet voor een effectief systeem 
van privaatrechtelijke handhaving van Europese mededingingswetgeving. Het tweede 
deel van het onderzoek (hoofdstuk 5, 6 en 7) is gewijd aan de bestudering van de in 
Engeland en Slovenië geldende nationale rechtsregels die van toepassing zijn op 
schadeprocedures met betrekking tot de mededinging.  
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de theoretische basis voor de privaatrechtelijke handhaving 
van de Europese mededingingswetgeving beschreven. Deze beschrijving ondersteunt 
de overtuiging dat procedures van mededingingsautoriteiten en schadeclaims elkaar 
moeten aanvullen. De voordelen van privaatrechtelijke handhaving zijn complemen-
tair aan de zwakheden van publiekrechtelijke handhaving en de voordelen van pu-
bliekrechtelijke handhaving zijn complementair aan de zwakheiden van privaatrechte-
lijke handhaving van de Unierechtelijke mededingingswetgeving. Daarnaast bevat 
hoofdstuk 2 een analyse van de ontwikkelingen die in dit opzicht op Europees niveau 
hebben plaatsgevonden. Gedurende lange tijd werd de naleving van de Unierechtelij-
ke mededingingsregels gezien als verantwoordelijkheid van de Europese Commissie 
(en de landelijke mededingingsautoriteiten). Meer dan vijftig jaar na het Verdrag van 
Rome veranderde deze overtuiging zowel op Europees niveau als op het nationale 
niveau van de Lidstaten. Met de aanpassing van Verordening 1/2003 werden schade-
procedures in rechtsverhoudingen tussen particulieren een belangrijke pijler in het 
handhavingsysteem van het Europese Mededingingsrecht. Indien een vordering 
wordt toegewezen, krijgt degene die schade heeft geleden als gevolg van gedrag dat in 
strijd is met het mededingingsrecht, die schade vergoed. Ook verhoogt de mogelijk-
heid dat particulieren elkaar aansprakelijk houden het niveau van afschrikking die het 
mededingingregime beoogt te bewerkstelligen.  
Om een volledig beeld te krijgen van het privaatrechtelijke handhavingsysteem 
van het mededingingsrecht van de EU, wordt in hoofdstuk 3 ingegaan op de verken-
ning van de basisdoctrines en regels die de relatie tussen het recht van de Europese 
Unie en het nationaal recht bepalen op het gebied van claims ten behoeve van de 
bescherming van EU rechten. Daarbij valt te denken aan het principe van nationale 
procedurele autonomie en haar principiële beperkingen ten aanzien van effectiviteit 
en gelijkwaardigheid, het principe van direct effect en het recht op compensatie als 
middel van wetshandhaving. Speciale aandacht wordt gegeven aan de ontwikkelingen 
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van de belangrijkste jurisprudentie van het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie op 
het gebied van privaatrechtelijke handhaving van mededingingsrecht, met name de 
welbekende zaken van Courage en Manfredi, waarbij het Europese Hof het principe 
van het op de EU gebaseerde recht op schadevergoeding in geval van overtreding van 
artikelen 101 of 102 VEU onweerlegbaar heeft vastgelegd. Ook de daaropvolgende 
uitspraken van het Europese Hof met betrekking tot Pfleiderer en Otis laten een 
duidelijk EU-beleid zien ten gunste van mededingingshandhaving en schadeprocedu-
res in het bijzonder. De analyse die in hoofdstuk 3 wordt uitgevoerd leidt tot de con-
clusie dat de Europese Unie meent dat er meer belang gehecht dient te worden aan 
de privaatrechtelijke handhaving en dat zij behandeld dient te worden als ware zij 
complementair aan publiekrechtelijke handhaving van de mededingwetgeving van de 
EU. De uitspraken van het Europese Hof van Justitie gaven de Commissie een sti-
mulans om schadeprocedures bij de overtreding van mededingingsregels te bevorde-
ren. Tegen deze achtergrond publiceerde de Europese Commissie het Groenboek, 
gevolgd door het Witboek waarmee zij fundamentele zaken identificeerde die moge-
lijk de privaatrechtelijke handhaving van mededingingswetgeving faciliteren of schen-
ding daarvan ontmoedigen, en die daarom van groot belang zijn voor het succes van 
effectieve privaatrechtelijke handhavingsystemen in Europa.  
Hoofdstuk 4 bestaat uit een analyse van de beleidsvoorstellen en specifieke maat-
regelen die in het Witboek door de Europese Commissie gepresenteerd zijn. Het 
begint met het specifieke met de mededingingswet in verband staande aspect van de 
positie van de indirecte koper en bespreking van collectieve verhaalmechanismen. 
Daarna volgt een presentatie van maatregelen omtrent toegang tot bewijs middels 
inter parties bekendmaking, aanpassingen van verjaringperiodes, kosten van schade-
procedures, de definiëring van verliezen en een schuldvereiste. Voorts worden de be-
leidskeuzes besproken ten aanzien van specifieke aspecten van de mededingingswet-
geving zoals de positie van indirecte verkopers, de beschikbaarheid van de ‘passing-
on defence’, en de interactie tussen clementieregelingen en schadeprocedures. Vol-
gens de Commissie zouden de voorgestelde maatregelen bijdragen aan het overwin-
nen van de beperkingen van het bestaande handhavingsysteem van mededingings-
wetgeving.  
Na hoofdstuk 2, 3 en 4, waarin de bespreking gericht is op het Europese perspec-
tief, verschuift de focus in hoofdstuk 5, 6 en 7 naar een nationaal perspectief. De 
Engelse regelingen die van toepassing zijn op EU schadeprocedures met betrekking 
tot mededinging worden gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 5. Hiervoor vormt de bespre-
king in hoofdstuk 4 het uitgangspunt aangezien de zaken die in hoofdstuk 4 gepre-
senteerd worden gezien worden als van belang binnen de context van mededingings-
wetgeving gebaseerd op EU wetgeving. Ook wordt in hoofdstuk 5 aangetoond dat 
een aantal van de procedurele maatregelen die voorgesteld zijn door de Europese 
Commissie al in het Engelse rechtssysteem aanwezig zijn, zoals de bindende kracht 
van de eindbeslissingen van mededingingsautoriteiten in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, 
een verjaringstermijn van twee jaar voor ‘follow-up actions’ en een systeem voor col-
lectieve vergoedingsmechanismen. Hoewel Engeland gezien wordt als koploper van 
de ontwikkelingen voor de privaatrechtelijke handhaving van mededingingsrecht in 
Europa, zijn er problematische onderwerpen in het Engelse systeem in de context 
van privaatrechtelijke handhaving. Het karakteriseren van het recht op schadevergoe-
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ding in verband met mededinging binnen de EU als ‘overtreding van wettelijke ver-
plichting’ en beperkende maatregelen die van toepassing zijn op compensatie van 
‘zuivere vermogensschade’ kunnen het voor bepaalde mededingingsslachtoffers lastig 
maken een claim in te dienen. Als gevolg daarvan komt de effectiviteit van de mede-
dingingswetgeving in de EU in deze gevallen in gevaar. 
De maatregelen die besproken worden in hoofdstuk 4 spelen ook een belangrijke 
rol in hoofdstuk 6, en vormen de basis voor de bespreking van de staat van de privaat-
rechtelijke handhaving in Slovenië en de richting van verdere ontwikkelingen door 
veranderingen in de regels die gelden voor onrechtmatige daden (Tort Law) en de 
burgerlijk procesrechtelijke regelgeving. Waar het handhavingssysteem van de mede-
dingingswetgeving in de EU tot op zekere hoogte gebaseerd is op bepalingen van de 
EU, is niet vast te stellen of de privaatrechtelijke pijler van de antitrust handhaving in 
Slovenië (nog) niet goed ontwikkeld is omdat er vrijwel geen procedures zijn in ver-
band met overtreding van mededingingsrecht. Ondanks het ontbreken van gerechte-
lijke uitspraken met betrekking tot civiele schadeclaims, heeft de analyse aangetoond 
dat het wettelijke kader van privaatrechtelijke handhaving van mededingingswetge-
ving voorziet in verschillende handhavingelementen teneinde consistent met privaat-
rechtelijke rechtszaken om te gaan. Ten eerste: bepaalde specifieke procedurele me-
chanismen waarmee de schadeprocedures bij mededinging kunnen worden gefacili-
teerd, zijn in Slovenië reeds geldend. Hieronder vallen ook het bindende effect van 
besluiten van de nationale mededingingsautoriteiten en de beperkende regels voor 
‘follow-on actions’. Ten tweede: het bestaande Sloveense civiele recht en de civiele 
procedures vormen in principe geen serieuze horde voor privaatrechtelijke handha-
ving in Slovenië als het gaat om regels met betrekking tot positie, bewijsregels en het 
bindende effect van de besluiten van mededingingsautoriteiten. Het gebied beheerst 
door het Sloveense burgerrecht ten aanzien van collectieve schadeprocedures vormt 
een obstakel voor de ontwikkeling van een systeem van privaatrechtelijke mededin-
gingswetgeving. De bestaande mechanismen die beschikbaar zijn voor de rechtban-
ken wanneer het gaat om procedures van meerdere partijen hebben zich ontwikkeld 
in het gebied van algemene civiele procedurele wetgeving en zijn beperkt en tot op 
zekere hoogte niet praktisch voor schadeprocedures op het gebied van mededinging 
(dit wordt aangetoond met de analyse in het hoofdstuk). 
Uiteindelijk bestaat hoofdstuk 7 uit een bespreking van de feiten uit hoofdstuk 5 en 
6, als toevoeging op de eindconclusies van dit onderzoek. Een lijst van aanbevelingen 
wordt geschetst die de EU zou moeten behandelen. De lijst van aanbevelingen is tot 
stand gekomen door de door de Europese Commissie in het Witboek beschreven 
maatregelen te classificeren in drie groepen, en elk van de aspecten in een groep te 
evalueren. De eerste groep van voorgestelde maatregelen betreft zaken die overeen-
komen met privaatrecht, en waarvan de introductie in nationale wetgeving niet nodig 
is. In deze groep vallen aanbevelingen omtrent doorberekening, verjaringsperiodes 
voor ‘stand-alone actions’ en kosten. De tweede groep bevat maatregelen die gewenst 
noch geschikt zijn (‘no go area’). Deze groep omvat voorstellen voor strafvergoedin-
gen (dubbele schade), veronderstelling van ‘passing-on’ en openbaarmaking. De der-
de groep bestaat uit maatregelen die inconsistent kunnen zijn met de regels van natio-
naal privaatrecht, maar waarvoor gegronde redenen zijn ze toch te aanvaarden: de 
aanbevelingen voor wettelijke positie, collectieve schadevergoedingsmechanismen, 
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zuivere vermogensschade en verjaringsperiodes voor ‘follow-on actions’. Wanneer 
het gaat om de positie van de indirecte koper is actie op EU niveau onontkoombaar, 
hoewel sommige Lidstaten (Slovenië) al voorzien in een mechanisme waarbij zowel 
de directe als de indirecte koper schadevergoeding kan claimen. Het probleem bestaat 
in de Lidstaten, vooral in Engeland,1 waar wettelijke bepalingen gelden die recht-
streeks de claims van de indirecte koper verhinderen. Uit de analyse in dit onderzoek 
blijkt dat de beginselen van effectiviteit en gelijkwaardigheid (Rewe test) op zichzelf 
niet voldoende zijn om een effectief middel te leveren voor handhaving van EU wet-
geving. Het doel van de Europese Commissie in het Witboek is te voorzien in effec-
tieve maatregelen om het recht op compensatie uit te oefenen ten aanzien van nadeel 
ontstaan door een overtreding van mededingingsregels. Om dit mogelijk te maken is 
het ten eerste noodzakelijk ervoor te zorgen dat ieder individu in alle Lidstaten zon-
der twijfel schadevergoeding kan eisen voor schade die hij heeft geleden door een 
contract of een gedraging die de mededinging beperkt of verstoort. 
Teneinde de toegang tot rechtspleging en dus de effectiviteit van civiele wetge-
ving te verbeteren is het van cruciaal belang een nieuw of verbeterd collectief ver-
haalmechanisme in te stellen voor zaken waarin de individuele claims te klein zijn om 
individueel ingesteld te worden. De analyse in hoofdstuk 7 suggereert echter dat de 
behoefte aan een collectief verhaalsmechanisme niet rechtvaardigt dat de introductie 
van de juridische regels in strijd zijn met de beginselen van burgerlijk recht. Daarbij 
komt dat de discussie omtrent een collectief verhaalsmechanisme gebaseerd op een 
opt-in of opt-out systeem, niet zozeer te maken heeft met toegang tot rechtspleging 
maar meer met kwesties betreffende informatie en het effectief verzamelen van indi-
viduele claims. Daarom dient het besluit tot een opt-in of opt-out regime overgelaten 
te worden aan de individuele Lidstaat.  
Zuivere vermogensschade is een ander voorbeeld van een situatie waarin de ci-
vielrechtelijke benadering van het begrip van verhaalbare schade het risico in zich 
draagt de effectiviteit te bedreigen van de Unierechtelijke mededingingswetgeving. 
Uitsluiting van de mogelijkheid om compensatie te krijgen voor zuivere vermogens-
schade (bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van winstderving) is een serieuze handicap voor 
claims ingediend in verband met mededingingsovertreding, aangezien overtredingen 
van mededingingswetgeving meestal (uitsluitend) resulteren in zuivere vermogens-
schade. Daarom is, althans voor een aantal van de privaatrechtelijke stelsels van de 
Lidstaten, actie op EU niveau nodig wanneer het gaat om zuivere vermogensschade. 
Een ander onderwerp dat op EU niveau gereguleerd dient te worden is de verja-
ringsperiode voor ‘follow-on’ acties. Verjaringsregels gebruikt in civiele schadeproce-
dures zijn algemene regels en daarom wordt daarmee niet het specifieke probleem 
met betrekking tot de mededingingswet aangepakt. Teneinde de mogelijkheid van een 
‘follow-on’ actie te behouden en daarmee te zorgen voor juridische zekerheid en de 
effectiviteit van de EU antitrust regels, zou een nieuwe regel vastgesteld dienen te 
worden waarmee het verlopen van de verjaringsperiode voorkomen wordt wanneer 
de publiekrechtelijke procedure nog loopt.  
                                                        
1  Eigenlijk is het Verenigd Koninkrijk een Lidstaat van de EU. Engeland is slechts onderdeel van het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk.  
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De conclusies weergegeven in hoofdstuk 7 kunnen daarom als blauwdruk funge-
ren voor de introductie van een systeem van mededingingschadeprocedures op basis 
van minimum harmonisatie. Ten tijde van de publicatie van het Witboek werd ver-
wacht dat dit gevolgd zou worden door publicatie van de concept Richtlijn voor scha-
de bij overtreding van EU mededingingswetgeving. Kort geleden nog, op 11 juni 
2013, nadat het onderhavige onderzoek afgerond was, heeft de Europese Commissie 
een verlaat concept Richtlijn gepubliceerd omtrent privaatrechtelijke mededingings-
chadeprocedures waarin de Commissie een niet-bindende aanbeveling van collectieve 
verhaalsmechanismen voorstelt. De belangrijkste reden voor de verlate reactie van de 
Europese Commissie ten aanzien van de ontwikkeling van het systeem van privaat-
rechtelijke handhaving van de mededinging is de aversie van de Lidstaten om de door 
de Europese Commissie voorgestelde maatregelen te introduceren in de nationale re-
gels voor onrechtmatige daden (Tort Law) en in het procesrecht. Om lange en moei-
zame discussies in het Europese Parlement en de Europese Raad (en daarmee een 
lange periode van onzekerheid) te vermijden dient aandacht te worden geschonken 
aan de categorieën van onderwerpen aangegeven in hoofdstuk 7. Op deze wijze zou 
de effectieve handhaving van mededingingsschadeprocedures gerechtvaardigd zijn, 
terwijl tegelijkertijd het evenwicht met de bestaande principes van onrechtmatige 
daden (Tort Law) en civiel procesrecht behouden blijft.  
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